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ABSTRACT
The dissertation is examines how traditional governors and feedback devices becanle formally
integrated into engineering and how modem control theory emerged and contributed to
computers and ideas of information. The first half of the study traces four separate threads
--~--------~--------------------between_~lSt16 __.and__l.9A_O_:_~_fire __contrClLin_the__NayY_Bllr~u ofp~~tn~_~~_~d i!~_~QJ1~.!~c:!Qr~~(t~~.
Ford Instrument Company, Arma, and General Electric); feedback engineering at the Sperry
Company; communications engineering and feedback amplifiers at Bell Telephone Laboratories;
power system engineering and differential analyzers in the Electrical Engineering department of
lvfIT- each worked with a distinct concept of "system," depending on their technical Cllld
institutional goals. From these distinct ideas of systems flowed separate conceptions of feedbac~
stability, control, and the human role in operating technical systems.
The second part of the study begins in 1940 and covers World War II. The National Defense
Research Committee (NDRC), founded by Vannevar Bush in 1940, included a division devoted to
fire control, Section D-2, later called Division 7. This committee subsumed much of the pre-war
work in control systems and let contracts which developed a broad array of automatic controls,
systems, and theory. These included directors, predictors, radar-controlled devices, and
psychological models of human operators. The NDRC's fire control work was supervised and
coordinated by representatives from the four threads discussed above: the Navy, Bell Labs,
Sperry, lvfIT, among others. Diverse notions of systems and control conflicted and fused amid the
frenetic and creative atmosphere of wartime technology.
Several important contributors to early computing, including Jay Forrester, Norbert Wiener,
Claude Shannon, and George Stibitz, participated in \"artime work on control systems. Their
jdeas and experiences gav~ rise, through varying routes, to the large command, controi, and
information systems which characterized the era of nuclear standoffand remain in place today.
The world these systems created, and their technological politics, contributed to the sense of
alienation and powerlessness from which gave rise to critiques of technological society. Thus the
cultural dilemma of technology out ofcontrol responded to the pelVasiveness of technolOgies of
control.
Thesis Supenrisor: Merritt Roe Smith
Title: Leverett HoweU and William King Cutten Professor of the History ofTechnology
Director, Program in Science, Technology, and Society, MlT
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
As the child of a writer and an engineer, I came to this topic thrcugh a number of routes. In my
work at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution with manned submersibles with remote and
autonomous robots, I began to see that "automation" was never as simple as replacing a human
function with a machine. Unexpected benefits and disadvantages always became apparent after the
fact. I've also always been fascinated by the animism of things, especially machines. For me, the
thrill ofengineering involved breathing spirit into dead matter, usually with feedback loops or
computers. Literature and mythology, from Pinocchio to Robocop, Joyce to Pyncho~ often
articulates the issues at stake. I want to show similar forces at work in engineering practice. My
study of literature sparked an interest in cultural criticism, but I've always fou;.d it frustrating:
when cultural critics address technology, even military technology, they seem hesitant to go below
the surface, to study the creation of machines in concert with their representations. In
technological practice, however, I find a rich interplay of perception, language, and autonomy.
The reader will note my deep debt to Thomas Pynchon and Gravity's Rainbow, the subject afmy
undergraduate thesis. While I do not discuss the book here, it lurks below the surface, and
certainly helps frame my questions. Much of the control technology I discuss deals with ballistic
trajectories; at one point even to counter the V-I and V-2 missiles. Hence, one might consider the
subject "gravity's other rainbow."
As Bruno Latour points out, any seemingly pure space of knowledge is always defined and
supported by an extensive social network. The years I devoted to this study owe to a number of
individuals and instittltions. Three years ofgraduate school were supported by a gradu1!te
-- --- -fellowslUp--frollflhe-Natio-n-al-Sciena--Foundation~--l--conceptualized the dissertation on-an--
extended teaching visit to the History of Science and Technology Department at the Royal
Institute ofTechnology in Sweden. The trip gave me ample time to think and read, as well as
many valuable conversations with Svante Linquist and Mats Fridlund. Several archivists were
particularly helpful in uncovering material: Helen Samuels, Elizabeth Hutchins and the staff at the
MlT Archives, Sheldon Hochheiser at the AT&T Archives, Michael Nash and Barbara Hall at the
Hagley Museum and Library, and Marjory Ciarlante at the National Archives. The Dibner Fund
and the Kelley Fund generously supported travel for archival research. John Sumida allowed me
to copy material from his personal library of fire control documents for Chapter 2. Ron Kline
generously loaned me copies of archival material from AT&T. Paul Ceruzzi entrusted me with his
rye copy of George Stibitz's memoir. The final year of writing was greatly enhanced by a
graduate fellowship at the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology, which
provided financial support but much more: beautiful facilities, intere~;ted colleagues, and an
environment most conducive to thinking and writing. I must also thank the STS Department at
MlT; its staff: especially Judith Stein, Graham Rumsay, Debbie Meinbresse, and Sarah Trautman,
made five years ofgraduate school a daily pleasure. No small number of colleagues have endured
Iny ravings, read pieces of the draft, and pushed me to be clear. They include: Atsushi Akera, Ed
Eigen, Robert Friedel, Rebecca Herzig, Michael Mahoney, Jennifer Mnookin, Bob Post, and John
Sumida. My mentors, in the form afmy thesis committee,. Tom Hughes, Leo Marx, Tom
Sheridan, Roe Smit~ and who, each in their own way, through their work, their teaching, and
their examples, shaped my fonnulation of this study and my identity as a ocholar.
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I IT',ust also acknowledge the memory of James Snead, my undergraduate mentor in literature,
who first suggested I might be a humanist as well as an engineer, and 'who directed me to MIT.
His tragic early death pains me often, but his voice echoes in my work. This study is partly in
conversation with him.
My brother, Joe Mindell, has been a COMdante and colleague for man.y, many years. In a sense, he
will understand this work better than anyone. He and his wife, Ossie Borrosh, saw me through the
many stressful months of this work. Their wedding and subsequent move to Boston kept the
absorption of dissertation writing from becoming isolating. They have tolerated my sometimes-
dull single-mindedness on control systems with grace and humor.
This dissertation coincides with & happy period for my family; my brother's maturing as a doctor
and a scientist, his wedding; the publication of my mother's books and broad recognition of the
fruits of her many years' work; my father f s moral guidance and his continued health. These are
not coincidental: we owe much to mutual intellectual and emotional support (and a fair degree
silliness). In that sense, this is a shared accomplishment.
Few graduate students have the luxury of a skilled and experienced engineer and an
internationally-renowned writer, editor, and teacher on the other end ofa fax machine at 1 A.M.
For that I thank my father, who nurtured my love of machines, historical, contemporary, and
imagined. What I hope is the clarity of writing in this work owes more to my mother, Dr. Phyllis
Mindell, than to anyone else.
I dedicate this work to my parents, PhyUis and Marvir. Mindell.
My first teachers, my first students, and my first colleagues.
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Ifyou want the truth - I know I presume - you must look into the technology of these matiers.
Even into the hearts of certa'n molecules - it is they after all which dictate temperatures,
pressures, rates of flow, costs, profits, the shapes of towers...
You must ask two questions. First what is the real nature of synthesis? And then: What is
the real nature ofcontrol?
Ghost ofWalter Rathenau to the Nazi elite,
Thomas Pynchon., Gravity's Rainbow
People 'track' during every conscious moment...alignment proce~ses, in which the alignment error
serves as datum for its own annihilation, are forever being carried out in the familiar operations of
living...The needs and nature of the interpretive and computing equipment cannot finally be
separated from those of tracking controls.
George Philbrick, 1945
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Sign of the Machine and Metaphor of Technology
Lewis Mumford erred when he rejected the stearn engine in favor of the clock as the
"outstanding fact and typicai symbol ofthe modem industrial age."l The governor integrates the
two, making the stearn engine a powerful clock, harnessing power with precision. It works like a
coxswain, directing both the crew and the boat, commanding the rowers to stroke in synchrony
and the vessel to hold its course. Without synchronization each oar pushes alone, its power
wandering aimless. The coxswain obselVes the course and makes corrections, shouts commands,
integrates individual rowers, and links them, united, to the vessel. Through perception and speech
the coxswain makes a machine. The Greeks called the action Jcubernan, \vhich in Latin became
gubernator and came to English as governor. 2
Like a superego (Jfthe machine, the governor coxswains the stearn en~ine. [*Figure 1-1:
Stearn Engine Governor] Two rotating balls monitor the speed, spinning faster and moving
outward with centrifljgal force. If the engine goes too fast, the balls swing out, and through a
linkage (a channel ofcommunic:ation) operate a valve which reduces the steam into the cylinder.
The faster the machine goes, the more the governor slows it down - negative feedback. If the
engine runs too slow, the balls drop in and allow more stearn into the cylinder, speeding it up.
Ideally, the machine and the governor reach equilibrium, balance, stability. Unregulated, the
engine loses speed with an increase in load. Regulated, it maintains a constant speed, regardless of
load (or variations in stearn pressure). Through feedback the governor speaks, transmitting low-
power information to enlist the high-power machine in its own regulation, rendering it automatic.
",
This study examines the governor and its transformations in the twentieth century. Like
the coxswain, the governor works as an observer, as a speaker, as an integrator. It integrates
I Lewis Mumfor~ Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt.. Brace &; Jovanovich, 1934), 14. Mumford's
book makes no mention of governors or regulators. His "oeoteebnic" phase of technology is one of electricity and
light, not ofcontrol or information.
2 The Oxford Englisb Dictionary lists the first d-mnitioo of "governor" as "A steersman, pilot, captain of a vessel."
Definition number eight reads "a self-acting contrivance for regulating the supply of gas,~ water, etc... to a
machine to ensure an even and regular motion."
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disparate elements, and also integrates mathematically, adding and averaging over time (frequently
a human operator, like the coxswai~ performs this function). It translates perception to
articulation. Perception refers to how the governor apprehends and absorbs the world, from
telescopes to radars. Articulation refers to speech or any complex, jointed output, particularly
moving machinery (an articulated crane, for example, concatenates segments like words
concatenate syllables). Technologies of control aid and automate each of these functions,
enhancing perception, amplifying art.'-·uJation, tightening integration.
Norbert Wiener derived cybe'j, .. ~!ics from the CJTeek word for steersman.3 The astonishing
resonance of the prefix cyber- in today's technological vernacular reminds us that governance
remains a central issue in the public imagination. of technology, both as a sign and as a metaphor.
As a sign, it stands for harnessing machines to individual intentions. For example, in recent
decades most increases in computing speed have gone to serve the "user interface" in a concerted
effort, still only partially successful, to couple the power of the knachine to human intentions. As a
metaphor, governance symbolizes technology as a force that itself needs harnessing. One question
continues to dog our seemingly endless progress: is technology out ofcontrol?
I use "control" to refer simultaneously to these two senses ofgovernance: the sign of the
machine and the metaphor of technology. 4 The trouble is, we have no map of this varied and
complicated representation. Controls are things (rudders, buttons, keyboards, steering wheels)
and we each experience the complexities ofmact-ine control (training, skill, augmentation..
automation, loss of control). Technology is an idea, and we share notions of its dynamics
(construction, autonomy, conspiracy, systems). Yet we lack a conceptual chain to link
technologies ofcontrol to the control oftechnology. S Until now, the jump from a machine to The
Machine has largely been a leap offaith. This study remakes that leap as a trajectory, a history.
J Nor:bert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1948), 11-12.
4 Control is preferable to governance because the latter has become slightly archaic. Control, in addition to its
political and psychological dimensions, finds broad application in technology and represents a genuine
subspecialty in engineering (in f~ part of this study traces a conceptual shift from regulation to control in
feedback technology).
5 One might argue that these connections are merely semantic, a linguistic coincidence that the same word,
____________________ conlrol,Jindscurrencyjnboth engineering and socialdiscourse. Contralis no isolated case; it actually represents a
broad coDvergence. The technical language of control systems is full of words laden with political meaning,
including governor, stability, servo (meaning slave), and system, suggesting the connections are more than
coincidental. The most striking aspect of the discourse of control is not that those discussing the control of
14
In this century, that history concerns not only control engineering, but also the stability of
large technical systems, the secrets of military control, and the profound and gradual shifts from
mechanical to electrical computers, from continuous to symbolic representation, from analog to
digital electronics. R&D superseded invention, systems eclipsed apparatus, perception replaced
force. The governor transformed from the simple regulator to the general infonnation processing
system, the computer.
Historical Work on Control Systems
For pre-twentieth century technology, Otto Mayr's work on feedback devices uniquely
attempts to link governors to governance. He approaches the subject as "a case study in the
intellectual history of technology," and explores the technological background and cultural
resonance of the feedback loop before the nineteenth century. He aims "to reconstruct an instance
of interaction between and society's practical technology and its intellectual and spiritual
culture. ,,6
Beginning with the preoccupation with clocks and automata in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, Mayr traces mechanical trends parallel with the scientific revolution and
mechanistic philosophy of the "world machine." Leibniz, Descartes, and Boyle used clocks to
demonstrate analogy between machines and the cosmos; the clockmaker's craft contributed to the
production of scientific instruments. According to Mayr, the clock epitomized mechanical
philosophy because "the system has a centralistic command structure; the original design,
continuing functioning, and ultimate survival of the whole system depend ultimately upon a single
authority... No dialogue was possible between the center and the lower branches; the flow of
communication was one way - downward." Thus the clock had no feedbac~ it was fully
deterministic (in modem parlance, open-loop) in what Mayr calls "the authoritarian conception of
order." It is as though the coxswain were replaced by a phonograph, an automaton which shouted
orders to the crew and manipulated the rudder on a preset mechanized schedule (programmed by
a geographical map). Automata, which derived both from clocks and from mechanical
astronomical simulacra, embodied this top-down direction: observation and perception did not
technology speak in technical terms, but rather that those who design technologies ofcontrol speak in language so
overtly political.
6 Otto Mayr, Liberty, Authority, and Machinery in Early Modem Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986), xvii, 1.
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contribute to the system, which integrated its elements solely by mechanic~ structure and not by
feedback or communication.7
Mayr argues the British rejected the clockwork universe in the eighteenth century in favor
of a liberal vision ofbalance and self-regulation.! In 1776, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations built
on David Hume's critique of mercantilism to elaborate the economic implications of self-
regulation. Smith applied it three phenomena: the distribution of compensation for various
occupations, the size ofa nation's working population, and supply and demand. The substance of
Smith's arguments were not new. His predecessors had explored all three, but not as self-
regulating systems; Smith explored the idea in detail, speculating about both static and dynamic
behavior. 9 Mayr attributes Smith's vision to a "liberal conception of order" which flows from
balance and self-regulation. Liberal order still involves hierarchy, but a structure built on balance
and not centralized control. "Thus it is possible to envision the entire universe as a network of
superimposed and interacting self-regulating systems, maintaining themselves and the world
permanently - despite occasional lapses - in some sort of dynamic equilibrium." 10
Similarly self-regulating (although in J\ttayr's scheme, more authoritarian), Foucault's
'\:lisciplinary society" also emerged in the late eighteenth century. The icon here is no machine but
Jeremy Bentham's panoptic prison. Inmates, with the omnipresent possibility of the guards' vision
upon them, became self-regulating like machines; they behaved like proper prisoners because they
knew they were under surveillance. Foucault sees the panopticon not just as a building but as "a
type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another." This
"political technology" made the hierarchy self-governing, it allowed traditional methods of control
to throw off the limitations of the physical world and vastly increase their potency. Technical
arlvances freqllently address the "weight" ofthe governor's functions, how much force, mass, and
7 Mayr, Liberty, Authority, and MachineI)', 39, 118, 69, 120. Also see Silvio A. Bedini, "The Role of Automata in
the History of Technology," Technology and Culture 5 (no. 1, Winter, (964), 24-42 and Derek J. De Solla Price,
"Automata and the Origins of Mechanism and the Mechanistic Philosophy," Technology and Culture 5 (no. I,
Winter, 1964),9-23. Price (22) writes, "By the time of Shakespeare, man's ancient dream of simulating the
cosmos, celestial and mundane, bad been vividly recaptured and realized through the fruition of many
technological crafts, including that of the clockmaker, called into being in the first place by this lust for automata."
Also see Bruce Mazlish, The Fourth Discontinuity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), Chapter 3.
8 Otto Mayr, "Adam Smith and the Concept of the Feedback System.'" Technology and Culture 11 (no. 1, 1971), 3.
9 Mayr, "Adam Smi~'" 11-12.
10 Mayr, Liberty, Authority, and Machinery, 187.
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energy they require. This study analyzes how control systems connect people, machines, systems.
"Speed," expresses the varying weights of those connections. II
I base my reading ofFoucault, especially the emphasis on the visible, the articulable, and
their integration, on Gille Deleuze's essay "A New Cartograptler.-"-ForDeleuze, the disciplinary
society emerged when vision and articulation separated as two discrete forms of the realization of
power. His distillation ofFoucault, that "All knowledge runs from a visible element to an
articulable one, and vice versa" echoes the translation perfonned by the governor. At the core of
this translation lurks control, which makes the system mure than the sum of its parts. Extend this
assemblage to a broad geography, connected by wires or networks, and it resembles a
technological system, "the diagram is no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a
cartography that is coextensive with the whole social field. It is an abstract machine. nl2
The mechanical governor appeared simultaneously with Smith's liberal balance and the
disciplinary society. Feedback devices had been invented at least as far back as ancient Greece,
including water level cut-offs (as in a modem toilet tank), pressure valves, and constant-
temperature furnaces. i3 The centrifugal flyball governor for steam engines, however, became the
first feedback mechanism to be widely employed by technologists and to enter the popular
imagination. That device appeared in 1788, only twelve years after The Wealth ofNations, and it
was invented by a friend of Adam Smith, James Watt. Well into the twentieth century, one expert
estimated that ninety percent of the governors in existence were of the centrifugal type derived
from Watt's invention. 14 Mayr attempts to connect Smith's model of the economy as a feedback
system to Watt's governor, but Watt himself did not conceptualize his device as a feedback
mechanism or a self-regulating system (although those who later improved the device did).
Moreover, since only circumstantial evidence connects the governor to Smith's work on supply
II Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, (977),205, also see
Idem., The Birth or The Clinic, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage, (973), Chapter 7, "Seeing and
Knowing."
12 Gilles Deleuze, "A New Cartographer," in, Gille Deleuze, Foucault trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1988), 23-44. Also see ~'Micropolitics and Segmentarity," in Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Paul Bove (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983),208-31,
which explicitly incorporates Foucault's disciplinary society into a discussion of connections and nodes in political
systems. Deleuze wrote of the transition from a disciplinary society to "societies on control," and the erosion of
institutional pillars of the former (schools, churches, prisons) in favor of ubiquitous ceding and the corporation,
"Postscript on the Societies of Control," October S9 (1992), 3-7.
13 Otto Mayr, The Origins of Feedback Control (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970).
14 W. Trinks, Governors and the Governing or Prime Movers (New York: Van Nostrand and Co., 1919),3.
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and demand, Mayr is content to outline the affinity of their tracks. Still, he lays out early parallels
between the trajectories of the stearn regulator and the self-regulating economy, governors and
governance.
At least one other British philosopher made similar connections: Charles Babbage.
Historians usually refer to Babbage only as the inventor of the "Difference Engine," and
"Analytical Engine," unrealized early computers. Simon Schaffer, in contrast, argues Babbage's
industrial philosophy (expressed in his 1832 Report on Machinery andManufactures) intimately
related to his calculating machines Gust as Shapin and Shaffer argued for attention to Hobbes's
science and Boyle's politics). Like Bentham, Schaffer argues, Babbage saw his technology as a
miniature field of visibility and control, "a manufactory of numbers. n "The replacement of
individual human intelligence by machine intelligence," writes Shaffer, "was as apparent in the
workshop as in the engines." But there was a catch. Machines deskilled workers while defining
human operators as intelligent and non-mechanical, "an unresolved contradiction between stress
on the subordination and thus mechanization ofworkers' intelligence and on the coordination and
thus cerebration of their labor."IS Put another way, in a system, did people form the unreliable
"weak links," or thinking, judging "strong links"?
For the twentieth century, few have connected governors to governance. Stuart Bennett's
two volume work, addressing 1800-1930 and 1930-1955, examines the history of control
engineering. 16 His internal accounts leave it "to others to delve into the complex relationships
between the technology and its social and economic consequences" by which he means
"unemployment, economic growth, removal ofdegrading and onerous work, and de-skilling." 17
His second volume follows three "areas" ofcontrol technology between the world wars. These
-----_ ..._---_._--_._---_._._----_.__ ._------_.. _.-
areas, process control, electronic negative feedback amplifiers, and selVomechaOism-s, fonne-d-the
basis of "classical" control theory, the set of techniques that dominated control engineering until
the 1960s.
IS Simon Schaffer, "Babbage's Intelligence: Caluclating Engines and the Factory System," Critica1lnguiry 21
(Autumn, 1994),222. For Boyle and Hobbes, see Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air PumP:
Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
16 Stuart Benne~ A History of Control Engineerin& 1800-1930 ( London: Peter Peregrinus, 1979). Stuart Benne~
A History of Control Engineering, 1930-1955 (London: Peter Peregrinus, (993).
17 Bennett, A History of Control Engineering, 1930-1960, viii.
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Like Bennett, I follow separate threads between the wars, showing how they developed
separately and grew together during the early 1940s. In contrast to Bennett, however, I examine
control technology along axes defined by Mayr, Foucault, and Shaffer through their readings of
Smit~ Bentham, and Babbage: as "a conception oforder," as a discipline (both epistemological
and professional), and as a technology of visibility and articulation. Hence my threads correspond
not to technical fields but to institutions. Laboratories, committees, and military-industrial
alliances represented innovations ill the conduct of technical work; they shaped approaches to
problems (indeed defined the problems) and established conditions of knowledge production and
authority. The organizational shifts are hardly separable from technical inventions. Where Bennett
shows a unified methodology of control engineering emerging from the pressure of war, I look
critically at the emergence of computers, infonnation systems, and system engineering, for how
they carried the legacies of earlier threads and the scars of their collisions. Throughout these
multiple paths, however, runs the common theme of systems.
Systems
Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little system, created to
perfo~ as well as to connect together, in reality, those different movements and effects
which the artist has occasion for. A system is an imaginary machine invented to connect
together in the fancy those different movements and effects which are already in reality
performed.
Adam Smith. IS
Alfred Chandler brings the coxswain and governor into the world of industrial systems
when he observes "the railroad and the telegraph marched across the continent in unison. n The
low-power telegraph regulates and coordinates the high-power railroad. Power means moving
trains along the rails, but control means moving them where you want them and when: power
with precision. Chandler persuasively argues the alliance between infonnation transmission and
physical power, his oft-repeated "coordination and control," lay at the heart of industrialization in
America. Managerial control marched in unison with industrial capitalism. Management
techniques, organizational forms, and data processing machines steered and synchronized the
18 Adam Smi~ "Principles Which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries, Illustrated by the History of
Astronomy," in Adam Smith, Works, ed. Dugald Stewart (London.. 1811), 5:55-90. Quoted from Mayrt "Adam
Smith," 17.
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economic vessel as the coxswain steered and synchronized his rowers. 19 Professional managers
acted to ensure stability, favoring long-term expansion over ~jhort-term profits. They tried also to
make their systems "self sustaining," able to survive and operate independent ofoutside
connect~ons. They observed the system, collected data on performance, then tweaked the
parameters accordingly, "for the middle and top managers, control though statistics quickly
became a science and an art.,,20 Feedback about the performance ofan industrial system became
essential fer making it run efficiently, indeed for making it run at all. An ideology developed that
managers could make human organizations as precisely as engineers made machines, echoing
Smith's observation that a system is an imaginary machine.
Imaginary machines became real through writing. Orders, procedures, documents, and
policies became the linguistic instruments of an increasingly rationalized management structure,
relying heavily on internal communications. "Oral exchanges, whether face-ta-face or by
telephone, were idiosyncratic, often inexact, and undocumented. The ideology of systematic
management demanded increasing written communication to provide consistency, exactness, and
documentation" writes JoAnne Yates. Managers employed writing for perception, sending
feedback up the hierarchy in the form ofcharts, tables, forms and reports. DOWTi the ladder went
articulation: announcements, circular letters, manuals, and company magazines. Gradually,
managers mechanized and then automated these activities. Vertical filing, carbon paper,
mimeographs, and the typewriter carried linguistic traffic while adding machines, punched card
tabulators, and cash registers ran the numbers.21
191n Chandler's view, management in American business arose from a problem of machine control. Railroad lines
got so long (150 miles) that they grew beyond the power of an individual to keep the trains from colliding, and
cooperative management procedures were created to coordinate rail traffic. In effect, Chandler's managerial
controls arose to bead off instability (characterized by accidents) in tbe rail network. Alfred D. Chandler, The
Visible Hand: The Managerial Resolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass.: Bellknap Press, 1977). Also
see JoAnne Yates, Control Through Communication: The Rise of System in American MaruJgement (Baltimore,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) for connection between data processing technology and management
technique. James W. Cortada, Before the Computer: ffiM, NCR. Burroughs and Remington Rand and the IndustJy
They Created. 1865-1956. (Princeton: Princeton Unversity Press, 1993). James BeDiger, The Control Revolution
(Cambrdige: Harvard University Press, 1986). See William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis (New York: W.W.
Norton and Co.• 1991) for an account of nioeteenth-ceotwy industrialization which discusses the relationships
between technical systems and natural geography.
20 Chandler, The Visible Hand. 10, 159, 109.
21 JoAnne Yates9 Control Through Communication: The Rise of System in American Management (Baltimore,
Johns flopkins University Press, 1989) 65-94. James W. Conada, Before the Computer: IBM. NCR, Burroughs and
Remington Rand and the Industry They Created, 1865-1956. (Princeton: Princeton Unversity Press, 1993). James
Beniger, The Control Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).
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These methods were not limited to commercial organizations or imaginary machines.
Technical systems, especially electrical ones (but also railroads, steamships, weapons) continued
to require hanlessing as well. Like Mayr's notion of liberal order or Foucault's disciplinary
society, each contained numerous small governors, themselves feedback devices regulating a local
parameter and transmitting up the hierarchy. For example, governors in electric power systems
maintained the speed of turbines and generators, critical to maintaining the consistent frequen~y of
alternating current, and voltage regulators maintained stable power levels. The system did not
distinguish between "imaginary machines" and metal machines. Linking technical governance to
Chandler's managerial control, Thomas P. Hughes has shown how technical managers ("systelns
builders") conceived their systems as seamless webs which included social, political, and
economic factors in their construction and operation.22
This study, in a similar vein, uses the idea of system to link the machine to The Machine.
This is a history of control systems, with all the complexity and diversity that follows from the
idea of"system." While including aspects ofcontrol theory and control engineering, the term
"control systems" also suggests a concrete, artifactual approach, encompassing the development
of particular technologies. 23 This strategy, in effect, connects Hughes's work on Elmer Sperry
with his work on electric power: I explore the confluence of feedback control with large technical
systems. The engine and the clock survive in the dual imperatives of stability and synchroruzation.
Military Command
One further ingredient completes this frame: military command. Military organizations
have always stressed order, discipline, and hierarchy. The words "command and control" became
linked in the 19505 to describe the military's simultaneous direction of people and machinery. In
fact, the work of the governor - observation, communication, and integration - also describes
the work of the commander. Like managerial control in industry, modem military command
emerged in the nineteenth century when general staffs arose to administer armies, driven in part by
22 Thomas P. Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems" in Wiebe E. Biijker, Thomas P. Hughes,
and Trevor Pinch eds., The Social Construction o/Technological Systems (Cambridge: lvIIT Press, 1981),54. For
the connections betweeD Hughes and Chandler, see David Houndshell, "Hughesian History of Technology and
Cbandlerian Business History: Parallels, Departures, and Critics," History and Technology 12 (1995) 205-224.
23 Contra/theory refers to a body of mathematical concepts that quantitatively describe the behavior of dynamic
systems. Control engineering i~ practice and technique that employs control theory to design such systems,
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telegraphs and railroads. This match could be problematic: coupling command to systenls imposed
the constraints of machinery on otherwise flexible human organizations with potentially disastrous
results. In 1914, for example, the Gennan military, designed to march into action with clock-like
precisio~ proved unstoppable and inflexible once set in motion, an early example of"technology
out of control.,,24
Military systems__ when they work well, resemble Mayr's liberal order more than the strict
authoritarian order; military command does not necessarily imply rigid mechanical hierarchy. The
chaos of battle always threatens communicating links. Ideally, commanders coordinate
independent units capable of autonomous operation. 2' Historically, military control did not
proceed by ever increasing automation, building ever higher degrees of rigidly centralized
authority. Rather, it maintained a delicate balance of independence and autonomy in operating
forces, from the level of systems down to individual soldiers. The militarist may dream of total
control, but experience suggests flexibility.
"Seamless webs" always have points offrietion, vulnerabilities, and margins. At its furthest
extension, the system faces its limitations and its impotence. A military-logistics system reaches
them at the front, the point ofcontact with the enemy, what John Keegan calls "the face of
battle.,,26 Technical systems have another margin in the command center, at the human operator.
Here machines meet people across an anxious and unsteady boundary, the control system, the face
of technology. The history of control shows systems constantly trying to extend and envelop these
margins, to bring the outside inside. 27 They fail by definition.
including the professional development of a discipline of control engineering, with its own joumals, professional
societies, and career tracks.
24Arden Bucholz, "Armies, Railroads, and Infonnatio~ the Birth oflndustriaJ Mass War," in Jane Sununerton ed.,
Changing Large Technical Systems (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, (994). Also see Stephen Kern, The Culture
of Time and Space (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), Chap. 10, "Temporality of the July Crisis."
25 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Harvard University Press: (985).
26 John Keegan, The Face of Battle. For Keegan, the "face" has two meanings: the point at which an anny faces its
enemy, and the individual human experience of warfare.
27 Deleuze and Guattari call this outside ,cthe war machine," the figure which constantly escapes inclusion by
proliferating networks. See "Treatise on Nomadology - the War Machine," in A Thousand Plateaus, 351-423.
"The war machine's form of exteriority is such that it exists only in its own metamorphoses; it exists in an
industrial innovation as weU as in a ~hnological invention, in a commercial circuit as well as in a religious
creation, in all flows and currents that only secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the state.t~Not to be
confused with military technology in general, or machines oewar, "war machines" appear in this study in several
fonns: Kamikazes, parasitic noise, unstable human behavior in machine operations. Each threaten technologies of
control, which respond by increasing their extension and complexity. See Michej Serres, The Parasite, trans.
Lawrence R Schehr (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) for a discussion of noise, anti-infonnation,
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After World War D, a constellation of techniques - Systems Engineering, Systems
Analysis, Systems Dynamics, Operations Research and Cybernetics - sought to extend systems
around various margins and to apply the war's engineering rationality to a broad range of
problems. Historians are only beginning to chronicle the colonization of other disciplines by the
systems constellation during the last fifty years. 28 In that story, the discipline of the history of
technology may itself be the last chapter. Hughes himself avoids the pitfall, insisting only on
consideration of technical and non technical components as part of the history of systems. Some,
however, take up his "systems approach" as a means for making "systematic" the history of
technology, "developing a systems approach to the social and historical study of technology as a
strategy for integrating the history of technology into the social sciences.,,29 I reject such attempts
at rationalization; history flattens when designed like a machine; "system" has no stable, ahistoric
essence. Most important, I avoid a systematic history because this study chronicles the very
growth of the systems consteUation in engineering, and its accompanying abstraction of
technologies and people. Within engineering the concept of"system" has various meanings, and
this study examines how it developed differently in a number of discrete environments. To attempt
such a project from within the critical framework ofa systematized historical approach would be
merely self-justifying, and would choke on its own tail.
The brightest star (or at least the loudest) in the systems constellation was Norbert
Wiener's cybernetics, a vision whose impact was exceeded only by its ambition. Despite its
currency, we have little historical understandi~g ofcybernetics. Wiener's seminal 1948 book
Cybernetics suggests that the engineering of human/machine boundarif~s err.erged whole, Athena-
like, from the heads ofWiener and his colleagues. "I think that I can claim credit," he wrote in his
memoirs, "for transferring the whole theory of the servomechanism bodily to communication
as a kind of war machine. The state appropriates the "war machine," in the fonn of a military; discipline and
hierarchy harness and direct it outward, across geography and toward the enemy, anxiously preventing the war
machine from turning in OD the state. See William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology. Armed Force, and
Society Since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) for an C\CCOUDt of the tense relationship
between states and military force, and technology's role as a mediator between the two. Also see Manuel DeLanda,
War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (New York: Zone Books, 1991) tor a "Deleuzian." reading ofmilitaIy
technology. DeLanda primarily translates existing histories (including McNeill's) into Deleuzian tenns. Ideas like
the war machine, however, prove most valuable when they point to new and unexplored areas of research.
28 See, for example, Lily Kay, Woo Wrote the Book of Life? (forthcoming).
29Svante Beckman, "On Systemic Technology," in Jane Swnmerton 00., Changing Large Technical Systems
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 311.
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engineering.,,30 Wiener rarely cited any work on feedback between James Clerk Maxwell's 1867
paper "On Governors" and the end ofWorld War II, despite the maturing of multiple, layered
traditions of control engineering during the period.
What was genuinely new about the human/machine relationship articulated by cybernetics?
How did cybernetics affect engineering practice? What was the legacy of cybernetics? How did it
relate to the other stars in the constellation? Answering these questions, or even posing them,
requires a historical understanding ofcybernetics and the entire systems constellation, including
their relationship to automation, to military command, and to the history of computing.
These topics have been obscured, at least in part, behind the thick veil of military secrecy.
It is no coincidence that the man who went down as the founding father of cybernetics, Norbe'rt
Wiener, renounced secret work after (and even during) World War n. Others did not have the
freedom to appeal to popular imagination. The technology of"fire control," which led Wiener to
his insights, was among the most secret technologies in the Amenc·an arsenal. The records of
Wiener's sponsor, the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), were declassified only in
the 1970s. By then, many participants had written their memoirs and several historians had
produced authoritative accounts. Wiener worked on two ofeighty projects in control funded by
this group. Others addressed infonnation theory, classical feedback control, human factors
engineering, and digital computing. Similarly, the Naval Bureau ofOrdnance, which oversaw fire
control between the World Wars, released its pre-1925 records to the National Archives only two
years ago. Later records remain in navy hands. In addition to the sources, secrecy materially
affected the history as it unfolded, sometimes providing engineers extraordinary creative freedom
behind its walls, other times breeding isolation and stagnation. Once removed, these walls prove a
boon for the historian. Correspondents spoke frankly when federal law protected their
confidentiality. Classified documents were tracked with precision as they proliferated, allowing a
detailed reconstruction of diffUsing ideas and technology.
World War II transformed the governor: radar automated perception, servomechanisms
amplified articulation, and computers integrated systems. Seeing these technologies in this light
begins to answer further questions: How did control and communication come together, and what
JO Norbert Wiener, I Am a Mathematician: The Later Life of a Prodigy, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1956), 265. Also
see Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1948), 8
for a similar account and a similar claim.
24
was Wiener's role in the match? What drove the growth ofengineering systems? How did
automation change in World War II? What initiated the change? What role did feedback control
play in the emergence ofcomputers and information systems? What became of the COOllnon
threads of perception, articulation, and integration?
Four Threads aod Previous Science
The social context of a science is rarely made up of a context; it is most of the time made
up of a previous science.
Bruno Latow31
To answer these questions, this dissertation chronicles a period of both technical and
institutional change, the history ofcontrol systems in the United States from 1916-1945. The
complex and continuous nature of the process makes the choice ofbeginning and ending
somewhat arbitrary. Starting with the battle ofJutland, which in 1916 demonstrated the
inadequacy ofBritish fire control systems, control engineering became part of formal engineering,
and produced control systems of increasing performance and delicacy. This period culminates in
1945, with the end ofWorld War II and the emergence of the general-purpose digital computer.
This ending, however, was itself the start ofyet another period in American technology which saw
dramatic developments in control systems, computers, and the role of technology in political and
cultural life in America.
The first part of this study follows four discrete traditions, or threads, of technological
practice during the interwar period. These traditions consist of different types of institutions, each
with its own culture and technical environment, each with different controls of technology. Each
worked with a distinct concept of usystem," depending on technology and institutional goals: fire
control in the Navy Bureau ofOrdnance and its contractors (the Ford Instrument Company,
General Electric, and the Arma Corporation), feedback and manufacturing at the Sperry
Company~ communications engineering at BeD Telephone Laboratories; and power system
engineering in the Electrical Engineering Department of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology - from these distinct ideas ofsystems flowed distinct concepts offeedback, stability,
31 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1988), 19. Emphasis original.
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control, and the role of the human operator. At various points, the study analyzes specific systems
which either typified practice or marked significant advances.
Of course, these four traditions do not cover the entire field of control systems during the
period in question. Other technical communities, in other industries, companies, universities, and
government institutions contributed to ever broadening fields of control. I pay little attention, for
example, to industrial process control, because it played a minor role in wartime development
projects, although it was arguably more common, if less sophisticated, in industry between the
wars than the forms of control I trace. Also, I discuss only briefly developments outside the
United States. During the world wars, secrecy made military controls truly national, although the
United States and Britain shared significant technology in wartime. Engineers in Germany and
Russia also made significant contributions, although neither country defined control as a discrete
category until after 1945. While the four traditions I have selected do represent the field, they
were more than typical: they were central. Their people, ideas, and devices played major,
determining roles in control systems during the war and after.
The four threads do more than span the field, however, they also serve as a comparison.
Each had different imperatives, different organizational structures, and different rei&tions to the
broader world of technology. Individual careers proceeded differently in each case. These factors
comprise what I call the "engineering culture" of each organization. The Navy Bureau of
Ordnance, for example, rotated officers through technical supervision every few years, and thus
had less continuity but more field experience than universities. Different perspectives also arise
from differences in source material. Academic engineers progress through publication., so the
published record reflects their work more than that of industrial researchers. Little contenlporary
documentation exists, however, for the laboratory culture of engineering students at MlT in the
19305, so instead I rely on theses, published papers, and memoirs. In contrast, the navy installed a
Naval Inspector in the factories of both Sperry Gyroscope and the Ford Instrument companies,
and the inspector's reports to his superior in Washington lend a unique window into the culture of
the rrJanufacturers, but these companies did not publish their research. More such comparisons
emerge in the course of the text; a balanced picture of the complex enterprise of control entails
examining several worlds simultaneously.
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The first tradition involves the mechanization ofcommand in the navy. To hit dist3Jlt
moving targets, heavy naval guns and antiaircraft artillery required mechanical computing devices
built into complex ufire control" systems. These systems not omy integrated diverse perceptions,
but they also centralized information and replaced human operators with ever higher degrees of
automation. This tradition developed primarily in the Navy Bureau of Ordnance and its
contractors - the Ford Instrument Company, the Anna Corporation, and General Electric. The
Bureau ofOrdnance had particular requirements for systems at sea based on tradition, training,
and combat conditions, as weD as their desire to control the space of battle. Control systems thus
fonned part ofa much longer history of the milifary's drive to order its world. Only private
industry, however, had the skills to build the demanding machines. The Bureau ofOrdnance built
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a closed and highly-secret community of fire control contractors. While the technology grew
quickly from about 1915 through the twenties, it stagnated in the decade before World War II.
When, in World War fi, the airplane seriously threatened the survival of the capital ship, the navy
responded with a crash program in antiaircraft fire control and integrated radar into feedback
loops. The unique conceptual, operational, and production demands (as well as the funding) of
these closed-loop systems demonstrated the difficulty of matching technical systems to command
structure.
The next tradition arose more directly from the "feedback culture" which developed out of
a long series ofgovernors and regulating devices. By "feedback culture" I mean a set of
techniques, tools, knowledge~ and,-·above all, a group of people who were skilled in applying
traditional govemors. 32 In the early twentieth century, the technologies of the mac~jne age,
especially steamships and airplanes, became so powerful they could slip out of human control,
risking wildness and instability. The Sperry Gyroscope Company manufactured devices that
domesticated these wild machines. In the 1920s and 30s, it developed an array ofcontrol and
feedback devices, from autopilots for airplanes to antiaircraft systems for the army. These
controls included sensors, data transmitters, centralized processors, and varying degrees of
automation - corresponding to the observation, articulation, anrl integration of the original
governor. A system was usually part ofan airplane or a ship, and stability meant flying level or
32 The concept of "feedback culture" expands on Donald MacKenzie's idea of"gyro culture" in Inventing
Accuracy: A Historical Sociology ofNuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 31.
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sailing on course. Furthermore, Sperry developed an industrial infrastructure which could apply
and manufacture advanced control technologies as they emerged from research. Through military
and commercial projects, the company came to see operators as "human servomechanisms" who,
like the machine itself: required regulation and taming by the system. Sperry's controls had to
respond not only to the needs of the operator but also to the demands of the production line,
hence the company's products tended to eschew the large, distributed systems typical of naval fire
control in favor of smaller-scale automation tightly coupled to the human operator's body. By
World War II, Sperry engineers could articulate t. coherent vision which connected a human to a
machine "to extend the functions and skill of the operator far beyond his own strength, endurance,
and abilities.,,33 Before World War II, Sperry spent more than two decades grappling with the
complexities of what is now called the cyborg.
Tradition three, communications engineering, arose from the large system of the telephone
network and industrial research at Bell Telephone Laboratories. Here telephone engineers
developed not only feedback theory but expertise in signals and electronics. Bell engineers,
especially Harold Black, Henrik Bode, and Harry ~yquist, conceived and fonnalized a theory of
negative feedback to solve the practical problems of long distance transmission of voice signals.
This theory contributed to a larger project of running a large network and connecting it to people.
Engineers studied the shape of the telephone handset, the physics of hearing, the wave nature of
transmission, and even developed nascent theories ofinfo~ation. Within the telephone company,
"The Syste~" as it was commonly called, meant the telephone network, and stability meant
electronic amplifiers that did not oscillate. The tradition of telephone engineering allowed Bell
engineers to conceptualize control systems in terms of infonnation, signals, and noise, ideas that
were critical for the rigorous undrrstanding of computers. In 1940, becau~e of its sophistication in
electronics and in coupling humans to communications systems, Bell Labs took the lead in
designing fire control systems for the armed selVices.
Feedback theory at Bell Labs developed in parallel with the fourth tradition, \It'ork on
simulation, calculation, and servomechanisms at MIT. This academic setting had ties to the other
large system of the day, electric power. The 1920s saw the connection of local power systems
33 "Introduction," to Sperry Company History, n.d., probably 1942. Sperry Gyroscope Company records, Hagley
Museum and Library, Wilmington Delaware, Box 40.
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into ever larger regional and then national grids. These networks had the potential to get out of
control, becoming unstable in response to transient events such as lightning strikes or short
circuits. Researchers at MIT studied relationships of the regulators and governors on individual
machines to the characteristics and stability of the overall system. Vannevar Bush and his students
at first built models, and then conceived more abstract "simulations:" machines as general,
progranlffiable representations of physical phenomena. The Network Analyzer, a simulation
machine, and the Differential Analyzer, a mechanical calculator, had features that would appear
later in real-time control systems including programmability, graphical user input, and digital
------------------s-Witching-:-Botn-spu-rred~lnlp-o-rtant-advances-in-control:-Harold--Hazen's3'Theory ·of--
Servomechanisms," provided a taxonomy of feedback devices and shifted the emphasis of the
feedback culture from static, steady-state performance, to dynamic, transient phenomena: that is,
from regulation to control. In this context, a system was an electric power network, and stability
meant that it would not fail when struck by transient events. The atmosphere of simulation and
calculation that prevailed at MIT in the 19205 and 305 prepared a generation of engineers to
innovate, manage, and organize the complex control and computing devices required by the
second world war.
While each of these four traditions corresponds to one or more institution, they by no
means proceeded in isolation. The borders between technical communities were porous and
shifting, with individuals, infonnation, and even hardware constantly moving between them.
Sperry Gyroscope hired MIT professors as consultants. MIT taught a special course in control
engineering for naval fire control officers. The Naval Bureau of Ordnanc;e directed computer
development at Sperry. Bell Labs had close intellectual exchange with MIT. Other factors
inhibited these flows, including military secrecy, industrial concerns with patents and proprietary
development, and plain narrow-mindedness. Still, the constant crossings and exchanges played a
critical role as mindset and technique flowed from one institution to another. The technology of
control systems developed as ongoing conversation and competition between organizations.
Wortd WarD
These connections greatly accelerated in 1940 when Vannevar Bush organized the
country's research and development for war, bringing the four traditions together. The second
half of the thesis covers the merging of the four traditions between 1940 and 1945. Problems of
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defending ships (especially battleships) against new high-speed airplanes became critical early in
the European war in 1939, and the Battle of Britain underscored the difficulty of defending cities
against attacking bombers. Bush's worry about the antiaircraft problem drove his attempts to
form a new research organization dedicated to defense. When, at Bush's request, President
Roosevelt established the NatiJnal Defense Research Committee (NDRC) in 1940, it included a
division devoted to fire control, section D-2, headed by Warren Weaver. Projects led by the
NDRC developed a broad array of automatic controls, systems, and theory, including directors,
predictors, and radar-controlled devices. Section D-2, and its successor, Division 7 (headed by
Harold Hazen) were run primarily by representatives from Sperry, MIT, Bell Labs, and the navy.
Again, the sources reflect the institution; fortunately, fairly complete correspondence between the
individuals in this group survives. Geographically dispersed committee members described their
work to each other in secret and frank memos. These sources depict how diverse notions of
systems and control conflicted and fused amid the frenetic and creative atmosphere of wartime
technology.
World War II marked a watershed in the history of science and technology in the United
States. Initiated by what Hunter Dupree has called "the great instauration of 1940," etched into
the public imagination by the atomic bomb, and codified by Bush's famous 1945 report Science
the Endless Frontier, the transfonnations of World War II ushered in a new era ofgovernment
relations with science and technology. It would last for several decades, and its effects will
continue indefinitely.34 This era included government and military sponsorship of basic researc~
huge sums for technology development, reliance on technical experts and their advice at the
highest levels ofgovernment, and an unprecedented coupling of political decision making to large
technical systems.
Historians have written much on the profound organizational changes in science during the
Second World War, but they have attended less to the equally profound organizational changes in
technology. Most discussions of the NDRC revolve around the atomic bomb, which transferred to
the Army when it became the Manhattan Project. Even the MIT Radiation Lab, known for its
work in short-wave radar, was atypical because it consisted mostly of physicists thrust into an
34 A. Hunter Dupree, "The Great Inslauralion of 1940: The Organization of Scientific Research for War" in
Gerald Holton, 00., The Twentieth Ceotwy Sciences: Studies in the Biography of Ideas (New York: W.W. Norton
& Co., 197).Vannevar Bush Science: The Endless Frontier (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945).
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engineering environment. In contrast, work in control and systems tended to be the domain of
engineers. Control system engineering was a sweet problem, appealing to engineers' sense of
balance and precision. Still, in comparison to the big physics problems of the day, control,
concrete and unglamorous, lacked the wartime cachet of atomic physics. Historians' 'view of
wartime research is weighted accordingly. To redress this imbalance this study emphasizes the
technology of the NDRC, examining how engineers, as opposed to scientists, created their nev.'
relationship with government.
The internal workings of the fire control division of the NDRC reveal the dynamics of the
wartime transfonnations as they occur:-ed. The NDRC fostered control not only by letting
research contracts but also by serving as a central clearinghouse for informatio~ a medium for
technology diffusion. Several of the post-war and Cold War command and control systems, as
we~1 as the epistemologies comprising the systems constellatio~ inherited the organizational,
inteUectual, and personal infrastructure of the NDRC control systems projects.
--------~------------Wartime-work-produced-not-on1y-a-new-role_for-science_and~technology_in_America,_but~a ~ _
new conception of system and infonnation. These ideas fonned the core of possibly the most
important invention of the century: the digital computer. The historiography of computers has
been dominated by priority disputes and sequences of hardware. Instead I show how wartinle
experiences, as well as the war's demands, shaped the tum to digital techniques and the
construction ofdigital control systems as information processors. In 1948, for example, Claude
Shannon published the "Mathematical Theory ofCommunication" which defined the modem
conception of information. Shannon worked at MIT for Bush in the late 1930s, performed
contract work for the NDRC, and eventually moved to Bell Labs. Similarly, the Whirlwind
computer, the first real-time control computer and progenitor Cold War command and control
systems, emerged from the MIT Servomechanisms Lab, founded by a cc,ntract with the NDRC.
Through the NDRC's fire control projects, methods of feedback devices, electrical power, and
telephone engineering contributed to the conception of computing and information that arose after
the war. Perception, articulation and integration, the legacy of the governor, shaped the rise of
digital information processing as a discrete activity.
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Automation and the Myth of Autonomous Technology
Technology in general has always been susceptible to mystification. Control systems,
because they create "automatic" machinery, are particularly vulnerable to the myth of autonomous
technology. The development of automata resembles the search for artificial life, the modem
robot the autonomous mechanical human. The same holds true for the computer: observers often
present its history as an intellectual search for a thinking machine. Recent scholarship that
criticizes the myth of autonomous progress, however, argues instead for a vision of technology
based on human choice and decision. 3s This lesson applies particularly to the history of automatic
-----------
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control, with its special pretension to autonomy. As we shall see, automatic control does not set
machines free as autonomous agents, but rather brings them under the purview of human
intention. While the autonomous vision has an undeniable metaphoric appeal and mythic
significance, it coexists with another venture: the search for technological aids to human
capabilities, for mechanical extensions of the body, the mind, and the social structure. Whether the
operation ofan individual device, the piloting of a vehicle, or the command of a large system.,
control involves a complex exchange of function and responsibility between operator and
machine, traversing the boundary between human and artificial. The technologies that traverse
these boundaries link not only machines and people, not only social and technical sYStems, but
political power and manufactured force as well.
Gentlemen! You can't fight in here, this is the war room!
President Merkin Muffiey, Dr. Strangelove
Stanley Kubrick's 1964 film captures the Cold War icon ofcontrol systems: air defenses,
bomber forces, anrl ICBMs run from centralized locations in technological environments. Images
of"war rooms" or "command and control centers" with their banks of computers, animated maps,
and clean sense of order, represented the ultimate in technological progress (hence President
Muffley's ironic injunction against fighting). [·Figure 1-2: SAC Command] The "control room"
came to stand for the increasingly abstract nature of technical systems and the technological
military. World War n produced these controls, defined the relationship between technology and
government which they embody, and brought technologically mediated warfare to the popular
35 Merritt Roe Smith and Leo~ 005.,~ Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological
Detenninism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
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imagination. The systems the war spawned, the command and control networks that characterized
the era of nuclear standoff: remain in place today. The images these systems created, and their
technological politics, contributed to the sense of alienation and powerlessness from which the
critiques of technological society of Mumford, Ellul, Marcuse, and others arose. The cultural
dilemma of technology out ofcontrol responded to the pervasiveness of technologies ofcontrol.
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Figure I-I: Flyball steam-
engine governor. A cord
from the engine crankshaft
rotates pulley d. Balls E
"observe," the speed,
swinging outward, pulling
down bar FGH and closing
steam valve Z. (John Farey,
Treatise on the Steam
Engine (London: 1827),
reprinted in Louis Hunter, A
History of Industrial power
in the United States, 1780-
1930 Volume Two: Steam
Power (Charlottesville,
Virginia: University Press of
Virginia, 1985), 123).
Figure 1-2: Perception and articulation: Strategic Air Command command and control system, underground
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Note the prominent place of the telephone. (Claude Baum, The System
Builders: The Story of SDC (Stanta Monica, California: System Development Corporation, 1981).
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Chapter 2
Grids on a Swirling Sea: Naval Control Systems
During the 19305, a visitor to the industrial areas ofLong Island City would find a curious
sight. The depression had closed factories, and at night the area was dark and deserted, one of the
myriad manifestations of economic disaster in New York's urban landscape. Long Island city,
however, had a single exception: one factory, lit up day and night, humming with production. I
The Ford Instrument company, preparing for a distant but impending war, busily served its single
customer, the United States Navy.
The Ford Instrument Company stood at the core of a specialized and secretive technical
clique which built control systems for naval gunnery. The Naval Bureau of Ordnance founded and
led this group, which also included General Electric and the Arma Company. The fire control
clique spent the years between the two world wars advancing and perfecting the technology of
aiming naval guns at surface targets and attacking aircraft. The navy had been instrumental in
establishing both Ford and Arma specifically for this purpose; both companies had a single
customer and a single product line. General Electric, though a vast and diversified firm, had a
secret division for fire control set up at navy request.
From this closed community grew a distinct engineering culture of control systems. In this
c'Jlture, a system was a set of interconnected instruments aboard a warship. Feedback was
accomplished by spotting sheD splashes and adjusting gunfire accordingly. Stability meant freedom
from the pitching and rolling of a ship. The machines this culture produced achieved a level of
automation, feedback, and human integration that dwarfed those in other fields in scope and
complexity. Together, Ford, Arma and G.E., in close cooperation with the Bureau ofOrdnance,
built technologies ofcontrol separate from the theoretical work in feedback at other institutions, a
separation enforced by military secrecy. They responded to a single customer, received handsome
premiums for staying out of other fields and developed significant techniques in mechanics,
feedback, and computing. The navy's strict control bread conseryatism, however, and by World
War II naval fire control reached the limits of its creative and technical resources.
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Control systems for naval guns, or "fire control systems," aim naval guns. They
incorporate a host of factors, including the range and bearing of the target, the pitch and roll of
the firing vessel, wind speed, air temperature, and ballistics) they calculate the proper angle and
elevation for the guns and transmit data to the gun turrets, along with orders to fire. Until about
1930, the leading edge of this technology concerned "surface fire," getting the main guns on
destroyers, cruisers and battleships to hit distant targets, usually other ships. During the 1920s,
and 305, however, the airplane emerged as an offensive threat to ships of all kinds~ antiaircraft
became the critical problem which drove fire control in the decade prior to Pearl Harbor. On the
eve of the war, the typical fire control system included a set of diverse machines: A "computer"
built by the Ford Instrument company calculated the course and speed of the target based on data
from rangefinders, telescopes, and, eventually, radar. A gyroscopically-controlled "stable element"
built by Anna corrected the solution for the pitch, roll, and yaw of the firing ship, and ordered the
guns to fire when the ship rolled to a specified point. General Electric built the data transmitters
that tied these elements together, along with electric motors to tum the turrets automatically, and
switchboards to program the system for different configurations.
Between 1916 and 1940 the Bureau ofOrdnance worked with its control systems
contractors in roughly three phases. First, from about 1916 to 1920, the US Navy struggled to
catch up with the British and develop domestic engineering resources for fire control. Rapid
organizational and technical change, intense effort, and the urgency of war characterized this
phase, when American naval control systems went from virtually nothing to major innovations.
Second, during the 19205, the Bureau brought in, at the expense of its first supplier Sperry
Gyroscope, an established contractor, General Electric. The bureau consolidated its pool of
control engineering in two smaller contractors, Ford Instrument and Anna, both of which supplied
exclusively to the navy. The basic system these three companies produced in 1930 would remain
largely unchanged throughout World War ll. The third phase, then, during the 1930s, saw
numerous incremental innovations in this setup, but none that altered basic system structure. This
period also saw the emergence ot: and response to, a new challenge: antiaircraft. The Bureau of
Ordnance and its contractors tried numerous solutions to the problem, mostly with limited
I This image is drawn from the author's interview with William Newell, former Ford Instrument Company Chief
Engineer, on May 12, 1995.
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success. At the end of this third phase, the closed and secret community had reached its technical
limits. Naval fire control could go no further without incorporating the latest work in other fields:
servomechanisms, electronics, and radar.
Fire Control: Historical Background
Ever striving to measure, rationalize, and order their world, military technologists were
children of the "low enlightenment," to use Ken Alder's phrase. Drill, discipline, uniformity,
measurement, standardization, and above all, control, characterized the military's special brand of
modernity.2 Naval control systems evolved in hannony with this worldview; the ability to control
machinery meshed with the desire to control personnel, production, logistics and ultimately the
field ofbattle. In naval warfare the field has no landmarks, no terrain, no features. It is more akin
to a magnetic field than a field of wheat: characterized only by imaginary lines of force imposed
upon an otherwise smooth space. In the words ofPaul Virilio, "the history ofbattle is primarily
the history of radically changing fields ofperception."3 Naval tire control systems standardize the
perception of these spaces and bring them under quantitative control. They establish a solid
reference (heading, horizon) from which to encounter the enemy, known relatively as range and
bearing. Polar coordinates track the enemy and bring it into the machine, where it can be
manipulated. On the turbulent ocean, fire control structures the space of war and fuses the "low
enlightenment" with modem technology.
In the first decades of the twentieth century increasing size and speed of turbine-powered
warships, combined with advances in gun and powder technology, created a "revolution in naval
gunnery." At the tum of the century, typical naval engagements took place between 2,000 and
4,000 yards. World War I battleship main batteries could shoot 20,000 yards, which increased to
34,000 yards by World War n and to 40,000 with wartime advances. 4 Firing shells and military
2 Ken Alder, "Forging the New Order: French Mass Production and the Language of the Machine Age," (ph.D.
Dissertatio~ Harvard University, 1991). Lewis Mumford argues the military is the prototypical industrial
production process in Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt Brace Javonovite~ 1934). For the historical
origins of military discipline, see William McNeill The Pursuit ofPower: Technology, Armed Force, and Society
Since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), esp. Chapter 4. For a recent, synthetic view, see
Merritt Roe Smith, "Introduction" in Military Entemrise and Technological Change (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1987).
] Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics ofPerceotion. trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 1989),7
4 Estimates ofgun raD.ge5 vary depending on whether one measures the distances at which fleets conducted battle
----------------------------------practicc,-the-distaoce of-hisIoricalJ~ngagemen~-or-the distaDce tbco~~_ ~ibJ~ ~!j~~t~~~!»_~~_~~_~g n __
Morison n:pons that Admiral Sims trained gunners to fire at 1600 yards, to prepare for battle conditions at 6,000
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utility, however, are not the same thing, and the revolution precipitated an attending crisis.
Shooting to great distances exceeded the ability to hit anything that far away. As ranges grew,
accuracy in aiming became critical; errors of fractions of a degree, difficult to eliminate from guns
mounted on a moving~ pitching platform, caused shells to miss their targets altogether. Hitting at
extreme ranges had important implications for naval tactics and ship design, for it allowed one's
own ship to fire while safely out of range of the enemy - thus permanently supplanting the time-
honored naval tradition ofclosing on the enemy.5 Naval gunfire was useless ifit could not be
governed; It had power but not precision.
To address this problem, between 1900 and World War I the British navy built up the
most sophisticated fire control technology in the world, the result of a difficult, often contentious
development program and the Dreadnought-era naval arms race. 6 Only around 1915 did the
Americans pay serious attention to the technology. Before examining the history of American fire
control from 1916 until 1940, then, it is necessary to assess prior work in both the U. s. and
Britain.
Naval Gunnery and Continuous Aim
Until the 19th century, naval gunnery had changed little for centuries. Ships fought at
close ranges, firing straight into the enemy required little aiming. As ranges grew, this approach
proved disappointingly inaccurate: as a ship rolls, the elevation of its guns rolls as well, thus
changing the aim. Traditionally, gunners adjusted to this problem by setting their sights relative to
the deck, waiting until the roll of the ship brought the target into sight, and then firing. This
method introduced a time delay, called "firing interval," as the gunner anticipated the proper
moment to fire to compensate for his own reaction time. The firing interval varied widely, a major
cause of inaccuracy.
yards in Admiral Sims and the Modem American NaVY (Boston: Houghton Miftlin, 1942), 142. For other
estimates, see Administrative History of the U.S. Na\'Y in World War ", Volume 79, Fire Control (Washington:
United States Navy, 1946), 2-3. Rodrigo Garcia Y Robel1SO~ "Failure of the Heavy Gun at Sea, 1898-1922,"
Technology and Culture 28 (DO. 3, 1987) 539-557. For a detailed assesment of accuracy at long ranges, !Jee W.J.
Iure~ '1be Evolution of Battlesbip Gunnery in the U.S. Navy, 1920-1945," Warship International (no.3, 1991),
240-71.
5 John Testuro Sumida, "British Capital Ship Design and Fire Control in the Dreadnought Era: Sir John Fisher,
Arthur Hungerford PoUen, and the Battle Cruiser," Journal of Modem History S1 (June (979): 205-230.
6 For an account of the politics of teehnology during this arms race, see McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, Chapter 8.
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Elting Morison chronicled the advent of"continuous aim" firing, which vastly improved
gunnery accuracy. In 1898, Captain Percy Scott of the Royal Navy introduced two technical
changes which allowed gunners to keep their target constantly in sight as the ship rolled. The
dynamics of"tracking" the target depended on the quality of sighting, human reaction times, and
the sensitivity ofcontrols: in short, the matching of human to machine (similar "tracking"
problems often characterize military controls). Scott increased the gear ratio of the gunner's
handwheel to make a more sensitive control, allowing him to move the gun more quickly. Second,
Scott added an improved telescope to the gunsight. 7 Now gunners could practice "continuous
aim," which not only improved their individual accuracy, but reduced variability across human
operators. In Morison's words, "where before the good pointer was an individual artist, pointers
now became trained technicians, fairly unifonn in their capacity to shoot."I Governance
introduced not only precision, but regularity
Continuous aim firing greatly improved gunnery, and it was brought to the U.S. Navy in
1902 by William S. Sims, who learned it from Scott. Sims's own measure, probably exaggerated,
estimated gunnery performance improved by a factor of three thousand percent by the 1905 target
practice. Morison's work on continuOllS aim concentrates on resistance to innovation in
institutional culture, but the technique was also an innovation in control. Continuous aim
constructed an assemblage of man and machine with the essential features of succeeding
generations ofcontrol systems. Scott's innovation made the gunner into a governor: he integrated
an instrument of perception (the telescope), and a means of articulation (the handwheel).
Director Firing
Continuous aim firing implied "pointer fire," where a gun captain at each turret or gun
sighted and fired his gun independently. A new method (also introduced by Perky Scott),
"director fire," removed that responsibility to a centralized location or "director."*The director,
7 Naval guns already had such sights, but gunners avoided them because the guns' recoil januned the sights against
their eyes. Scott added a flexible mount which decouploo the sights from the recoil of the gun and allowed the
gunners to keep their eyes constantly in the scope and on target. Moriso~ Admiral Sims. 83. Also see Elting
Moriso~ "Gunfire at Sea," in Men. Machines, and Modem Times (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966).
8 Morison.. "Gunfire at Sea" Moriso~ Admiral Sims, 178, 145.
•A note on the tenn director. In this CODtext, director can mean L~ actual mechanism whereby the main gunnery
officer aims his telescopes and transmits orders to the turrets. Director can also refer, however, to that officer
himself. Director fire tends to refer to the whole system as set up with a main officer in the foretop conttolling fire.
Later, in U.S. Navy terminology, the marlc: series assigned to directors had a variety of meanings; the Mark I, for
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aloft or on an upper deck, sighted the target with a precision telescope and calculated settings for
each gun which would make their fire converge on a single point. He then communicated these
sightings to the individual guns.9 The director could fire all guns simultaneously with an electrical
trigger, termed "single key" or "master key" firing. The main advantage of this system derived
from "spotting." When shells exploded near the target, an officer with a telescope "spotted" the
splashes, and called corrections to the gunners, adjusting up, down, right, or left to bring the next
shots closer to the target. All guns firing at the same time made spotting easier and quicker. The
ideal would be "strarldling," wherein some splashes would be spotted short ot: and some beyond,
the target - thus indicatli18 that others had hit in between. The US Navy first installed director
firing in a tower ("the tops") on a battleship in 1916. 10
Unlike in continuous aim, in director firing the guns no longer followed the roll of the
ship. Now the gunnery officer in the director tower (himself the "director") waited for the ship to
come to a particular point in the roll, arid pressed a button which sounded a buzzer in the turrets,
commanding the turret operators to fire (soon the director's trigger actually fired the guns
remotely). The operators in the turrets, the "pointers," concentrated on indicators which
transmitted the gun orders to them from the director; the pointers brought their equipment into
line accordingly. Thus director firing achieved, in Peter Padfield's words, "a complete reversal of
the 'continuous aim' Percy Scott himself had pioneered.,,11 The capability for locaJ pointer fire
remained in place, however, as a backup in case the director system failed during battle.
Director fire introduced new instruments of perception. Telescopes in the director tower
("directroscopes") measured the elevation and bearing of the target to a fraction ofa degree. A
optical rangefinder, a device like a giant set of binoculars, determined the target's range. The
bearing of the target could also be read offofa separate reading on the rangefinder or on another
example, was really a computer, whereas the Mat. VI was a gyroscopically controlled stable-element. A given fire
control system could be composed of many different elements called directors, but each with a distinct function.
9 Peter Padfield, Guns at Sea (London: Hugh Evel~ 1973), 245.
10 For an excellent first-hand summary of fire control development in the U.S. Navy 1915-1920, see Wiltiam R
Furlong "Development ofFirc Control," undated memo (probably 1920), William R Furlong Papers, Librai}' of
Congress, Box 6, Folder Ordnance - American. For .Percy Scott and director firing see padfield, Guns at Sea. 246.
Director firing, which allowed all guns to fire simultaneously in a complete salvo, made shell splashes easier to see
at extreme ranges. Scott remained a finn believer in spotting and, while be favored director fire, he was not as
sanguine about the new "fire control" technologies. Jon Testuro Sumida, "The Quest for Reach: The Development
ofLong-Raoge Gunnery in the Royal Navy, 1901-1912," unpublished manuscri~ March, 1995,8, 13.
II Padfield, Guns at Sea 247. Furlong, "Development of Fire Control." Norw.an Friedman, US Naval Weapons,
(London: Conway Maritime Press, London, 19f3), 26.
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rotating telescope called a "Target Bearing Indicator." Ideally, these instruments would be
gyroscopically stabilized to remain on target while the ship rolled (introduced about 1920). All
were connected by electrical data transmitters, which had to be accurate to fractions of a degree
and rugged enough to withstand the shock of firing. With the introduction of director firing, fire
control became a system -instnlments of perception and articulation distributed around the ship
and connected by electrical communications.
The Pollen System
Gunnery officers in a "plotting room" integrated perception and articulation. In this
armored room below decks, they plotted data, calculated tiring solutions, and sent orders to the
guns. This process required combining two primary operations, prediction and ballistics. The time
of flight of a shell could easily exceed a minute, during which time a target ship moving at twenty-
five knots would move more than seven hundred yards. Officers thus had to predict (i.e. lead) the
position of the target, which required knowing not only the range and bearing of the target, but its
course and speed as well. They looked up the ballistics of the gun in tables, to determine what
elevation would send the shell to the proper range.
Originally officers in the plotting room did this work by hand in classic naval fashion .-
plotting successive ranges and bearings on a chart and measuring rates and courses with a
compass or protractor. The British began automating the process with a simple mechanical slide
rule (a "dumaresq") and a "range clock," or "Vickers Clock." The dumaresq calculated the rate of
change of range and the rate ofchange of bearing to the target, fronl which prediction could be
calculated. An officer set the dials on the Vickers Clock with an initial range and set the clock's
speed with the rate ofchange of range as calculated by the dumaresq. The clock then indicated on
its dial how the target range changed as time progressed. For example, ifone detennined a target
was five thousand meters away, and its range was changing five hundred meters per minute, the
clock would read 5,500 after one minute, 6,000 after two, then 6,500 and so on into the future. It:
over t;rne, ranges indicated on the clock did not match the rangefinder's actual observations of the
target, then the estimated course and speed of the enemy were incorrect and the estimates needed
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to be adjusted or "tuned."12 This tuning, a feedback process, would be repeated until it converged
on a correct solution for course and speed, which would then produce an accurate prediction.
This setup, however, had a critical flaw. 13 The rate ofchange of range was itself rarely
constant, even if the target remained on a constant heading. If two ships headed straight toward
each other, then obviously the change of range would be constant as the sum of their speeds, or
the difference of their speeds if they headed directly away from each other. If the two were offset
by any distance, or on different headings - a far more likely scenario - the rate of change of
range would vary in time, as shown in Figure 2 [*Figure 2-1: Rate ofchange of range] The
Vickers Clock ran at a fixed speed, so it could not track continuously. The clock would have to
be constantly adjusted, also by hand, to read the proper values.
Arthur Hungerford Pollen, an English entrepreneur and managing director of a newspaper
equipment manufacturer, understood the problem ofcontinuously changing range rate. He
invented a fire control system to solve it and struggled to bring "scientific" fire control to the
Royal Navy. 14 His system predicted the future position of the target based on an accurate and
continuously updated derivation of the rate of change of target range. An automatic printer
plotted the data on paper.
The Admiralty, and especially its gunnery officers, were by no means predisposed to such
radical aut~mation of their plotting and fire control procedures. I~ After extensive trials and much
debate, in 1913 the Admiralty officially adopted a less-autonlated system, the Dreyer Table,
designed by a gunnery officer, over Pollen's. John Sumida explains the Admiralty's rejection of
the Pollen system in part by the threat the highly-automated Pollen system posed to traditional
gunnery officers: "Fire control was regarded as the special preserve ofg~nnery officers, who had
been able to establish themselves as an elite in the late 19th and early 20th centul)' with the onset
of the gunnery revolution. Their high standing had been derived in large part from the importance
12 Padfiel~ Guns at~ 22S. Also see John Testuro Sumi~ In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance.
Technology, and British Naval Polic;y 1889-1914 (London: Routledge 1989), 74-75.
1J Sumida lists three major weaknesses in the dumaresqlVickers clock combination: poor visibility could obstruct
the necessary ranS,e readings, the range rate itself was inaccurate, and data had to be transferred manually out of
the Vickers clock, because its output was too weak to drive a data transmitter, ""file Quest for Reac~" IS.
14 Sumi~ In Defence of Naval Supremacy. It is worth noting that Sumida follows Pollen's terminology and uses
"change of range rate,n to mean "the rate of change of the range" (velocity). For clarity, I avoid "change of range
rate" because to the modem reader it might also suggest "the rate at which the change of range is changing"
(acceleration), thereby causing confusion.
I~ Sunli~ In Defence of Naval Supremacy, 133, idem., "The Quest For Reach," 28.
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of human marksmanship. Pollen's work... reduced the significance of human intelligence, training,
skill, and the courage that was required to perform complicated tasks while under fire." 16
Comparing Pollen and Dreyer's equipment is complex and contentious, especially because
Dreyer eventually incorporated several Pollen innovations. Still, both established a fundamental
reliance on feedback: a cycle of correction and recorrection through the machine, aimed at
estimating the critical values of target course and speed. These values themselves formed the
foundation ofanother feedback loop, that of firing and spotting. In fact - and this point was
much misunderstood during the debate on these systems - the computing mechanisms did not
seek to provide a complete solution, but rather to factor out the relative motion of firing ship and
target. 17 Automatic control compensated for the relative motion of the ships to cancel it out of the
gunnery spotting feedback loop. Thus, "the target could be regarded as motionless," in Pollen's
words, "exactly as if the firing ship and target were standing still." 18
The dominance of British fire control began to erode in May, 1916 at the battle of Jutland.
In this, the largest Naval battle of World War I, British and Gennan main battle fleets engaged at
ranges from 14,000 to 18,000 yards. The British, with all their equipment, achieved less than three
per cent hits - an embarrassing and potentially scandalous perfonnance. The conditions of the
battle exposed the fatal weakness of the Dreyer table: its inability to account for changes in the
rate of change of range. The single British ship equipped with a Pollen system turned in the best
shooting accuracy. ''Never has the potential power of naval force" Pollen wrote of Jutland, "stood
in so sharp a contrast with its actual efficiency in war." The Admiralty recognized their mistake; a
subsequent investigation privately criticized the Dreyer table as inadequate. 19 By this time the
Royal Navy had a great deal of practical experience with fire control equipment but an elegant,
workable solution would come only in the 1920s. By the~ however, Americans had drawn their
own lessons from British technology and from Jutland and developed competing technologies.
16 Sumi~ In Defence of Naval Supremacy, 333,217-219. Padfield., Guns at Sea. 226
17 ''Target r:mge," i.e. that calculated by the syste~ was quite different from "gun r:mge," which included
corrections for various ballistics factors (as well as wind) and actually set the guns. Pollen himselfbelieved that
only spotting shell splashes, and not rangefinding equipmen~ could detennine gun range. Without fire control,
however, spotting would have to find both gun range and the target's motion simultaneously -literally shooting
at a moving target.
18 Arthur Hungerford Pollen to Lieut. Reginald E. Gillmor, April 14, 1916. Pollen Papers, courtesy John Sumida.
Padfield, Guns at Sea, 226.
19 Arthur Hungerford Polle~ in Land and Water, August 17, 1916. Surni~ "The Quest For Reach," 36.
45
American Fire Control Before World War I
Despite its problems, in World War I the Royal Navy's fire control was more sophisticated
than United States Navy. The Americans were beginning to make their own progress, however,
and Jutland provided a window for new ideas. In 1905, a Fire Control Board within the US Navy,
which included Admiral Sims, had fonnally advocated direc,1or firing. The board recommended "a
system of fire control and a system of information," where "system of information" meant data
transmission between fire control operators. The board's report laid special emphasis on
communications and on operators' interaction with machinery:
It is considered as an essential that the system ofcommunicating ranges and deflections to
the guns be rapid and continuous and that the ranges and deflections be made to appear on
an indicator directly in/ront ofthe eyes of the sight setter when he is at his station...Means
are essential for conununicating regular battle-orders direct from the fire control stations to
each gun controlled therefrom.
In the years before World War I, with a boost from another Fire Control Board in 1910, fire
control in the US Navy began to take shape. The Naval Academy began teaching fire control in
1911.20
American plotting rooms contained a plotting board, instruments for reading wind, speed,
and course corrections, and means for sending data to the turrets (often voice tubes or
telephones). Officers manually plotted data on a chart as it came from the aloft: director. As data
points accumulated, the officers read off target bearing and speed. They visually averaged the
data, eliminating spurious readings and errors and carefully observing trends. Then target bearing
and speed were entered into instruments essentially similar to the British dumaresq plus Vickers
clock arrangement. 21 From the output of these calculators, the officers in the plotting room
figured firing solutions and sent them to the guns. In contrast, the more automated British system
conveyed orders from the director in the foretop to the guns, with the plotting room playing a
supporting role. 22
Officers in the plotting room on American vessels served as "integrators" in both senses of
the word: (1) gathering data from distributed sources and integrating it into a center of calculation
and (2) integrating mathematically, averaging and smoothing the data with their eyes to eliminate
20 Fire Control Board quoted in Friedman, US Naval Weapons, 28. Wilbur R Van Auken. Notes on a Half Century
of United States Naval Ordnance 1880-1930 (Washington: George Banta Publishing, (939), 20.
21 Norman Friedman, U.S. Naval Weapons: EveD' Gun, Missile, Mine and Torpedo Used by the U.S. NaVY from
1883 to the Present Day (London: Conway Maritime Press, (983),27.
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error. This role reflects a "strong link" role of humans in automation: they make subtle and high-
level judgments beyond the capability of the machine. Where a "weak link" vision seeks to replace
people with automation, a "strong link" approllch seeks to improve communications, between
operators and between operators and machines. As the 1905 Fire Control Board had reported, "a
method which would pennit orders being received by the sense of sight rather than hearing would
be preferable," but only telephones and voice tubes were available at the time. 23 Voice was an
imperfect medium, especially compared to instruments which made information visible. To link its
strong-link operators, the board chose writing over speech.
\Vith several years of neutrality before entering World War I, the American navy had time
to catch up in technology. Between 1914 and 1917 it modernized its fleet, brought its fire control
closer to British standards, and sowed seeds for its own control technologies. Before 1916, the
US Navy did not generally recognize director fire as a significant improvement over individually
controUed pointer fire. Intelligence from the war in Europe, however, began to change that view,
------and-the-battle-of-Jutland-drove-the-point-home.~While.-the-British-stilLhad-superior-equipment,
they also a more rigid hierarchy and a more traditional institutional culture whose resistance to
outsiders (like Pollen) hindered innovation. The Americans' relative backwardness made them
more receptive to new solutions. A small group of line officers within the Bureau of Ordnance
became the driving force behind fire control in the United States. With no expertise internal to the
Navy, they had to import technical skill from outside the service (and outside the country), and
maintain control of that expertise. To establish independence and leadership in fire control, BuOrd
fused naval experience with American manufacturing.
The Bureau ofOrdnance
In the US Navy, the Bureau of Ordnance had primary responsibility for fire control
systems, with its Fire Control Section. This group, led by naval line officers who were not
necessarily engineers, specified equipment, let contracts, supervised manufacturers, and oversaw
the installation and operation of fire control in the fleet. In effect, these officers formed a
technology agency for naval control systems. Before considering the navy's efforts to control and
direct this technology, however, we must first understand something of the organization of the
22 Furlong "Development of Fire Control." Fri~ U.S. Naval Weapons, 27.
2J Quoted inFri~ US Naval Weapons, 28.
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navy and how technical responsibility divided up among its bureaus. Who were the officers in
charge of fire control? What was their background and experience? What were their goals?
A modem navy consists two units: operating forces, "the fleet," which sail the seas and
fight battles, and a logistics or support structure, which builds, staffs and supplies the fleet. By the
mid-nineteenth century, naval t~hnolog-.Y' had advanced to the point where the skills (both
personal and institutional) required for logistics largely differed from those required for
operations. In the words ofMatthew Fontaine Maury "shipbuilding and ship sailing are entirely
distinct and separate professions.,,25 In 1842 Congress established "the Bureau system," of naval
organization, dividing the support functions of the navy among five bureaus: Yards and Docks;
Construction., Equipment, and Repair; Provisions and Clothing, Ordnance and Hydgrography;
Medicine and Surgery. In 1862, the structure adjusted to eight Bureaus from the original five
adding, for example, the Bureau of Steam Engineering. Hydrography moved into the Bureau of
Navigation, thus creating the Bureau of Ordnance. With few changes (e.g. the addition of the
bureau of aeronautics), the bureau system remained largely the same until 1947 - minor
alterations considering the extent of technological change during those hundred years.
The responsibilities and authority of each bureau, known officially as "cognizance," were
hotly contested. Originally, the Secretary defined cognizance, but in 1909 the Attorney General
ruled that only congressional appropriation could define the bureaus' assignments. In theory, the
bureaus reported to the Secretary of the Navy, but in practice they lobbied congress directly for
their money, bypassing the Secretary. The Bureaus themselves had a great deal of discretion
allocating funding - a significant source of power. Operating forces of the navy then, had very
little say over their ships, weapons, and supplies. The bureau system was never popular with the
navy's front-line forces. 26
The Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd for short), however, lived in a slightly more rational
world. The other Bureaus (save one) consisted of officers from the navy Staff Corps, often
specialized enginee~.ng professionals. The Bureau of Ordnance, however, employed line officers,
men from the fleet with gunnery credentials. This arrangement brought field experience into
24 Van Auke~ Notes on HaIfa Century of Naval Ordnance, 23,27.
2j Quoted in Julius Augustus Furer, Administration of the NaVY Department in World War II (Washington: United
States Navy, 1959), 196.
~urer, Administration of the NaVY Department 205-6.
48
harmony with weapons development and procurement. It also had a disadvantage: the officers of
BuOrd, who rotated between sea (juty and staffjobs, did not have engineering or management
expertise in the dtsign and construction ofweapons as did Staff officers in other bureaus (in, for
example, shipbuilding). The officers ofBuOrd, then, while knowledgeable of operations, had to
rely on outside sources of technical skill to implement their ideas.
BuOrd had cognizance over developing and building the navy's guns, as well as
production and procurement, including the massive amount ofammunition required in wartime.
Internally, the bureau had a number of divisions, including technical, research, industrial,
maintenance and operating, and civil. These divided funher into sections, including guns, turrets,
torpedoes, armor, gun mounts, mines, powder, contracts, patents, and personnel. BuOrd had its
own facilities, including the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, the Naval Gun Factory (at the
Washington Navy Yard), the Naval Proving Ground (in Dahlgren, Virginia) and a number of
other factories (many run by private contractors). These assets contained significant expertise in
traditional naval crafts; for new technologies the Bureau depended on private industry for much of
its design, development, and production.
To incorporate private technology into the fleet, a Naval Inspector of Ordnance (NIO),
usually a gunnery officer on rotatio~ monitored production at each manufacturer and served as a
liaison between the Bureau and the contractor. In the words ofa BuOrd Chief, "A good inspector
must combine the functions ofconfessor, advisor, stimulator, and if need be, a spur. In simple
words, it is up to the inspector to put the Prod into Production. ,,27 The naval inspectors embodied
the technical exchange between the government and its contractors: they brought requirements
and specifications from the navy to the company, and sent design and production data in the other
direction. Thus the naval inspectors provide a rich resource for the historian; their correspondence
with the bureau paint a detailed picture of industry's role in naval technology. The NIO was by no
means a neutral observer; he directly represented the all-powerful customer and could halt
payments for unacceptable work. Still, the NlO, stationed in the factory, participating in its daily
life, and working with the problems of production, often articulated a more honest appraisal of
working conditions than the company staff: who always tried to represent themselves in the best
possible light to the navy.
27 Admiral William H. P. Blandy, quoted in Furer, Administration of the Navy Department 326.
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During World War I, the U.S. Navyfe;~;~~~Pl~~ than 500,000, and
the Bureau of Ordnance grew by a similar factor of ten. The fire control section grew from one
officer and one clerk to seven officers and eight support staff Commander F.e. Martin headed the
section until July 1917, when he was replaced by Commander Wilbur R. Van Auken, who
remained until nearly the end of the war when Commander William R. Furlong took over. 28
Because of these very rotations, the bureau had to rely on stable companies to provide continuous
expertise in the new technology.
In the early twentieth century, stearn and steel technologies matured and the reverse
salient of naval warfare shifted to gunnery. It also saw the golden age of the battleship, and naval
strategy and tactics revolved around its striking power. Thus the Bureau of Ordnance and its
professional "gunnery officers," stood on the forefront of the Navy's mission. Despite the rise of
submarines and aircraft, until World War II gunnery remained an elite occupation, colloquially
known as the "gun club," both highly technical and intimately involved with fighting the enemy.29
To an increasing degree, gunnery officers in the plotting room actually fought naval battles-
they aimed the big guns and carried the prestige of the marksman. Within gunnery, powder, shell,
and gun technology matured, and the reverse salient shifted to fire control.
Sperry Enters the Field
The Sperry Gyrocompass
In 1909 and 1910, inventor Elmer Sperry built a gyrocompass which eliminated problems
of the magnetic compass by pointing to "true north" instead of magnetic north. 30 The spinning
gyro sensed the rotation of the earth and aligned itself to the earth's rotational axis without regard
to magnetic fields. By 1911, Elmer Sperry completed a gyrocompass and tested it for the U.S.
Navy aboard one of its first dreadnought battleships, the Delaware (also the first US ship to
2S u.s. Bureau ofOrdnarace, Departmeot of the Navy, Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Ordnance Activities: World War
1917-1918 (Washington, 1920), lSI.
29 Arleigh Burke, for example, a World War II hero and post-war Chief of ~lava1Operations, served as gunnery
officer aboard the ~uizo~ (BuOrd's gunnery officers first look charge of nuclear weapons when they entered the
navy in the late 19405). David Alan Rosenberg, "Officer Development in the Interwar Navy: Arieigb Burke -The
---------------------------------&1a1(-.og of -3- Navar ProfessTonaf:I9T9-1940:n -P-acilicHiSiOOcarRCViewrr97S). ------------ --------------------
lO For problems of the magnetic compass, see British Admiralty, Technical History Sectio~ 'The Development of
the Gyrocompass Prior to and During the War," October, 1919, Pamphlet TIl 20,3. Courtesy Jon Su'llida. For
early gyrocompass history in Gennany, see Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of
Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 34-35.
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implement director firing). The Delaware trial defined the personal core of the Sperry Gyroscope
Company and its close ties to the navy. Hannibal Ford, Sperry's Chief Engineer, supervised the
installation. At the Boston Navy Yard, Ford met two enthusiastic young men who had
responsibility for the trials. Ensign Reginald E. "Foxy" Gillmor, originally from Menominee,
Wisconsin, had graduated from the Naval Academy in 1907. Electrician petty officer Thomas
Morgan, "a square hewn-country boy from North Carolina," joined the navy after high school. 31
Both had good electrical skills and they backed Sperry's new device. In 1912, Gillmor and
Morgan left the navy and joined Sperry Gyroscope; both would eventually become president of
the company. The gyrocompass performed well on the Delaware, and the navy immediately
ordered six units from Sperry Gyroscope for dreadnoughts and submarines.
The Sperry gyrocompass was an observer: it sensed the heading of the ship and displayed
it to the crew, but articulated no further motion. It corrected errors arising from the course,
speed, and latitude of the ship - operations similar to those involved in fire control calculations.
A "follow up" or "phantom," a feedback device, which automatically tracked the movement of the
sensitive element of the gyro, amplifying its signal without drawing power and affecting its
accuracy. The follow-up servo could drive any number of"repeater compasses," located
anywhere around a ship and wired to a single central gyrocompass, exactly replicating its
reading.32
With the navy's help, Sperry developed his invention into a practical system and a viable
commercial product, the Sperry Gyrocompass for ships, installing it on more than 700 ships
worldwide by 1920.33 The product brought Sperry Gyroscope not only commercial success, but
also valuable marine engineering experience and a pattern of contact and technical exchange with
Naval officers. The Sperry Gyrocompass, with its ability to track "true north" as opposed to the
unreliable "magnetic north," had obvious advantages for piloting and navigation at sea. Both the
merchant marine and the navy recognized these benefits, but the latter had an additional, unique
interest in the device. Repeater compasses, because they transmitted a solid heading reference to
various points in the ship, could aid in gunlaying. The gyrocompass, with its stable heading and
]1 "Sperry: The Corporation" Fonune, May, 1940.
32 Hughes, Elmer Spem, 146. Patent Nos. 1,2SS,480~ 1,296,440.
l] Hughes, Elmer Speny, 241.
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connected repeaters, formed the reference point for a fire control system. Repeater technology
could do even more.
Ever since the Delaware trial, Elmer Sperry had been thinking about fire control. The
same system which transmitted compass readings from the master gyro to its repeaters could also
transmit fire control information from the director to the plotting room and the turrets. By 1914
Sperry introduced a system of repeaters, based on his gyrocompass repeaters, to transmit data for
fire control, communicating target bearing and turret train to and from the plotting room. 34 Gyro
repeaters replaced unreliable and error-prone voice-tube communications with a system of visual
data.
Technology Transfer from England
Sperry's early tire control work did not compare to British technology in sophistication.
Fire control novice Sperry Gyroscope, however, had a valuable source of intelligence in England
which allowed it to incorporate the Royal Navy's experience. In 1913, Reginald Gillmor and Tom
Morgan went to London, were they founded Sperry Gyroscope's British subsidiary, the Sperry
Gyroscope Company Ltd. From England, Gillmor corresponded regularly with Elmer Sperry. The
inventor frequently asked Gillmor's opinions, and he would write detailed reports which Sperry
distributed to his naval contacts. In 1916, Gillmor reported about Jutland and the role of the
Sperry Gyrocompass in the engagement. 3S Gillmor proved so knowledgeable in these matters, and
had developed so many contacts within the Admiralty, that in April 1917 he returned to the navy
as Flag Secretary on the staff of Admiral Sims, who served as the US Navy liaison in London.
Gillmor conducted a technical survey of European fire control systems and sent it to
Sperry. Gillmor was also closely in touch with Arthur Pollen and sent Sperry details of the
Englishman's work and opinions on naval strategy and tactics. Gillmor felt Sperry Gyroscope
should license and manufacture Pollen's system. A twenty-four page memo from Gillmor, dated
August 1, 1916, compared the tactical and technical issues of British versus American fire control
with a clarity unsurpassed in any BuOrd documents of the time. Sperry passed the memo on to
).t Elmer A. Sperry (hereafter referred to as EAS) to BuOrd, March 14, J.914. RG 74 National Archives and
Records Administration, Suitland, Maryland (hereaftet" referred to as RG 74) E-30 Box 587 Subject 29758 Folder
I-SO.
lS Gillmor to EAS, June 16, 1916, and EAS to J. Stra~ Chief of BuOrd, July 17, 1916, including excerpts from
Gillmor's letter. RG 74 E-30 Box 586 Subject 29758 Folder 101-150.
the bureau.36 Through what Elmer Sperry called "channels which insured their freedom from
censorship" Gillmor transferred fire control technology from the Royal Navy to Sperry
Gyroscope.37
The Sperry Fire Control System
Gillrnor's communications, combined with Sperry's own contacts, gave Sperry Gyroscope
an initial lead among American companies adapting the technology to the U. S. Navy.38 In 1916
the company introduced a complete system, the "Sperry Fire Control System," with a central
plotting machine, the "Battle Tracer." The Sperry Battle Tracer plotted on paper the observed and
predicted course ofboth the "own ship" and the target, allowing a gunnery officer to read the
bearing for his guns to fire [*Figure 2-2: Battle tracer]. Although less sophisticated than the
Pollen system in its firing solution, the Battle Tracer used more advanced electrical transmission.
The mathematics were not complicated, but the inputs came from varying sources and in varying
forms. The Sperry Battle Tracer and Fire Control system integrated a diverse array of factors into
a single graphical representation of the field ofbattle. The U.S. Navy liked the Sperry system
because it was lighter, less bulky, and simpler than Pollen's, and also ofdomestic origin.39
A set of 1916 Sperry Gyroscope bulletins describes the fire control system in detail. The
Battle Tracer itself formed but one part ofa larger set of equipment "designed to concentrate the
control ofall gunfire at one point, causing the entire battery of the ship to operate as a single
unit." The system included rangefinders and target bearing telescopes to transmit range and
bearing of the target from the foretop to the plotting room. [*Figure 2-3: Battle Tracer system
diagram]. The ship's gyrocompass provided own ship's heading as a reference to resolve other
readings into "true course" bearings. Two "Revolution Transmitters" logged the rate at wrel1n the
ship's propeUers turned; a "Revolution Converter" averaged these rates, corrected them for tides
and currents, and sent an estimate ofown ship's speed to the Battle Tracer. These instruments of
J6 "Mr. Gillmorts Report - Result ofbis Investigations," RG 74, E-2S, Box S86, 297581110.
37 EAS to Lieut. Comdr. F.C.~ August 31, 1916. EAS Papers, Hagley Museum and Library (hereafter
referred to as EAS Papers), Box 32, Lt Logan Cresap Fire Control Correspondence folder.
31 Sperry was also a friend of Admiral Bradley Fiske, credited with an early invention of director firing. The two
men had pateoted a device for "automatic gun pointing," in 1914. Patent 110. 1,238.503.
39 W.R Auken to EAS, March 4, 1917. EAS Papers, Box 32, W.R. Auken folder.
perception brought data into the plotting room; other devices allowed the gunnery officers to
articulate commands to the gun crews in the turrets.4O
In the plotting room, four motors moved the Battle Tracer across a plotting table to draw
own ship and target ship courses over time. These motors corresponded to four variables: own
ship's heading, own ship's speed, target bearing, and target range. A "Contact Clock" sent a
signal to the Battle Tracer once a minute to depress its pens to paper and plot the current data
(this clock provided only the time baseline for the system to mark on the plot; it did not perform
any of the ranging or prediction that clocks perfonned in the Pollen system). A manually operated
protractor-like device attached to the tracer to extrapolate target course into the future to
calculate the lead necessary to compensate for the projectile's time of flight. The gunnery officer
in the plotting room read the firing solution off the instrument and manually entered turret train
(i.e. turret rotation) into the Target Turret Transmitter by a hand crank. This value then appeared
on the Turret Train Receiver in the turret itself: where the operator saw desired position in the
form of an arrow, and actual turret position as a cartoon of the turret on the dial., "a visual means
of comparing the designated train with the actual train of the turret. n His only job, then, was to
"follow the pointer" and bring the two dials into coincidence - the human operator thus closed a
feedback loop, moving the turret with visual feedback. A Turret Train Transmitter, which meshed
with the gear teeth on the rack that turned the turret, sensed actual turret train. This data went
back to the gunnery officers in the plotting room, as a "return check" to visually ensure the turrets
were properly trained before firing - another feedback loop.41
The Battle Tracer was a literary technology - it not only calculated and integrated on
paper, but also r~rded the battle in writing, "to make a permanent chart record of the conditions
throughout an entire maneuver." Recording furnished "practically a bird' s eye view of the
engagement and maneuvers involved,'" and it monitored the perfonnance of subordinates,
"carelessness on the part of any of the operators of the fire instruments... are immediately
shown.,,42 Sperry's pamphlet emphasized the units' integration:
40 See also Patent DOS. 1,356,505, "System of Gunfire Control;" 1,2IS,42S, "Plotting-Indicator;'" 1,296,439,
"Multiple-Turret Target-lndieato~" (all Elmer A. Sperry).
41 "Turret Control Equipment," Bulletin 303, 1916. Sperry Gyroscope Company Papers, Box 33.
42 "The Sperry Fire Control System," BulJetin 304, 1916. SGC, Box 33. See also Patent DO. 1,293,747, "Battle
Tracer."
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Certain of these units or subdivisions of this Fire Control System may be installed to
advantage without the rest of the system, but to obtain the maximum operating efficiency it
is desirable to install the entire equipmen~ as the units are closely related and the results
obtained from any one unit become more valuable when combined with the results that are
contributed by other units.43
This passage presents an early example of what would later be called systems engineering,
emphasizing the interconnection of the components and their synergistic efficiency when operated
in concert. Still, Sperry's sense of competition rings in this statement. In the development of
"systems thinking, n integrating systems could be as much a marketing strategy as a technical one.
"The individual components ynll work," the company seemed to tell its customers, "but not nearly
as well as ifyou buy the whole thing." In 1916 this threat became real, as competitors built
_____ ~ui~ment to fit into and replace the Sperry system.
-----------=------=-_._---------_.
In early 1915, Sperry Gyroscope installed a Battle Tracer aboard the battleships Utah,
New York, and Arkansas for testing at no cost to the government and they employed the tracer
during maneuvers in 1915-16. Since the device primarily tracked the course of its own ship, with
only limited ability to track a target, the fleet found it more useful for navigation than for fire
control. In general, they saw it as a "dead reckoning instrument...of the greatest assistance as an
aid to navigation."44 The commander of the New Yark noted "the apparatus requires an
attendant to keep it from running otT the table under some circumstances," and that it was unlikely
to remain in operation during a battle due to the exposed nature of its optical instruments. Still,
the New York did use the device for fire control exercises, and was able to obtain from it the
course and speed of a target Ship.4~ The general consensus among the ships employing the Battle
Tracer was that it had potential but needed more engineering. The navy was less interested in the
Battle Tracer itself than in the transmission instruments, put together into a "follow-the-pointer in
train" system. By the end of the war, the navy bought only 20 Battle Tracers for its battleships,
but several hundred Target Bearing Transmitters, Target Turret Indicators and transmitters, and
Turret Train Transmitters.46
43 "The Speny Fire Control Syste~n Bulletin 304, 1916. SOC, Box 33.
44 Capt. Albert Gleaves (USS Utah> to Secretary of the Navy, and BuOrd., June I, 1915. RG 74 Box 587 Subject
29758, Folder I-SO.
4S Lieul Palmer (Commanding Officer, USS New York) to BoOrd, July 14, 1915. Commander, New York to
Commander, Battleship Division 6, August 2, 1916. RG 74 Box 587 Subject 297S8, Folder 101-150.
46 U.S. Bureau of Ordnance, Naval Ordnance Activities, 152.
S5
Sperry system dealt only with target bearing and guns' train (or rotation), not with target
range or gun elevation. In 1915 the commander of the New York suggested developing "a range
keeper which would utilize the course and speed of the enemy," and the following year again
recommended "fitting to the tracer an automatic range projection feature which will show the
components of motion in the line of fire, or of ship and target, also the components at right angles
to the line of fire for deflection." Gillmor suggested a similar device in his 1916 memo to Elmer
Sperry.47 The bureau not only agreed with these suggestions, it had already started a program to
build this new "range keeper," in a program at a spin-off company of Sperry Gyro~..-:ope that
would grow to dwarf the company's efforts in fire control. This device emerged directly from
Sperry's Gyroscope's fire control work when, in 1914, the company's chief engineer, Hannibal
Ford, left to ,..,"'rt his own firm. Ford had been the company's first employee~ he had played an
instrumental role designing Sperry's gyrocompass; he had invented the Battle Tracer. 48
The Ford Instrument Company
Hannibal Choate Ford (no relation to Henry Ford), whom Vannevar Bush called "about as
ingenious an individual as I ever heard ot:" was born in Dryden, New York, in 1887. He later
lived in Cortland, New York, Elmer SpefT'j's home town, and his older brother had been a friend
of the young Sperry. Ford's father published the local newspaper, and Hannibal got his
introduction to machinery in the press room and on the precision lathe of the local jeweler. He
attended Cornell University, studied electrical and mechanical engineering, and met Sperry for the
first time at a gathering of the Institute for Electrical Engineers in Niagara Falls in 1903. The two
got on well and kept in touch during the following years while Ford held a number of different
engineering jobs. In a series of posts before and after college, Ford patented speed control devices
for the Nevv York City subways, worked for several different companres designing typewriter
mechanisms, and at Westinghouse as a tool maker. Ford possessed a special mechanical talent
augmented by an enthusiasm for machinery and fine shop skills. 49
47 Lieut. Palmer (Commanding Officer, USS New York) to HuOrd, July 14, 1915. RG 74 Box--S87SJibjeei29758,
Folder 51-100. Commander, New York to Commander, Battleship Division 6, August 2, 1916. RG 74 Box 587
Subject 297S8, Folder IOI-ISO. "Mr. Gillmor's Report - Result of his Investigations."
48 Patent no. 1,293,747, "Batt1e Tracer," Hannibal Choate Ford assignor to the Sperry Gyroscope Company.
49 Vannevar Bush, Pieces oCthe Action (New York: Morrow, 1970) 183. RF. Jahn, ~Employees Honor Hannibal
C. Ford" Spenyscope12 (00. 2), Summer 1950. pp. 11-12. Roswell Ward, "Hannibal For~ Sperry Pioneer"
.5..oerryscooe 9 (no. 11), March, 1943. pp. 12-13. Also see RF. Jahn, "Employees Honor Hannibal Ford,"
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Unsatisfied in his early engineering jobs, Ford corresponded with Elmer Sperry on matters
of mechanical design for gyroscopes. In 1909, Sperry hired Ford as a design engineer. While at
Sperry Gyroscope, Ford worked closely with Elmer Sperry, helping him perfect the gyrocompass
and designing much of!h~ company's fire control instrumentation. Yet Ford had higher ambitions
and left Sperry in 1914. The following year, with investors Jules Breuchaud and J.B. Goldsboro
and $50,000 in capital, he organized the Ford Marine Appliance Corporation. I"ater accounts
describe Ford's aims for the new company as the exclusive design offire control instruments, but
documents from the company itself suggest it had originally intended to manufacture the Carrie
Gyro Compass, a British device, to compete with Sperry Gyroscope in its core business (although
a gyrocompass could be considered a fire control instrument).5o The navy's needs, however, and
their confidence in Ford's skills, soon changed these plans.
By 1915, the navy was installing Sperry Gyroscope's folJow-the-pointer in train
instruments throughout the fleet, and employing the Vickers clock as a means to determine and
follow range. 51 To solve the clock's problem ofcontinuous change of range rate, and at the
urging of the fleet officers who had tested the Battle Tracer, the navy requested proposals from
both Ford Marine Appliance and Sperry Gyroscope, "to develop a more efficient method of
maintaining the Range in action than at the present time. ,,52 In May of 1915, both companies
Spemscooe 12 (no. 2), Swnmer, 1950, Hannibal For<L ObituaJy, New York Times March 19, 1955, Ford
Instrument Company, Division of the Sperry Corporation, "News Releaase: For Release in the Event of Mr. Ford's
Death." The connection between printing and fire control may be more than coincidence: Arthur Pollen's company
had originally manufactured newspaper equipment; see Swni~ In Defence of Naval Sucrernag': Finance,
Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (London: Routledge, (989) 77. After Wolrd War II, to convert
its wartime production capacity to civilian use, the Ford Instrument Company began prociucing printing machines,
largely based on its fire control technology. William Newell, interview with author, on May 12, 1995. For an
anectodal account of the Ford Instrument Company, see Quentin Reynolds and Wilfrid S. Rowe, Operation Success
(New York: DueU, Sloan, and Pearce, 1957) Chapter IS, uThe Father of Weapons Control," 153-60.
so Ford Instrument Company, uReport on Organziation and War Activities of the Ford Instrument Company, Inc.,"
June, 1919. RG 74 E-2S Box 2740, Subject Filt 36276/110, mentions that Navy interest "necessitated the
abandonment of commercial projects then underway, including the manufacture of the Carrie Gyro Compass, and
other work in which the company was engaged." This document was the source for the infonnation on Ford
Instrument in Bureau of Ordnance, NaVY Ordnance Activities, 159. The book does not mention the Carrie
compass, but has been the source for the majority of the scant historical material on Ford Instrument. For a
description of the Carrie Gyro Compass V5. the Sperry model, see British Admiralty, 'lhe Development of the
Gyrocompass Prior to and During the War," 7.
Sl The Na~ purchased more than 400 Vickers Clock Mark lIs during World War I. U.S. Bureau of Ordnance,
Naval Ordnance Activities, 152.
S2 BuOrd to Secretary of the Navy, June 3, 1915. RG 74, E-30 Box 587, Subject File 29758, Folder 1-50.
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submitted proposals, Sperry's for a "Range Clock," and Ford's for a "Range and Deflection
Predictor."
Documents in the Sperry archives reveal a curious collusion between the two companies.
The week before submitting its proposal, Ford Marine Appliance entered into a licensing
agreement with Sperry Gyroscope to make Battle Tracers and sell them to the navy in conjunction
with its new machine. Ford, even though he assigned the Battle Tracer patent to Sperry
Gyroscope, may have had an agreement to receive royalties on the device from his old employer.
Perhaps as insurance against losing the competition. Ford licensed the Sperry Range Clock as
------·---well~-Two-years-late-r;Ford-released-hi-s-interest-in-the-Battle-Tra-cer,-an-d-licen-se-d-his-own
Rangekeeper to Sperry Gyroscope (which never produced them). These arrangements suggest a
spirit of healthy competition between Sperry and Ford, rather than resentment at the split. ElDier
Sperry loudly voiced his opinions when he ttlOUght his patents were violated, but no documents
betray a bad word about Hannibal Ford, other than a mild jealousy of his success. 53
The Blureau chose to purchase one each of the Sperry and Ford machines, "to encourage
competition in working out future development along this line." This decisio~ coming less than
six months after Ford founded his company, implies the navy had encouraged him from the start
to compete with Sperry Gyroscope because of the service's aversion to single-supplier
technologies. 54 They probably became nervous about depending on Sperry Gyroscope's
monopoly in the American gyrocompass market and had originally intended Ford to compete in
that arena. In any case, Ford Marine Appliance quickly abandoned its gyrocompass plans and
regrouped in response to the navy's interest in range predictors. In late 1915, a new finn, the Ford
Instrument Company, with 5250,000 capital, absorbed Ford Marine Appliance. In its official
announcement, the new company dedicated itself to "the inventions of Mr. Ford, in the line of
scientific instruments and automatic machines involving mathematical and technical problems,
intricate mechanism, epicyclic gearing, electrical devices, etc." - technical euphemisms for fire
~3 License agreement between Ford and Sperry for Battle Tracer, May 4, 1915. Licence agreement between Ford
and Sperry for Range Clock, JuJy 7, 1915. sac, AC #1915, Box 67, "Ford Instrument Company Patents."
Thompson to EAS, February 27, 1919 rmd December 1, 1919. sac Box 32 Folder Fire Control Patents and
Hannibal Ford Interference. Contrast this situation with that of Carl Norde~ who quit Sperry Gyroscope in 1913 to
manufacture bombsights for the Navy. "Sperry took Norden's resignation as a personal affront, beginning a half
century of conflict between the Sperry Company and Norden. Sperry felt he had taught Norden everything he knew
about gyroscopes and therefore should share in any of Norden's future patents." Stephen L. McFarlancL America's
Pursuit of Precision Bombing 1910-1945 (Washington: Smithsonian Instiution Press, 1995), SO.
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control. The new company's logo was built around a differential gear. Breuchaud remained as
president, and Goldsboro as treasurer, with additional management, "men of experience in large
financial and engineering ope. .Jtions." Hannibal Ford becam~ Vice President and General
Manager, reflecting his interest in the daily engineering and production of the company rather than
managing the business. The company established its factory and headquarters at 80 Lafayette
street in New York City.5s
In May of 1916, Sperry Gyroscope and Ford Instrument each demonstrated their new
range predictors to the navy. The Ford device, called the "Rangekeeper," was "entirely
successful," whereas, the inspector noted, the Sperry machine required more work. 56 Tests
showed the Ford Rangekeeper, "affords a means of rangekeeping far superior to present
methods.,,51 By July, a Ford delivered his rang~keeper to the fleet for testing. This was the same
spring as the Battle ofJutland, and reports trickling in from England (largely through Sperry's
Gillmor) underscored the need for a device which could continuously track the changing rate of
change of range.
The Ford Rangekeeper
Like the Dreyer Table, the Ford Rangekeeper struck the right combination ofautomation,
operator control, and credibility with the service. [*Figure 2-4: Ford Rangekeeper] In July of
1916 BuOrd fOlWarded the prototype to the battleship Texas, with a request for the fleet to
appoint a board ofgunnery officers to conduct sea trials, and report "as to its merits as compared
to the present methods ofrangekeeping."~1 Hannibal Ford personally installed and tested the
device. In early August, the Texas conducted trials, and the evaluation board, made up of gunnery
S4 BuOrd to Secretary of the Navy, June 3, 1915.
ss The Ford Instrument Company, Inc., "Announcement," n.d., received by BuOrd December 4, 1915. see R-F.
J~ "Employees Honor Hannibal Ford," incorrectly lists the date of reorganization as November, 1916, probably
intending the previous year. Ford Instrument Company, "Report on Organziation and War Activities," erroneously
lists the birth of Ford Instnunenl out of Ford Marine Appliance as JanlW)', 1915, which was actually the founding
of the latter.
56 Elmer Sperry to F.e. Marti~BuOrd, May 8, 1916. Naval Inspector of Ordnance to BuOr~ May 11, 1916
(witnessed Sperry Gyroscope rangekeeper). Naval Inspector of Ordnance to BuOrd, May 11, 1916 (witnessed Ford
Instrument Co. rangekeeper). RG 74 E-30 Box 587, Subject 29758, Folder 51-100. The Naval Inspector for these
trials was assigned to E.W. Bliss, Company, a manufacturer of torpedoes in New York. At this point neither Speny
nor Ford had enough Navy work to justify their own inspector, but soon thereafter a pennanent inspector was
assigned to both companies.
j1 BuOrd to Commaoder-In-Chief, Atlantic Reel, July 11, 1916. RG 74 E-30 Box 747 Subject 30309, Folder
Without Line Numbers. 1915-1917.
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lieutenants, filed a favorable report. Because the rangekeeper had manual inputs, it could act as a
calculator to simulate typical problems, "the Board worked a problem out on the machine giving
both firing and target ships' speeds of thirty knots and causing them to pass in opposite and
parallel courses...due to the constantly varying rate of change and change in deflection, this
problem could not be handled by any of the present methods." Hannibal Ford "5 hand is evident
here, because the problem the evaluation board worked out on the machine matches exactly,
down to the speed of the ships, with the one Ford included in his original proposal for the device.
The board further noted that, "The rangekeeper works out prfJblems with mathematical
accuracy," and emphasized the importance of the human operator, "Its value therefore depends
considerably upon the expertness of the operator and his skill in utilizing the data supported."
Unlike Pollen's system, which sought to eliminate this operator from the equation, Ford's system
left an important place for the experts. Who were the operators who would run this machine in
practice? The very gunnery lieutenants who comprised the evaluation board - pleased, no doubt,
that the success of the device depended on "an experienced operator.,,59 The board recommended
six or eight of the rangekeepers be supplied to the fleet as soon as possible, and that the machines
be employed continuously alongside existing manual methods of range plotting.
The Ford Rangekeeper quickly won the favor of the naval establishment. The Commander
in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet supported the evaluation board's recommendations to the Chief of
Naval Operations. The following month, Ford Instrument quoted a price 0[$100,000 to the navy
for delivery of nine Ford Rangekeepers within eight to ten months.60 Sperry Gyroscope enjoyed
no such luck. Its device did not become ready for testing until August of 1916, when the board's
report on the Ford machine had already been issued. Sperry did not demonstrate the device to
battleship officers until December, by which time contracts and production design for Ford's
machine were well underway.61 No further mention of the device exists in the bureau's records.
S8 BuOrd to Commander-In-ehief, Atlantic Fleet. July 11, 1916.
S9 Board to Test Ford Rangekeeper to Commander, Battleship F1ee~ "Test of Ford Rangekeeper," August 3, 1916.
See also the Official Report 'lfthe board to Commander, Battleship Fleet-August 28, 1916. RG 74 E-30 Box 743,
Subject 30309, Folder I-SO.
60 Conunander-In-Chief, Atlantic Fleet to Chief of Naval Operations, August 11, 1916. Ford Instrument Company
to ChiefofBuOrd, September 20, 1916. RG 74 E-30 Box 743, Subject 30309, Folder 1·50.
61 BuOrd to Battleship New York, August 2, 1916. EAS to Lieut. Comdr. F.C. Martin. December 2, 1916. RG 74
E-30 Box 586, Subject 29758, Folder 101·1S0. Sperry may have missed the yard period of the New York in
August, which was why it had to wait until December to demonstrate the device. battleship captains were willing to
help the bureau evaluate new technologies, but not if it meant holding their ships in port.
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1916 was a busy year for Sperry, as the Battle Tracer was just maturing and, as we shall see, the
company's data transmission instruments began to have significant problems.
After its summer trials, Ford instrument spent the winter of 1916-17 putting the
rangekeeper into production [~'Figure 2-5: Ford Rangekeeper production]. The device itself
incorporated much of the experience of British fire control, but with a mathematical precision and
mechanical elegance unmatched by anything of the time. For reliability, the rangekeeper's
calculations were almost entirely mechanical; the only electrical input came from the ship's
gyrocompass. Ford also made a point of the rangkeeper's only semi-automated calculation, "All
of the automatic features are under supervision of an attendant who is enabled to exercise a
certain amount of discretion in acceptance of incoming information and, in case of emergency or
any electrical trcuble with any part of the instrument, to operate the same manually." Ford
astutely perceived the technical core of the problem and automated it only to the degree
necessary. Perhaps he chose not to build a highly automated device in order to stay within his
young company's infant capability.
In 1917 a Royal Navy fire control expert visited the US and noted the Ford device "is very
similar to Pollen's clock and P0:isesS€s about the same merits and demerits when compared with
our system.,,62 In 1918, on the Louisian!b the US Navy compared the Pollen and Ford sytems
head-ta-head and found the two instruments equally accurate. The smaller and lighter Ford
machine was more difficult to maintain and much harder to use, having little of the automation of
the Pollen, "Any good man may be allowed to operate the Pollen even without an officer present
whereas no one should be allowed to touch the Ford excepting in the presence of an officer. n
While the Ford was new and "the ship's force have not sufficiently operated the Ford to feel fully
qualified to draw a comparison...at the present time they have considerably more confidence in the
Pollen than in the Ford.,,63 Clearly the Ford's success in the fleet did not derive from a radical
technical superiority, although the machine did hold its own in the comparison. The Pollen's
automation broadened the pool of potential users, just as the Ford's manual nature restricted users
to officers. Nonetheless, looking only at the artifact misses a key feature of the Ford Rangekeeper
62 Quoted inFri~ US Naval Weapons, 33.
63 Commanding Officer, Louisiana to Commander, Battleship Force One, "Pollen Fire Control Instruments,"
March 31,1919. RG 74 Box 345 Subject 28499.
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that made it attractive to BuOrd: it was domestic technology, produced by a supplier under total
control of the navy.
It is unclear where Ford got his understanding of the range problem, which closely
matched Pollen's. The navy's request for proposal does not survive in the bureau records. Much
of the inspiration for the Ford Rangekeeper's design undoubtedly grew from the specifications in
this request, as the Sperry Range Clock shared some similar features. The device embodied a
more sophisticated understanding of the fire control problem than Ford's previous fire control
project at Sperry Gyroscope. Somewhere, Hannibal Ford learned about British fire control. He
built a company selling that knowledge to the navy.
Feedback and Integration in The Ford Rangekeeper
To understand the basic mathematical problem of the rangekeeper, consider Figure 7
[·Figure 2-6: FRK Angles] (Also see Appendix 2-A for a detailed explanation). The own ship
does the firing (and contains the rangekeeper), shooting its guns at the target ship. The basic
problem is to use a series of range and bearing measurements to solve for the course and speed of
the target, which then can be extrapolated into the future to track the target's position as it
changes and to predict the position of the target. If a shell tired from the own ship takes a minute
to-reach-the-target;-then-the-target~s-course-must-be-estimated-for-a-minute-into-the-future-when---------­
the gun is fired. Similarly, if the target becomes obscured behind fog or smoke and its course and
speed are known, it can be continually tracked while not under visual observation.
The rangekeeper solves a series of equations to detennine the course and speed of the
target, from which it calculates present range, i.e. where the target is now, and advance range,
where the target will be at some time in the future. It takes as input the own ship's course, which
comes automatically from a repeater compass, the own ship's speed, which can be entered
manually or from a revolution transmitter connected to the ship's propellers. A target bearing
instrument, on the foretop measures the target bearing and sends it to the plotting room, where it
is entered into the rangekeeper either automatically or manually. In addition to these data, the
gunnery officer enters initial guesses for the factors the rangekeeper: target course and speed, and
target range, from "any source whatever, such as plotting board or Battle Tracer." The basic
operation of the machirle, then, consists of "tuning" these guesses, based on observed data, until
converging on a stable solution.
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Consider, for example, if the target ship's course speed as entered are correct. Then the
rangekeeper calculates, by integration, the expected range and bearing of the target as it changes
with time. If this calculated range and bearing does not match future observations of the target's
range and bearing (from the rangefinder, spotting, and the target bearing instrument), then the
estimated course and speed of the enemy are in error. The same holds true for deflection, and "we
can compare this range and bearing produced by integration with the range finder range and the
exact bearing from the target bearing instrument.,,64 In this way the estimated course and speed of
the enemy can be corrected until the calculated range and bearing matches observed data. The
result of this feedback process, then, is to produce an accurate course and speed of the enemy,
which may be used to predict its future position to set the guns.
This feedback cycle, of course, assumes the target's course and speed remain constant
long enough to converge on a solution. The assumption will hold for short periods of time during
a naval engagement. The Ford Rangekeeper, however, really comes into its own when the target
changes course. Assume that the system has been corrected and settled on a proper course and
speed. The operator overlaid dials, which indicate the calculated and observed speed and bearing
indicate the same value. [*Figure 2-7: Calculated and observed speed and bearing] When the
target changes course, those dials will diverge, immediately signaling the opera~or that a change
has occurred. If the system has already settled on a solution, the old course and speed serve as the
initial guesses for the new solution. Since, of course, the target cannot change its course and
speed instantaneously - in fact they change rather slowly - the old solution will likely be a
pretty 8fJod estimate for the new values, and the system will converge on a new solution fairly
quickly. Thus the rangekeeper and the operator can "track" the target as it changes direction, and
can solve for its new parameters continuously as they change.
In a sense, the Ford Rangekeeper combines into one instrument the British dumaresq and
Vickers clock, a fact not lost on the gunnery officers of the time. 6' The Ford adds a crucial
ingredient: mathematically accurate integration. The "Ford Integrator," as the mathematical
component became known, improved on Pollen's integrator. Consider the silnplest type of
64 Lieul. RM Terril, "Notes on the Theory of tile Ford Range Keeper," print issued by the U.S.S. New Mexico
Gunnery Department, c. 1919, National Archives, RG 38, Entry 178, Box 3, File Folder Conf. 59 (65), courtesy
Jon Tesuro Sumida, Christopher Wright.
6S Tenil, "Notes on the Theory of the Ford Range Keeper," 2.
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integrator, the wheel and disk type. [*Figure 2-8 : 3 types of integrators] Here the disk rotates at
a CJnstant speed, providing the time variable for integration. The wheel contacts the disk at a
right angle and rotates at a speed proportional to its distance from the center. If the wheel is close
to the center, it rotates relatively slowly, and ever faster as it moves toward the outside. The
function to be integrated, then, actuates the distance of the wheel from the center, and the rotation
of the wheel reflects the integral of that function. This setup works like a continuously variable
transmission, and is often referred to as a variable speed drive.
The wheel and disk integrator, however, has a problem: the wheel slips while in contact
with the disk. Hence this mechanism is relatively inaccurate, especially if the wheel drives a load;
to make the device useful in a calculating machine, it needs to drive other mechanisms. Lord
Kelvin created the "ball AIld cylinder" integrator in the 1870s on inspiration from his brother,
James Thompson. Kelvin probably suggested the device to Pollen personally in 1904, as Kelvin
selVed on the board of Pollen's Linotype Company and as a scientific mentor to Pollen.66 Here, a
ball contacts the disk and transmits its rotation to a cylinder which lies across it. Pollen
incorporated this device into his own machine, but it too has serious faults, most notably that the
ball is pressed to the disk only by gravity, and its own weight is not enough to preveni slipping.67
Hannibal Ford improved this device to eliminate this shortcoming and made it useful for numerous
computing tasks. He added another ball, which further reduced friction, 'and tight springs on the
cylinder bracket to hold the two balls firmly in place. This device could perfonn highly accurate
mechanical integration with sufficient force to drive mechanisms connected to its output. 6IJ The
integrator formed the central component in analog computers through World War II, and even
early digital computers were often referred to as "electronic integrators. n
HThe Secret Fire Control Design Section of/he u.s. Navy"
After the initial tests in the summer of 1916, Ford Instrument geared up for production
while the prototype rangekeeper remained on the Texas for further testing. The navy ordered
66 Swnida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, 78. Sumida (210) specuJales that Pollen might also have learned of the
mechanism from anotber British physicist, Charles Vernon Boys, who also advised him on fire control.
67 A.B. Clymer, "Mechanical Integrators,n M.S. Thesis., Ohio State University, 1946,20-22. Clymer was an
engineer at Ford Instrument See also A. Ben Clymer, wrhe Mechanical Analog Computers of Hannibal Ford and
William NeweU,n IEEE Annals ofthe History o/Computing 1S (no. 2, 1993) 19-22 and Allan G. Bromley,
"Analog Computing Devices," in William Aspray 00. Computing Before Computers (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State
University Press, 1990).
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more than twenty five Ford Rangekeepers at a cost of $8,000 eac~ intending to install four to six
units in each of its battleships. In July, 1917 installation began on first-line battleships, including
New York, Wyomin~ North Dakot~ Pennsylvani~ and Arizona. A new machine replaced the
prototype on the Texas (the prototype is likely now in the collection of the Naval Academy
museum). That same summer of 1917, Ford Instrument introduced a low-cost version., the
Rangekeeper Mark II, for $800. This device, nicknamed the "Baby Ford," included only the initial
stages of the calculation, where components ofthe own and target ship's motions are resolved
and added. From the course and speed of the own ship and that of the target ship, the
Rangekeeper Mark II solves for present range, range rate, and bearing rate only, it included no
integration, no prediction, and no feedback or correction. The Mark II began production in
August, 1917 and because of their simplicity and low cost the navy ordered Baby Fords for all its
battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and gunboats. The Bureau found both models ofFord
Rangekeepers "very reliable and [they] require little or no repair."69
From its introduction in 1916 until World War II, the Ford rangekeeper underwent a
number ofdifferent variations and mark numbers, although its core function remained essentially
the same: assimilating diverse data, eliminating contradictions and discrepancies, calculating
sighting for the guns, and maintaining a plotted record. 70 The Mark 8, introduced in the early
thirties, selVed as the primary rangekeeper for both battleships and cruisers up to and during
World War II. The Mark 8 differed little from the old Mark I machine in basic structure: it took
initial estimates of enemy course and speed, matched them with observed data, and allowed the
human operator to make corrections accordingly. By tracking the target, the rangekeeper
68 Patent DO. 1,317,915.
69 The production device became the Rangekeeper Mark I mod I, the mod number indicating minor modifications
made after the Texas tests.These modifications mostly entailed removing the automated input from the target
bearing transmitter and replacing it with a follow-the-pointer operatio~ thus making the machine "entirely
independent of all other apparatus.. .In other words, the machine is self-contained." F.e. Martin. BuOrd, to D.C.
Bingham (Fleet Gunnery Officer on the staff of AdmriaJ Mayo), May 14, 1917. For the navy's order, see F.e.
Martin, BuOrd, to D.C. Bingham, May 14, 1917 RG 74 E-30 Box 743 Subject 30309, Folder No Line Numbers
1918. For the Marie II uBaby Ford" Rangekeeper, see Patent no. 1,310,204. This patent covers the Mark II
machine, DO individual patent covers the first rangekeeper. Also see United States Naval Academy, Notes on Fire
Contro~ 1940, Chapter 6, "Secondary Battery Rangekeepers," (Washingto~ 1941) for the Baby Ford, and Martin's
comments on the Baby Ford, F.e. Martin, BuOrd, to D.C. Bingham, May 14, 1917. For BuOrd's comments on
reliability, see BoOrd to Ford Instroment Co., Au~ 1917. BoOrd to Commander In Chief, Atlantic Flee~
---------.---.--..-·.---------·---August-3.~-·191~,.:·-RG-74--E--30-Box-74~-Subject-3030~;_Folder-Withoul-bine-Numbers-191~-1-7-;--------------------------------
70 The Marie 0, as we have see~ was the "Baby ForcL" attached to the gun directors themselves. Mark m was
another main battery director. Mark IV attached to an antiaircraft director. Mark VII was used in cruisers.
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extrapolated "advance range," and generated orders for the guns to fire. 71 The Mark 8, however,
included many more variables and corrections than the Mark I.
The original Mark I rangekeeper was a box on a pedestal easily operated by one man who
turned cranks. None of the variables were automatically entered, except for the own ship's
course, which came in via a gyrocompass repeater (but could be bypassed and entered manually).
The Mark 8, in contrast, achieved much greater automation, reflecting the navy's increasing level
of comfort with electrical machinery, and especially with electric data transmission. Most data
came into the unit automatically, although a number of manual inputs were available as backups
[*Figure 2-9: Course and Speed]. It also looked much more like a "computer" in the modem
sense than the older Mark I. The Mark 8 consisted of five separate boxes (divided as functional
units) bolted together into a single console. [*Figure 2-10: Mark 8 rangekeeper]
To support these delicate and intricate devices, BuOrd and Ford Instrument forged a tight
and complicated relationship. Ford had a privileged position in fire control, but at the expense ofa
wider business. Bureau chief Ralph Earle ordered, "that you do not disclose to anyone even the
fact that you are making rangekeepers, and that you do not dispose of similar instruments to other
governments."n Ford Instrument provided space in its factory for the Naval Inspector of
Ordnance, Benjamin B. McCormick, who was also the naval inspector at Sperry Gyroscope. The
navy began sending its gunnery officers and machinists to Ford Instrument to learn the principles,
operation, and repair of the Ford Rangekeepers, and before long Ford Instrument set up formal
courses of instruction on its products. These courses involved "solving problems" on the machine
(as though it was a calculator), receiving lectures on the mechanisms, taking tours of the assembly
rooms, and learning proper adjustment of the rangekeepers. 73 Eventually, the navy took over
instruction of the courses, but still within the Ford Instrument facility. For new development
work, the navy formulated requirements, and Ford Instrument responded with a design, which, if
accepted, the company would manufacture only for the navy. The Ford Instrument Company
71 "Rangekeeper, Mark sn in U.S. Naval Academy, Postgraduate School, Fire Control Installations, 7.
72 Breucbaud to Earle, May 28, 1917. RG 74 E-30 Box 743 Subject 30309 Folder 1-50. Earle to Breuchaud, July I,
1917. RG 74 E-JO Box 747 Subject 30309, Folder Without Line Numbers 1915-17. Elmer Sperry, as a member of
the Naval Consulting Board, however, did have access to the Ford machine and when the board visited BuOrd late
in 1916, Ford wrote that "[I] have no doubt that Mr. S. was all eyes when examining the instrument." Ford to
Martin, October 4, 1916. RG 74 E-30 Box 743 Subject 30309 Folder I-SO.
73 Ford lnst.rument Company, "Report on Organziation and War Activities of the Ford Instrument Company, Inc.."
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evolved, in the ~lords of a British observer, into "the secret Fire Control Design Section of the
U.S. Navy.,,74
To make this special institutional coupling work BuOrd had to carefully define and
control the nature of technical knowledge. Where did fire control technology originate and reside?
In the tactical and strategic requirements specified by line officers? Or in the ilbility of engineers to
tum those requirements into practical mechanisms? At first, the navy and its contractors had the
same answer: knowledge was imported from outside the country. The navy virtually stole
technology from abroad and protected the companies which produced it from legal action. In
1918 Ford Instrument expressed its concern to the navy that its rangekeepers might violate
patents for Pollen's system (both Sperry and Pollen believed they did). Assistant Secretary
Franklin Roosevelt responded by guaranteeing "to hold and save you harmless against any and all
suits" brought for infringing patents on British fire control. 75
Other times the location of technique proved more contentions. "Research and
development," was not understood as a specific activity; when the navy wanted a new machine, it
simply specified one and ordered it from a company. BuOrd then did what it pleased with the
technology, including awarding production to another company. In contrast, the contractors saw
navy specifications as broad outline for work which often required engineering talent to implment
in a working device. Contractors thus claimed ownership of technology built under navy
specifications and challenged the navy's right to let production contracts to other manufacturers.
Sperry, G.E., Ford, and Arma had numerous disputes over ownership, especially when one
company went through a long development process only to see BuOrd award production
contracts to other vendors. In the late thirties BuOrd instituted a policy whereby the government
could license inventions, royalty-free, but only within the sphere of its clique of contractors (Ford,
G.E., and Arma).76
Secrecy further defined the sphere, hampering the contractors' ability to profit from their
inventions beyond the confines ofBuOrd. Handling patents for secret technology raised difficult
74 Captain H.J.S Brownrigg, RN, "'Ford.' Fire Control System: Interviews with representatives of Ford Instrument
Coy. of New York,'" IQIDNO (January-June, 1919) Naval Library, Ministry of Defence, London. Courtesy Jon
Testuro Sumida See Also Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, 314-315.
7S Roosevelt to Ford Instrument Company, April 30, 1918. RG 74 E-30 Box 747 Subject 30309 Folder 201-250.
76 Departmeot oftbe Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General to AdmriaJ Furlong, April 6, 1938. RG 74 Box
1740, Ford Instromeot Company Folder.
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contradictions. Initially the bureau insisted that no fire control devices could be patented, owing
to their essential origins within the navy and the need for secrecy. Hannibal Ford, in fact, never
patented the first rangekeeper, but only discrete parts of its computing mechanisms, usually under
nondescript names like "mechanical movement," "calculating instrument," or "control system."
One strategy for maintaining secrecy imposed a long delay from application to granting the patent,
since that amounted to declassifying the invention. Instead of the usual three years, Hannibal
Ford's "Range Predicting Apparatus" took six years to be approved~ his "Calculating Instrument"
took five. Elmer Sperry submitted an application for a "Director Firing Sys~em," in 1917 and did
not receive a patent until after his death in 1930.77 Delays ofeven twenty years on fire control
patents were not unusual - in fact, long delays between patent and issue often signals an
innocuous-sounding invention had military applications. Through the fire control clique, and its
sometimes contradictory conditions of knowledge, BuOrd appropriated technical expertise from
private companies into its unique mission.
Fire control was not the only arena BuOrd built these special ties. BuOrd handled
bombsight development and manufacture much the same as fire control. The primary contractors
were Sperry Gyroscope and another captive contractor formed by a former employee, Carl
Norden. Sperry competed with Norden for Navy bombsights, which, like fire control, were
delicate and precise mechanical calculators which had to work under demanding conditions. They
became the paradoxical "famous secret weapon" of World War U. BuOrd's relationship with Carl
Norden Inc. and Ford Instrument (and, as we shall see, with Arma) represented a concerted effort
to found and foster captive contractors to make new technology in what amounted to private
arsenals. 78
77 Patent DOS. 1,387,S.5I; 1,450,58.5; 1,755,340.
78 Like Hannibal Ford, Norden had been an early Sperry employee, and he left about the same time as Ford to
consult for the navy. Unlike Ford, however, Norden fell out with Elmer Sperry, as the two disagreed about
Norden';s patent obligations to Sperry for the ship stabilizers on which Norden had worked as a Sperry employee.
Norden did design work for the navy, until 1927 when he and a partner set up a company, Carl Norden Inc., to
manufacture his devices (in 80 Lafayette St., the same building in which Ford Instrornent had started). Historian
Stephen McFarland writes "Norden's re!ationship to BuOrd was irregular from the beginning" because the navy
illegally gave production contracts to Norden without competitive bidding. He calls Norden's facility the navy's
"private bombsight factory;" Ted Barth, Norden's partner wrote "Our business policy was to be controlled by the
Bureau [BuOrd) ...and we were to function as a sort of subdivision of the Bureau as far as the bombsight problem
WdS concerned." McFarland, America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing. 50-60. Barth quoted in McFarland, 58-9. I
bonow the idea of a "captive supplier" from the semiconductor industJy, which uses the term to describe suppliers,
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Sperry's Fate ia Fire Control
Sperry Gyroscope, though it started out as BuOrd's main fire control contractor, could
not fit this constricting, if profitable, role. By 1920, the US Navy had installed Sperry fire control
systems on nineteen dreadnoughts, eleven second line battle ships, and nine armored cruisers,
including many hundreds of data transmitters, receivers, and indicators. 79 Most of these
instruments supplied data to Ford Rangekeepers. Despite Sperry Gyroscope's strong initial
position, Ford and his company eclipsed Sperry's dominance. The rise ofFord Instrument as
BuOrd's favored fire control manufacturer, technical troubles with Sperry instruments, Sperry's
own organizational problems, and its unwillingness to be confined to serve BuOrd exclusively
ended the company's status as a member of the clique.
When Sperry Gyroscope's range clock had lost out' to Ford's machine, Elmer Sperry
recognized the importance of the rangekeeper and still wished to compete. "The navy are
obsessed by the [Ford] range clocks," he wrote to Gillmor in England as he considered licensing
Pollen's machine. Sperry believed Ford's rangekeeper overlapped with both his and Pollen's
systems, uHowever he [Ford] is very cute in this regard and probably has worked out some other
method. This, ofcourse, is a direct attempt on his part to short circuit our further sales of the
Battle Tracer." GiUmor promoted Pollen's system to Elmer Sperry, but the inventor was more
cautious of the assertive Pollen, thinking uP's belief in his own system borders either on bigotry or
fanaticism." Sperry also saw a "vital weakness of P's patent situation," and lamented, "I do not
now see very much hope ofbeing able to stop the other fellow [Ford]." Pollen argued that Ford
had stolen his rangekeeper "bodily" from him, but Sperry Gyroscope never licensed Pollen's Argo
Clock. so
Sperry's own devices also had crippling technical problems. Naval officers who worked
with the Sperry system complained of light construction, difficult maintenance, and unsuitable
data transmission. Myriad correspondence from the fleet to the bureau, as well as directly to the
such as the chip-making capacity of ffiM, which (until the 19905) provided chips only to the parent company for
its products. I use wcaptive supplier" slightly differently, to mean a company that sells only to the navy.
79 Sperry Company MemorandUlll. June S, 1920. EAS Papers, Box 32, Capt. William McEntree, Naval
Constructor Folder. U.S. Bureau of Ordnance, Naval Ordnance Activities, 152.
80 EAS to Lieul. Comdr. F.e. Martin, August 31, 1916. EAS Papers, Box 32, Lt. Logan Cresap Fire Control
Correspondence folder. EAS to Gillmor, October 20, 1916. EAS Papers, Box 32, Capt. William McEntree, Naval
Constructor folder. EAS to Gillmor, February 13, 1917. EAS to Gillmor, July 2S, 1917. EAS, Box 32, C~mdr. F.e.
Martin folder.
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company, l~,. ',t played consistent frustration and disappointment with Sperry Gyroscope's fire
control equipnlent. Through 1917 and into 1918, Sperry Gyroscope experienced delays in getting
its equipment installed in the fleet~ much of it was returned for repair due to errors in construction
and installation. 81
As for the Battle Tracer, the fleet tested the device and deemed it potentially useful and
worthy of further work, but Sperry Gyroscope did not respond. The Commander of the Arkansas,
for example, made detailed recommendations for improvements, but he complained, "none of
these suggestions have been acted upon [by Sperry Gyroscope] and both ships lliew York and
Utah] have been left largely to their own devices to develop on board the waya and means for
solving the problem...the battle tracer, in its present form, leaves something to be desired when
considered either as a fire control instrument or as a navigational instrument." He reported a
scathing opinion of Sperry Gyroscope's approach to nav~ engineering and suggested naval
officers contributed more to the technology than the company:
It should be remembered in this connection that the designers of the apparatus turned out
by the Sperry Gyroscope Company are trial and error men. So far as is known not a single
instrument or appliance that has so far been turned out by this company has been
thoroughly satisfactory in its original fonn. The gyrocompass itself, manufactured by this
company, was at first WlSuccessful and has been subject to repeated modifications leading
to its improvement as suggested by naval officers as a result of their experience with this
instrument. The same is true of the target bearing transmitters, the turret target indicators,
the optical range transmitters, the multiple turret indicators, the plotting indicators, and
finally the battle tracer.
This missive concluded with a suggestion for choosing an experienced officer to "take up with the
Sperry Corporation the incorporation of the necessary features." 82 Naval officers did not expect
technical perfection straight ott: ~nd they expressed desire to work with the company to improve
their instruments. When reporting problems with Sperry equipment, officers frequently stated
their belief that it could be made to work, and that its potential usefulness was worth the effort.
The attitude, however, was predicated on the officers' perception of the company's willingness to
cooperate, and confidence that the technical problems were tractable. Not only did Sperry
81 Chafee to BuOrd, January 26, 1915. Commander, BanelshilJ Force to Conunander in Chief, January 25, 1918.
RG 74 E-30 Box S8S Subject 29758 Folder I-SO.
82 Commander, Battleship Force to Commander In Chief, October 5, 1916. See also Commander in Chief, to
Commander, Battleship Force, September 22, 1916, Commanding Officer, Utah to Commander, Division 7
Battleship Force, August 25, 1916, Commander, New York. to eomnlander, Battleship Force, August 6, 1916, and
Conunander:'New York. to BuOr~ August 14, 1915. RG 74 Box 586 Subject 29758 Folder 101-150.
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Gyroscope's reputation for cooperation erode, but sea experience increasingly showed that Sperry
equipment had an insoluble flaw: the problem of synchronization.
The Sperry system translnitted data in a DC "step-by-step" mode, derived from the
original compass repeaters. An on-off relay servo sensed when the receiver was in a different
position from the master transmitter, and moved the receiver dial one way or the other to bring it
into line. This method transmitted relative and not absolute position, requiring that that "before
the equipment is ready for use the pointers in the Turret Indicators are synchronized with the
Target Turret Transmitter by pushing a synchronizing button. ,,83 These on-off elements could not
withstand nearby firing of a battery of sixteen-inch guns, however; the shock of a salvo usuaJly
knocked the system out of synchronization. Gunners had to continually reset the system to get
accurate readings, an operation annoying, if not impossible, under battle conditions. Similarly, the
navy was gradually incorporating the ability to swap components between multiple subsystems.
With the Sperry equipment, switching a data transmitter to a new set of receivers (or vice versa)
would require resynchronization.
Sperry Gyroscope stonewalled, then submitted a number of stopgap solutions, including
an additional "Turret sync\lfonizing system" which provided a central button to synchronize the
entire system. Elmer Sperry himself patented no less than 3 "synchronous data transmitter~" in
1919 and 1920, seven in the decade before his death in 1930.84 The complaints continued. The
commander of the Pennsylvania reported, "every day at General Quarters the synchronizing of the
instruments is checked which takes considerable time." BuOrd Chief Ralph Earie summarized the
situation to Sperry's Naval Inspector in 1918: "the instruments, being of the step-by-step type,
lead to errors... there is an opinion current in the fleet that these instruments may prove to be
unreliable." The inspector echoed to the company, "As instruments frequently get out of step, this
fault appears to be a most serious one...They do not appear sufficiently lugged to stand up under
weather." A Bureau of Standards engineer ask~d to examine the situation wrote to Ralph Earle
"it will be impossible to alter Sperry's system to be self-synchronizing... We can make
83 Turret Control Equipmenl," Bulletin 303, 1916. Sperry Gyroscope Company Papers, Box, 33
84 EAS to F.C. Martin, June 6, 1917. Sperry Gyroscope Company to BuOrd, December 1, 1917. RG 74 E-30 Box
S86 Subject 29758 Folder 151·200. Patents 1,468,330; 1,850,640; 1,656,962.
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synchronizing easier but we cannot make the Sperry system self-synchronizing. n 8S While the
bureau continued to order Sperry instruments, the complaints did not cease~ by the end of 1918
confidence in the Sperry apparatus had evaporated.
The navy's disenchantment with Sperry Gyroscope was well founded: the company was in
crisis. In March of 1918, Van Auken visited the company and grew concerned about its lack of
organization.16 Gillmor was in the midst of a radical restructuring~ he took the bold, and perhaps
desperate step of exposing his company's internal problems to the navy, "in an endeavor by the
Company to reinstate itself in the confidence of the department." In a letter to the Assistant
Secretary of the navy attached to a "Statement respecting the situation now existing in The Sperry
Gyroscope Company and the policies now pursued by that company," Gillmor admitted that
"during the past year it has been evident to anyone who has come in contact with the Sperry
Gyroscope Company that its efficiency and its policies have not been such as to create
confidence.n
GiUmor attributed this situation to corrupt management by the Secretary and Treasurer of
the company. In December, 1917 at Elmer Sperry's request, Gillmor had left the navy and his post
in England to take control of the company in New York. 8? He fired a number of workers and
managers, including the Secretary and Treasur~r, F.R. Alle~ imposed a more strict, rational
structure on the place, and brought production under control. A11e~ Gillmor warned, "has made
violent threats against Mr. Sperry personally and has attempted to blackmail him," by threatening
85 Ralphe Earle to Naval Inspector of Ordnance, Speny Gyroscope Company, SGC. February 16, 1918. Earle's
lette. summarizes a letter to him by the Commanding Officer of the Texas, January 22, 1918. RG 74 E-30 Box 585
Subject 29758 Folder 301-350. Naval Inspector of Ordnance, Sperry Gyroscope Company to Sperry Gyroscope
Company, February 25, 1918, emphasis original. RG 74 E-30 Box 585 Subject 29758 Folder 301-350. These
records contain numerous complaints about ruggedness and synchronization in the Sperry systems, see EAS to
F.e. Martin, June 13, 1917 (Folder 151-2(0), BuOrd to Naval Inspector of Ordnance, Sperry Gyroscope Company,
Sperry Gyroscope Company September 10, 1918 (Folder 151-200), Captai~ Arkansas to BuOrd, March 3, 1918
(Folder 2S 1-300), "Report on Installation Tests of Sperry Target Turret System USS Michigan, April 25, 1918
(Folder 400-450), Electrical Officer to Commanding Officer, USS Utah May 21, 1918 (Folder 400-450), Earl to
Naval Inspector of Ordnance, Sperry Gyroscope Company, September 13, 1918 (Folder 450-5(0), Earle to EAS,
July 21, 1919 (EAS Papers, Box 32), Jorel to EAS, September 29, 1924 (EAS Papers, Box 32, Capt. William
McEntree, Naval Constructor Folder). For the review of the system by the National Bureau of Standards, see Earle
to Sperry Gyroscope Company, May 1, 1918, RG 74 E-30 Box S8S Subject 29758 Folder 351-400 and la:hnical
note to Ralph Earle, handwritten., March 12, 1918, Folder 301-350.
86 W.R Van Auken., "Report of Visit to works of Sperry Gyroscope Co. and Ford Instrument Company, March Il,
1918."
81 EAS to Van Auken., December 18, 1917. SGC Box 32 Folder Capt. William McEnuee, Naval Constructor. For
Sperry's 1918 reorganization, also seeHu~ Elmer SPem 210-11. Sperry Gyroscope's new organizationc~
as published in Sperry's public newsletter, does not list the secret fire control division.
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to "spread scandal in the newspapers." Gillmor sought to head otT Allen's accusations before they
reached the navy by discrediting hi~ "this man has made it appear highly probable that he is
mentally unbalanced." In an attempt to win back the department's favor, perhaps with a tinge of
envy for Ford's new position, Sperry Gyroscope offered "to consider itself an auxiliary of the
Government service. ,,88
Although Gillmor improved the situation at Sperry Gyroscope, the company's relationship
with BuOrd had suffered pennanent damage, especially as the bureau had other reasons to be
uncomfortable with the contractor. Fire control made up a small part of Sperry's business. With
its gyrocompass and other control devices, the company had a dynamic and growing commercial
operation. BuOrd did not object to commercial sales per se, but the corporate culture required to
support commercial sales, especially internationally, was incompatible with the bureau's
preoccupation with secrecy. Sales organizations, marketing literature, and the general level of
publicity to promote industrial products fostered the very exchange of information that BuOrd
sought to restrict. BuOrd did approve the sale of Sperry Gyroscope's Target Bearing Instruments
and Turret Control Systems to some foreign navies, but it was less comfortable with other more
threatening rivals. Elmer Sperry was beginning a personal fascination with the Japanese that
included sharing American technology and supplying equipment to the ImperiaJ Navy.89 Japanese
naval officers toured the Sperry plant and inspected the Battle Tracer system. The bureau had not
purchased the rights to the Battle Tracer, and indeed had lost interest in the device, but it still
worried that such a demonstration would reveal to the Japanese other parts of the fire control
system which operated in the American fleet. The Russian navy also adopted the Sperry
Gyrocompass; the Russians deemed the device so successful that the Sperry representative in
--------- Moscow was decorated by the Czar. -90--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------.---------
BuOrd saw the company as an untrustworthy source of fire control tect-tJlology. Ford
Instrument, in contrast, had no salesmen, no foreign connections, no offshore plants~ in fact Ford
Instrument had no public image at all. Ford Instrument by nature was highly responsive to the
demands of its sole customer and its sole source of income. Sperry's technical problems, its
88 Gillmor to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, June 13, 1918. RG 74 E-30 Box 584 Subject 2~758 Folder 450-500.
~ughes, Elmer Sperry, 395-303.
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troubled relationship with BuOrd, and its internal difficulties finally caught up with the company.
In 1920, Sperry Gyroscope lost a key contract for fire control systems for the new Battleships
Colorado and Maryland. The company dropped out of the fire control business. It continued to
supply the navy with gyrocompasses and gyropilots for submarines and surface ships, as well as
naval searchlights and some smaller naval instruments.
Fire Control in the Twenties
Sperry's departure from fire control was part ofa broad demobilization. With the end of
World War I, military work of all types was scarce; The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty (and its
1930 London successor) set strict limits on numbers and sizes of naval warships; new building
during the foUowing decades was sporadic at best. Only three new battleships (Maryland,
Colorado, and West Virginia) were laid down between the end of World War I and 1937. Still,
within that limited sphere, fire control played an important role and did require new development.
Treaty limitations measured tonnage, but improved fire control could increase the striking power
of a given vessel with negligible added weight. The technology then, with its relatively low cost,
mass, and volume (compared to ships), had high leverage for sea power. And the navy, with
growing understanding of how to control development within its captive contractors, made the
most of its limited resources to promote exclusive American leadership. As one path toward that
leadership, the navy brought in the premier American technology company.
Though BuOrd had helped Ford Instrument get started in order to foster competition,
disenchantment with Sperry Gyroscope left the bureau again with a single contractor. In 1918,
the~ the bureau sought new industrial talent to help solve the synchronization problem and create
a new generation of control systems. The new contractor had vast technical resources and an
established reputation within the navy as a supplier of electrical equipment: General Electric. G.E.
was widely recognized as the leader in industrial research and certainly on the cutting edge of
electrical technology. Nonetheless, the bureau's choice represented the established route,
displaying the conservatism for which the bureau system was renowned. Rather than depend
solely on small companies, with their attendant friction, instability.. and unreliability, the navy
sought familiar expertise. Beginning in 1920, then, General Electric not only brought a full
~AS to J. Stra~ July 17, 1916. BuOrd to SGC, August 14, 1916. RG 74 E-30 Box S86 Subject 29758 Folder
101-150. NIO, SGC to BuOrd, March 21, 1916 and March 23, 1916.1. Strauss to SGC, March 23, 1916. D.M.
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research organization to the problem, but solid electrical skills as well - elements lacking at both
Sperry Gyroscope and F(Jrd Instrument. As a consequence, naval control system technology
became both more stable and more electrical.
The choice of General Electric also reflected the background of the new post-war head of
the Fire Control Section, William R. Furlong. A 1905 graduate of the Naval Academy, Furlong
had earned a Master's degree in electrical and radio engineering at Columbia University in 1914
(he would go on to head BuOrd from 1937-41). During the World War I, he brought an electrical
perspective and a keen inventive eye to his work in the fleet as a gunnery officer. In early 1918,
Furlong sailed with the British Grand Fleet to evaluate fire control. He then returned to the United
States to head the fire control section of BuOrd. Full of new ideas, Furlong inunediately began
looking to staff his department with electrical engineers.91
General Electric's S>nchronous System
General Electric had no prior experience in fire control, but it had built a follow-the-
pointer system for commanding the motion of the doors of the locks in the Panama Canal. The
control sy~tem maintained a miniature simulation of the canal's locks, doors, and water levels in a
central control room, much as a fire control system represented the field of battle in the plotting
room. After learning of this system, in mid-1918, the bureau procured a motor from G.E. for
testing, along with samples of a position indicator the company had designed. The devices, which
were fully synchronous, seemed suitable for fire control, but General Electric had never worked in
---------the-area-and_had_rJo_engineeL~with ex~erience in the technology - they ~ouldE~~~~VY _
direction. BuOrd chief Van Auken recalled, "no citizen or private manufacturer at that time had
sufficient knowledge of director firing, or the complete needs of fire control, as to initiate a
system " Still, G.E. had credibility and reputation within the navy, supplying a host of components
to naval shipyards including the numerous electric motors required to run modem naval vessels.
The New Mexico, launched in 1915, had been hailed as the "all electric ship," with everything
Mahood to BuOrd, March 29, 1916. RG 74 E-30 Box 587 Subject 29758 Folder 51-100.
91 W.E. Furlong Papers, Library of Congress, Box 4. As early as 1905 Furlong thought about improvements to fire
control. His dial))' as an ensign aboard the Franklin that year criticizes the communications systems based on voice
tubes, "as long as the 5eDSe of bearing is depended on there are going to be mistakes... instead of rigging up these
temporary range transmission gadgets we should be trying to develop something that is practical under battle
conditions." Furlong Papers, Box 5, General Correspondence, Military File, Franklin Diary, 1905. For Furlong's
hiring of electrical engineers, see Box I, General Correspondence Folder.
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from steering gear to ammunition hoists to kitchen appliances run by G.E. electric motors. The
period 1916-1920 also saw the brief heyday of G.E. 's advanced but short-lived turboelectric
power drives for propulsion.92
William Furlong had also seen the sample G.E. synchronous device. When he returned
from Europe he immediately began development of a synchronous fire control system for new
battleships West Virgini~ Colorado, and Maryland. For three years, Furlong literally tutored G.E.
engineer Edward Hewlett and his assistant in fire control. Hewlett, the company's premier switch
and switchboard designer from Schenectady, had designed the motors and switchboards for the
Panama Canal. The men met several tilnes a month; Furlong sketched ideas and Hewlett designed
and implemented them in a system. Technical exchange between the navy and its contractors
reduced to the interaction of these two men. Between 1918 and 1920 Hewlett developed a new
fire control system built around the self-synchronous motor, or "selsyn." Hewlett and his
assistants built models, laid out systems for range and deflection transmitters, bearing indicators,
compass relays, directors, control towers and a broad variety of devices and systems.93 Together,
Furlong and Hewlett matched military experience to technical expertise.
The G.E. self-synchronous syste~ or "sels~" as it became known, used A.C. rather than
D.C. electrical signals. It kept two dials, connected by three wires, exactly in line with each other.
[*Figure 2-11: AC Selsyn Principle] Thus if one rotor is connected to a "master" dial, a
rangefinder for example, and the other one connected at some distance to an indicator dial, the
dial will read exactly the setting on the rangefinder. G.E. called this technology "Selsyn" but
BuOrd copyrighted "synchro" to mean the same thing regardless of manufacturer.94 The basic
idea was not unique to G.E.; other companies suggested similar systems, including the Pioneer
Instrument company and Ford Instrument. During World War II, several companies (including
92 Wilbur R Van Auke~ "Adoption of General Electric Fire Control Syste~" JuJy 23, 1929. RG 74 Box 1740,
Folder General Electric Fire Control - General. Also see John Winthrop Hammond, Men and Volts: The Story of
General Electric (philadelphia: lB. Lippincott Co., 1941) 356-8,370-1. For the "all electric ship," see William R
McBride, "Strategic Detenninism in Technology Selection: The Electric Battleship and U.S. NavaJ-Indust.. '131
Relations," Technology and Culture 33 (no. 2, April, 1992) 248-277.
93 W.R Furlong to AdmiraJ Larimer, January 8, 1932. Furlong Papers, General Correspondence, Military FiJe,
Box 4. This letter supports a commendation by the Navy of Hewlett for his work on the selsyn fire control system
and narrates the development process. Also see General Electric Company, "Report of Expenditures up to October,
1920 for Development of Fire Control Apparatus as Shown by the Following Special Manufacturing Orders Since
February 14, 1919," RG 74 Box 32S1 Subject 39117 Folder 1..50.
94 "Elements of the Synchro System." in U.S. Naval Academy, Pc,stgraduate School, Fire Control Installations PGS
No. lOS, 1939.
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Ford Instrument, Arma, and G.E) manufactured these devices in large numbers for a wide variety
of control applications (rotating radar sets, for example, were all built around this technology).
BuOrd had not sought to exclude Speny Gyroscope. Van Auken mentioned the selsyn to
Gillmor and hoped the company would incorporate it into a data transmission system. Gillmor
declined. Furlong also recalled he tried to interest the company, but UI could not get Snerry or
others to tackle the job." Only when Speny was losing contracts to G.E. did Elmer Speny
develop a fully synchronous system. They came too late. Speny submitted its earliest patent
application for a synchronous system in December 1919, by which time General Electric was well
on its way. 95 Clearly angry about having been squeezed out, Elmer Speny accused G.E. of
violating his patents and criticized the company as unsuitable for fire control work because, "like
all large commercial companies, [they] are built up and maintained to manufacture commercial
products in quantity for long periods of time without change in design.... they are too unwieldy to
incorporate valuable ideas and suggestions coming from naval. officers and others without going
to tremendous expense.,,96 lronically, the shortcomings Elmer Speny pointed out in G.E. reflected
at least some of the failings of his own company in the navy's eyes (G.E. and Speny eventually
settled, and the navy admitted it violated the Sperry patents, claiming it had to in order to move
the technology forward).97
In 1920 the bureau contracted with General Electric instead of Speny for fire control for
battleships Colorado and Maryland. By the end of that year General Electric had no less than six
types of gun directors in design and a number of other fire control projects underway, all using
synchronous transmission (although otherwise similar to earlier systems). Ford Instrument
provided Range Keepers and a number of other instruments as a subcontractor. During the 19205
G.E. consolidated earlier fire control designs and converted them to fully synchronous operation.
95 W.R Van Auke~ "Report of Visit to works of Sperry Gyroscope Co. and Ford Instrument Company, March 12,
1918." Furlong to Larimer, January 8, 1932. EAS to William S. Furlong, September 18, 1919, EAS Papers. R.C.
Hya~ USN Bureau of Ordnance "Discussion of Modem Fire Conuol System," NWC, 1.
96 Elmer A. Sperry to Comdr. C.S. McDowell, September 3, 1924.
97 For BoOrd patent policy, see O.G. Murfi~ Memorandum for File, "Patent Rights for Fire Control Material,"
August 12, 1933. RK. Davi~ Office of the Judge Advocate General, 10 Admiral Furlong, "Bureau ofOnlnance,
New Patent Clause," April 6, 1938, RG 74 Box 1740 Ford Instrument Company Folder. For Sperry's position
regarding G.E., see Sperry Gyroscope Company, "An Analysis of the Fire Control Patent Situation in the U.S.
Navy," n.el, ca 1920, and associated correspondence in RG 74 E-30 Box 2924,37186. This folder contains a
handwritten note, 1922, that "G.E. reports that it has arranged with Sperry, Hammond, Ford to use apparatus. This
is covered by clause in contract allowing not over $9000 for patent rights."
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G.E. built directors not only for the big main battery guns, but also for secondary "broadside"
batteries on battleships West Virgini~ Colorado, and Maryland. 98
G.E. brought two key innovations from electric power into fire control: power drives and
switching. Power drives coupled a producer of information, either an observer or a rangekeeper,
directly to the motion of the guns, and switching aJlowed the entire system to be "programmed. n
In 1922, Ernst F. Alexanderson, the G.E. engineer who had done pioneering work in high-
frequency alternators and other fields of power electronics, became involved in Hewlett's fire
control work. Alexanderson studied vacuum tube drives for selsyn moto~s which allowed
synchronous instruments to drive high power equipment. This technology eliminated follow-the-
pointer indicators, allowing instruments, even delicate calculators, to move the turrets directly,
without human intervention. Moving large machinery with small signals easily leads to oscillation
and instability. Much ofG.E.'s research in the mid twenties consequently related to "antihunt"
devices for stabilizing these servo loops. In 1930 AJexanderson and G.E introduced "thyratron"
control for high power motors. The thyratron was an electrical tube, but unlike a traditional
"vacuum tube," it contained specific amounts of inert gasses. While not able to amplify small
analog signals like a standard tube, the thyratron could switch high currents on and off with small
elecrrical inputs. Later in the thirties Alexanderson and his group introduced the "amplidyne," a
power amplifier based on a dynamo also capable of amplifying small signals into immense
amounts of electrical power. The amplidyne was incorporated as an electric drive on navy turrets,
and thyratrons drove motors in smaller applications.99 G.E. 's work in power drives automated the
98 In these "master gun" setu~ a gunnery officer aimed at the target with a single, instrumented gun mount
(equipped with a Mark U "Baby Ford" rangekeeper), and gunners on the other mounts followed-the-pointer to
track the master's movements. For a good summary of fire control in the eaJly twenties, see Comdr. RC. Hyatt,
USN, "Discussion of 'Modem Fire Control System, n, Lecture to Naval War College, February 2, 1925 NWC
XOGF-44. For a list of G.E. 's fire control work in 1920, see NIO, General Electric, to BuOrd, "Maryland and
Colorado Contract 1#2992, Fire a>ntrol, Generallnfonnation of Progress of Work," November 15, 1920. RG 74 E-
30 Box 3251 Subject 39117 Folder I-50. Fri~ US Naval Weapons, 3S appraises fire control in the twenties.
For a technical description of one of these systems, see "Main Battery Fire Control System, U.S.S. West Virgini~"
Chapter IV, in U.S. Naval Academy, Postgraduate School, Fire ControllnstallatiQRS PGS No. 105, 1939. Also
United States Naval Academy, Notes on Fire Control 1940 250·70.
99 James E. Brittai~ Alexanderson: Pioneer in American Electrical Engineering (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
----------University--Press,-l992)'--.204'-219~222,-231-~242~-See-aJso-United-States-Naval-Academy,-Depl-of-Ordnance.and------------------------------------­
Gunnery Naval Ordnance and Gunnery Volume 1: Naval Ordnance (Washintgon: Bureau of Naval Personnel,
USGPO, 1955), Chapter 10 section d., "Amplidyne Follow Up System.," 221-6. Also Stuart Bennett, A History of
Control Engineering, 1930-1960 (London: The Institution ofElectricaJ Engineers, 1993), 10-12.
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articulation of the control system, converting low-power information generated by rangekeepers
into high-power signals required to move guns.
Where power drives coupled information to articulation, switchboards routed information
between sensors and processors. Fire control became generalized: each sensor produced a signal,
calculators translated signals, and output actuators turned signaJs into motion. For redundancy,
warships had two conning towers with two each of gun directors, spotting telescopes, and
rangefinders. Turrets also contained their own rangefinders and instruments. The plotting room
usually had multiple rangekeepers, and eventually an entire second plotting room was added with
wiring physically and electrically separate from the main control room. With the switchboard, the
ship's crew could easily switch signals between all these components, and hence optimize the
system for different appiications. For example, in dividedfire the main battery could split between
fore and aft turrets and engage two targets simul(aneously, using two directors. In the 1920s,
battleships began carrying one or two seaplanes for spotting, allowing iluiirect fire when the ship
itself could not see the targ~t or the salvo splashes. Provision had to me made then, for entering
spotting corrections after receiving them by radio from a spotting plane rather than from the
spotter in the conning tower, as well as for s,vitching quickly to standard optical sighting if the
target came into view - all by means of the switchboard. [*Figure 2-12: System configuration
and switching] With the switchboard, the control system took on new structures depending on
these different operating modes. Primary control, secondary control, auxiliary control, local
control all referred to different combinations of directors, rangefinders, and plots detennined by
the switchboard which made them "interchangeable."IOO
G.E. '5 switchboards made the fire control system programmable~ they could reconfigure it
for a broad variety of contingencies. Covering the walls of the plotting room, switchboards
connected individual elements to connect to common "busses;" in a director or a turret, different
signals could be employed by connecting equipment to different busses. By changing the switch
settings, the system could be given a new configuration. These diverse arrangements, of course,
played an important role in battle, since the "system" needed to be robust to the loss of any of its
100 Comdr. G.L. ScbuJyer, lbe Present Status of Ordnance Developments in the US Navy," Lecture to Naval War
College, Newpo~ Rhode Islan~ March 9, 1928. RG IS, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Annual
lectures on ordnance by BuOrd personnel to to the War College trace the development of fire control during the
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individual elements. Redundancy, then, was built not only into the components themselves, but
into the very system structure. Flexibility meant reliability. Such systems required G.E. 's
synchronous data transmission: the Sperry step-by-step type would need to resynchronize every
time a switch was thrOM!, but the selsyns came into line automatically.
In modern terminology, switchboards made naval fire control a hybrid anaJog and digitaJ
systems. The rangekeepers, as well as the various telescopes and rangefinders, produced analog
signals: continuous, smooth data. The switchboard, however, formed a digital matrix~ by routing
those analog signals to different places, it programmed the system for different data flows. Fire
control manuals portrayed fire control in block diagrams representing data flow, both within the
computers themselves and aboard the entire ship. These manuals contained pre-detennined tables
of switchboard setups, which operators dialed in for a particular application. 101 As we shaJI see,
this hybrid system paralleled other systems of the same period: the telephone network, which
routed analog phone calls through a matrix of switching relays, and Vannevar Bush's Rockefeller
Differential Analyzer, which combined analog computing elements through a set of telephone
relays. The plotting room became a "control center," where information was processed, switched,
and routed to its destination. "A machine is a little system..." wrote Adam Smit~ and "a system is
an imaginary machine." [*Figure 2-13: AnalogfDigital system]
The Arma Engineering Company
As Ford Instrument became dedicated to fire control, the navy still had no second supplier
---- --------
of gyrocompasses, and hence still dependent on Sperry Gyroscope's monopoly. They then tunled
to another young company formed by an ex-Sperry employee, the Arma Engineering Company, a
partnership of its two founders David H. Mahood and Arthur P. Davis (taking the first two letters
of Arthur and the first two of Mahood formed "Arma"). Mahood \"vorked in the fire control
division of the Sperry Company during the war, and then as the chief civilian in the Ship's
Electrical Apparatus Testing Laboratory of the Brooklyn Navy Yard. This facility handled
virtually all the new equipment emerging from both Sperry and Ford for installation on navy
vessels, so Mahood's position brought him into intimate contact with control technologies of the
twenties. For a clear, diagrammatic example of the switchboard system, U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance, "Main
Battery Fire Control System," pamph'.et OP 1387, June 14, 1948, s.
101 U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance, ~Surface Fire Control," OP 1701 n.d., probably mid 19405. U.S. Navy Bureau
of Ordnance, "Main Battery Fire Control System." OP 1387
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time (as well as their problems). Davis, a young, self-educated engineer, had worked on
switchboards at G.E. in Schenectady. Davis and Mahood formed the Arma company on January
30, 1918 with a capital of about $1500. Like Ford, Anna was originally located in Manhattan but
moved later to larger quarters in Brooklyn and eventually to Long Island. In 1919, Anna obtained
a navy contract for searchlights, in direct competition with Sperry Gyroscope. 102
At the end of the first world war, the navy captured the design for the German Anschutz
gyroscopic compass which inspired Elmer Sperry's original design. The Navy gave the Anschutz
to Anna which built a business supplying gyroscopic control and stabilization systems for several
navy bureaus. The company soon applied its energies to fire control. In 1924, Arma competed
with G.E. for gun directors for the new aircraft carriers Lexington and Saratoga. It won the
contract by underbidding G.E. by a factor of two, thus beginning a relationship with the Bureau of
Ordnance. 103 Anna, like Ford Instrument, became a captive supplier, fully responsive to the needs
of BuOrd. Anna seemed I~ke a small version of Sperry Gyroscope, but optimized for B.IOrd's
secret work. Founder D.H. Mahood contrasted Anna to Sperry Gyroscope: having responded to
a request by the navy "to enter fields of work which were then in the hands of a monopoly
[Mahood wrote] ... \ve have had no other customer but the U.S. Navy Department, have never
sought any foreign or commercial contracts and have maintained the fullest secrecy which would
have been impossible otherwise." Mahood wrote, "We have considered ourselves part of the
Navy Department."I04
Anna's became specialized in applying gyroscopes to fire control. In 1929, Anna
introduced the "Stabl,~ Element" which employed a gyroscope to maintain an absolute horizontal
and vertical reference for a fire control system. It recreated the horizon mechanically in the bowels
of the plotting room, analogous to the "artificial horizon" instrument in an airplane (introduced by
Sperry Gyroscope at about the same time). Anna did not invent the idea. The British Navy,
Sperry Gyroscope, even the National Bureau of Standards had all experimented with or designed
102 S.J. Davy, "A Case Study: The American Bosch Anna Corporatio~" January 21, 1958, Tenn Paper, Sloan
School of Management, MIT. Davy, a fire control engineer at Anna, compiled this history from annual reports and
interviews with Anna employees.
103 Davy, "Case Study." Hya~ "Discussion of Modem Fire Control System." 8.
104 D.M. Mahood to Chief of BuOrd, December 22, 1931. RG 74 E-2S Box 1740 Anna Folder.
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similar devices before 1920. IOS Like Ford Instrument with its rangekeeper, Anna created a
workable device that filled a niche for the bureau, and Anna was willing become a captive
contractor.
The Anna machine, located in the plotting room next to the rangekeeper, now fired the
guns with a trigger. 106 It could command continuous aim by sending orders to the guns to track
the target. In rough seas, the guns could not move rapidly enough to maintain continuous aim, so
intermittent aim kept gun train and elevation fixed in relation to the dec~ moving with the ship's
pitch and roll. When the gunnery officer depressed the firing key, the stable element waited until
the Oat point of the roll and then automatically sent the firing signal. The stable element
anticipated ~he proper angle by a certain finite period of time so the ship would be at the exactly
correct angle, not when the gun fired but a few milliseconds later, when the shell left the barrel. 107
With the stable element, the bulk of the control system had now moved to the plotting room. The
gun director in the conning tower merely tracked the target in range and bearing.
Fire Control in the 19305
Surface fire control achieved a certain technical maturity around 1930. The essential
configuration did not change much until well into World War II, except for myriad incremental
improvements. Despite the depression and treaty limitations, new ships continued to be built,
some with funds from Roosevelt's National Industrial Recovery Act. Battleship construction
began again in 1937. While the closed and secret world could allow rapid innovation, it also
separated the community from advances in other fields. No evidence indicates fire control
engineers were aware of parallel work in feedback amplifiers or servomechanisms until the late
1930s. Even the newer systems in use as of Pearl Harbor were basically designed around 1930~
105 SGC to BuOrd.. August 19,1915. RG 74 E·30 Box 587 Subject 29758 Folder 51-100. Gillmor to EAS, January
17,1917, SGC Box 32 Folder Comdr. F.C. Ma.."1in. Cresap to EAS, February 11,1918, SGC Box 32 Folder Ll.
Logan Cresap Fire Control Correspondence. Earle to NIO, SGC, March 17, 1918. RG 74 E-30 Box 585 Subject
29758 Folder 301-350. EAS to Earle, Apri115, 1918 and Earle to EAS, April 27, 1918, RG 74 E-30 Box 585
Subject 29758 Folder 400-450. B.A. Wittkuhns to BuOrd, July 2, 1931. RG 74 E·25 Box 1741 (S-71) Sperry
Gyroscope Company Foljer.
106 It measured the pitch and coll and resolved them into level and cross level, the components aCthe motion the
line of fire. The elevation of the gun then could correct for level, and cross level contributed to a quantity called
trunnion ti/I, which affected both the guns' elevation and angle of tire.
107 Bureau of Naval Personnel, Naval Ordnance and Gunnery Volume 2: Fire Control (Washington: 1955) 120-8,
140-8. .
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they remained operational through the war. On December 7, 1941 all American battleships except
five still used the Ford Rangekeeper Mark I, originally designed in 1915. 108
The technical maturity paralleled an organizational and technical conservatism. Hannibal
Ford became president ofFord Instrument in 1930, removing him from daily operation of the
company (he would retire in 1943). Given Ford's influence over his company's technology, the
change surely had practical effects, but it was symbolic as well, signaling the company's stability
as an engineering firm and government contractor. The company did, however, begin to hire
established technologists. Two important engineers joined the firm: Edward Poitras and James
Tear. Poitras had been a student of Harold Hazen and Vannevar Bush at MlT, before going to
G.E. 's Schenectady works and Tear's laboratory.
A new holding company, the Sperry Corporation, acquired Sperry Gyroscope in 1930 and
then the Ford Instrument Company in 1933. This acquisition, however, put the bureau in a
quandary, as their animosity toward Sperry had not yet cooled. Because "the Sperry Company has
proven unmindful of protecting American interests of secrecy in the past and there is no assurance
that they will become less careless in this respect" BuOrd threatened to restrict Ford Instrument's
access to Naval technology. Probably because of these threats, even under the same umbrella
Sperry Gyroscope and Ford Instrument had very little contact with on another, and they retained
their separate corporate cultures. Ford engineer William Newell, who joined the company in 1926,
recalled having "practically no contact" with Sperry Gyroscope. 109
By the 1930s fire control matured as an integrated system composed of General Electric,
Ford Instrument, and Arma equipment. It culminated the bureau's second, interwar phase of
control systems engineering. General Electric's synchronous data transmission system brought
data to and from sensing instruments and its switchboard routed the signals to different places.
The company's power controls tied these signals to the movement of the guns, and hence to the
gurtl1ery officer in the plotting room. Ford Instrument's rangekeepers collected data from the
system, bringing the target's motion into the machine where it could be tracked, predicted, and
sighted. Anna's stable element stabilized this pitching, rolling, heaving apparatus, not by keeping
101 United States Navy, Administrative History of the U.S. NaVY in World War II Volume 79, Fire Control <Except
Radar) (Washington: 194XX), 17.
109 C.C. Badger, wMemorandum for Chief of Bureau., n RG 74 E·2S Box 1740, Fire Control-General Folder.
William Newell interview May 12, 1995.
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it physically still but by providing reference signals, minute corrections \vhich could be subtracted
and factored out of the calcul1tions. Still, despite its sophistication (and because of it), the control
system began to push the limits of its dynamics, "Having grown up like Topsy, it varied to a
certain extent from ship to ship, depending on the date of installation and the progress of
modernization, but the equipments shared several things in common: they were able to pro·,,'ide
adequate fire control for main battery guns, and they were rough in operation, unpopular with
crews, and far from the ultimate in fire control equipment."IIO [*Figure 2-14: Main Battery Fire
Control System, 1940]
Emergence ofthe Antiaircraft Problem
By the 19305, control technoloID' had essentially caught up to the capability of the big
guns, which stayed comparatively constant since before World War I. A new problem emerged,
however, for which engineers had few adequate solutions: antiaircraft fire control. Antiaircraft
inherited the difficulty of the surface fire control problem, but with added complexity: aelial
targets were smaller and moved faster and in three dimensions, and shells had to be fuzed not to
explode not on impact but after a finite time period, another variable in the system. Antiaircraft
guns were smaller and more numerous than surface batteries, typically five or six inches instead of
fourteen or sixteen, so gun directors had to be smaller and faster. The introduction of the 5-inch
38-caliber (5"/38) "dual purpose," gun, which could fire at airborne or surface targets, introduced
a standard, high-quality secondary battery gun which could benefit from precise director fire. III
Ford Instrument built the first naval antiaircraft director in 1926~ it became operational as
the Mark 19 the following year. This device had 55,000 moving parts and integrated an entire
control system into a single unit, including a rangekeeper, a stable element, and level and tracking
telescopes. It used the same ca.iculations as for surface fire control but handled a target at a
different altitude from the firing ship. 112 While an impressive solution to a difficult problem, the
Mark 19 took only a first step. In the words of one history, "its continued use represented
principally a monument to the difficulty of obtaining sufficient peacetime appropriations for naval
development." On December 7,1941, forty two of these devices were installed in the fleet.
110 Buford Rowland and Wlliarn B. Boyd, US Nayy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II (Washington: Bureau of
Ordnance, Department of the Navy, 1953),373.
III Jurens, '1he Evolution of BattJeship Gunnery," 257-8.
112 William Newell interview May 12,1995.
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Several successors also entered the service, incl-Iding the Mark 28, built by G.E. with a Ford
Rangekeeper and an Arma stable element. Then in 1934 came the Mark 33, built by the Naval
Gun Factory in Washington, DC, which include(~ the same rangekeeper and stable element, but
added power drives to move the ever heavier machinery. The Mark 33 mounted on a pedestal
atop the ship, ~Clrrled ~he appelation "apple on a stick" because of its top-heavy appearance. And
top heavy it was, the whole unit weighted nearly 20,000 pounds and wobbled considerably in all
but the lightest se~. 113
The Mark 37, introduced in 1939, was state of the art in 1940. It was not self-contained
but rather divided its functions between the director and a room below deck. Hence it was no
longer called a director but rather a gull fire control system. The Mark 37 employed a Ford
rangekeeper, but its designation was changed to Mark I computer in recognition of the increasing
ability of the machines to track more information than range. It also incorporated an Arma Stable
Element, essentially the same as the devices controlling surface fire. The Mark 37 was hailed as
the first gun director specifically designed to anticipate the inclusion of radar, but this distinction
seems to derive from little more than the unit's flat top for mounting an antenna. 114
Most important, t~le Mark I computer incorporated "fully automatic rate control," which
automated the feedback loop for course correction. The operators, rather than adjusting the
course and speed of the target to match the observed data, merely tracked the target, and the
Mark I computer converged on the solution by itself This closed-loop feature saved the operators
some effort, but it brought an essential difficulty which pressed the limit of technical knowledge in
BuOrd and its contractors. The tracking and convergence feature of the Mark 37 had a stability
problem in its servo loop and would oscillate when perturbed by disturbances. When radar was
added in 1941, the problem became still worse and led to a complete breakdown. How each of
these loops interacted and fed back on each other was poorly understood, and "when the first
complete director-to-gun system was tested, operation was entirely unsatisfactory." The
equipment was already in production, ana war was rapidly approaching. Still, the Mark 37
became the most prominent antiaircraft d~r~ctor of the World War II era, and its presence is a
113 For an excellent summary of the state of naval fire control in 1940 by a part.icipan~ see United States Navy,
Administrative History of the U.S. Navy in World War II, 137-145 and Jurens, "The Evolution of Battleship
Gunnery," 259-60.
114 United States Navy, Administrative History oCme U.S. Navy in World War II, 146-7.
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visual landmark and nearly all U.S. warships of the time. More than eight hundred of these units
were eventually produced, in 92 separate modifications. liS [*Figure 2-15: Mark 37]
Naval Fire Control in 1940
By 1940 the action of naval warfare, what John Keegan has called "the face of battle,"
had shifted. Buried deep in the armor-protected hull, officers who operated machines and
supervised data flow became those who actually fought the enemy. Naval gunnery took place, in
the words of the foresighted Fire Control Board of 1905, through a "system of information." Fire
control joined the airplane and the machine gun in displacing people from the immediacy of
combat, creating technologically-mediated war. By the 1930s no realm of warfare had become as
mech?:nized, precise, and remote as naval gunnel)'.
This displacement could not proceed in isolation; it necessarily accompanied parallel shits
in infrastructure. As technology changed, the critical industries shifted from gun manufacturers to
instrument manufacturers to electrical and electronics companies. The Bureau of Ordnance, with
its fire control section, supervised and directed these shifts. An esoteric technology like fire
control had no commercial applications, so the navy had to educate and train each new cOlnpany
it brought into its secret fold. Officers had to ensure the contractors and their technology
continued to suit the navy's needs, to keep thei:- secrets, and to deliver their equipment. Fire
control technology had to he controllable.
Aircraft were making the battleship itself cb~c!ete, and increasingly the ship's resources
went toward defending itself. Centralized fire control, in fact, had largely reached its limits by
194L) The antiaircraft directors of the 1930s, reversing the earlier trend, began to distribute fire
control around the ship. These devices, however, which merely adapted surface fire control to
aerial targets, could not counter the threat. Interwar fire control remained both cumbersome and
open loop: human operators still closed the primary feedback loop, observing targets, plotting
shell splashes, and making corrections. To successfully fight aircraft, fire control needed to be
quicker ann more autonomous, ifless precise. Toward this end, the navy followed two strategies,
First, return the guns to the gunners; allow them to again move the guns with their bodies, and
use technology to enhance their perception. And second, close the control loop in the machine~
automate perception and tracking. These solutions required cheaper, mass-produced gun
115 Rowland and Boy~ US NaVY Bureau of Ordnance, 377-8.
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directors, radar for tracking, servomechanisms to move the guns, and new techniques of control
and systems to maintain stability. None of these technologies, however, was under the control of
the Bureau ofOrdnance as war approached.
I
87
APPENDIX 2-A: ALGORITHM OF THE FORD RANGEKEEPER MARK I
The own ship has a course and speed (Co and So), as does the target (Ct and St) (see
Figure 2-6). The essential problem is to detennine the course and speed of the target ship.
Consider an imaginary line, the line offire which connects the two ships, which could also be
called line ofsight. The length of this line, of course, is the target range. l"he course of the target
with respect to the line of fire is known as the target angle, Bt. Consider then that each ship has
two velocity components relative to the line of fire, Xo and Yo for the own ship, and Xt and Yt
for the target ship. Y, for both ships, indicates the component of the ships rnotion along the line of
fire (in the direction of range). The sum of Yt and Yo is identical to how quickly the two ships are
closing or opening in range, and hence is the rate ofchange ofrange. Xo and Xt are the
components of the ships motion normal to (at right angles to) the line of fire, and their sum is
known as deflection. To hit at a moving target, one would not aim the gun directly along the line
of sight but at some angle ahead of it, and that is deflection.
Figure 2-16 shows the basic layout of the Ford Rangekeeper's data flo wand algorithm.
["Figure 2-16, FRK rvfk I Algorithm]. 116 Starting at the top, the course and speed of the own ship
come into the machine from a gyrocompass repea .. ~r, and a revolution counter, respectively. l'hen
initial guesses for the target's course and speed are cranked in by hand, usually taken from a
Battle Tracer or hand plot (1) (the own ship's course is subtracted from the target bearing to give
target course (2»). The two component solvers, resolve these data into their components relative
to the line of fire, i.e. Xt,Yt, and Xc, Yo. Differential gears subtract these components from each
other, to give dR, the change in range, and RdB, or change in deflection.(3) dR then goes into an
integrator which produces R, or range, which varies linearly at a rate determined by dR. This R is
only an incremental range, thou~ so it needs to be added to an initial observed range, Ro to
produce an accurate "prese~t range," which is read off a numerical dial (4). To calculate advance
range, the range of the target at some time in the future, the range rate dR needs to be multiplied
by that time Interval. The time interval, Tp (time of prediction), consists of two factors. First, is
116 This description of the Ford Rangekeeper is compiled from data in Ford's original proposal for the device,
Hannibal Fo~ "Ford Range and Deflection Predcitor, n May IS, 1915, BO E-3D Box 696 Subject 30199 as well as
Terril, "Notes on the Theory of the Ford Range Keeper," "Rangekecper, Mark I, Mod. 3" in U.S. Naval Academy,
Postgraduate School, Fire Control Installations PGS No. IDS, 1939.
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the time of flight of the shell - the amount of time it takes the shell to reach the target after
firing. The Ford Rangekeeper treats the time offlight as linearly proportional to range, which is
only an approximation. The second component ofTp is the amount of time between when the
"advance range" is read off the dial and when the gun is actually fired~ or transmission interval.
This number includes delays in data transmission to the turret, loading the shell, elevating the gun~
etc. The transmission interval, To, is cranked in by hand. The sum of the time of flight and To are
then multiplied by the range rate, which is then added to the previously-computed present range,
to derive advance range.(5) Advance range can be adjusted up or down manually, depending on
~__~_---_~--spotting-corrections~thus-ifthe-spotter-sees-that-a-shot-falls-l-00-yards-short,Jr~is-adjusted--to~-----------------------­
subtract from the calculated advance range. RdB, or the rate of change of deflection, is then
divided by ~ the calculated range, to derive the change of bearing. (6) This quantity, dB, is then
integrated to produce bearing, which, when added to initial bearing, calculates a generated troe
bearirlg.
A final mechanism derives the deflection. Deflection itself is expressed in knots, as the
speed at which the target ship is sailing perpendicular to the line of fire. For a given range, this
can be converted to an angle, the amount off the line of sight the gun needs to aim, and depends
on four factors: (1) the target's change of bearing during the time offlight, (2) drift, the tendency
of the trajectory to curve to the right due to the fact that the projectile is spinr~ng, (3) wind, and
(4) spotting and ballistics. The mechanism, a set of cams and multipliers, takes as input the
present range (from which it calculates a time of flight), and the deflection rate or RdB. Jd, the
spotting correction (in the form afuleft" or "right" a certain number of yards), is entered in by
hand. The system then calculates drift via another cam, and outputs on a dial the deflection setting
for the guns.
AJthough elegantly executed, with the exception of the improved integrators these
calculations are not qualitatively different from those in the British fire control machjnes. A key
innovation of the Ford Rangekeeper, however, comes in the final stage of output. [*Figure 2-7,
FRK Speed Error] This setup allows direct comparison of the "guessed," quantities entefed in the
beginning of the calculation and the calculated quantities produced by the machine. A cartoon of
the target ship appears on a rotating dial. Its angle indicates the target st~_~ ~~ l;' dring, and a small
"button" within the cartoon itself indicates the speed of the ship, as entered in the initial
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estimation. Ford's innovation is to derive "range rate" back out of the calculated "advance range"
as it changes. This he accomplishes with an ingenious and subtle use of feedback, connecting the
input and the output of an integrator together through a differential. If the speed of the shafts
coming into the differentiaJ are the same, the output shaft doesn't tum at all, and the mechanism is
in a kind of equilibrium. Since one of these shafts represents advance range, and the other the
output of the integrator, they will only tum at the same rate when the integrator is adjusted so that
the its output speed exactly matches the rate at which the advance range is changing. Otherwise,
the output of the differential changes the position of the balls on the integrator, moving them
toward the equilibrium position. At the equilibrium point, the position of the balls is proportional
to the rate of change of the advance range. Thus, by taking a shaft rotation as an input and
producing an output proportional to its speed, this arrangement acts as a differentiator (like a
tachometer). Through a feedback loop, Ford inverted the function of the integrator - an
accomplishment not repeated in other fields until a decade later.
The ship's own speed along the line of fire, Yo, is then subtracted from the output of the
mechanism, producing the target's speed. This calculated target component alo11g the line a/fire,
or the rate at which the range to the target is changing, then drives a needle, called the horizontal
wire, that overlays the indicator which reads the observed speed button. Thus another feedback
loop is set up, this one involving the human operator. He looks at the needle and the button,
\\'hich implicitly compares the estimated values of target speed and course, with the calculated
quantities based on other observations and integration. His job then, is to reduce the "error"
indicated by the distance between the h'Jtton and the needle, which he does by adjusting the
estimates of target speed and course accordingly. This cycle of correction continues until the dials
and needles match up. At that point the rangekeeper has converged on a solution for the target's
course and speed which matches both the estimates and observations, and the predicted advance
range will be accurate for setting the guns.
A similar cycle works for bearing. An integrator converts the rate of change of bearing
into an incremental bearing, whic~ when added to the initial observed bearing produces a
generated true bearing [·Figure 2-7, White and Gold Pointer]. This reading drives a needle called
-------------~----the-goldpointeron--a-bearing--scale:--On-the-same-scaJe;-a-while-poitller-reflectsthe-observed---- --
present bearing, as indicated by the target bearing instrument. The operator then obselVes the
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difference between th/~se two. Because these bearings may differ only slightly, a vertical wire
exaggerates the difference to make it easier for the operator to read. Where the horizontal wire
~~----indicates~errorsjn-Yt,-the-white--pointer-and_Y-ertica1_wirejndicate_a_need_!o corr~ctAbJLis WOrl_h _
noting, however, that the range comparison is based on advance range, the result of a prediction
into the future, whereas the bearing comparison works off present bearing. The first model of the
Ford Rangekeeper made no bearing predictions.
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Figure 2-1: Illustration of change in the rate of change of range for two ships
approaching each other on parallel courses 10,000 yards away @ 30 kts.
(from Hannibal Ford's original proposal for a rangekeeper, May 15, 1915).
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Figure 2-2: Sperry Battle Tracer (Hagley Museum & Library)
Figure 2-2a: Collected equipment of Sperry Naval Fire Control SystelTI
(Hagley MUSeUlTI& Library)
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Follow-the-pointer
Turret Train Receiver
(commanded)
Long Base
Rangefmder
(forward)
Target Bearing Transmitter
(Inside Foretop) Turret Train Transmitter
(actual, meshes with gear
teeth)
Long Base
Rangefmder
(aft)
Revolution
Counters
(mounted on
propel lor shafts)
Figure 2-3: Sperry Battle Tracer and Fire Control System Layout (ca. 1916)
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Figure 2-4: Ford Rangekeeper Mark I (1916)
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Figure 2-5: Rangekeeper production at the Ford Instrument Company, ca. 1916
(Hagley Museum & Library).
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True North
TARGET
SHiP
Yt
~
~t
Future Target Position
~ Angle Between Tracks
Bs\xo
~
OWN
SHIP
Co
Co - Own Ship's Course
So - Own Ship's Speed
Xo - Component orOwn Ship's Speed Nonnal to Line of Fire
Yo - Component ofOwn Ship's Speed Along Line ofFire
Ct - Target's Course
St - Target's Speed
Bt - Target Angle
(Target's course wI
respect to line of fire)
Xt - Component of Target Ship's Speed Nonnal to Line ofFire
Yt - Component of Target Ship's Speed Along Line of Fire
Bs - Relative Target Bealing
Figure 2-6: Angle measurements in Ford Rangekeeper
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Figure of target ship represents
estimated course, button indicates
estimated speed.
,-J-~-+----r--White Pointer
(observed target
bearing)
Rotating Scale
(slaved to compass)
Target
Speed
Button
Gold Pointer
(estimated target
bearitlg)
"Horizontal Wire" indicates error
between estimated and observed
target speed
Speed Error
Figure 2-7: Subset of dials on Ford Rangekeeper. "Horizontal Wire" indicates
error between observed and estimated target speed. "Gold Pointer" and "White
Pointer" indicate difference between observed and estimated target bearing, against
a rotating scale which indicates compass bearing.
Figure 2-8: Mechanical Integrators
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~~pCASE
SHIP
SPI!ED MANUA.L
POWER.
Figure 2-9: Mark 8 Rangekeeper, selections from system diagram showing user
inputs. This clip represents about 5% of the total rangekeeper system diagram
(courtesy John Testuro Sumida).
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Figure 2-10: Two views of the Mark 8 Ford Rangekeeper (Mod 2), circa 1930. Note operator's
seat and the five separate sections, receiver, calculator, ballistics, transmitter, and plotter. This
n1achine was standard on battleships and cruisers from the 1930s on, and ren1ained in service on
battleships retired in the mid 1990s ( "Fire Control Installations," Postgraduate School, U.S. Naval
Academy PGS 6 no. 105, 1939, Chapter 9, courtesy John Testuro Sumida).
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120 Volts AC
s.
If this rotor rotates.... This rotor moves to the same place
Figure 2-11: AC Selsyn Principle
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Figure 2-13: Subset of switchboard signal routing in a fire control system. The fire control
station and the director have local switchboards and connect to common wiring busses that travel
throughout the ship. The main switchboard in the plotting room routes signals fronl the busses
into and out of the rangekeeper. This shows a small fragment of the total systelTIaboard a cruiser
(from "Main Battery Fire Control System CA 68, 72, and 122 Class Ships," OP 1387 U.S. Navy
Bureau of Ordnance, 1948, 47). Note the similarity of this notation to the Differential Analyzer
program in Figure 5-9, page 299.
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INCREMENTS OF GEN.
OIAECTOtt TRAIN
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-----.lEVEL
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CONTROL PANEL
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EQUIPMENT
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Figure 2-14: Main battery fire control system from a cruiser including Ford Rangekeeper Mark 8,
Anna Stable Vertical Mark 6, and General Electric Mark 34 Director, circa 1940. Note optical
rangefinder integrated into director (from "Main Battery Fire Control System CA 68, 72, and 122
Class Ships," OP 1387 U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance, 1948,82).
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49
Figure 2-15: Mark 37 Director (left) with Bell Labs' fire control radar (ca. 1940). Note optical
rangefinder protruding from side of director. This director primarily drove five-inch 38 caliber
"dual purpose" (antiaircraft and surface fire) guns (right). It connected to a Mark I "Computer,"
(a late-model Ford Rangekeeper) below deck.
Translating perception to articulation: Mark 37 internal crew positions (Friedman, US Naval
Weapons, 83).
I. Range Talker
2. Rangefinder Operator
3. Illumination Control
Officer
4. Talker
5. Control Officer
6. Pointer
7. Trainer
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Figure 2-16:
Ford Rangekeeper MIL I
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Chapter 3
Taming the Beasts of the Machine Age:
The Sperry company
Sperry Gyroscope's falling out with the Bureau ofOrdnance did not eliminate the
company fran. the field. In fire control, it merely switched services: the army too needed to
counter the increasing threat from aircraft. Sperry Gyroscope brought its naval experience to the
army's version ofthe problem. Where naval fire control integrated naval weapons within a naval
wanhip, army fire control worked quasi-independently in the field. The latter befit Sperry's
talents, as the company envisioned a relationship between human and machine more suited to
these smaller, dynamic machines than to the ponderous, intricate naval systems. Sperry's products
retained the basic functions ofthe coxswain or governor: perception, integration, and articulation.
Where naval fire control responded solely to the needs ofthe Bureau ofOrdnance, Sperry
responded to the marketplace and its demands for technology - taming powerful and potentially
wild machines. Corporate culture, economics, and differing technical context gave rise to
variatioM on the basic governor structure.
Sperry's post-World War I fire control work was part ofa broad business stabilizing ships,
airplanes, and guns, aU ofwhich were developing higher paformance than human operators could
control. Increasing size, performance, and complexity pressed new machines to the edge of
stability, Sperry Gyroscope's control systems reined them in, adding precision to the power. The
company rarely designed the machines themselves, but rather added to developments in other
areas. Sperry's regulators brought human operators into new combinations with new machinery,
brought technological power into the range Clfhuman reaction, endurance, and precision. Sperry
Gyroscope did ~t replace the coxswain with a governor; it amplified the coxswain's power to
govern the machine.
The company inherited its practical style ofcontrol from its founder. Until his death in
1930, Elmer Ambrose Sperry, led Sperry Gyroscope in applying regulators and governors in
diverse fields. At first glance, his career appears fragmented: Sperry moved from arc lighting, to
power generation, to marine machinery, to aircraft stabilization. On closer analysis, as his
12S
biographer Thomas P. Hughes has shown, we see that Elmer Speny's work consistently improved
existing machinery through the application f feedback mechanisms - making smoother arcs,
steadier power, straighter courses, and more stable flying. 1 Elmer Sperry founded several
companies, but Speny Gyroscope, founded in 1910, was the last and the largest.- After Sperry's
death the Sperry Corporation emerged, a holding company for Sperry Gyroscope, Ford
Instrument, and a number ofother manufacturers, reflecting the maturity of its organization and
its technology but retaining the founder's vision. Elmer Speny's greatest contribution may have
been the very notion ofa company that specialized in control systems as a discrete technalogy.
Hughes has noted Elmer Speny's conception ofthe airplane as "a beast ofburden
obsessed with motion," and this suggestive metaphor captures the Speny Gyroscope vision.2 It
projects onto machinery animism and autonomy - not an ~mism of intelligence like "thinking
machines," but an animism ofthe body, more akin to horses than automata. Seeing machines as
beasts equates the human relationship to machinery with our relationship to animals. As with the
stirrups on a horse, control systems do not create autonomy in the machine but rather remove it,
bringing its independence under the will and intention ofthe human rider. This humanlbeast
metaphor oftechnology parallels the division between infonnation and power. To tie it to
Chandler: horse is to rider as railroad is to telegraph. The notion of "harnessing" technology
follows from this idea ofmachines as beasts ofburden. Speny's control systems, rather than
seeking "autonomous" machinery, sought to bring machines into close connection, physical and
intentional, with the human operator.
Gradually, however, the idea ofcontrol systems as taming beasts evolved. The distinction
between people and beasts became more complex and less clear; human and machine performed
more ofeach other's functions. Control moved beyond taming to become a system, integrating
information, interconneding people, and replicating social and political relationships - as in
naval fire control. This evolution, from beasts to systems, was neither linear, causal, nor complete.
As a commercial enterprise Sperry responded to its customers, who often did not require the most
1 Thomas P. Hughes, Elmer Spem:: Inventor and Engineer (Baltimore: TIle Johns Hopkins University Press
1971),284-8S.
• To avoid confusio~ I will use the terms "Sperry," or "Sperry Gyroscope" to refer to the company, and "Elmer
Sperry" to refer to the man, excqJt where syntax makes "Sperry" clearly the man.
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advanced, systematized automation. Sperry's main attempt at selling large scale control systems,
its naval Fire Control System, failed, as eventually did its antiaircraft fire control and other
systems projects. Instead, the beast vision, far from being displaced by such information systems,
had surprising staying power; it produced lightweight controllers easy to manufacture and use -
critical for the country in World War II. Sperry engineers in the twenties and thirties worked out a
set ofcompromises on complexity, cost, and automation. The beast vision ofcontrol and the
system vision coevolved, and their dialectic tension drove the technology. In this chapter I
examine Sperry's antiaircraft devices as the n~xus ofthis coevolution; they struck a curious
balance between beast control and system integration, incorporating "human servomechanisms" to
integrate separate components into a single system.
In time, Sperry came to see the control system as making the machine the extension ofa
person, literally grafted onto the senses, the body, or the mind, what Hughes has called
"technological appendages.,,3 By 1940, the company could write coherently about "the inability of
the unaided man to operate his weapons:"
His airplanes have become so big and fly so far that be must have automatic pilots instead
of flying by hand. The machine gun turrets must be moved by hydraulic controls. The
targets ofhis antiaircraft guns DOW move so fast in three dimensions that he can DO longer
calculate his problems and aim his gun. It must all be done automatically else he would
never make a hit...There bas come into being a whole new field ofscientific accessories to
txtend the functions and the skill of the operator far beyond his own strength, endurance,
and abilities.4
This vision culminated three decades ofcontrol engineering at Sperry. During that time, however,
the idea ofcontrol as an extension ofthe human was still evolving and company could not
articulate its goals so clearly. Rather, Sperry engineers worked out their ideas and expressed
themselves by building machinery with different degrees ofautomation, different roles for the
human operator, and different types ofsystems. They developed skills not only in negative
2 Hughes, Elmer SSm. 173. Sperry's words have a biblical ring: "Ofall vehicles on earth, under the earth and
above the earth, the airplane is that particular beast ofburden whicb is obsessed with motions, side pressure,
skidding, acceleration Pressures. and strong centrifugal moments...aU in endless variety and endless combination."
3 Hughes, Elmer Soeny, 173.
.. "Introduction," to Sperry Company History, n.d, probably 1942, Sperry Gyroscope Papers, Hagley Museum and
Library, Wilmington Delaware (hereafter referred to as SOC) Box 40. Similarly, Sperry Corporation President
Thomas Morgan wrote in the 1943 Annual Report, "The primaly value of Sperry's military products is that they
extend the pbysical and mental powers of the men in the Armed Forces enabling them to hit the enemy before and
more often thaD the eoemy can bit them." 1bis annual report refers not only to Sperry Gyroscope but to the other
companies., including Ford Instrument, UDder the Sperry Corporation.
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feedback mechanisms, but also in electrical instrumentation, data transmission, analog computing,
and power drives. What eventually emerged as Sperry's "philosophy" ofautomation during the
second world war was the result ofengineering research, commercial imperatives, production
compromises, and military demands.
Military Demands and Automation
Sperry Gyroscope's innovations in military control systems deJ)eQded on its unique
institutional culture. Heavily emphasizing engineering, the company relied on technology for
competitive advantage, often leaving a field when it generated competition (and, as with naval fire
control, sometimes being forced out). They built long-term relationships with officers and military
organizations, frequently hiring military personnel and lending people to the serviCt,~ for special
projects (Sperry reportedly recruited graduates ofthe Naval Academy who had failed the eye
e).am). Before the war, military customers paid Sperry Gyroscope to make complex mechanical
devices with very high precision in small numbers, at relatively high costs. Fortune magazine
reported Sperry had the largest collection ofhigh-precision machine tools under one roof in the
country, and characterized the company's production by this fact: the Sperry Direction Gyro sold
for $350, and its raw material cost was thirty-nine cents.' These strengths were Sperry's limitation
as weD, as the company sometimes relied on its skills in precision mechanical design, machining,
and manufacturing to the exclusion ofnewer electrical and electronic techniques (although it get
an early start, with brothers Russel and Sigurd Varian, in klystron radar tubeS).6 StiD, during the
thirties, when military funding declined and government arsenals could not keep pace with new
technology, Sperry sustained and developed control systems which otherwise would have
stagnated. The SJlf9TY Corporation research and development budget rose steadily, although
maintaining an average 2.5% ofsales from 1933-1940.' When the time came to ramp up
production for war, the company was ready.
The military was no steady customer, especially between the wars, so Sperry adapted to
the changing economics ofdefense. The company's rhetoric maintained that cycles ofarmament
, "Sperry: The Corporation" FortuDe, May, 1940. This article provides a detailed description of the state of the
compmy in 1940.
6 Dorothy Varian, The Inventor and the Pilot: Russel aDd Sigurd Varian (Palo Alto: Pacific~ 1983).
7 DaIa taken from Speny Corporation Annual Reports, 1933·1940. MD spending at the oompany actually went
clown as a percentage ofsales during the war due to the radical increase in sales.
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and disannament called for automation at every point. Rapid mobilization required machinery that
a man could use with minimal training. Wartime required weapons he could use under the stresses
ofcombat. Post-war drawdown required technology that extended his powers to compensate for
limited resources. Each needed Sperry's automatic machinery.
To accommodate these fluctuations, Sperry retained a paradoxical view of human
operators as either the "weak link" or the "strong link" in a system, depending on the situation. As
the weak link, humans were unreliable, obstreperous, and failure-prone. As the "strong li~"
people could smooth noisy data, evaluate patterns, use judgment, and make intelligent decisions.
Which view one adopted depended on whose role was being automated (e.g. officers or enlisted
men), the current availability ofpersoMel, training capacity, and the limitations of achievable
mechanisms. Often "weak link" and "strong link" ~anguage shaped the perception ofa machine to
present its strengths and limitations in the best possible light. An automated gunsight could extend
the powers ofan experienced gunner, or it could make a novice gunner shoot like an experienced
one with minimal training.' Publicity and sales notwithstanding, good engineering dictated using
the strengths and weaknesses ofoperator and machine to complement one another.
Sperry's military work felt these issues more keenly than its other projects, for military
automation has a different set ofimperatives from industrial automation. Automation on the
battlefield or at sea carries social, psychological, and technical baggage that overlaps only partially
with automation in the factory. At the start ofa war, for example, when the nation mobilizes, the
military has too much labor - the problem becomes how to utilize it effectively, not how to
reduce it. For an anned service, labor is cheap and plentiful, and the rigid hierarchy can overlook
user problems and complaints and order compliance with new techniques. Automation in the
military concerns issues ofperfonnance, precision, combat stress, and, above all, the technological
extension ofa warrior's capabilities (although production is still a major issue in wartime). In
contrast, industrial automation tends to address co~ efficiency of production, and worker
autonomy. While other historical studies have analyzed automation in the military, they have
• See, for example, "Bomber Defense from a Little Black Box," SpeI'I)'SCOJJe 9 (DO. 12, July, 1943).
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looked prinwily at production, where they can directly compare military and industrial contexts. 9
Automatic machinery in combat has no such clear civilian counterpart.
Elmer Sperry And De Gyrocompass
The Ship Stabilizer
Elmer Sperry founded the Sperry (Jyroscope Company in 1910 spurred by the "stability
problem" ofocean vessels. Traditional sailing ships had enjoyed a naturaJ stability due to do the
balance ofwind and water forces, but steam ships tended io roll severely, making life aboard
rather unpleasant for pusengers. S~rry designed a large spinning gyroscope to be installed in a
ship's hold which could tilt fore and aft on its mount and apply the force of its precession to
stabilize roUe While others had already built similar devices, Sperry added an innovation to make it
more effective. The earlier gyrostabilizers were passive, i.e. they relied only on the precessional
force ofthe gyroscope to counteract the rolling ofthe ship. These devices were only minirnalIy
useful because the action ofthe gyroscope would lag the roU ofthe ship and would not exert
much force until the vessel was already rolling with considerable momentum. Speny made his
system "active:" he added a pendulum which sensed the slightest roU (eventua1ly a small
gyroscope replaced the pendulum as the sensing element). This sensor caused a motor to tilt the
gyroscope, thus countering the motion while the ship was still nearly vertical and moving slowly
with little momentum. Thus the gyro seemed to "anticipate" or "lead" the roll, keeping it to
relatively small excursions from the vertical (later a similar lad would be used to predict the future
positions ofaircraft). Active stabilization provided markedly better perfonnance than earlier
passive gyrostabilizers. Elmer Sperry used the gyroscope as a reference for stability, echoing the
long tradition of regulators and governors which imposed regularity on mechanical motions. His
early goals were to provide regular and even motion more than dynamic control.
Between 1910 and 1915, Elmer Sperry developed the gyrostabilizer further~ in close
cooperation with Captain (later Admiral) David W. Taylor, delivering a unit to the US Navy for
testing aboard the USS Worden in 1912. The ship stabilizer displayed the key characteristics ora
control system: control ofa high power deviet; (the large gyro) by a low power device (the
9 Hu8b Aitken, Taylorism at the Watertown Arsenal (Cambridge: HaJvanI University Press, 19(0). David Noble
Fonp ofProductioo (New York: AIfied A. Knopf, 1984). Hany Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Canital: The
I)mpdatinn ofWork in the TwenIieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
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sensor). "Sperry did not use the terminology ofautomation, but he incorporated in his
stabilization system a sensor, feedback, a programmed controller, and 8 servomotor.t'tlO Sperry
Gyroscope built and marketed a number ofdifferent versions of the gyrostabilizer, including one
for luxury yachts. The company eventually installed the devices on more than fony ships between
1915 and 1935. Gyrostabilizers never really succeeded in the market, however, and were
eventualJy superseded by active external fins. They were not to be Elmer Sperry's most important
invention. II
The GyrocOHlptJSS
By the tum oCtile century, the increasing power ofsteamships, combined with their
expanding complements ofelectrical machinery, exposed the linutations ofmagnetic compasses.
They wobbled, reacted to iron huDs, and pointed only to magnetic and not true north. Corrections
could partially compensate for these errors, but new equipment and the need for greater accuracy
made the magnetic compass an increasingly unacceptable source ofheading data. In military
applications the problem was worse. On a warship, rotating the heavy steel guns would change
the ship's magnetic signature, and the compass could be thrown otfby 180 degrees when the guns
fired. For submarines, running underwater depended on large electric motors, whose magnetic
fields would disturb the compass even more. This limitation proved especially critical since dead
reckoning, the only way to navigate below the surface, depended on an accurate heading
reference. In a bid to sail to the North Pole by submarine, German inventor Hennann Anschiitz-
Kaanpfe had invented a device that employed a gyroscope to provide for undersea navigation in
1905.12 In 1909, while in Germany promoting the gy!ostabilizer, Elmer Sperry had seen the
Anschiitz gyrocompass, which eliminated problems ofthe magnetic compass by pointing to "true
north." The spinning gyro literally sensed the rotation of the earth and aligned itself to the earth's
rotational axis without regard to magnetic fields.
Elmer Sperry introduced the gyrocompass in 1911, and its success, resting in part on naval
applications, won Elmer Sperry acclaim as a great American inventor, and access to the upper
echelon ofAmerican technology (including the Naval Consulting Board, charged with bringing
10 Ifu&bes, Elmer SJpry, 114.
I) "The Products ofTbe Speny Corporation," ad, probably 1935, SOC, Box 12.
12 DoaaId MacKenzie, InymtiDB Accuracy: A Historical Sociolocy ofNuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1990), 34-35.
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new inventions to the war effort). By the end ofWorld War It the gyrocompass had become an
accepted and rebable technology, and the company profitably busied itselfoutfitting the world's
fleets, both civiliarl and military. Yet even with its internal feedbacks, the gyrocompass remained
essentially a sensing device a stable reference, and an "open loop" device. It Wi,:S 3J1 ideal
candidate to be inco~r&ted into a larger closed-loop control system. Such a system made sense
as a marketing strategy ,,, well, for customers who already owned the sensing device could be
sold additional equipment ·0 complete the control loop. 13
Resuming a project It had started but shelved before the war, in 1922 Sperry Gyroscope
introduced the "Gyro-pilot." ~·Figure 3-1, Sperry Gyropilot] This device connected the sensing
element of the gyrocompass oack through a ship's wheel in a negative feedback loop that would
keep the ship automatically on course. It truly tamed the beast. In promoting the device, Sperry
emphasized its recording capability and registered a weak-link view ofhumans in automation:
Our studies include many hundreds ofautomatically made records showing the movements
oftbe ships~ together with the movements ofthe rudder. These records clearly show
that even the best ofmen are not constitutionally adapted to perfonn this purely
mechanical task [steering]. The man's powers ofattentioo quickly become fatigu~ he
fails to detect small deviations from the course, these smaI1 deviations quickly become
large deviatiOll:J, too mum or too little rudder is applied and the ship perfonns a sinuous
course. The result is waste ofpower, both in the steering engine and the main engines. 14
Here, the rhetoric ofautomation reflects larger cultural currents: the concern with "waste of
power" echoes the efficiency craze ofthe 19205.
Although operated by a simple feedback loop, the Sperry Gyropilot nevertheless had the
uncanny sense ofautomatic machinery. It truly seemed to be alive. Sperry sales literature played
on the novelty and mystery ofthe device. One promotional pamphlet, "A True Story of the Devil"
tells a racist tale ofa ship captain sailing in the f\~editerranean. He invites an Arab captain, an
experienced and able seaman, aboard the vessel to see it operate under automatic steering by the
Sperry Gyropilot. The Arab sees the wheel operating "by itself' and stands in awe. After much
searching for hidden ropes or some other source ofthe trick, he remains incredulous, convinced
the ship must be possessed by the devil. The American captain explains to him the ship is being
driven by an angel which only Christian believers can see. Ifhe were to convert from his "godless"
13 Hugla, Elmer Sperry, 27'-279.
14 Sperry GyroIcope Company, lbe Gyro-Compass and Gyro-PiIot: Their Operating Principles, Construction., and
uses," SOC.
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ways, he too would see how the ship drives itself .5 The ship might still have been a beast, but
now an intelligent, domesticated one.
Other advertising playerl on shipboard labor politics, a1Y!ays a present issue with automatic
devices. A common ad portrayed the Gyropilot as a man looking for wor~ in a tone that cannot
have been comforting to working sailors:
Wanted - a permanent position on board ship as a wbeelsman. Have bad experience in
steering every type ofmerclwtt ship, can steer courses more accurately than others and use
less rudder. Am sober, intelligent, strictly attentive to business, never ask for time off, do
DOt talk back, am not atfcctcd by bill of&re or poor ~ingt ill fact do not eat at all.
Wages wanted, only 54 cents per day for 24 hours service.
[Signed]
Sperry Gyro Pilot. 16
These familiar claims often surround the introduction ofautomated devices: improved accuracy,
greater obedience, and more reliability than human operators. Furthermore, Sperry sold a "course
recorder" which could flCCOmpany the gyropilot and record on paper the precise course of the
vessel during an entire trip, thus demonstrating the superiority ofthe gyropilot for accurate course
keeping. The course recorder also exposed differences between individual helmsman, as well as
any variations in the quality ofsteering during a particular watch. Fortune magazine reported in
1940 that "helmsman regarded the course recorder as a kind ofmechanical company spy, and the
marine gyropiJot as a wicked device meant to send them into technological unemployment.,,17
Nevertheless, the gyropilot was a hit with industry and the public, and quickly acquired the
nickname "Metal Mike." Still, despite Sperry Gyroscope's promotion of the "weak link" view of
the human steersman, customers, especially in the traditional nwitime trades, hesitated to
relinquish such an important function as steering to a machine. The Company therefore hastened
to assure prospective users that after ceding control, they could grab it back anytime. The
Gyropilot included a feature (in the form ofa large lever) to physically disengage the unit,
returning it to manual operation, assuring that "the regular ships control is instantly availableJOT
emergency. ,,11
15 Sales Pamphlet, n.d., "A TI1Ie StoIy of the Devil," SOC, Box 1.
16~ ad, SGC, Box 3.
17 "Speny: The Corporation" Fortune.. May, 1940.
•1 Automatic Steering for Naval Vessels. Publication DO. 19-3, 1932. SOC Box 2. Emphasis original.
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The Gyropilot then, while it usurped control ofthe steering function, gave th~ human
another task: control ofthe gyropilot. Originally the pilot had only one way to control the syste~
turning the wheel; the gyropilot increased the number of inputs to seven. The original wheel still
worked as before, when the autopilot was disengaged. "Metal Mike" itself had a smaller wheel,
used for setting the heading to hold (in another mode, this wheel could also operate the rudder
directly). As mentioned above, a clutch could physically remove the gyropilot from the system.
The "weather adjustment" allowed the ship te yaw a certain amount without initiating a correction
(known as a "deadband" in today's parlance). "Initial rudder adjustment" provided a means for
"meeting" the help as it returned to course, easing offon the rudder as it approached the proper
course (analogous to "derivative gain" in today's terms). "Rudder ratio adjustment" determined
the amount of rudder required to bring a particular ship back on course ("gain" in today's terms).
While the last tended to be a permanent setting, varying only from ship to ship, others needed to
be tweaked more frequently. In fact, the control system required proper "tuning" (as do all
closed-loop systems) to perform most efficiently, and sometimes even to operate at all.
This is not to imply that "Metal ~e" did not save labor: it genuinely kept the ship on
course and relieved the operator ofsignificant workload. Rather than eliminating the steersm~
the gyropilot altered the character ofhis job. The pilot set the desired course, and changed it in
accordance with navigation. He also adjusted the instrument for different weather conditions and
different speeds. And, most important, he controlled when the automation was in effect. Entering
a harbor or avoiding an obstacle, for example, would not call for automatic control. The
helmsman thus engaged and disengaged the autopilot according to the circumstances, literally
trading or exchanging control between human and machine. Man and beast worked together, each
covering the other's limitations.
As with the earlier gyrocompass, the navy's interest in the gyropilot extended beyond that
ofcommercial users. It cared less about labor problems and barely at all about labor costs,
emphasizing instead accuracy, precision, and performance. The Gyropilot allowed better course
tracking for maneuvers, and more accurate courses meant more constant speeds and better firing
solutions. In its constant search for accuracy, naval gunnery sought to measure its world, to
control its environment by bringing more and more variables into the machine. Closed loop
control ofship's heading stabilizeel a major component in the complex equation ofwarfare at sea.
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Sperry catered to the navy's special interests. In other applications the company touted the
e81le and uniformity ofoperating automatic machinery, where the operator only perfonned
"mechanical" functions. In the navy, however, this vision ofa robot-like operator broke down
und'er conditions ofextreme stress.
It bas bt:n assumed that many ofthe helmsman's reactions under the stress of battle
conditions will be mere automatic reflexes, inculcated by previous training until the
familiar tasks may be perfonned without conscious thought. While it is a fact that
predictions ofhuman reactions must be based on averages, the man at the wheel is
unfortunately DOt an average but an individual.
Herf: Sperry display's a certain sophistication concerning the role ofthe human operator. It
presllpposes machinery designed to match average human operators trained to perform
refle:ovely. The unique individual, with aU his judgment, skill- and possibly panic, uncertainty
and ,mistakes - reemerges from this average in battle, invalidating the automation. The solution
to utis quandary was not less automation but more, to shift the operator's burdens to less stressful
timE: periods. Once setup and adjusted the gyropilot would literally sail through battle:
The consisten~macbiDe-1ike precision ofthe Gyro-Pilot cannot fail to enhance the qualities
which are alI-essentiaJ in battle. Tnte, man can never be displaced by the machine, but his
function may weD become that ofthe staDd-by observer, rather than prime-mover in the
action where perfection in every detail must ever remain the objective.19
COJmbat, that most chaotic and unpredictable human situation, caDs for the highest precision and
certainty technology can provide. The steersman need only stand by and watch. More than merely
taming the beast ofthe machine, however, the control system plays a dual role, taming and
standardizing the human operator as well.
Wiley POlt and the Sperry Automatic Pilot: Putting on tbe Machine
The sea was not the only area in which Sperry sought to stabilize motion. Before World
War I Elmer and Lawrence Sperry had experimented with gyroscopic stabilization ofaircraft.
During the war they built, under government contracts, an unsuccessful autonomous flying bomb
or "aerial torpedo." This device suffered from the "afterthought" nature ofcontrol engineering;
even Sperry did not have a broad enough view to design the airplane mechanism with automatic
controls in mind.20
19 Ibid.
20 Hugbes, Elmer Sperry, 269.
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Sperry first echieved commercial success in aviation not with robots but with instruments,
giving pilots feedback on the state ofthe airplane which they could not get from other sources.
These devices helped expand the operating envelope ofaviation into adverse weather conditions.
Aviation needed reliability to make the transition from a technical curiosity to a mainstream
business. Where the military needtXI to bring the chaotic field ofbattle into its quantified purview,
commerce needed to bring the wild airplane into the world of acceptable risk and reliable
scheduling.
During the first world war, Sperry conducted a difficult development program in
gyroscopic aircraft instruments for the navy (Elmer Sperry'5 navy liaison for this progr~ Luis de
Florez, an MIT graduate, would later be the primary sponsor for the Whirlwind digital computer).
Sperry introduced a gyroscopic tum indicator in 1918, then a "directional gyro" and a gyroscopic
"artificial horizon" in 1930. These devices became part of the standard suite ofairplane
instruments and remain so today. Sperry's first truly high-volume products, the directional gyro
Uld the artificial horizon were installed on nearly all airplanes produced in this country through
World Warn.
Just as it had introduced the "Metal Mike" gyropilot to close the loop around marine
gyrocompasses, Sperry closed the loop around its aviation instruments with an autopilot. The
company built on its flying torpedo technology \\ith Sperry Automatic Pilot for aircraft, a
pneumatic-hydraulic device. As early as 1914 Lawrence Sperry had demonstrated gyroscopially
stabilized tlight, but war interrupted development. After Lawrence's death in 1924, it remained
for Elmer Sperry Jr. to develop a fully automatic autopilot, in cooperation with the army from
1925-29. Similar to the navy's interest in the gyrocompass, the army wanted the autopilot to keep
an airplane stable during a bombing run. The first Sperry device, designated A-I had reliability
and maintenance problems which were corrected in the A-2 model.21 Sperry's A-2 autopilot, the
first such device to be practicable, became enormously popular in the thirties. TWA equipped its
entire fleet with the device in 1933; it earned the appelation "Elmer" after its designer. The
autopilot's rise to popularity began in the hands ofa man who single-handedly brought together
pilot and airplane, tightening the man/beast relationship into a much more intimate affair.
21 Stcpbcn L. McFarland., America's Pursuit ofPrccision Bombing 1910-1945 (Washington: Smithsonian
Instiution Pre&, 1995), 36-9.
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Wiley Post, an Oklahoma fann-boy with training in mechanics and electronics, left a job in
the oilfield! for a career in the small and marginal profession ofcommercial pilot. From the
beginning, Post made his mark as an operator particularly close to his machine. An early colleague
recalled "he dido't just fly an airplane, he put it on." Another remembered Post as, "as near to
being a mechanical flying machine as any human who held a stick." 22 In Post's words, when flying
I tried my best to keep my mind a total blank...Jdo not mean that I paid no attention to the
business ofhandling the ship. I mean that Jdid it automatically, without mental effort,
letting my actions be wholly controlled by my subconscious mind. 21
in 1926 an oilfield accident cost Post his left eye, and he literally replaced it with a
machine, using workmen's compensation to buy his first airplane. He found a job ferrying
Lockheed's Vega airplanes from the factory to its customers. Here Post gained experience with
the problems of"blind flying" (what today we would call instrument flying) through clouds and
bad weather, relying on Sperry gyroscopic instruments to keep his bearings. In 1931, Post and
partner Harold Gatty (who had trained Lindbergh in navigation) made headlines by piloting a
Vega, named "Wmnie Mae," around the world in record time.24 For this flight Post grouped his
instruments right in front ofhis eyes and modified his cockpit to fly with one foot on the rudder
pedals and one hand on the wheel. As Sperry President Preston Bassett later described Post's
piloting, "As many will recall, Waley had only one good eye. So, all combined, the setup was that
ofa man flying around the world with one eye, one arm, one leg, and two instruments. You will
see that we are building toward a very good servomechanism.,,25
In 1933 Post replaced Gatty with an early automatic pilot donated by Sperry Gyroscope.
He repeated the trip around the world solo, relying heavily on the Sperry device. The machine
freed Post for other functions like navigation, but primarily it allowed him to nap, considerably
reducing his fatigue.26 Post took over full manual control when the autopilot experienced
22 J.H. Conger, quoted in Stanley R. Mohler and Bobby H. Johnson. Smithsonian Annals of Flight Number Eight:
Wiley Post. His W11Ul;~MM, and the World's First Pressure Suit (Washington, Smithsonian Institution Press,
1978), 5. Will Banis in Ok"homa City 'IiD& August 16, 1935, 1, quoted in Mohler and Johnson, 116.
23 Wiley Post and Harold Gatty, Around the World in Eigt Days: The Flight oftbe Winnie Mae, (London: John
Hamilton, Ltd, 1932), 26.
24 Ibid.
25 PresIon R. BISfJdt, "Servomecbanisms: Control.linl Vehicles in the Air," From an address given before the N",w
York Sectioa oftbe American Rockd Society, $j!enyscope 13 (DO. 1, second quarter, 1953), 22.
26 New York Times, July 23, 1933, 1. Wiley~ "Destination - New York," $Jlenyscqpc 7 (DO. 2, October,
1933). PoR's Sperry Autopilot mnaiDs on display at the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum. Evcots dramatically
_ the importaDce of the Sperry Autopilot's R:ducins Post's fatigue. The day after Post landed, two
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mechanical failure. Once repaired, the autopilot took control when Post needed sleep. The two
worked together, trading control depending on the circumstances, playing on each other's
strengths and alleviating each other's weaknesses. In Wiley Post's imaginative hands, the Sperry
autopilot brought the beast closer to the pilot. No longer was the ~~chine the body/power and the
man the mindlintention. Rather, the machine become part of the man's body. Technology began
to fuse governa;. and governed.
Public exposure ofPost's seven-day flight not only promoted the Sperry Automatic Pilot
but brought automatic control into public consciousness. The New York Times declared "the days
when human skill and an almost bird-like sense ofdirection enabled a flier to hold his course for
10Dg hours through a starless raight or over a fog are over. Commercial flying in the future will be
automatiC.,,21 [*Figure 3-2, Wiley Post and Winnie Mae] In his later (/ eer, Post further
mechanized his body, developing the first pressure suit to allow him to fly into the stratosphere
(this may have been what his friend meant when he said Post "P'Jt on" the airplane). [*Figure 3-3,
Pressure Suit] In 1935 he and Will Rogers died in a plane crash in Alaska.
The Sperry Corporation in the 1930.
By 1929, the year before his deat~ Elmer Sperry sold his stake in the company. It was a
heady, chaotic time for the airplane industry, and Sperry Gyroscope becaJne part ofNorth
American Aviation which included several airlines and aircraft manufactures. Tom Morgan
became President of Sperry Gyroscope, and soon after President ofNorth American. General
Motors acquired North American in 1933, and the fallout from that transaction created the Sperry
Corporation, with Tom Morgan as President, a holding company for smaller firms brought in
through acquisitions (including Sperry Gyroscope Ltd., the English subsidiary).21
Reginald Gillmor, who had overseen installation of the earliest gyrocompass aboard the
Delaware, and who had traJljferred British fire control technology to the United States, now
headed Sperry Gyroscope. The company's business divided into J()OAJ naval, )OOA. military, 3()OAJ
nlarine, and }OOA. aeronautical markets. The last sector grew most quickly. Morgan committed the
Italian aviators were criticaUy injured landing in New York after a tIIngtl,ntic flight. The cause of the crash: pilot
fatigue. New York Times, July 24, 1933.
21 New York TiMeS, July 24, 1933, 2.
21 "Sperry: The Corporation,tt Fortune, May, 1940.
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company to the field with a substantial fraction ofthe r~search and development budget going to
aircraft. By 1937 aviation accounted for one-halfof Sperry Gyroscope's business. 29
For the Sperry Corporation overall, control encompassed more than aircraft; during tbe
early thirties it took shape as an integrated control system company. It purchased Ford Ins~rument
in 1933, which remained under the leadership ofHannibal Ford, who found himselfonce again a
Sperry Employee. Ford Instrument still exclusively made naval fire control computers for the
Bureau ofOrdnance, operating out ofthree separate plants in Long Island City. Though owned
by the same holding company, Sperry Gyroscope and Ford Instrument shared remarkably little
technology, well into the 1940s.
Where Sperry Gyroscope and Ford Instrument specialized in the precision components
required for perception and integration, the feedback part ofthe control process, ~veral
acquisitions during this ~riod brought ihe company expertise and products for articulation, the
output ofcontrol. In 1935 Sperry acquired the Waterbury Tool Company ofWaterbury
Connecticu~ maker oflarge, variable-speed hydraulic transmissions for the navy. Waturbury's
hydraulic gear moved turrets for large naval guns and shell hoists, cranes, and numerous other
shipboard machines. In 1937 De2roit-based Vickers Inc., the country's largest maker ofoil
hydraulic mac;hinery (not related to the British arms firm, Vickers Ltd.), \vas brought into the fold.
Vickers specialized in small, high-powered, reversible power control for industrial applications,
inclUding paper making and cable m&lufacture. HaJKy Vickers founded the company in 1920, with
financial backing from Fred Fisher ofthe Fisher Brothers. Fisher now became t~le single largest
stockholder in the Sperry Corporation, with about two and a halfpercent of its shares (he
r~mained on its board until his death in death in 1941, when he was replaced by his brother
Charles). In 1940 Waterbury was incorporated into Vickers to create a product line that covered
the fun range ofhydraulic power devices. Morgan chose not to integrate these companies as
divisions under a single corporation, but rather to keep them subsidiaries to retain their separate
cultures (Waterbury ~ventually became a division of Vickers). Sperry corporate structure mapped
the functions ofthe governor; they frequently sold systems comprised ofcomponents from
multiple subsidiari~.
29 Speny Corporation, Annual Report. 1937.
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By 1930, Sperry Gyroscope itselfhad grown to about 1,000 employees with annual sales
ofover $5 million - it typically accounted for half of the Sperry Corporation's sales (although
this percentage declined as the hydraulics businesses expanded). Its product line consisted ofa
number ofcontrol systems and components, but also refl~"1ed the company's history. The flagship
products remained marine gyrocompasses and gyropilots, both commercial and military. Although
excluded from naval fire control, Sperry Gyroscope's nav2d roots survived in searchlights, ship
stabilizers, and II number ofmarine instruments, includirlg a sali..uty recorder for boiler water.
Within the Sperry Corporation, fire control for the navy was now the exclusive domain ofFord
Instrument. In the twenties, naval fire control was itself starting from scratch on the new problem
orantiaircraft defense, and S~rry Gyroscope teamed up with the army to attack this difficult
challenge ofcontrol.30
ADtiai~ ...rt ArtiUery Fire Control
As Sperry Gyroscope improved airplanes, it also built a business destroying them. Control
technology, as it had with steam-engines, railroads, and naval gunnery, responded to progress in
other types ofmachinery. The aerial combat ofWorld War I, combined with postwar fears of
aerial bombing, created a military demand for sophisticated fee control for antiaircraft artillery.
Shooting an airplane out ofthe sky is essentially a problem of"leading" the target. As aircraft
developed rapidly in the twenties, their increased speed and altitude rapidly pushed the task of
computing this lead out ofthe range ofhuman reaction and calculation. Fire control equipment
for antiaircraft guns was a means oftechnologically aidiJlg human gunners to acconlplish a task
beyond their natural capabilities.
Sperry's work in antiaircraft control culminat"Xi its interwar work, synthesizing the beast
and system visions ofcontrol. Human operators worked in close concert with automatic
machinery to the point where the "system" represented people connecting different machines, or
machines connecting disparate people, depending on one's perspective. As automation
progressed, human operators were gradually reduced, but in a piecemeal, almost hesitating way
- the distinction between mechanical and human function blurre.d to the point \vhere substituting
one for the other required subtle judgments.
]()"The Products ofTbe Speny Corporation," n.d, early 19395. SOC.
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During the first world wat, antiaircraft fire control had undergone some preliminary
development. Artillery officers used slide rules to calculate lead angles based on optical sighting
oftargets. These slide rules were incorporated into boxes; an operator would dial in data with
knobs, read out an answer on a dial, and telephone azimuth and elevation to those operating the
guns ("Azimuth" is the term used by the army for the gun's rotation, where the navy uses "train"
for the equivalent parameter. Both services use "elevation.") Elmer Sperry, as chairman ofthe
Aviation Committee ofthe Naval Consulting Board, was familiar with this technology and th~
Army Ordnance Department invited him to submit a proposal for an antiaircraft instrument based
on his work in naval fire contro).31 Sperry came up with two instruments: a goniometer or
rangefinder, and a pretelemeter, or calculator, both ofwhich included rudimentary data
transmission systems. Sperry Gyroscope was unable to produce these devices in quantity during
the war, however, because ofother wartime obligations; several French-manufactured equivalents
were used, but only in small numbers.32
When the war ended in 1918, the army undertook virtually no new work in antiaircraft
fire control for several years. In the mid-1920s, however, they began to develop components for
antiaircraft equipment including stereoscopic height-finders, searchlights, and sound location
equipment, the latter two ofwhich invl'lved Sperry Gyroscope. Sperry had made its first
searchlights in 1916 and sent them to war in 1917.33 After the war, searchlights grew to a
significant fraction ofSperry sales, for both military (navy and army) and commercial applications,
and would continue so well into World War II. Sound location equipment did not enjoy the same
longevity. It worked by exaggerating the distance between an operator's ears, which allowed him
to locate incoming airplane sounds, within three or four degrees. The basic physics ofthe method
had problems, however, for sound traveling in air is highly sensitive to turbulence, wind, and
temperature variations, all ofwhich reduce accuracy. Furthermore, improved propellers reduced
engine noise and higher aircraft altitudes made airplanes harder to ear on the ground, rendering
sound locators virtually useless by the late thirties. Radar, which began as radio direction finding
around 1930, eventually superseded this method. Nonethelesst sound locators illustrate Sperry's
31 Rose to Sperry, August 11, 1917. Elmer A. Sperry Papers, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington Delaware
(bcrcaftcr referral to as EAS) Box 32.
32 Elmer Sperry to T. Wilson, Fnmkford Arsenal, July 10, 1925. EAS, Box 33.
33 "Ordnance History oltbe Sperry Gyroscope Company, Inc.•" SOC Box 33, File Control Folder.
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evol\¥ing philosophy ofaugmenting human capabilities, literally grafting machinery onto the
operator's senses. [-Figure 3-4, sound ranging equip.]
The army had responsibility for coastal defenses; large coastal guns were similar to naval
guns and faced similar problems ofcoordination when shooting at distant marine targets. After
World War I, the army studied the navy's director firing and eventually incorporated the
technique, including computers, into its coastal artillery.:W In 1925, Major Thomas Wilson, who
had participated in that work and was now at the Frankford Arsenal in Philadelphi~ began
developing a central computer for antiaircraft fire control, also based on the system ofdirector
firing in naval gunnery. Wilson's device resembled earlier fire control calculators, accepting data
as input from perception components, performing calculations to predict the future location of the
target, and articulating direction information to the guns.
Integration andData Transmission
Even with Wilson's director, the components ofan antiaircrcte battery remained
independent, tied together only by voice telephone. Sperry's ChiefEngineer, later President,
Preston R. Bassett directed tile company's searchlight and sound locator development. He later
recaUed, "no sooner, however, did the [antiaircraft] components get to the point offunetioning
satisfactorily within themselves, than the problem ofproperly transmitting the information from
one to the other came to be of prime importance.,,3' Tactics and terrain considerations often
required different fire control elements be separated by up to several hundred feet. Observers
telephoned their data to an officer, who manually entered it into the central computer, read otfthe
results, and telephoned them to the gun installations. This communication system introduced both
a time delay and the opportunity for error. The components needed tighter integration; that meant
automatic data communication. With its gyrocompass repeaters, the Sperry Gyroscope Company
could provide such a system.
Because ofSperry'~ experience with fire control in the navy (at least the positive part of
it), as well as Elmer Sperry's earlier work with the goniometer and pretelemeter, the army
14 Sperry Gyroscope eventually made computers for anny seacoast guns. For a history of Sperry's involvement with
coast artillery, see Sperry Company Report, "Gun Data Computer, MI, February', 1944. SOC, Box 40.
See correspondence in NARA RG-38 EotJy 178 Box 3 Folder S9/6S.~ John Tcsturo Sumida.
35 Sperry Company memorandum, probably by Preston R. Bassett, "DeYelopmeot ofFire Control for Major caliber
Anti-Aircraft Gun 8attCIy," 2. SOC, Box 33.
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approached the company for help with data transmission for antiaircraft fire control. To Elmer
Sperry, it looked like an easy problem: the calculations resembled those in a naval application, but
the physical platform, unlike a ship at sea, anchored to the ground. It also had its own electrical
system, and stood physically separate from the guns, which could help avoid the synchronization
problems Sperry's system experienced aboard ships. Sperry engineers visited Major Wilson at the
Frankford Arsenal in 1925, and Elmer Sperry fonowed up with a letter expressing his interest in
working on the problem. He stressed his company's experience with the navy, as well as its recent
developments in bombsights, "work from the other end ofthe proposition."36 Bombsights had to
incorporate numerous parameters ofwind, groundspeed, airspeed, and ballistics, so an antiaircraft
director was really a reciprocal bombsight. In fact, part of the reason antiaircraft fire control
equipment worked at all was it assumed a«acking bombers had to fly straight and level to line up
their bombsights. Elmer Sperry's advances to Wilson were warmly received, and in 1925 and
1926 Sperry Gyroscope built two data transmission systems for the anny's gun directors.
The original director built at Frankford was designated T-l, or the "Wilson Director." The
anny had purchased a Vickers director manufactured in England but encouraged Wilson to design
one that could be manufactured in this country.37 Sperry's two data transmission projects added
automatic communications between the elements ofboth the Wilson and the Vickers systems
(Vickers would eventually incorporate the Sperry system into its product), one the traditional DC
step-by-step type and one the newer synchronous AC system. Major Wilson died in 1927, and
Sperry Gyroscope took over the entire director development from the Frankford Arsenal with a
contract to build and deliver a director incorporating the best features ofboth the Wilson and
Vickers systems.
With this project Sperry undertook a small but intensive development program in
antiaircraft fire control that would last more than fifteen years. The company set up a separate
department with its own facilities and personnel, and gradually developed a cadre ofexperts. Earl
W. Chafee headed the effort, an engineer whose strong personality and free ntanageriaJ hand
allowed him to completely dominate Sperry's fire control work well into the 19405. During the
J6 Elmer A. Sperry to T. Wilson, FraDkford Arsenalt July lOt 1925. EASt Box 33. For the Spcny Bombsights, see
aIIo McFarIaDd, AMica', Pursuit ofPRcision Bombing.
37 United Stata Armyt 0rdnaDce Department, "History of Anti..Aircraft Director DevelopmcD~" n.d., probably
prepared in the fall of 1935. SOC, Box 4.
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second world war, government officials viewed all Sperry fire control work as canying Chafee's
personal imprint. The company financed its engineering internally, selling directors in small
quantities to the army, mostly for evaluation, for only the actual cost ofproduetion.31 Of the
nearly ten models Sperry developed before 1935, it never sold more than twelve ofany version;
the average order was five. Sperry Gyroscope offset some development costs by sales to foreign
governments, especially Russia, with the army I s approval - exactly the arrangement which had
annoyed the navy.39
Antiaircraft work was a difficult enough problem by itseU: but during these years it faced
an additional challenge. Not only did the machine have to track high speed aircraft, but aeronautic
technology itselfwas rapidly changing. In 1925, bombers flew at 100 miles per hour at relatively
low altitude. This speed more than tripled in the next ten years, and the bombing altitude rose to
.
wen abo,re IS,OOO feet. Still~ this situation was part of the terrain: in these years control systems
by nature were driven by other technologies. In more ways than one, Sperry was shooting at a
moving target.
The Antiaircraft Problem
Defense against high altitude bombing drove antiaircraft development between the wars.
Only late in the thirties did close in attack and dive bombing emerge as significant prob~ems. A
number ofdifferent control systems emerged to deal with the~ including trtcer bullets and "lead
computing sights" for smaller caliber machine guns (see Chapters 6 and 7). Sperry's antiaircraft
work in the twenties and thirties concentrated on aiming large guns (three to four inches in
diameter) firing exploding sheDs to relatively high altitudes to reach attacking bombers. The shells
were not intended to hit the target directly but rather to explode nearby, a predetermined time
after firing. Since this scenario represented the most difficult antiaircraft situation at the time, it
led fire control technology and its techniques diffused into other applications, including coastal
defense and traditional artillery.40
31 Sperry Gyroscope Company, "Development ofFire Control for Major Caliber Anti-Aircraft Gun Battery."
39 Ibid. See also Sperry Company Form '1607, "Sperry Universal Director: Information to be Furnished by
Customer." SOC, Box 3. This document was intended for foreign governments wishing Sperry to customize
directors to different types ofguns.
40 See, for exmnple, G.M Wells "New Fire Control for Divisional Weapons," Army Ordnance XI (no. 65) March-
April 1931 which explicitly suggests extending Sperry's AA fire control system to standard artillery. Sperry also
did some work in seacoast artillery fire control in 19291Dd 1938, although one repon admitted "Our primaJy
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Rising aircraft speeds and altitudes created a number of problems. Once fired, shells travel
with ever-decreasing velocity due to gravity and air resistance. Typical guns of the 19305 could
easily have a time offlight offifteen seconds to reach 5,000 feet, and double that to reach 8,000
feet. A plane traveling at 100 miles per hour at 5,000 feet would travel about 750 yards
horizontally (toward the target) during lhis time oftlight. Thus the "lead" for the gunner would be
750 yards. A plane traveling at 250 miles per hour at 8,()()() feet would travel 3,660 yards during
shell tlight, a lead nearly five times greater than that for the slower, lower plane. For either case,
the shen would need to be fired not at the plane itself: but at the place it was expected to be after
the time offtight. The structure ofthe prediction was the same as in naval gunnery, but the
distances and times were different. The longer the time offL1ght, the more difficult this prediction.
Furthermore, the problem had an inherent feedback loop, because prediction could only be
accomplished when the time offlight was known, but time offlight depended on the aiming point,
itself the output ofprediction.
Tactics further complicated prediction. For antiaircraft tire to have real defensive effects it
needed to shoot down attacking planes before they released their bombs. This limitation reduced
the time available for the director to produce a firing solution: tracking could begin only whe"l the
attacking aircraft came into visual instrument range, and the shell must be fired at least one "time
offlight" before the bomb release point, which would precede the target by an amount depending
on the aircraft's speed and altitude.[*Figure 3-5, Antiaircraft trajectory diagram] Earl Chafee
produced the fonowing chart (for a 100 mph bomber, assuming the guns were placed right at the
bombing target):
Maximum time within zone ofeffective fire:
Maximum time within range of60" searcblight:
Maximum time within effective sound locator range:
Maximum time within trajectory of 3" gun:
Maximum time within visual observation range
under conditions of ideal visibility:
Maximum time within limits ofaudibility with sound
2.5 minutes
4 minutes
5 minutes
S.S minutes
6 minutes
contributioa to the seacoasI fire COIIbOI problem bas been our RlStained interest in a very slow moving field"
RoIwe11 Ward, "Gun DaIa Computer. MI" January 31. 1944. SOC. Also see Constance M. Green, Harry
TbompIon, aDd Peter C. Roots, The ClrrInanq Department: Planning Munitions for War Volume 1of Tbc US
Army in World Wv D: The TecJmjcal Services (Washington, DC: 0fIice of the CbiefofMilitary History,
Deputmeot oftbe Army, 1955), 344.
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locator:
These values would all diminish by a factor of2.5 for 250 mph bomber. One way to improve the
situation would be to move the antiaircraft director and battery forward of the target, allowing it
to engage attacking planes well before their bomb release points. The ability to predict the
bomber's position, however, followed from an assumption ofstraight and level flight. This
assumption held during a bombing run, when the plane needed to fly steady to align its own
bombsight - for as much as a minute with 19308 equipment. Too far ahead ofthe target,
however, an antiaircraft battery would catch the bomber before its bombing run, when the straight
and level assumption was not yet valid.42 Nevertheless, ifthe antiaircraft system could completely
solve the problem for a given zone, it could force attackers to maneuver or climb to a higher
altitude, making their job more difficult and achieving a partial tactical victory.
The T-6 Director
Sperry's new version ofWilson11 s director was designated T-4 in development. This model
incorporated corrections for air density, super-elevation (the need to aim a bit high to compensate
for the droop ofthe trajectory due to gravity), and wind. Assembled and tested at Frankford in the
fall of 1928, it had problems with backlash in its gearing and reliability in its predicting
mechanisms. Still, the anny found the T-4 promising and after testing returned it to Sperry for
modification.43 The company changed the design for simpler manufacture, eliminated two
operators, and improved reliability. In 1930 Sperry returned with the T-6, which it tested
successfully. In 1931, the anny ordered twelve ofthe units. The anny standardized the T-6 (i.e.
accepted it as operational) as the M-2 director.44
Since the T-6 was the first antiaircraft director to be put into production, as well as the
first one the umy formally procured, it is instructive to examine its operation in detail. Such an
analysis also clarifies the basic features ofthe antiaircraft problem, which would drive the
41 Spcny Gyroscope Company, "Anti-Aircraft Gun Control" Publication No. 20-1640 (Brooklyn, New York:
Speny Gyroscope Company IDe., 1930), 7.
42 Earl W. Chafcc, "Study of tile Requirements for a Satisfactory Antiaircraft Fire Control Syste~" Fire Control
Design Division, Frankford Arsenal, PbiJadclphia, Pa. February 15, 1943. This was the final report from the
"Chafee IDquiJy" which Chafce oooducted for the NDRC fire CODlroI division to asses the importaDce of radar in
AA fire cootroI systems. It iDcludcs, however, a cIctaiIcd history ofSpcny's fire control developmeot written by its
primary participant
4] "History mAnti-AiJaaft Dira:tor Devclopmen~" 12-14.
44 "History of Anti-Aircraft Director Developmen~" 9-16.
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development ofcontrol systems through the end ofWorld War ll. A technical memorandum
dated 1930 explains the theory behind the T-6 calculations and how the system solved equations.
Although this publication lists no author, it was most likely written by Chafee, Sperry's director of
fire control engineering.45
Chafee begins by placing the highly technical tract into strategic context. He addresses
"the influence ofpublic opinion" and points to "the f=ar ofair raids which has been built up
through the public press,n which may cause "a dangerous division ofair forces" in wartime as
scarce airplanes divert from offensive purposes to defending cities. Automatic antiaircraft devices
can perform this defensive function, setting the public's mind at ease and leaving aircraft to fight
fOlWard battles. Chafee's description ofpublic fear orair raids foreshadows the effects ofcivilian
bombing ofWorld War ll. Simi1arIy, in the Cold War, public fear ofair raids would drive the
development ofcomputerized air defense control systems such as SAGE, a descendant ofthese
early Sperry systems.
''The heart ofthe gun control system is the Computer,n writes Chafee, using the term
Ucomputer" for a calwlating machine a decade earlier than recent observers have noted.46 Chafee
describes in detail the workings ofa mechanical analog computer that connected up to four three-
inch antiaircraft guns and an altitude finder into an integrated system. [*Figure 3-6, Antiaircraft
system layout] Just as with Sperry's naval fire control system, the primary means ofconnection
were "data transmitters," similar to those that connected gyrocompasses to repeaters aboard ship.
The director takes three primary inputs. First, target altitude comes from a stereoscopic range
finder, similar in design and construction to those used in naval fire control. This device has two
telescopes separated by a baseline oftwelve feet; a single operator adjusts the angle between them
to bring the two images into coincidence. Slant range, or the raw target distance, is then corrected
45 Sperry Gyroecope Company, "Anti-Aircraft Gun Control" Publication No. 20-1640 (Brooklyn, New York:
Sperry Gyroecope Company IDe., 1930), SOC. nis document does DOt list an author, but its language and
explanatioDs are quite similar to thole in an article pubIisbed by Cbafee, "A Miss is as Good as a Mile," in
Sperrpcope, the ofticiaI Sperry Company orpn, ·n April, 1932. Also see Earl W. Cbatee, Hugh Mwta~ and
Shierfelcl G. Myers, u.s. Patent 110.2,065,303, "Apparatus for the Control ofGunSre," filed JanuaJY, 1933, issued
December, 1936.
46 Paul Ceruzzi writes that before the 194Os, the tam "computer" meant a persoa who performed mechanical
calatlations in "When Computers Were Human," APM" oftbc Hisqry ofComJutinl13 (00. 3) 1991, 237. AIro
sec Ceruzzi, R..,.: The Pi1!bi11ory oftbe Dicital Compuaer (WeIIpOIt, Conn.: Grccnwood Press, 1983), S.
Paul McCoaDd DOleS that "caIlinI their caJa.JatiPI devia:s 'oomputaI' appears to have been an aa:epIed practice
with aviators as early as 1926." "Some Early Computers for Aviators" AnNis of the RiMa ofComputing 13 (no.
2) 1991, 174. Cbafee'l use of the tam for antiaircraft direcIon probably derives from its use in aviation.
147
by elevation angle to derive its altitude component. The second and third variables come from two
additional operators, each with a separate telescope, who track the target for azimuth and for
elevation (these telescopes physically mount on the director). Each sighting device has a data
transmitter that measures angle or range and sends it to the computer. The computer receives
these data and incorporates l1Wlual adjustments for wind velocity, wind direction, muzzle
velocity, air density, and other factors. It calculates three output variables: azimuth, elevation, and
a setting for the fuze. The latter, manually set before loading, detennines the time after firing at
which the sheD will explode (corresponding to the time oftlight).
The director performs two major calculations. F~ prediction models the motion ofthe
target and extrapolates its position to some time in the future, based on an assumption ofconstant
course, speed, and altitude. Prediction corresponds to "leading" the target and parallels the
function oCthe Ford Rangekeper as weD as the lead ofSperry's ship stabilizer gyros. Second, the
ballistic calculation figures how to make the sheD arrive at the desired point in space at the future
time and explode, solving for the azimuth and elevation ofthe gun and the setting on the fuze.
This calculation corresponds to the traditional artilleryman's task of looking up data in a
precalculated "firing table" 8I1d setting gun parameters accordingly. Ballistic calculation is simpler
than prediction, so we will examine it first.
The T-6 director solves the ballistic problem by directly mechanizing the traditional
method, employing a "mechanical firing table." Traditional firing tables were printed lists of
solutions for given angular heights ofthe target, horizontal ranges, and a number ofother
variables. The Wilson Director had these tables graphically printed on a cylinder, on which an
operator set a needle to read the data. The T-6 replaces the firing table with a "Sperry ballistic
cam." A three-dimensionally machined cone-shaped device, the ballistic cam or "pin foUower"
solves a pre-determined mathematical function. [*Figure 3-7, Sperry ballistic cam] Two
independent variables are input by the angular rotation ofthe cam and the longitudinal position of
a pin which rests on top ofthe cam. As the pin moves up and down the length of the cam, and as
the cam rotates, the height of the pin traces a function oftwo variables: the solution to the
ballistics problem (or part of it). The T-6 director incorporates eight ballistic cams, each solving
for a different component ofdie computation including superelevation, time offlight, wind
correction, muzzle velocity, air density correction. Replacing the ballistic cams with a new set
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machined according to different firing tables could adapt a director to different guns.47 Foreign
governments, for example~ could supply Sperry with firing tables and the company could machine
custom cams and produC'~ a special director. The ballistic cams comprised a central component of
Speny's mechanical cornputing technology.
Sperry literature touted the utility ofballistic cams, even that they could be adapted to
more general probletr!S, "this method ofsolving a mechanical problem is so flexible that it can be
used for any range problem in which a desired solution can be expressed in tenns oftwo known
coordinates.,,41 Thf~ cams had one major drawback, however, being extremely difficult to
manufacture. To ~nake one, a rough cam would be cast, and then a machinist would drill hundreds
ofsmall holes, ",arking from a blueprint derived from a firing table usually supplied by the army's
Aberdeen Proving Ground. He needed to continuously examine the point ofthe drill for wear, for
each hole needed to be drilled to an accuracy ofone ten-thousandth ofan inch. He would then
ground the cam smooth and polish it. Later, in an attempt to reduce costs and increase
throughput, Sperry built a special machine to shape several cams at a time from a master template,
similar to thf~ 19*-century Blanchard lathe. Even with this improvement, the difficulty ofballistic
cam manuf8feture proved a major limitation on Sperry's production ofdirectors.
Ballistic cams essentially formed the permanent memory or stored program ofthe director
computer (8~thOUgh far from a "stored program" machine in the way we think of it today).
Numerical c:alculations from the Army Ordnance Department provided the data from which to
fabricate th4~ cams, the machinist's blueprint was an intermediate step which could be eliminated.
Cam produf:tion became increasingly automated, from the ballistics calculations that produced the
data up thr()ugh aetua1 fabrication. This process, with its flow of information from ballistics to
machine contro~ gradually approached "numericaUy controlled" machining. In chapter 9 we shall
see how ho,w this process drove developments in digital computers and early numerically
controlled lmachine tools.
Thf, T-6 director performed its other computational function, IJrediction, in an innovative
way as weIll. Though the target came into the system in polar coordinates (azimuth, elevation, and
range), targets usually flew a constant trajectory (it was assumed) in redangular coordinates - i.e.
41 Robert Lea. "Tbc BaIIisIic Cam in Dean HollisIcr's Lamp," SOC.
• "UDiversll1 Fire Control Director For Defense Against Attack from Air,~ or Water," publication DO. 14-
8053. SOC. Box 3.
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straight and level. Thus it was simpler to extrapolate to the future in rectangular coordinates than
in the polar system, and also simpler to include wind and parallax corrections. So the Sperry
director projected the movement ofthe target into a horizontal plane, derived the velocity from
changes in position, added a fixed time multiplied by the velocity to detennine a future position,
and then converted the solution back into polar coordinates. This approach loosely parallels the
plotting oCthe Sperry Battle Tracer, which resolved range and bearing onto a Cartesian map. It
became known as the "plan prediction method" because ofthe representation ofthe data on a flat
"plan" as viewed from above; it was commonly used through World War n. The plan prediction
method was a pure analog ofthe world, "the actual movement ofthe target is mechanically
reproduced on a small scale within the Computer and the desired angles or s~s can be
measured directly from the movements ofthese elements.,,49 The familiar radar target display,
introduced years later, in which a beam rotates sweeps around a round tube to reveal targets,
became known as the PPI or "plan position indicator," an appellation inherited from this method
ofcomputation.
Together, the ballistic and prediction calculations form a feedback loop. [*Figure 3-8,
Detailed T-6 data flow] Operators enter an estimated time offlight for the shell when they first
begin tracking. The predictor uses this estimate to perform its initial calculation, which feeds into
the ballistic stage. The output ofthe ballistics calculation then feeds back an updated time offlight
estimate, which the predictor uses to refine the initial estimate. Thus "a cumulative cycle of
correction and recorrection...brings the predicted future position of the target up to the point
indicated by the aetuaI future time offlight."so
The T-6 director, a square box about four feet on a side, mounted on a pedestal on which
it could rotate [*Figure 3-9, T-6 Director photo]. Three crew members sat on seats and one or
two stood on a step mounted to the machine, revolving with the unit as the azimuth tracker
followed the target. This arrangement provided comfortable, stable positions for the tracking
operators. As the unit and the trackers rotated, the remainder ofthe crew, who stood on a fixed
platform, had to shutBe around with it. While the rotation angles were small for any given
49 "Anti-Aircraft Guo ControL" 21.
50 "Anti-Aircraft Guo Contro~" 32.
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engagement, it must have been awkward. The director's pedestal mounted on a trailer, on which
data transmission cables and the range finder could be packed for transportation.
The T-6 computer required only three inputs, elevation, azimuth, and altitude (range), and
yet it required nine operators. These nine did not include the operation of the range finder, which
was considered a separate instrument, or the men tending the guns themselves, but only those
operating the director itself: What did these nine men do?
Human Servomechanisms
The operators were "manual servo-mechanisms." One specification for the machine
required "minimum dependence on 'human element'." Sperry Gyroscope explained, "All
operations must be made as mechanical and fool proofas possible; training requirements must
visualize the conditioruJ existent under rapid mobilization." The memory ofWorld War I rings in
this statement. Even at the height of isolationism, with the country sliding into depression, design
engineers considered the difliculty of raising large numbers oftrained personnel in a national
emergency. Designers also considered the ability ofoperators to perform their duties under the
stress ofbattle. Thus, nearly aU the work for the crew was in the "foUow-the-point~r'~ mode,
derived from naval systems: each mar. concentrated on an instrument with two indicating dials,
one the actual and one the desired value for a particular parameter. With a hand crank he adjusted
the parameter to match the two dials. The control system domesticated not just the beast but its
operator as wen.
Still, it seems curious that the T-6 director required so many men to perform this follow-
the-pointer input. When t~ external rangefinder transmitted its data to the computer, it appeared
on a dial and an operator had to fonow the pointer to actually input the data into the computing
mechanism. Similarly, the machine did not explicitly calculate velocities. Rather, two operators
(one for X1north-south and O~ for Y/east-west) adjusted variable-speed drives until their rate
dials dial matched that ofa constant-speed motor (the adjustment on the drive then equaled
velocity). When the prediction computation was completed, an operator had to feed the result into
the ballistic calculation mechanism. Finally, when the entire calculation cycle was completed,
another operator had to fonow the pointer to transmit azimuth to the gun crew, who in tum had
to match the train and elevation ofthe gun to the pointer indications.
lSI
Figure 3-10 shows the crew arrayed around the T-6 director, in an arrangement ~.hat
today seems almost comic&1 [*Figure 3-10, Crew around T-6]. Strange as these operations seem,
they reveal Sperry engineers' conception of the human role in the operation ofan automated
system. The numerous foUow-the-pointer operations were clearly preferable to data transmission
by telephone; in that sense the system was automated. Operators literally supplied the feedback
tlW made the system work, although Sperry's idea offeedback was rather different than the
modem one:
In many cases where results are obtained by individual elements in the cycle of
computation it is necessary to feed these results back into the mecMnism or to transmit
them.
The operLtors provided this feedback in part to drive the heavy ballistic ca.n5. The Sperry
document acknowledges the possibility ofautomating these operations, but does not find it the
preferable option:
When mechanical methods are employed, it is DeCeSsaJ)' to use some fonn of "servo-
motor," aDd electrical servo-motors are used to a limited degree for "feeding back" data
into the computer.
It bas been found in many cases to be much easier to rely OIl a group ofoperators
who fulfill DO other function than to act as serv.a-motors....This operation can be
mechanically perfonned by the operator under rigorous active service coodition.•.S!
Here Sperry promotes the view ofautomation that best matches the strengths and weaknesses of
its own products. Human operators connected "individual elements" into an integrated system.
The mer. were amplifiers, and hen~ quite similar to servomechanisms in other mechanical
calculators ofthe time, especially Vannevar Bush's differential analyzer (see Chapter 5).
The term "manual servomechanism" itself is an o~ron: by the conventional definition,
all servomechanisms are automatic. Just using the term acknowledges the existence ofan
8l\tomatic technology which might replace the manual method. With the T-6, this process was
alre.tdy und~y, for though it required nine operators, two had already been eliminated from the
previous generation T-4. Servos replaced the operators who fed-back superelevation data and
transmitted fuze setting. Furthermore, in this early machine one man corresponded to one
variable, and the machine's requirement for operators corresponded directly to the data flow of its
computation. Thus the crew that operated the T-6 director was an exact reflection of the
algorithm inside it.
lS2
Why, then, were only two ofthe variat-~~es automated? While the Sperry literature proudly
tnlli1pets ~uman tDUOW·the-poi.~ter operations, it barely acknowledges the automatic servos, and
even then provides the option ofmanual follow-ups "if the electrical gear is not used." This
partial, almost hesitating automation indicates there was more to the human ~rvo-motors than
Sperry wanted to acknowledge. As much as the company touted its weak-link view, "their duties
are purely mechanical and little skill or judgment is required on th~ part of the operators," .nen
were still required to exercise some judgment, even ifunconsciously. The data were noisy, and
even an unskilled human eye could eliminate complications dl~e to erroneous or corrupted data.
Furthermore, noisy data did more than canupt firing solutions. The mechanisms themselves were
rather delicate, and erroneous input data, especially if it indicated conditions that were 210t
physically possible, could lock-up or damage the mecha,,~sms.'2 As in naval fire control, the
operators perfonned as strong-link integrators in both ~.;enses ofthe tenn: they integrated different
elements into a system, and they integrated mathematically, acting as filters to average out noise1
Later Sperry Directors
When Chafee wrote this report in 1930, his engineers were already at work on a newer
generation director. The T-8 was called the "uriversal dir~or" because it could direct fire to
both airborne and ground targets. Chafee intended this machine to be lighter and more portable
than earlier models, as ·II-:U as less expensive and "procurable in quantities in case of
emergency.,,53 The company still emphasized the need for unskilled men to operate the system in
wartime, and their role as system integrators. They were "mechanical links in the apparatus,
thereby making i~ possible tr ?\foid m~hanical complicatiol' which would be involved by the use
ofelectricaJ or mechanical servo motors." army field experience had shown Sperry directors to be
difficult to use, and that operators were not receiving proper training. The T-6 had also
demonstrated that servo motors were a viable way to reduce the number ofoperators (and hence
reduce the training problem) and improve reliability, so the requirements for the T-8 s~ified that
wherever J10ssible "electrical follow-up motors shall be used to reduce the number ofoperators to
SI "Anti-Aircraft Gun Control," 24-25.
S2 Anti AiJaJft Defense (Hanisburg, Pennsylva..tia: 1940). This book reprints the manuals for the Srcrry M-2
director aDd t'iscusses the mechanical problems that cern be caused in this generation of Sperry directors by
contradictOIy inpot data.
Sl "Anti-Aircrcdl Gun Control," 18.
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a minimum.",. Thus the T-8 continued the process ofautomating fire control, reduced the number
ofoperators to four and aimed to be lighter, more portable, and less expensive than the T-6. Two
men followed the target with telescopes, and only two were required for follow-ttte-pointer
functions (for the two rate follow-ups). The other follow-the-pointers had been replaced by
follow-up servos fitted with magnetic brakes to eliminate hunting (the inclusion of these brakes
suggests that the hesitating use of servos in earlier models was partly due to concerns about their
stability). Several experimental versions ofthe T-8 were built, and it was standardized by the army
as the MJ in 1934.
In 1936 Sperry let a contract to Professor Nicholas Minorsky (1885-1970) to study the
possibility ofreplacing the calculation mechanisms of its mechanical directors with electrical
components. ~orsky had worked for Steinmetz at General electric and had done pioneering
work in the theory ofcontrol systems, especially for ship steering, in the 1c. 205 (see Chapter ~).
He then moved to the navy's David Taylor Model Basin and to the University ofPennsylvania.
Minorsky proposed a design for an electrical director, which a Sperry engineer, Bruno A.
Wittkuhns, evaluated. He found it "entirely too complicated and impracticable" but came up with
a scheme afhis own to convert the MJ director to electrical computation. Where Wittkuhns
employed "follow-up" motors to implement sines, cosines, multipliers, and differentiators, his
scheme still involved mechanical cams. He noted electrical equipment is "well suited to mass
production," and,
While there seems to be DO field now for a director of this type at this time, it is entirely
possible that ifdeveloped in a sufficiently small size and light weight and comparable
accuracy interest in this machine can be found, ifDOt for Army work then possibly for
Naval instalJations where the resistance against electrical devices seems to be less
noticeable.s,
The company had been spending significant amount~ ofmoney on director development at this
time, and sc=lling relati",ely few units, so it took no further action on developing an electrical
director. In 1940, an engineer at BeD Telephone Laboratories would "invent" exactly this device,
based on an electrical replacement for the ballistic cams (see Chapter 8).
Throughout the remainder of the thirties, Sperry and the army fine-tuned the director
system as embodied in the MJ. Succeeding models automated further, replacing the foUow-the-
S4 "Universal DiJedor and Data Transmission Syste~" Sperry Gyroscope Publication DO. 14-80S1, August 1,
1932, 6. SOC, Box 2. This document is esc;entially a specification for the T-8.
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pointers for target velocity with a velocity follow-up servo which employed a ball-and-disc
integrator, derived from Hannibal Ford's device. The M4 series, standardized in 1939, resembled
the M3 but abandoned the constant altitude assumption and added an altitude predictor for gliding
targets. About 2(~M4s were eventually produced.56
The M7, standardized in 1941, was essentially similar to the M4 but added a number of
modifications, including the provision for radio range finding and full power r,ontrol to the guns
for automatic pointing in elevation and azimuth. Automating the pointing ofthe 8"0 was a more
difficult problem than data transmission because it involved significant power amplification.
Speny Gyroscope purchased the rights to the Neiman torque amplifier system from Bethlehem
Steel in 1926, which could provide precision high-power outputs in response to low power torque
inputs (the Neiman torque amplifier ~-ould find its way into Vannevar Bush's differential analyzer,
see Chapter 5). During the next several years Speny applied power controls to a number of
individual guns. None were incorporated into aetuaI systems, however, due to army concerns
about reliability and perhaps also to problems ofstability. No further work was done on po'Ner
controls for guns for almost ten years. Not until 1939 did Sperry begin to develop an electro-
hydraulic remote control system for the army's new 90mm antiaircraft gun. Speny's acquisition of
Vickers and Waterbury provided corporate skills with hydraulic drives. Still, the company had to
build its power controls around existirtg guns, and could not suggest changes to the mount to
make it more adaptable to the power control. This machinery was undergoing testing when
reports from the Battle ofBritain indicated that automatic power controls for gun pointing "was
not only desirable but was absolutely necessary." The army then contracted Sperry to produce
power centrals for all its 90mm guns, which it began in 1941. The company delivered more than
3500 of the devices in 1942, and more than 4000 in 1943, although most did not accompany
Speny directors.57
The later Sperry directors had ~Iiminated errors to the point where the greatest uncertainty
in the system was the varying time it took different crews to manually set the fuze and load the
s";:8 into the gun. Automatic setters and loaders could improve the situation, but crews found
5S Bruno A. Wiukubns to E.W. Chafee, P.R. 8aactt, aod KK~ June IS, 1936. SOC, Box 33.
56 "History of the AA Director DeveIopmcaI (Army 0nIDaDce)," Sperry GyroIcope Memo, n.d., probably Fall,
1935. SOC, Box 4. For anexplaDalion of the Spenyvdocity sen'O, see Allan G. Bromley, "Analog Computing
DeYices" in William Aspray eel Computinc Before ComputeJs (Ames, Iowa: 1990), 190.
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them unreliable and dangerous to the integrity oftheir fingers, and would not use them. When, in
1940, the National Defense Research Committee began studying the antiaircraft problem, one of
their first tasks was to conduct efficiency studies ofpeople doing fuze setting. The other weak
link was the range finder, because readings from the stereo viewfinder depended greatly on the
skills afthe human operatof, even changing from day to day without the same operator. The M7
model included a provision for entering azimuth observations from radio locator equipment,
anticipating the addition of radar for target observations. At the start ofWorld War ll, the M7
was the primary anti aircraft director available to the army, although the M4 was considered state-
of-the-art as weD.
The M7, culminating fifteen years ofwork at Sperry, was a highly developed and
integrated system, optimized fOf reliability and ease ofoperation and maintenance. As a
mechanicaJ computer, it was an elegant, if intricate, device, weighing 850 pounds and including
about 11,000 parts. The design ofthe M7 capitalized ('8 the strength of Sperry Gyroscope:
manufacturing ofprecision mecharJsms (espec.:ially btJlistic cams)r data transmission, and intimate
involvement with technical officers in the anned services.
These capabilities, however, became scarce as the United States prepared for war. Sperry
reluctantly subcontracted director production to the Ford Motor Company, but it remained a "reai
choke" and could not keep u:, ... :'h production of the 90mm guns, well into 1942 (Sperry
subcontracted many of its products for volume production during the war). ~I The army had also
adopted an English machine, known as the "Kerrison Director" or MS for lighter guns. It was less
accurate than the M7 but easier to manufacture. Sperry redesigned th~ M5 for high-volum~
productior. in 1940, but passed on manufacturing responsibility to the Singer Sewing Machine and
Delco companies in 1941.59 When the National Defense Research Committee was formed in
1940, among its first projects were to create standardized setups for testing antiaircraft director
performance. Such tests proved the Sperry machines to be seriously flawed in their firing solutions
and by 1943 an electronic computing director developed at Bell Labs superseded the M7) which
~ production.
S'Sperry Com,any Report, "Power Controls," February 7, 1944. SOC, Box 4C.
51 Harry C. Tbompson and Lida Mayo, The United States Army in World War 0: The Qrdnance Deputment
Volume 2: Procmmcnt and Supply (WzshiDgton, DC: 196D), p. 86.
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The Sperry antiaircraft directors of the 19305 were transitional, experimental systems.
Exactly for that reason, however, they allow us to peer inside the process ofautomation, to
examine the displacement ofhuman operators by servomechanisms while the process ,vas still
underway. Skilled as Sperry Gyroscope was at data transmission, it only gradually became
comfortable with the automatic communication ofdata between subsystems. Sperry could brag
(perhaps protesting too much) about the low skill levels required of the operators ofthe machine,
but in 1930 it was unwilling to remove them completely from the process. Men were the glue that
held integrated systems together.
As products, Sperry Gyroscope's antiaira~ gun directors were only partially successful.
A decade and a halfofdevelopment produced machines that could not negotiate the fine line
between performance and production imposed by national emergency. Still, we should judge a
technological developlnent program not only by the machines it produces but also by the
knowledge it creates, and by how that knowledge contributes to future work. Sperry's antiaircraft
directors of the 1930s were early examples ofdistributed control systems, technology that would
assume critical importance in the following decades with the development of radar and digital
computers. When building the elect:ronic and radar controlled antiaircraft directors ofWorld War
0, engineers at Bell Labs, MIT, and elsewhere incorporated and built on Sperry Gyroscope's
experience, grappling with the engineering difficulties offeedback, control, and the augmentation
ofhuman capabilities by technical systems.
Condulion: SUlVivai of the Beut vision
In 1940~ Sperry Gyroscope listed the following as its product t\ne: aircraft gyropilot,
automatic (radio) direction finder, directional gyro, gyro horizon, incandescent searchlight, high-
intensity searchlight, course recorder, ship gyropilot, rudder indicator, electromechanical steering
system, gyro-compass, sound locator, antiaircraft searchlight, universal (antiaircraft) director.60 Of
S9 Sperry Company memo on M-S and M-6 directors. SG(~, Box 33. Also see Bromley '4Analog Computing
Devices," 186-191.
60 Spenysag listed the company's products inside the front cover. This list comes from Volume 9 (no. 2, April,
1940). Because of the developmental nature of many \'r Sperry Gyroscope'5 IJroduets, dates of introduction are
open to interpretation. The following list of the dates of introduction of Sperry's 1940 products is compiled from a
chart in bmD;ope 7 (DO. 7, April, 193') page 16, and a "family tree" ofSpcrry products from"Tbc StolY of the
Sperry Corporation," ad., probably 1943. SOC, Box 40: aircraft gyropilot (1931), automatic (radio) direction
finder, diRctiooaI gyro (1918), gyro horizon (1930), incandescent searchlight (1924), high-intensity searchlight
(1916), course ra:ordcr (1918), ship gyropilot (1922), rudder indicator (1920), electromechanical steering system
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these, only two were introduced after 1930, the automatic direction finder in 193 1 and the
universal antiaircraft director, M4, in 1936. Despite Sperry Gyroscope's emphasis on new
technology, and despite its consistent engineering efforts, most of the company's catalog in 1940
did not represent important new inventions. The other devices had undoubtedly matured in the
previous ten years, but antiaircraft fire control was the company's only significantly new product.
This stagnation probably reflects the effects ofthe depression and the passing ofElmer Sperry as
a creative force. Several development programs did not produce lasting products: Sperry fire
control lost out to Ford and G.E., Sperry bombsights lost out to Norden, Sperry antiaircraft
directors lost out to Bell Labs, and its aerial torpedoes and gyrostabilizers proved impracticable.
Sperry tried several failed product lines for every one that stayed in production; they had great
difficulty developing complex, high-performance control systems and deploying them in the field.
In fact, the company's history ~ith automatic machinery is as remarkable for its difficulties as for
its successes. When World War n came, the company's value lay in its production capacity and
engineering vision as much as its research department. The major pre-war product litle,
antiaircraft fire control, was discontinued at the height ofthe wartime production boom because
ofmanufacturing complexities. Groups with no experience in fire control were able to learn the
field quickly and build better systems than Speny's, although building on Sperry experience.
In the year or two before 1940 Sperry engineers had begun work on new controls which
combined perception and articulation and left integration to the human operator. The company
had recently supported klystron research by Russel and Sigurd Varian, which had not yet
produced commercial products but gave the company an advantage when radar growth exploded
during World War 0.61 1940 saw the introduction ofa number of new products which assured the
company's success during the war: simple and easily manufactured controls for fire control
aboard aircraft. Unlike battleships, most World War n bombers did not use director fire to
coordinate their guns. Machine gunners defending flying fortresses from attacking fighters each
worked individually, with no coof,iination or centralized control (except through voice intercom).
Beginning in 1940, the Sperry Corporation produced these individual controls, hydraulic turrets
(1930), I)'IO-QJIDP8SS (1914), sound locator (1921), antiaircraft searchlight (1923), universal <antiaircraft> ciirector
(1936). The "family tiCC" is somewhat suspect because it dXI not list the Battle Tracer, or any of Sperry's World
War I naval fire conttol work. It altogether skips over the year 1916, w~n these devices were introduced.
61 Varian, Tbe Wyentor and the Pilot
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for machine gun defenses ofB-24 and 8-17 bombers. These devices allowed a gunner to rapidly
and smoothly swing around himselfUld his machine guns to fend offattacking airplanes. Sperry
Gyroscope built on its strength in aviation instruments and its corporate traditio~ going back to
the original gyrocompass, ofreference and measuring devices. The company built instruments of
perception; gyroscopic aviation instruments coupled to visual indicators called "lead computing
sights" imposed scales on the gunners' vision and indicated where to aim. Vickers, in
complement, made the system's articulation component: small, electro-hydraulic power controls
to move the turret. Subcontractors made the glass and steel structure.62 Th'JS Sperry's corporate
organization mapped two functions ofthe governor, perception and articulation, leaving the third,
integration, for a strong-link human operator.
These machines, especially the famous "Ball Turret," comprised a popular image of
mechanized air combat during World War IT, and their production occupied much of Sperry's
wartime resources. [*Figure 3-11, Sperry Ball Turret] These simple but effective machines placed
heavy emphasis on the human operator, aiding his mind and his body at critical points but leaving
command in his hands. At Sperry, at least, the beast vision survived. Only the B-29, operational
late in the V/ar, incorporated "central station" control ofits air defenses (with deadly effects but
few enemies over Japan in 1945). Sperry Gyroscope developed a prototype ofthis system, but
again lost out to a General Electric design (partly because ofSperry's overburdened production
lines). During the war Sperry made not the most advanced or intricate products, but rather those
that effected simple, tight assemblages ofmechanical and human functions and which could be
produced in large numbers. Even the Bureau ofOrdnance needed these devices. As Ch8!Jter 8 will
recount, Sperry sponsored a university researcher, Charles Stark Draper, to apply flight
instruments to defending ships, and his work brOltght Sperry back into naval fire control after a
twenty ye.- hiatus.
·i1iGSe simple, human-centered controls ~roduced great rewards for the Sperry Company,
as it was ideally suited to wartime demands and devoted itself exclusiveiy to war production.
Sperry Corporation sales doubled from 1941 to 1942, and quadrupled the following year. 1942
sales peaked at seventeen times 1939 figures and equaled the nine previous years combined.
62 "Aircraft Fire ControI," Sperry Gyroscope Company~ SOC, Box 22. "Aircraft Computing Sights," Sperry
Gyroscope CoMpany, Vmson report edited by RosweU Ward, February 8, 1944. Rqlon, SOC, Box 40. Roswell
Ward, "Aircratt Turrets: Description afProduct Development aDd History," February 16, 1944. SOC Box 40.
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[-Figure 3-12: Sperry Sales Chart]. The government built the company a 520 million plant at
Lake Success on Long Island, and in 1943 Sperry employed 50,000 people, ten times the 1939
number. Profits rose so high that the company voluntarily returned money to the government
(several valuable project histories in the Sperry archives were produced for these negotiations).63
Sperry trumpeted its vision ofautomation as the extension, rather than replacement, of the
human operator's capabilities, brought forth by its experience between the wars:
There bas come into being a whole DeW field of scientific accessories to extend the
functioos and the skill of the operator far beyond his own~ endurance, and
abilities....The importance to the Government ofhaving these organizations [the Sperry
companies] carrying 00 continuous research along these highly teehnicallines independent
ofgovernmental authority or even popular support is bome out by the fact that DOW the
products ofthis twenty years ofSperry development must be produced in quantities much
greater than the companies can handle.
Mass conscription would have little affect without increases in production; Sperry argued its
products brought the wartime mobilization ofmanpower t(\gether with the mobilization of
indu~1ry.
Over a billion dollars ofthis material [control systems] must be produced by us within the
next two years. But this bOOoo dollars' worth ofteehnical equipment will fill the vital gap
between the one hundred billion dollars' worth ofweapons and the thousands ofmen who
must operate them. With this equipment, neither men nor Weapons would be effective.64
Sperry's control systems united the beasts procured by the services with the men who would ride
them into battle.
63 Data taken from Sperry Annual Reports, 1939-45. Also see the "family tree" in "The Story of the Sperry
Corporation," and page 18 of that booklet for photos ofthelc devica. Project histories can be found in SOC, Box
40, folder "RA:oegotiaion Documents."
64 "IntroductioD," to Sperry Company History, n.d, probably 1942. SOC, Box 40. Emphasis added.
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The Repea.ter Compass.
Wheel for c:hanging
course or controlling
rudder.
Steering motor is con-
tained in this pedestal.
Figure 3-1: Sperry Gyropilot, "Metal Mike."
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Figure 3-2: Wiley Post and his airplane, Winnie Mae, in which me made his
around-the-world solo flight with a Sperry Autopilot (From sales pamphlet,
"'Round the World with the Sperry Pilot.," SGC).
Figure 3-3: Wiley Post in his pressure suit. Note the oxygen tank feeding into the
helmet next to Post's eye patch.
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Figure 3-4: Sperry Sound Ranging Equipment, principle of operation.
Figure 3-4a: Sperry Sound Ranging Equipment, human operator.
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Figure 3-5: Antiaircraft trajectories and leads for different bomber speeds (From Chafee, 1930).
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Stereo
Rangefmder
Trackers'
Seats &, Hanwbeels
~rcraftGum
Computer
Transport &, Mounting Trailer
Figure 3-6: Layout of Spe1aj T-6 Antiaircraft Director (numan shown for scale only)
Figure 3-7: Operation of Sperry Ballistic Cam. Two variables are input by rotation of handles at left.
Pin rides along cam as it rotates, height of pin S provides output value for feeding into another
mechanism. In this example, for a given range and angular height of a target, the ouput S is the
superelevation, or the firing angle of the gun. Handles would likely be rpelaced b}' shaft inputs in
real machine.
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Figure 3-9. The Sperry T-6 Director
A. Spotting Scope
B. North-South Rate Dial and Handwheel
C. Future Horizontal Range Dial
D. Super-Elevation Dial and Handwheel
E. Azimuth Tracking Telescope
F. Future Horizontal Range Handwheel
G. Traversing Handwheel (Azimuth Tracking)
H. Fire Control Officer's Platform
J. Azimuth Tracking Operator's Seat
K. Time of Flight Dial and Handwheel
L. Present Altitude Dial and Handwheel
M. Present Horizontal Range Dial and
Handwheel
N. Elevation Tracking Handwheel and
Operator's Seat
O. Orienting Clamp.
Figure 3-10. The Sperry T-6 Director mounted on a trailer with operators. Note power
supply at left and cables to other system elements. (Courtesy Hagley Museum and Library)
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Figure 3-11: Sperry Ball Turret for the B-17 bomber, 1941. Note eyepiece for
the lead-computing gunsight.
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Figure 3-12: Sperry Corporation Sales and R&D Expenses, 1933-45
(Source: Sperry Corporation Annual Reports)
Year
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
Sales ($M)
3.5716
7.8310
8.6901
14.6841
15.2773
25.3992
24.8561
47.5145
99.8195
216.2819
429.0160
420.1860
288.9337
R&D Expenses R&D as a Percentage of Sales
$112,451 3.15%
$216,3 70 2.760/0
$254,194 2.930/0
$291,033 1.980/0
$352,433 2.310/0
$546,527 2.150/0
$789,437 3.180/0
$1,049,046 2.210/0
$2,211,313 2.22%
$3,483,221 1.61%
$4,902,265 1.14%
$6,783,536 1.610/0
$6,663,513 2.31%
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Chapter 4
Feedback Amplifiers and Mixed EU9tions
At Ben Telephone Laboraturies
People assimilated telephony into their minds as if into their bodies ..- as if it were the
result ofa new step in human evolution that increased the range of their voices to the limits
ofthe national map.
Jolm Brooks, Telephone: The First One Hundred Years)
The engino=r who embarks OIl the design ofa feedback amplifier must be a creature of
mixed emotions.
HeDdrik Bode, 1940
Opening Black'. Box: Retbinking Feedback'. Myth or Origin
Like any modem epistemology worth the name, the theory offeedback has a myth of
origin. On a sunny August morning in 192~/, Harold Black, a 29 year-old systems engineer, rode
the Lackawanna ferry to work at the Bell Telephone Laboratories. Many Bell enginl,.;fs lived in
New Jersey; on the early nloming ferry rides across the Hudson to the Manhattan laboratories
thl.Y frequently gathered on the forward deck for informal technical conferences. This morning,
Black stood alone, staring at the Statue ofLiberty-, and had an epiphany: "I suddenly realized that
ifl fed the amplifiet output back to the mput, in reverse phase, and kept the device from
oscillating (SingUlg, 1Ut we called it then), I would have exactly what I ~Nanted: a means of
canceling out the distortion in the output.,,2 As it happened, the New Yark Times that day
contained a blank page and Black sketched his idea, "a simple canonical diagranl of a negative
feedback amplifier plus the equations for the amplification with feedback." He rushed into wor~
asked a ttchnician to wire up a prototype, and gave birth to a foundational circuit ofmodem
electronics. This story has become enshrined as one ofthe central "flashes of insight" in electrical
I John Brooks, TcIglbopc:]be First One HUDdred Yean (New York: Harper and Roes 1975), 142.
2 Harold S. Black, "Inventing the Negative Feedback Amplifier," IEEE Spectrum 14 (December, 1977), S4-60.
George Stibitz's mcmcir bas maooricI of the early morning Ccny~]be Zeroth Generation: A scientist's
recollections (1937-1955) from the e.vIy Binuy Relay Digital Computers at BeD Tegbone Laboratory and OSRD
to a flqlgliog Minicomputer at the 8aJber Coleman Company (unpubli5bcd MS, 1993), 54. Courtesy Paul Ceruzzi.
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ellgineering in this century, periodically retc~d as an inspiration for engineers.3 One current
textbook on rootrol engineering prints the story ofBlack's visicn verbatim in the first chapter. 4
This canonical version ofBlack's invention fonows typical engineering ontology - a
cleaner, more intellectual lineage than the military ana industrial tales of the previous two
chapters. The inventor brings forth a seminal idea witll far reaching implications. The engineering
community recognizes its value, expands on the idea, and formalizes it into a set of design rules.
In the feedback story Harry Nyquist and Hendrik Bode add the formalism, producing a set of
stability criteria and design methods. Th~n practicing engineers make it their own, using the rules
in routine design and as building blocks for larger ~stems. At nell Laboratories from 1927 to
1940, the legend goes~ Black, Nyquist, and Bode laid the foundations ofcontrol theory, which
engineers then applied to all t}1>es ofclosed-loot' systems from servomechanisms to thermostats,
fire -:ont~tll systems to automatic computers.5 More than Sptrry or BuOrd's cont~ol systems, this
story offeedback: earned a place in engineering legend and cullege textbooks. it produced design
methods and graphical techniques which carried their author's names (the Bode plu!, the Nyquist
diagram) and earned telephone engWeering a claim to priority in feedback history.
But like the later Cybernetics, feedback's origin myth effaces its sources. It reveals little
about the concrete problems these men worked on when they produced their solutions. It skips
over the relations between the men, and how their backgrounds and prior experience influenced
their work on feedback. The story also removes feedback theory from the landscape of telephone
engineering between the world wars. Nor does it account for the relatj.';'i1ship of the feedhack
amplifier to the long tradition ofgovernors and self-regulating machinery. How did feedback
3 Fur other aa:ounts of BIack~s invention, see Hendrik Bode, "Feedback: 'The History of an Idea," Proceedings of
the Symposium on Active Networks aJK4 Feedback Systems, Polytetlh'~c Institute of Brooklyn (polytechnic Press,
19(0) reprinted in Rh:bard H~llman, cd., Selected PaPers on Matheu18tica1 Trends :n Control TI.eorylNew York:
Dover. 1964). M.J. Kelley, "Career of the 1957 I,amme Medalist Harold S. B~" Electrical Engineerif18 '/7
(August, 19~8), 720-22. Prescott C. Mabo~ Mission Communications: The $toO' of Bell Labor~~ (MWTay
Hill, New Jersey: Ben Tclepbonc Laboratori~ 1975), 39-40. Of historian's aa:ounts, IJIOS( t1 "ougb is S[l!art
Bennett, A History of Control Engineering 1930-19SS. I' (London: ?ch:r Peregrinus, 1993) Chapter 3, 'Ibe
Electronic Negative Feedback Amplifier." Also see E.F. O'Neill, ed. A History of Science and Engineering in~
Bell System: Transmission Technology CI925-!97S) (Murray Hill, New Jersey: AT&T Bell Laboratories, 1985)
Chapter 4, "Negalive ~eedback." Roeald Kline, "Harold Black and the Negative-Fecdbact Amplifier," IEEE
Control Syatems, Au". 1993, 82-8S. Also see a short film, "Communications Milestone: N~gative Feedbac~"
(BeD Telephone L8b0.~ric5, 1977).
.. Richard C. Dod, ~Ie(n Control Systems (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley), }4'ifth Editio~ 1995.
SHcDdrik W. Bode, Svnency: Technical IntemtiOD and TechnoloPe&1lnnovation in the Bell System ~lunay Hill,
New Jersey: Ben Telephone Laboratories, 1971), 138-40.
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theory reconfigure the governor arid its functions of perception, integration, and articulatjon? We
can begin to answer this question by connecting Black's heroic tale to longer trellds in electrical
engineering and to the immediate context of the telephone network. Telephone engineers had
their own version of the governor. It coupled hUDl8Il beings to the system. It connected rlifferent
locales with transmission media. It listened and it spoke.
Thus a reexaminatiol1 of the sources is in order, one which reveals a history at once less
shnple and more interesting. On the ferry, Black did not understand as m\lch abOlA~ fee.dback and
stability as he later recall~. To make his idea credible, Black needed Nyquist's solution to the
thorny problem of stability. And Bode, brir.ging the subtle analytics ofnetwork theory to bear nn
the feedback problem, actually sought to limit feedback, outlining the tight constraints which a
stable feedback amplifier must meet. BliCk, NyqlJist, and Bode all worked on a 11etwork which
strove to extend its reach, to expand its capacity, and to translate ever more of the world into
transmissible messages. This translation required ever closer coupling of human arid mechanical
elements through the medium of sound, a coupling which left a discernible mark on feedback
theory.
Rethinking the work ofDiack,Nyquist, and Bode in this way clarifies the history of
negative feedback and elicits how researchers at BeD Labs conceptualized systems, stability~ and
human operators in the years prior to World War n. Toward these goals, this chapter asks the
fuUowing qu~stiQns: What was the engineer:ng culture at Bell Labs in the late 1920s7 What was
the histOrica·1 and technical background of tile organi7..ation? Who worked there? What di~bcult
problems did they face-! What were their new technologit3? Relating feedback control in
tel~phor~y to fire cont~ol in the navy anti to Sperry Gyroscope raires further question:;: What was
the system? What was stability? How did the system connect to its human operators? How did the
feedback theory ofBlac~ Bode, c1Jld Nyquist map onto the governor's perception, integratiort,
and articulatioll?
Negativr feedback grew in the context ofextending the telephone network across the
cor,u\er.t, increasing the networkfs carrying capacity, 10d malt'Jng it work tJ:-~ietably in the face
ofchanges in season, weathcrr and landscape - the context, that is, ofbuilding a large technical
~stem and operating it over a di,-erse Uk:J ""tended geography. Engineers' increasing facility with
creating, manipulating and ~witching signais i:l lhiat system prompted them to reconceptualize the
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netwltrk. Theyb~ to understand electric waves as abstract signals and analyzed those signals
as sums offrequencies. Then the Bell System became not rrerely a conduit for voice
conversations but a generalized system, capable ofcarry5ng any signal as a new currency:
information.
Tecbaical and Historical Background: Network Geography
The Bell System was an engineer's dream: geographically expansive, reaching into all
types ofdifficult terrai.n and climates, and yet always in control, tiea to the central office, never
re!eased to survive autonomously in the terrifying world. The phone system reached interregional
and national scale in 1910; by comparison tile other large system, electric power, dealt with
numerous smaller systems and did not become c{)mparably interconnected until the late 1920s.
Still, in the first decade ofthe century American Telegraph and Telephone company did not yet
have its familiar hegemony, it controlled only about h&1fthe telephones in the country. Long-
distance was the key to expanding that share, as competing local operators could not offer the
service. The Bell System thus followed its own frontier on a western expansion - often literally
along the tracks ofthe railroads (and, ofcourse, the telegraph). But beyond the Rocky Mountains
the problem became extraordinarily difficult Transmission over such distances posed a critical
problem for AT&T engineers; it required adding energy to the network.6 AT&T's chiefengineer,
J.J. Carty, translated corporate goals into geographical expansion, and transmission was the key
to that translation. From the rum of the century un~i1 the l~jOs, AT&T expressed its milestones in
geo&Taphical terms: the New Yark/Chicago line stood for carrier frequency transmission; the New
York/San Francisco transcontinental line stood fur vacuum tube repeater~; the Morristown trial
simulated the entire country and repre~nted the negative feedback amplifier.
~finjng the Signal: Time and frequency
At the tum ofthe centuly i.i.e telephone network remained a passive device, as it had been
since the time ofAlexa.'lder Gra.'1am Bell. Carb, Jnicrophones added energy from a battery to the
\¥eak acoustic signal from a speaker's voice, but once the wave entered the line it traveled to the
6 For a generd history oftbe SeD System, sec Brooks, The First One Hundred Years. Thomas Shaw, "The
Conquest ofDistaDce by Wire Telephony," BSTJ 23 (DO. 4, October , 1944). Leonard Reich, "IndUS!rial Research
cmd tile Pursuit of Corporate Security: The Early Years of BeD Labs," Business History Review 54 (Winter, 1980),
511. See also Leonard Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research: Science and Business at GE and Bell,
J876-1926 (New York: Cambridge Uni\'crsity Press, 1985, Chapters 7-8.
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receiver without further gain. In fact, resistance in the wire imposed considerable losses, as did
capacitance and inductance, whose loss varied with frequency and hence introduced distortion.
Increasing the thickness ofthe wire could reduce this attenuation, but the additional copper
proved heavy and expensive. Because it increased with cross-8el:lional area., cost went up with the
square ofdistance. Around the tum ofthe century, then, the telephone network ran up against the
limits of transmission, both in extensio~ where it determined the; furthest distance a signal could
travel, and in economy, where it determined the cost of more moderate distances.
Weather stressed the problem further. The standard type of transmission. even for long
distanc,es, was "open wire," which literally meant each circuit had its own separate wire, separate
from the others by a few inches [·Figure 4-1, Open Wire System]. This separation wires
minimized "crosstalk," where one conversation leaked to an adjacent wire, and also kept losses to
a minimum. Telephone poles with tens ofwires characterized this technology, similar in
appearance to the te1eraPh cables that ran along railroad tracks. But these lines were particularly
vulnerable to snow L'ld ice storms, in addition to cluttering the urban landscape. Cables, an
alternative to open wire, bundled numerous smaller wires together and could be buried, so they
were more im.~une to weather and and cheaper to install. [*Figure 4-2, Cable Route] But because
of the small diameter of the wires and their tight packing, cables had higher losses than open wire,
easily 20-30 times more signal attenuation, and further pressed the limits oftransrrjssion.
Solving the transrmssion problem required rethinking the telephone signal, transcending a
direct-current model based on the telegraph. In the late 19th century, Enlglishman Oliver
Heavyside argued for seeing telephone signals not simply in terms ofOhm's Law of voltages and
currents, but as electric ,vaves traveling down the line. Heavyside observed that, over certain
frequencies and distances, ~ncreasing inductance could actually redu~ the attenuation of the wire.
Thus, adding passive inductors placed at discrete intervals along the wire, uloading coils,"
decreased &ttenuation by a factor of three or four, and thus increased transmission distance
proportionally. Michael Pupin ofColumbia University and George Campbell ofWestem Electric,
working simultaneously, made the loading coil a practicable electrical device.7 It began
7 IaIDCi E. Britt.ain. "The Introduction of the Loading Coil: George A. CampbeU and Michael I. Pupin."
Technology and Culture 11 (110. I, January, 1910), 36-57. Sec also discussion of Britttain's Paper by Lloyd
Espcnsc~ Joseph Gray Jackso~ and John G. Braine~ Technology and Culture 11 (00. 4, October 1970), 596-
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commercial installatio~ in 1904, and rapidly proliferated through the network, especially on cabled
routes. Spacing ofthe loading coils illustrates the difference between transmission media: open
wire required loading coils every eight miles, whereas cables required them every mile. 8 Still the
loading coil remained pa!;Sive - it facilitated the propagation of the wave down the line but
added no additional energy.
Heavyside's contribution, however, went beyond spurring this important invention. His
"operational calculus" reduced the solution ofcomplex differential equations to simpler algebraic
manipulation. He introduced a "step function" (which still bears his name) to analyze a circuit,
network, or system in terms of its response to a sudden shock. This "indicia! admittance," - how
a system received the shock ("impulse response" in today's temtinology), determined the response
ofa system to any arbitrary input. The technique was analogous to hitting the system with a
hammer, and watching vibrations as they died out. John Carson at AT&T showed that the shape,
frequency, and decay of the vibr~tions provided sufficient information to calcul;~te the response of
the system to any input. Heavyside's work was formalized, simplified, a.~d applied to practical
problems by Carson and Vannevar Bush at MIT, among others.9
This "transient response" approach described short, instantaneous events. It found wide
application in telephony, since a voice signal, semi-random in character, could be seen as a long
succession of these events. In contrast, "steady state" methods described systems in their long-
tenn, stable conditions. Much of Steinmetz's work on power systems, for example, used complex
algebra to describe steady-state phenomena ofalternating current. 10 Early in this century,
however, engineers (including Steinme·z) became increasingly contfortable with describing
electricity from both points ofview. The translation between transient, time domain and steady-
603. Neal Wassennan, From Invention to Innovation: Long-Distance Telephone TransmiS5ion at the Tum of the
Centwy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).
8 Fagan cd., The Early Years, 241-252.
9 Carson gave a series of lectures un Heavyside's operational calculus at the Moore School of Engineering at the
Universaty ofPennsylvania in the spring of 192~, which he also published in the BSfJ in 1925-26. These were
compiled in a book, Electric Circdit Theory 2nd the QoeI;)liOnal Calculus (New York: McGraw Hill, 1926). See
also Vanoevar Bush (with aJY appendix by NoJbert Wiener) Operational Circuit AnalYsis (New York: John Wiley
8L Sons, 1929). For backgrotmd on Heavisidc, see St-.1ItBe~ A History oeControl Engineering 1800-1930
(London: Peter Peregrinus, Ltd., 1979), 19S-200. Paul J. Nahin, Oliver Heaviside: Sage in Solitude (New YOh::
IEEE Press, 1988). Ido Yavetz, From Obscurity to Enigma: The Work of Oliver Heaviside, 1872-18~2 (Basel:
BiJthauscr Verlag, 1995).
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state, frequency domain representations was greatly aided by Fourier methods (Fourier series, the
Fourier integral, and the Fourier transform) which expr~ssed signals as sums of sine waves.
Engineers now saw telephone signals simultaneously as transient and steady-state
phenomena and described and manipulated them in both the time and frequency domains.
Modulating a signal, for example, shifted it up or down the spectrum; a radio transmitter
modulates a signal from voice frequencies up to radio frequencies for transmission and then the
receiver modulates it back down to audio. Another frequency manipulation technique, the the
electric wave filter (also invented by George Campbell), selects a particulaT set offrequencies and
excludes others. In a trend complimentary to that in communications, power engineers used
transient analysis to understand their systems during rapid cha.'1ges, when steady-state analysis
were inadequate (see Chapter S). Fourier analysis and operational calculus formed the intellectual
tool~i for attacking the transmission problem, and the backdrop against w~ch feedback theory
developed at Bell Labs. These techniques allowed engineers to manipulate signals on paper; and
embodied in modulators and filters they manipulated electric waves in the circuits themselves.
Telephone Repenters: Linking Geography, Technology, and Corporate Goo!s
These analytic trends were supported by organization and policy. John J. Carty, chief
engineer of the Bell System in 1907, had a clear vision ofth~ social role of the telephone networ~
as "society's nervous system." He and his engineers vigorously pursued the goals of AT&T
President Theodore Vail's famous motto, "One policy, one system, and universal service." Carty
strongly supported science within the company, the modem vision of industrial research.
Corporate research translated corporate goals into technical problems to be solved ill the
laboratory - in AT&T's case as much for protection against competition as for advancement. 11
10 Late in his career, Steinmetz did work on trans~~Dt pheDOme~ and made important coatributions to the
understanding of transients in eL:ctric power systems. See Ronald Kline. Steinmetz: Engineer and Socialist
(8a1timore: Johns Hopkins Uni1l/crsity Presa, 1992), 138-49.
II M.D.F~ cd A Histo'! of Enginceriog and Science in the Bell System: The Early Years (187S·1925)
(Murray Hill, N.J.: BeU Telephone Laboratories, 1975), 32-35,44. Ironically, Carty closed Western Electric's
Boston engineering department which bad been investigating Lee deForest's audion for use as an amplifier. Hugh
Aitken argues that Vail's CIOSlDg of the lab may have cost the company several years toward making a practicable
telepbone amplifier. A proposed contract with Reginald Fessenden for radio technology also became a casualty of
Vail's consolidation. "What slipped through the Telephone Company's finge~ in short, was a unique opportunity
to rome to grips with electronic tcclmology," Aitken argues, countering other historians (Hoddeson and Reich)
who see the move to a single department in New York as progressive toward industrial research. See Hugh Aitke~
'The CvuAAWW Way'S: Ti&hiaiIoj-i aD4 American Radio 1900-1932 (Pt~: I7aiAMUu Uiiiy~"iti Piwo, 1985),
75-78. Lillan Hoddcson.. "The Emergence of Basic Research in the Bell Telephone Syste~ 187S·1915."
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Otle ofCarty's long-time associates recalled him as a system-builder in the Hu~iesian sense: "He
recognized the interrelationship in the telephone business of operating methods, design of the
plant, and the rate strueture...He had in mind that all of these factors must be considered in
relations to one another.,,12 On all ofthese f~ts, Carty believed, science could be brought to
bear.
And science he needed. By 1911, the state of the transmission an had hit its praeticallimit:
"loaded lines" reached the 2,100 miles between New York and Denver. But the frequency-
dependent nature of attenuation so mangled voice transmitted over that distance it was barely
understandable. Still, the BeD System sought to further extend its reac~ all the way across the
United ~tates with a transcontinental line. In 1909 AT&T's tech..,jcaJ ma..,agement irdtiated a
project to extend the Denver line to California.
This geographical problem had a technical core. Bridging the distances required an
amplifier or "repeater," an active device which added energy to the signal, as opposed to the
passive loading coils, which merely stemmed its decay. Developing a repeater had a strategic
dimension as well: the rapid rise of new wireless communications seemed a threat t,o wired
communication, and repeaters would give the company the opportunity to control radio
technology, which r~uired similar types ofamplifiers. Taward these goals, in 1911Carty
organized a special Research Branch of the Western Electric Engineering Depanment, with E. H.
Colpitts as its head. 13 The two men shared the belief that long-distance transmission posed the
most challenging, and re1,rarding technic~ problem. Thus Colpitts a.-td the Research Branell
sought a repeater which would ren~w the signal periodically along the line, t\l counter the energy
di~~ip81ed by the resistance of the wire.
Techn%gy and ClJltaue 22 (1981), 530 ;ootes that the term "fundamental research" began to appear in the
Company's rbetoric about 1907. Horace Coon, ~IiQm..Iel and Tel: lObe Story ora Great Monopoly (New York:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), 197 also makes tbf: point:tbout fundamental research. See also Reic~
"Industrial Research" and The Making Of..Amel~can Industrial r&SQlCh for the defensive stance ofearly industrial
research.
12 Bancroft Gherardi, "Tbe Dean ,.lTcIcpbooc Engineers," Bell Laboratories Record !BLR) 9 (no. 1, September,
1930).
13 Shaw, "Tbe Cooqucst of Distance," reprints Carty's original proposal tor the transeootioentalline. Reich quot:s
Carty's UDderstandin& of the strategic importaDce of the repeater, "'A successful telephone repeater...would not only
react most favorably 011 our service where wires are lJSCIA but might put us in a position ofcontrol with respect to
the art ofwireJcss tdepbooy, should it turn out to be a factor cfimpcrtaDce." The organization chart of the
AT&.TlWestcm Ekctric Enginecrinl departments in 1905, 1901, 1909, 1911, 1915, and 1925 is reprinted in
Shaw, 400-406 aDd Fagan ed, The Early Years, 43-S5.
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M~hanical telephone repeaters, logical eXiensions of siJllple and common telegraph
repeaters, had existed for SClJr.c J~~ne. The'.;e devices coupled acoustic energy from a speaker into a
microphone, amplified the &Gla181~d retransmitted it. This approach amounted to connecting two
telephone circuits enrl ..(o-end, and alumerous such devices were patented before l~. More
elegant solutions used the same principle but combined the elements into a single unit. Because of
inertia, the mechanical coupling lagged the electrical signal and the output was not very linear
with input, whicli meant that mechanical repeaters introduced significant distortion. No more than
a few could be connected in series, and the delicate devices proved especially sensitive to
temperature variations. The BeD System did employ m~~ca1 irnplifiers to a lilnited extent in
tae first decade of the century, a.~d they briefly carried the transcontinental line. As a transitional
technology, mechanical repeaters clarified the requirements for improved amplifiers. Bell
engineers clearly needed a better solution, and tbey began thinking about new approaches. 14
Where Colipins and his lab carried out fulldamental research on reper,ters, Carty gave
respons:bility for the overall construction of the transcontinenta11ine to a young physicist, Frank
Bald~~Jl Jewett, assistant chiefengineer at Western Elect~ic. Jewett came to the company in 1904
from a stint as an instructor in electrictll engineering at IdiT. He earned his doctorate ill physics at
the University ofChicago, where he worked under Albert A. Michelson and became friendly with
Robert Millikan. In 1910 Jewett, Hhen faced with the problem ofmaking repeaters for l:he
transcontin,entalline, re.'\lized that a solution, "in order to follow all of the minute modulations of
the human voia:, must be practically inertiaJess.,,15 It might lay in the electron physics he had
studied at Chicago, Jewett thought. At Jewett'!t requeS\, Millikan sent several recent Ph.D.'s to
AT&T, AAd they formed an important axis of the company's research for years to come: Iloward
D. Arnold, H. J. van d~ Bijl, H.W. Nichols, John Mill~, Karl K. Darrow, Harvey Fletcher, and
Merton J. Kelley. In his quest for the repeater, Jewett had enlisted Millikan, the e;cctron., and the
very discipline of physics in support of his industrial goals - now it remained for him to;olidify
14 See Shaw, "The Conquest cfDistance" 3";f--79 for a c:!etailed discussion of mecba.'lital and mercury arc
r.:peaters. Also sec Fagan ed, Tbe Early Years, 241-256.
15 Jewett to Millikan, quoted in FIpd eel., 1bc Early Yem, 258. kwett and Millikan had boarded together at
Chicago, in a group which also included Tborsctien VeillcD and Harold Ickes. Jewett was the btst man at
Millik~'swecIding. Robert A. Millikan, The Au1QbiQgrapby ofRDbcrt A. Millikan (New York: Prentice F~,
1950), 52-3. Millikan recounts the story of Jewett's approach to biJn. 116-17. Millikan remaine4 a consultant in
long-distance tc:epbony and his testimony helped settle the protracted suit between G.E. and AT&T over the
vacuum tube, 12o-l22.
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the alliance as equipment in the network. Frank Jewett's became intimately associated Mth long
distance transmission; when he retired in 194·', BTL published an "implicitly b:JgraphicaJ" tribute,
not a description of the man's life, but a detailed technical history of the transcontinental line. ~6
Harold D. Arnold carne first from Chicago, and he joined Colipitts's new R.esearch
Branch. Arnold began to investigate Lee De Forest's audion., which the ·.nventor demonstrated as
an amplifier of radio waves. Th~ telephone COmpallY purchased de Forest's patent rights. Arnold,
with fellow Millikan discip,ie VafJ der Bijl, analyzed electron behavior within audion tubes,
characterized their behavlt)r as cirt'"t ele:ments, and engineered them for mass, interchangeable
production. '~y i913, Arnold's "high vacuum thermionic tube," later known simply as the vacuum
tube, could amplify signals in telej>hone repeaters. 17 The repeater enabled the transcontinentd
line, which opened on schedule at the San Francisco exhibition in 1915 with great fanfare.
Alexander Graham BeD on the East Coast repeated his famous first conversation with Thomas
Watson, now in (;alifomia. The line consisted of 130,000 poles, more tha.'l ninety-nine percent on
open wire (the few cables forded stream:; and rivers). It had loading coils every eight rrjles~ and
eight vacuum-tube repeaters amplifying the signal in both directions, working over copper wire
.165 inches in diameter. Calling across country was far from t:'outine; a three-minute call co~t more
than twelaty dollars, and included only a third of the bandwidtt': of standard lines (and hence
reduced quality). 11
Repeater amplifiers on long distance lines, made the telephone network no longer a
passive device. Now it actively added energy along the route. The network became a machine.
The repeater, amplifying and renewing the signal as it lost strength, effectively decoupltd the
wave from its physical limits. Electricity nnw became merely a carrier alld not a means of power,
16 Shaw, "The Conquest of Distance." Hoddeso~ "The EmergeDC% of Basic Researc~" 533. Van der Bijl, with a
doctorate from Leipzig, carne to Western Electric in 1913. Nichols, in 1914. Bruno Latour uses Jewett's
appropriation of the electron as an example of"machines" as abstract apparatus for tying together interested
gJ1>UpS, in Scieoce in Action ( Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987), 125-6.
11 Shaw, "The Conquest of Distance," 375,379-82. Hugh Aitken argues that Arnold simply bad a fundamentally
different vision ofthc audion's potential than did de Forest. "Amold...saw in it. ..something its inventor did not see:
the pogibility of makiog it into a high-vacuum device, operating by pure electron emissio~" whereas de Forest
saw it as a gas-diJcbarge dev'ce. StilL in Aitken's view, the dist~~ between telephony and wirelcss 6c;layed the
Bell sySlCm'S adoptioa of'bL audioo for a number of years. Hugh Aitke~ The Continuous Wave, 244-S} and 546.
II E.H. Colpittl, "Dr. H. D. Arnold.," BLR 6 (no. 6, June, 1928), 411-413. Gradually, more~rs were added
and the IIUIDber ~Ioading coils reduced; the coils reduced the bandwidth oftransmissi~~ and reduced the speed of
signal propagation, which led to problems with echoes. Shaw, "The Conquesl of Distanee," 389-92 provides a
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"useful only as a means of transmitting intelligible sounds while it would have no appreciable
value purely from the power standpoint."19 As part of this evolution, the product of the n~lWork
became standardized. No longer did the system merely deliver conversations, now it delivered
signals within a spe---:ific frequoncy range, at a specified volume, and with a specified amount of
noise. This transformation required standard measures; the "mile of standard cable," was replaced
by the "transmission unit," renamed the "beD," and eventually 8tandardized in the "decibel,"
smaller by a factor often (still the standard measure ofattenuation). Noise became a measurable
quantity, and t~ limiting factor in quality.20 The message was no longer the medium, now it was a
signal - which could be understood and manipulated on its own tenns, divorced from its
physical embodiment.
The Eltablishmeat of Bell Laboratories
The success ofthe transcontinental line proved to Carty and AT&T the value ofJewett's
alliance of physics, electronics, and telephone engineering. l·he trflllscontinentalline so solidified
the alliance technically that loading coils were gradually removed from the network. 21 But
duplicatin~this succe~s would require an organizational solidity as well. On January 1, 1925,
then, the AT&T and Western Electric engineering departments combined to form the Bell
Telephone Laboratories Incorporated (BTL). BTL was responsible to AT&T for fundamental
researc~ and to Western Electric for the products ofresegfch, and the rNO companies funded the
lab accordingly. The new lab, at 463 West Street in Manhattan, had 3,600 employees, including
2,000 scientists and engineers. Carty (now "General Carty" after his role in the World War) was
the ch&101an of the bOard, which also included vice presidents ofWestern Electric and AT&T.
Frank Jewett became President, and Harold Arnold Director ofResearch. While an important
milestone for corporate research, it's easy to overestimate the importance of the foundation of the
detailed technical descripticln of~ transcontinental line. The line was DOl permanen~ but was "build up by
switches" wbcD 1ICCIbI. as was the New YorkIDeover!iDe. Fagan eel, The Early Years.. 263-4.
19 H.8. Nance, 0.8. Jacobs, "Transmission Features of Transcontinental Telephony," J. AlEE 45 (November,
1926), 1062.
20 w. H. Martin. "Tnmsmittcd FrcqucDtY Range for Telephone Message Circuits," BSTJ 9 (July, 1930) 483-6.
W.K Martin, "The TratlSlllissioD Unit and Telephone Transmission Reference Systems," BSfJ 3 (no.3, July,
1924),400-408. R.V.L. Hartley, wlU Becomes 'Decibel,'" BLR 7 (no.4, December, 1928) 137-9. J.B. Johnson,
"Tbennal AgitaMn ofElectricity in Conductors," and H. Nyq~ "Thermal 1:.gitation of Electric Cbarge in
CoDductors," Phys. Rev. 32 (July, 1928), ~7-113.
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laboratory itse1l The new organization mostly resembled the old Western Electric engineering
department, with only moderate chang~. 22 Research condueterl at Western Electric carried on
largely unaltered, as did the <:Meers of the engineers. Until 1934, BTL did not include the
Development and Research (D&R) department of AT&T, which had 1,100 engineers and
scientists.
The TecluJicaJ Agenda
The completion of the transcontinental line overcame the major distance hurdle in North
America, and a major teclmicalgoal ofthe BeD engin~s. Now they aimed to bring down the cost
of the connections. TIw meant distributing the capital ofthe line over several channels, and Bell
engineern turned their attelltion toward improving the capacity' ofa wire, putting fnore
conversatior.s ooto a single line. The most promising method, "carrier multiplex," modulated
several voice signals onto higher frequency "carrier" frequencies. If these modulations occur in
distinct frequency bands, they may all be sent over the same line, much in the same way separate
radio stations occupy the electromagnetic spectrum. At the receiving end & wa"le filter, invented
by George Campbell, separates out the voice ~ha...llJlels. [*Figure 4-3, Carrier modulation] The
idea had been around for a long time; and both Etisha Gray and Alexander Graham Bell had
investigated carrier techniques in their telephone research.23 But with the introduction of the
vacuum tube, carrier telephony became practicable (it became known as "wired wireless") as did
continuous wave wireless transmission.24 The first comme~'cial e&rier system, type "A" was
21 The _ line was fully unloaded in 1920, more than tripling the velo:ity of transmissio~which
reduced ~bo effects and improved the "seo.se of nearness" oftbe speakers. Shaw, Ibe Conqaest {'fDistance,"
396.
22 In 19~6Bn opened a laboratory in Whippany New Jersey for radio researcb. In 1941, it moved IDOS'l of its
opcratioos to a DeW campus in Murray Hill~ New Jersey. Fagan, cd, The Early Years. S4-SS compares Bn with
the old AT&T aad W.E. engineering organizations. Also see the organization cbarts in Shaw, Ibe Conquest fll"
i)jstaDce~" 406 for its similarity to the initial Bn orgaointion outlined below.
23 E.K ColpitIS aDd 0.8. BIackweU~"Canier Current Telephony aDd Telegraphy," J. AlEE 40 (April, 1921) 301-
31S has a delailcd bisIory of carrier Dabods in telepboay, ~ we1I as an elegant explanation of carrier moduIauo~
;and transmissiort
24 John Stone Stolle, '1be Practical A.~ dthe Propagation ofHigb Frequency Electrk Waves Along Wiles,"
Jour. FrtlIIkJi'!l IMt. 174 {DO. 4. Odober. 1912) described higb-fRqucocy multiplex telephony as "identical "ith
that oltbe L-W cootinucus wave tJ3iD" ia1ldio, aDd iDcIudcd the AkxaDderson alternator as an element a teltphone
desip. Also see Lloyd EspenscI1if:4 "Application ofRadio to Wire TrallvnissioD Engineeri.qg," BSTJ 1 (110.2,
October, 1922) 117-141. For "wired wirdcss/' sec Fagan cd, Tbc Early Ycars,. 282.
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rnstalled in 1918, putting four two-way channels on open-wire pairs. 25 [*Figure 4-4, carrier type
A] [*Figure 4-5, Carrier on open wire]
Another means of increasing capacity, cables, carried ten times as many circuits as open
wire lines. But cables were still a difficult and demanding tecrul01ogy, installed for interregional
distan~ like Washington to Boston (which opened in 1913), but difficult for continental spans.
Cables had such high attenuation that they required repeaters every five miles, whereas open wire
lines required them every 250. In October 1925, a cable opened between New York and Chicago,
but only with difficult and precise construction pushing the limits of the medium. The success
came at a massive cost in equipment and material, requiring an expensive, large diameter cable
and extensive loading and repeater equipment.26 Making long cables practicable and economical
required many repeaters along the same route, and massive manpower (distributed along the
route) to maintain the delicate devices. But such a serial connection needed amplifiers of an
extraordinarily high 'i~ality, oth~rwise distortion would accumulate from repeater to repeater,
rendering the voice signal unintelligible after only several stages. These problems, of carrier
transmission, cable attenuation, and high-quality amplifiers defined the culture ofBell Labs at its
founding.
Bell Labs' Organization and Engineering Culture
Ben Labs' publications describe the technical problems and reveal how they shaped the
organizational culture. Beginning in 1922, The Bell System Technical Journal (BST1) published
~ientific and tectdlical work by researchers in the Ben System, including Bell Labs and Western
Electric (its editorial board inc~IJded Carty, Jewett, anti Colipitts). Industrial research derived a
certain credibility by publishing results in the maJ1J,er ofa university, and also provided a quasi-
academic outlet for the many scientists recruited away from university careers. Unlike most
scientific journals, however, BTSJ represents a cross 5e(~ion ofwor:< at a single institution,
because it contains articles almost exclusively by Bell Sy~)tem authors. These articles often
appeared in mainstrea[l1 engineering journals simultaneuu~,ly with their appearance in BSTJ, but
compiled in one place they paint a detailed picture of the iioterolsciplinary engineering surrounding
25 In 1924 the "e" system VIeDl into service, ina>rporating lessons from the more experimental A and B systems. C
carrier systems were so 5UC('eSSfuI the last ODe was not removed from seJVice until 1980. O'Neill, eel. Transmission
Technolo(Y. Chapter 1, "The State of the l"echnology (1925-1930)," 3-14.
26 KP. Charlesworth, "General Engineering Problems ofthc BeU Syste~" aSTJ 4 {CX'~r, 1925J, SI5-41.
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the system. A typical issue might include a primer on electron physics, a discussion ofcircuit
theory, an analysis of speech sign~s, and a statistical study of quality control in manufacturing.27
Less tecfmjca1 and more focused on Bell Labs itself: the monthly magazine Bell
Laboratories Record, a typical "company organ" of the time, began publication in September,
1925, nine months after BTL's founding. The Record had news about employee activities, clubs,
awards, and retirement, in addition to technical articl~~ aimed at the educated lay reader,
describing research at BTL with an emphasis on engineering practic~.28 The first several issues
contained articles describing each department in turn, its key executives and researchers, as well
as their educational and professional backgrounds. Together, the Bell System Technical Journal
and the Bell Laboratories Record provide a technical, personal, and organizat~on~ view of
romm'Jnications research reflective of its comprehensive, scientific approach to the problents of
"The System."
Bell Telephone Laboratori~s d~vided into six departments: Systems Development,
Researc~ Apparatus, Inspection Engineering, Commercial Development, and Patents. Inspect~on
Engineering set and maintained quality standards, both ofequipment itself and of the product, the
voice signal. For example, the group developed statistical sampling techniques for measuring mass
production lots of equipment with only minimal interference.29 A young engineer in this group,
Donald A. Quarles, would become secretary of the Air Force and Assistant Secretary of Defense
during the Cold War.
Only the Research Department performed "basic" industrial r~search in the classical sense.
Headed by Harold Arnold and comprising five hundred people, its mission was I. ~o find and
formulate broadly the laws of nature, and to be concerned with apparatus only insofar as it selVes
to determine these laws or to illustrate their application in the service of the BeH System."
Research covered nine main areas: speech, hearing, conversion of energy between acoustic and
electric systems (i.e. speakers and microphor.es), electric transrnisc;ion of intelligence, magnetism,
21 For the BSTJ's mission., see "Foreward," to the first issue, BSfJ 1 (no. 1, July, 1922). The remainder oftht~
editorial board was, E.B. C~ H. P. Charl~orth, B. Gherardi, L.F. Morehouse, O.B. BlackweH, and R.. W. King
(e<!itor).
21 Company organs of the time typjcally had several audiences, including employees, prospective customers, and
the engineering profession, under the guise of technical jOtL''DaJ~. Sec David Nyc'5discusston of General Electric
ReviRf, a similar publication during the same peri~ in Image Worlds: Corporate Jden~ General Eloctric
Ll.890-1930) (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985),62-64.
29 Franis J. 1U1Jenbec~ 1bc Inspection Engineering DepartmeDt," IJLR 2 (00. 6, August 1926), 243-7.
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electronic physics, electromagnetic radiation, optics, and ch~mistry. The Research Department
also inclucied a vacuum tube group under Mervin J. Kelley which not only studied tube design and
fabrication, but actually manufactured the tubes for the Bell system (in 1925, tube manufacture
remained a delicate, manual affair).30 Still, within the Bell System, the Research Department did
not have 2 monopoly on fundamental exploration, because the Development and Research (D&R)
department of AT&T, witit a similar charter, remained separate from BTL for the labs' first ten
years.
The Apparatus Department served Uto bring to commercial completion certain of the
studies ofthe Research Group." Under the direction ofJohn J. Lyng and including seven hundred
employe~s, Apparatus also designed new equipment not covered by the systems group, improved
existing equipment and reduced its cost, and compared Bell System equipment with that of other
manufactures. It maintained measurement standards for "fundamt-ntal electrical quantities, such as
inductance, cap~tance, and frequency." It also designed radio equipment for telephone
transmission over impassable terrain, talking movies, television, train dispatching and power
station control systems, and public address systems. The Appratus Department also included a
"General Development Laboratory," which pro~ded engineering services to BTL overall.3!
Where apparatus focused on laboratories and equipment, the Systems Development
Department had a broader view ofthe network. It served as a liaison with the operating
companies, determining their needs and translating them into engineering requirements. The eight
hundred people of Systems Development also studied the growth of the systeni as a whole,
projected future needs and spawned re~ch or development programs accordingly. They
designed the actual telephone circuits for the network, incl\lding equipment structures, office
layouts, and the electric power systems required to run ~he equipment. 32 \Vhile this group had the
widest scope of the engineering departments, its vision of the system remained concrete - the
actual groups ofwires and switches which made up the network.
One other group served as a consultal1t to the rest of the laboratory, The Mathematical
Research Department, under the direction ofThornton C. Fry. Fry, who specialized in applying
30 Paul B. Findley, "The Research Department," BIR 2 (no. 4 June, 1926), 164--70. Mervin J. Kelley, "The
Manufactw'e of Vacuum Tubes," BIR 2 (DO. 4, June 1926), 137-144.
31 I.J. Lyng, "The OevelormeDt of Apparatus," Paul B. Findley, "The Apparatus Development Department," BIR 2
(DO. 3, May 1926), 113-J10.
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probability to engineering problems, came to the phone company from a te1ching post at the
University ofWisconsin &nd a year at MIT. He maintained a staffofmathematicians and
Ucalculators," women who performed numerical tasks required by th~ projects. While Fry's group
did not provide "computing" services to the departments, it did maintain a set of mechanical
calculating instruments for use in its O\VD work. These in..;luded a Millionaire, a mechanical
multiplier, a Coradi Integrapl-a, for finding the area under curves, and eventually an "Isograph,"
whic)~ Fry designed for finding the roots ofequations. Fry analyzed, for example, the glass-to-
metal seal ofthe vacuum tube, and developed an equation for describing it which designers then
widely employed.33 George Stibitz, a recent Ph.D. in mathematical physics from Cornell, join~
this group in 1930; he:: built mechanical calculators for the department and would lead BTL's
work in digital computers during Wor1d War II.
Over time, the department undertook its own mathematical investigations, but originally
Mathematical Research furnished only "f:xpert advicet " to other investigators. Fry strongly
believed in the role of mathematicians ill industry, not as quasi-engineers but as liaisons between
science and industrial research, "to give council and assistance...to translate the abstract language
of science into terms more suitable for scientific explanation:' "The mathematician in industry,"
Fry wrote in 1941, "is a consultant.. not a project man.,,34 As we shall see in later chapters, Fry
played a central role in applying Bell Labs experience and knowledge to military problems in
World War II. In structure and responsibility, the Applied Mathematics Panel of the NDRC,
which Fry joined under Warren Weaver, strongly resembled this group at BTL.
It would be maccurate to characterize all ofliTL's work as "industrial research.." in that it
addressed fundamental sci~ntific problems which might be ofuse in the phone Sjntelns. Most of
BTL engaged in the routine, ifcreative w.)rk ofdesigning telephone equipment and making it
work. Only one section, the actual Research Department, perfonned exclusively "fundamental" 0:
"exploratory" investigations. Furthermore, despite the system-oriented organi~tion ofBTL, its
members did cot do "system engineering" in any modem sense. The System Development
Department did not tormulate the most abstract vision of the sys~em overall, but in fact had the
most concrete job: pl&nning wiring, power supply, and equipment layouts. No one at Bell Labs
32 Paul B. Findley.. "The Systems Development Depar·'J.:n~" BLR 2 (DO. 2, April 1926), 69-73.
33 "Mathematical Rcsearc~"BLR 1 (DO. 1, September 1925). Ricch, Industrial Re~tUch. 21S.
~ Thornton C. FE:", "Industrial Mathematics," BS1J 20 (no. 3, July J941), 258.
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specifically addressed the system as an abstract entity - all focused on particular pieces of the
overall problem, with no systematic integration ofall the activities. The work at BTL overall,
however, did represent "systematized research./' in Director ofResearch Arnold's words, as a
concerted attack on a related set ofproblems.3S
The New Problems Facing BTL
Among the chief problems facing BTL, long distance transmission continued to playa
critical role. After the New York to San Fr&~:--isco line in 1915, there wasn't much further to go
with wires (trans-oceanic telephony was a radio problem). But it was one thing to span the
continent and quite another to offer high-capacity economical service ofthat distance. Increasing
the capacity over existing long-distance routes thus began to drive technical development. Just
meeting demands for growth proved a constant problem, about 800,000 new lines were added in
1925 alone. This task required planning and forecasting future requirements based on the rate of
growth, and detailed cost analysis to determine when new cables were required.36 Engineering
studies considered a series oftradeoffs between the diameter ofthe wire, the number of repeaters,
the cost ofthe terminal equipment, and the number ofavailable channels.
What was the state oftranslni~siontechnology when Bell Laboratories was established in
1925? The system had matured, but it had yet to employ several ofthe new technologies. Vacuum
tubes had proliferated, with a total of7,5oo tube repeaters in the nearly three-million miles of
circuits. Still, sixty percent ofthe system still operated by voice-frequency on open-wire, and
thirty-nine percent by voice frequency on cables. Under two percent utilized the new carrier
methods on open wire; virtually none used carrier on cables. 37 Botil carrier and cable, and
especially the two in combination, still posed difficult challenges.
Carrier transmission, because of its higher frequencies, suffered greater attenuation than
voice band signals. Thus carrier on open wire required more repeaters than voice...band sign.sls,
more still on cables. The original transcontinental line, a voice-band system, required fewer than
ten repeaters across the continent, (w~.ich gradually increased to twenty). But to make this
transmission ecfjDOmical, a carrier system was required, and forty repeaters. An equivalent
3' H D. Ar001d, "Systematized Research," BLR. 6 (00.4, June, 1928), 316-17.
36 Charlesworth, "General Engineering Problems."
37 O'Neill, ed, Transmission Technology. II.
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transcontinental cable would employ two hundred.31 Herein lay the problem: both carrier
modulation and long strings of repeaters required amplifiers with extremely pure characteristics,
otherwise unacceptable distortion would accumulate along the line; amplifiers had to be highly
linear.
An ideal amplifier is a pure multiplier, producing as output a simple 1l1ultiple of its input.
This means the amplifier must have a linear relationship between input and output - literally a
straight rine whose slope is the multiplication ratio or the gain. But the output vs. input curve of a
vacuum tube tends to be more s-shaped. [*Figure 4-6, Vacuum Tube Non-linearity]. This non-
linearity introduced hannonic distortion, which caused two problems. First, with a modulated
signal the non-linearity produced extraneous harmonics outside of the desired signal band. This
becomes a problem when one starts to add several signals on the same wire, with closely spaced
spectra. The hannonics from one signal bleed over into the band ofother signals, causing
"crosstalk"- where one conversation bleeds through into another. [*Figure 4-7, intennodulation
products] Second, distortion gets progressively worse when passed through several non-linear
amplifiers, as it did on a long line with several repeaters. The signal itself is cumulatively distorted
until the speech is hopelessly garbled after only a few stages. Thus, as the line became longer and
longer, and as more and more signals were sqUf:ezed onto a single wire, the amplifiers had to
become correspondingly higher in quality. This was a system problem par-excellance: the
behavior of the individual components was determined by the expected performance of the system
overall.
The Negative Feedback Amplifier
The Search for the Linear Amplifier
It was to this problem of linear amplifiers which Harold Black turned his energies when
joined the Systems Engineering department of Western Electric in 1921. A Massachusetts native,
he had graduated that year from Worcester Polytechnic !nstitute in electrical engineering. At that
time, the new type "e" carrier systems, which had not yet entered serlice, were having probl~ms
with distortion and cross talk. The first approach, and the logical starting point, was to make the
vacuum tubes themselves more linear -8 common line ofattack at the time. Toward this goal
38 See table in O'Neill, ed., Transmission Technology, 63.
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Black worked with Mervin Kelley and the vacuum tube department, but with little success.
Despite their utility as circuit elements, vacuum tubes remained complex, unruly - and non-linear
- devices. "The problem lay with the unwanted frequencies generated by the vacuum tubes,"
Black recalled, "particularly the second-order hannonics and other [distortion] products that
predominated.,,39
Black realized that the distortion and modulation products "contributed by a string ofx
amplifiers are virtually x times that contributed by a single amplifier." Thus in a string of 1000
amplifiers, each would have to be 1000 times better than one operating alone. Black plotted a
chart ofthe linearity requirements and distortion effects ofa string ofamplifiers, where the
number in the string varied from one to 3,000. This number was way beyond an expected
requirements ofthe time; Black claimetl that recognizing the possibilities of this radical increase in
perfonnance led him to consider fundamentally new approaches to the problem.
Black's version of the legend then invokes the great engineer ofthe time. In 1923 Black
attended a lecture by Charles Stienmetz at an AlEE meeting in New York, less than a year before
his death. Impressed by the simplicity and clarity of Steinmetz's presentatio~ Black rethought his
own problem. He began to think not of making a highly-linear amplifier, but of removing
distortion products from the output. He reconceptualized the output of the amplifier as containing
a pure, wanted component, the signal, and an impure, unwanted component, the distortion. The
problem, then, was to somehow separate the two, and keep only the pure signal. Black's
invocation of Steinmetz may be apocryphal or irrelevant, but it links Black's thought process to
the transformation in electrical engineering, both in power and communication, toward thinking
about abstract signals, as opposed to concrete electricity (a transformation for which Steinmetz
was a key intellect and icon).
Black came up with an arrangement which manipulated his signal by clear, if inelegant,
means. [*Figure 4-8, Feedforward amplifier] 1be output ofthe rmplifier was reduced in
amplitude, Md the original input signal subtracted from it, which produced in pure form the
unwanted part of the output, the distortion. This distortion could then be amplified back up to the
391bis aor.:ount is based on Harold S. Black. "Inventing the Negative Feedback Amplifier," IEEE Spectrum
(December, 1977) and Harold S. Black to A.C. Dickieson, June 16, 1974, AIT. For a typical effort to design linear
vacuum-tube amplifiers, see E.W. Kellogg, "Design of Non-Distorting Power Amplifiers," Electrical Engineering
44 (192~), 490.
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level of the amplifier output, and subtracted from it, leaving only the pure signal at the output of
the amplifier. Black built a laboratory prototype, which achieved the desired result, and applied
for a patent in 192j.40 Though this setup proved that a low-distortion amplifier was possible, it
was far from practicable. It required two power amplifiers, for example, an inefficient application
ofenergy. Furthermore, because of the many additions and subtractions, each amplifier and s:gnal
element had to be perfectly adjusted and balanced, else it would introduce more distortion.
Black's new amplifier required hourly adjustment, which engineers could do in a testing lab but
not in a complex system deployed in the field.
Black's Feedback Vision
For three years then, Black struggled with simplifying his solution. Finally, in 1927, he had
the ephiphany on the ferry: if the gain ofthe amplifier were reduced by some amount., und that
amount fed back into the input, the linearity could be vastly improved. In fact, distortion was
reduced (i.e. linearity improved) by the same factor that the gain was reduced. A simple
explanation ofthe idea appeared in a paper ofBlack's in 1934. [*Figure 4-9, Black's 1934 fb
diagram] Black showed the gain of the amplifier depends only on the feedback network, b, and
not on the gain rnorthe amplifier itselt: This assumption holds to within 1/ 11\ so if the amplifier
gain is 100, then 1 percent of the gain is determined by the vacuum tube, and 99 percent by the
feedback network. Since the latter can contain only passive elements, such as resistors, capacitors.
and inductors, it can be much more precise than vacuum tubes, and much more stable with respect
to temperature and other changes over t.ime. The higher the gain 11\ the it contributes tQ the final
result. Even then, gains 10,000 or 100,000 were achievable, and Black's invention reduces the
distortion and non-linearity by that same amount. Thus a feedback amplifier with a vacuum-tube
gain of 100,000 has on the order of .001 percent of the distortion of an open loop amplifier. The
price, ofcourse, is to throw that gain away, and settle for an overall amplifier gain that's much
lower, say one, two, or ten. On December 29, 1927, Black and BTL engineers succeeded in
making a feedback amplifier whose distortion was reduced 100,000 to 1 (and whose gain was
reduced accordingly).41
40 Harold S. Black, Patent DO. 1,6'16,792, "Wave Translation System."
41 Harold S. Black, "Inventing the Negative Feedback Amplifier."
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Stabilizing Black's Box
Still, Black had no easy time convincing others at Bell labs of the utility of his id,ea. He
recalled that Jewett supported him in his research, but that Arnold refused to accept a negative
feedback amplifier and directed Black to design conventional amplifiers instead.42 To tht~
generation ofengineers who had struggled to make the vacuum tube amplify at all, thro,ving away
the hard-won gain seemed absurd. Furth~rmore, no one could understand how an amplifier's
output could be fed back to its input without a progressive, divergent series of oscillation~tThey
knew the difficulty ofmaking a high-gain amplifier even without explicit feedback. Subtle,
uncontrolled feedback would arise through, for example, stray capacitance between wires, or even
between elements within the tube itself: and cause the amplifier to go into "parasitic oscillation'~' or
"singing." Two BTL engineers, H.T. Friis and A.G. Jensen, studied this phenomena of"feed-back
or regeneration" occurring through the tube, which "makes the total amplification vary irregularly
in a very undesirable manner and also makes the set 'sing' at certain frequencies."43 They sought
to eliminate feedback as a means to good design, not to explicitly incorporate it as Black did;
Black's work ran counter to the grain of the regenerative amplifier designers.
Black had similar difficulties with the U.S. Patent Office. His application for a "Wave
Translation System," originally filed in 1928, was not granted until 1937. The British Patent
Office treated it the same way the would a perpetual motion machine, and would not approve t.he
invention without a functioning model, which Black submitted while the device was in engineering
trial. Black insisted "the long delay resulted because of my refusal to the U.S. Patent Office reject
a single claim," and that "the patent had to teach a new art: the negative feedback amplification
principle."....
Black interpreted the resistance to his ideas as evidence of their radical nature. But as an
engineer with a bachelor's degree the Systems Department, he did not possess the analytical
sophistication, the communications skills, nor the prestige ofthe top research minds at BTL at the
time. His lab assistant during this period, Alton C. Dikieson, recalled Black as in constant conflict
with his own management, and with the rest ofBTL. Dikieson's recollections ofBlack's troubles
42 Black, "Inventinl the Negative Feedback Amplifier," 59-60.
43 H.T. Friis and AG. Jensen, "High Frequency Amplifiers," BSTJ April, 1924.
44 Black to Dickieson, Juuc 16, 1974. ATI. Harold S. Black, patent application 298,155, August 8, 1928. "File
History ofBlack Application Serial No. 298, ISS," AIT.
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parallel the inventor's own ar.counts, so his memory seems credible.4~ Such conflicts were one
thing for a lucid genius, but Black was far from self-explanatory. "A compulsive, non-stop
talker...[Black] was inventive and intuitive, but not particularly clear at exposition." His negati\te
feedback scheme was only the last in an series ofattempts and ideas over a period of several
years, all ofwhich Dickieson wired up and built, but, as he recalled, "none of the schemes we
tried showed any real promise." Dickieson also recalled "quite a bit of rivalry" between the
circuit designers in the Research Department and Black, from the lower-status Systems
Development department. "There seemed to be some feeling that exploratory development was
the exclusive province of the research people. Mathematicians like Thornton Fry found Black's
mathematics ~~neath contempt.,,46 Black - restless, creative, and a bit arrogant - was
traversing the established boundaries of the organization.
Credible as Dickieson's recollections see~ no contemporary accounts exist to support or
refute them. The documents do allow, however, a thorough analysis ofBlack's ideas, and show
how Black himselfhad to transfonn them (or enlist others to transform them) in order to win their
acceptance. A key point surrounds his claim that the epiphany on the ferry included a concern for
dynamic stability, that ifhe "kept the device from oscillating (singin~ as we called it then)" it
would worlt~ - he implies he understood "stability" ofthe amplifier as the central problem. But a
look at Bls)ck's conception of stability at the time reveals it to be different from this standard
meaning of"freedom from oscillation." In fact, Black's conceptions ofboth negative feedback
and stability differed markedly from much of the engineering community at the time, although
they wO'Lild have been common to practicing telephone engineers.
Differil"K Conceptions ofFeedback and Stability
The id~ offeed-back had become current with the introduction of the "regenerative
ampli~fier," a positive feedback device. Positive feedback, or "regeneratioll," in radio engineering
increased the sensitivity ofa receiving tube by sending a wave back through an amplifier many
times. Today's common notion of"negative feedback" derives from the element of subtraction _.
the feedback signal subtracts from the input signal (as opposed to adding it in positive feedback).
Put in tenns ofalternating currents, we say the signal shifts by 1800 , to the negative counterpart
.5 See, for example, "Inventing the Negative Feedback Amplifier," 59-60 for Blackts conflict with H.D. Arnold,
and intimations ofconsistent conflict with his superion.
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ofthe cycle, in the feedback network. Put in terms ofthe steam engine governor, we say the faster
the balls spin around, the more they retard the motion of the engine. Black's earlier feedforward
amplifier made explicit use of this subtraction, as the circuit amplified the distortion products Cllld
subtracted them from the output. In Black's tL.'1le, however, even this specific-sounding term
"negative feedback," had yet to settle on a definition. Black insisted it referred not to the
subtraction, but to the fact that gain was reduced by the addition offeedback, as opposed to
"positive feedback." In tenns ofthe steam engine governor, this sense of "negative" means the
energy required to spin the balls reduces the energy available to the engine - not a significant
effect in this case. In their 1924 paper, Friis and Jensen, had made the distinction Black used
between "positive feed-back" and "negative feed-back," not by the sign of the feedback itself: but
rather by its effect on the amplifier's gain.47 Serious misunderstanding did not arise over these
differing notions ofnegative feedback, but they do demonstrate the confusion that existed over
the most basic matters ofdefinition.
Confusion and misunderstanding, however, did arise over the issue of stability. Dikieson
recalled why those concerned with singing in amplifiers did not take Black seriously, "Harold did
not even approach the question ofstability - he simply assumed that it did not sing...[he] knew
about oscillations and that the circuit would sing if the gain and phase around the loop were zero,
but he did not have the mathematical tools to analyze the stability problems." Documentary
evidence supports Dickieson's memory. Black's first published paper on the topic offeedback
appeared in 1934, and its title, "Stabilized Feedback Amplifiers," reflects Black's central concern
with stability. Discussing Black's paper in Electrical Engineering, BTL engineer Homer Dudley
listed freedom from singing as one ofthe two most important problems ofthe amplifier. But to
Black stability referred to long-teon behavior ofcomponents in the telephone network not to
freedom from oscillation. Stability meant,
When many amplifiers are worked in tandem.. .it becomes difficult to keep the overall
circuit efficiency constant, variations in battery potentials and currents, small when
considered individually, adding up to produce serious transmission changes in the overall
circuit.a
46 AC. Dickieson to M.J. Kelley, July 6, 1972. ATI 4309 03. Emphasis added.
47 Friis and Jensen, "High Frequency Amplifiers," 204.
41 Harold S. Black, "Stabilized Feedback Amplifiers," BSTJ 13 (1934), a paper presented at the Winter Convention
of the A.I.E.E., New York City, January, 1934, and also published in Electrical Engineering January, 1934. See
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Temperature changes, aging ofcomponents, changes in the power supply, and any number of
other factors could affect the characteristics ofan amplifier. Life in the network exposed a
telephone repeater to a harsh world, and Black sought to insulate the signal from the brutal
reality. He wanted to use feedback to "stabilize" the characteristics of the amplifier over time.
Rain and temperature, by changing the resistance and electrical properties of the wire, caused the
attenuation to vary significantly, potentially by a factor of more than a hundred over the course of
a single day, and comparably over the change of seasons (an aerial, open-wire cable might
undergo halfof its annual temperature change in a day).49 [*Figure 4-10, Temperature variation in
line resistance] These alterations could radically alter the physics oftransmissio~a potentially
disastrous effect for a system already operating close to its physical limits. Black was not
primarily concerned with the stability against oscillation that others saw as the key problem \vith a
feedback system. H";s original patent application, filed in 1928, makes no mention ofeven the
possibility of "singing" or oscillation. 50 He resubmitted the application in 1932, and added this
clarification,
Another difficulty in amplifier operation is instability, not used here as meaning the singing
tendency, but rather signifying constancy ofoperation as an amplifier with changes in
battery voltages, temperature, apparatus changes including changes in tures, aging, and
kindred causes...Applicant has discovered that the stability ofoperation ofan amplifier can
be greatly improved by the use of negative feedback. S)
He acknowledges the other meaning of stability, but assigns it unequivocal second billing:
Applicant uses negative feedback for a purpose quite different from that of the prior art
which was to prevent self-oscillatioo or '~singing."To make this clearer, applicant's
invention is not concerned, except ill a very secondary way...with the singing tendency ofa
circuit. Its primary response has no relation to the phenomena of self-oscillation.52
[emphasis added]
In his explanation in the patent, Black "simply assumed" that the amplifier did not oscillate
- due in part to his concerns with the daily, as opposed to the theoretical, behavior of the
system. In fact, Black's conception of stability was in line with that of telephone engineers in the
the discussions by F.A. Cowan (April, 1934) 590; by G. Ireland and H.W. Dudley (Marc~ 1934) 461-2; and by
Harry Nyquist (September, 1934), 1311-12.
49 H. A. Mel, C. S.Dc~ and C. W. Gn:c~ "Carrier Systems on Long Distance Telephone Lines," BSTJ 7
(July, 1928), 384. The third author oftbis paper was Harold Black's boss.
so Harold S. Black., patent 2'pplicatioo 298,155 August 8, 1928. "File HistoJY of Black Application Serial No. 298,
ISS" AlT.
SI Harold S. Black., "Wave Translation System," Patent DO. 2,102,671, page 2.
S2 Black., "Wave Translation System," 2.
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Systems Development department (as opposed to those in Rese,arch Department). To them,
"stable" amplifiers retained consistent performance in the face of varying conditions experienced
by equipment in the telephone network. Consistency, regularity, and "stability" of the circuit
elements themselves were critical to transmission systems operating near their physical limits.
Black, then, employed this operational conception of stability in the analysis of his amplifier. He
used the term like an engineer from the Systems Development who saw "the System" as a
concrete, operational entity.
Despite their emphasis on transmission stability, systems engineers would also have been
familiar with dynamic stability through the problem of"singing" - which they mayor may not
have called stability. The old mechanical repeaters had a natural resonance right in the middle of
the voice band which caused them to sing audibly. Similarly, early repeater circuits, whether
mechanical or electronic, would sing if the signal from one direction oftransmission leaked into
the other (a full repeater requires two amplifiers, one for each direction of speech). In response to
these problems, telephone engineers filtered out the singing frequencies and imposed limitations
on the amount ofgain in each repeater. Carrier systems a1~ tended to sing, either locally or
through the transmission line. In 1921, for example, Colpitts and Blackwell wrote that singing in a
carrier system could arise when the gain was greater than one and when there existed "sufficient
unbalance," between the circuits.53 The introduction of the now-familiar telephone handset in the
late twenties depended on understanding and preventing "howling" or singing between the
earpiece and mouthpiece. In 1926, Harvey Fletcher analyzed the howling telephone as a dynamic
electrical system to understand the relationship between impedance, frequency, and the tendency
to break into the oscillation.54
Stuart Bennett observes that at least some telephone engineers in the 1920s were aware of
earlier work on the stability ofmotion, although they were unsure how to apply it to vacuum tube
circuits.5~ In the late 19" century, E.l. Routh addressed "dynamic stability" which Ineant the
53 Colpitts aDd Blackwell, "Carrier Current Tel~hony aDd Telegraphy," 313.
S4 Harvey Fletcher, "Tbc Theory of the Operation of the Howling Telephone with Experimental Confirmation,"
BSTJ 5 (DO. I, JanuaJY, 1926), 27-49. Fletcher's paper does not employ the terms "stability" or "feedbac~" in its
analysis, althoqb it does analyze electro-acoustic circuits which greatly resemble canonical feedback systems.
Shaw, "Tbc Conquest ofDistance," 382-3. For the problems ofhandsct bowling, sec Fagan cd., The Early Years
146-50 aDd Gherardi aDd Jewett, "Telephone Communication of the United States," 9.
55 Stuart Bennett A History ofControl Engineering 1930-19S~, 77. Sec also Ronald M. Foster, "A Reactance
Tbeorem," BSTJ 3 (110.2, April, 1924), 266.
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absence ofosci1latory behavior, and provided a tool for analysis, "Rof Lth's stability criteria." So
"stability" as resistance to oscillation would have been familiar to electrical engineers at Bell Labs,
possibly even to Black. Those building on Black's work uncritically used stability to refer to
oscillation or singing, and not the stability of transmission.
Multiple, overlapping conceptions ofcritical ideas, negative feedback, regulatio~ and
stability, surrounded the introduction ofBlack's amplifier. These differing notions help explain
why the Research Department would not have taken Black seriously. Feedback and stability
meant different things, depending on whether one saw as a vulnerable system surrounded by a
hostile geography (and atmosphere), or whether one studied a free, dynamic entity. Simply put,
when Black "inventedtJ the negative feedback amplifier, he invented a different machine from the
one it eventually became (and the one he remembered). These clashing visions raise questions
about the feedback amplifiers' relationship to earlier feedback mechanisms: Did Black's invention
draw on the long tradition of regulators and governors that preceded it? Did Black understand his
work in relationship to that tradition?
The Feedback Amplifier and Regulators and Governors
In his later memoirs, Black said he did. His patent, as issued, states negative feedback
principle applies to more than electronic amplifiers, "the invention is applicable to any kind of
wave transmission such as electrical, mechanical, or acoustical... the tenns used have been generic
systems." But the patent never specifies what those systems might be, and a steam-engine
governor or a voltage regulator fits into the category "wave translation system," only with wide
latitude. Black likely had in mind more directly analogous systems, such as the numerous electro-
acoustic translations required in telephony. Neither the patent, nor any ofBlack's early writings,
nor the writings ofany ofthe BTL feedback theorists for at least ten years, mention regulators,
governors, or any oCthe myriad devices we now understand as employing negative feedback.
Nonetheless, even transmission stability required selfregulating mechanisms. To
compensate for changing transmission characteristics ofthe wire, gains in the repeaters would
require adjustment. A "pilot wire," with no telephone signal ran down the tran~mission line and
looped back, carrying a dc-current connected to a meter which monitored line resistance. This
value indicated on a dial, which a human operator would read and then adjust the amplifier
parameters accordingly. Black's stability oftransmission was a kind ofautom&tion; it relieved
204
network maintenance personnel ofadjusting delicate amplifiers. 56 About the same time, in the late
1920s BTL automated the process in another way as well. An "automatic regulator," located in
about every fourth repeater station, adjusted the amplifier gain with a feedback loop driven by the
resistance of the pilot wire. The New York/Chicago line in 1929 included six regulating stations
among the twenty repeaters. 57 Still, no evidence suggests Systems Engineers understood these
self-regulating lines as similar to traditional mechanical regulators.
Was the earlier tradition of regulators and governors even present in BTL's engineering
culture? Yes. Research at Bell Labs did employ precision regulation, especially of the speed of
electric motors for sound movies. The speed ofa silent film could fluctuate fairly widely without
being visible to the human eye, but a synchronized sound track required tighter control. Variatioos
in speed introduced changes in pitch ofthe sound which became noticeable and annoying to the
listener with less than a percent offluctuation. Fluctuations in power supply, film mechanisms, or
frequency ofthe AC power supply all would affect the speed of the motors, and hence ofthe film
and sound. Furthermore, the television systems in development at BTL in the 1920s employed
large mechanical disks to scan the picture (instead ofthe later electron beam). These needed
regulation and synchronization, as the disks on the transmitter and receiver sets needed to align
exactly.
BTL engineers around the time ofBlack's invention discussed governors fOf sound
movies and television in the context ofthe tradition offeedback devices. In a series of papers
published between 1927 and 1929, H.M. Stoller of the Apparatus Department analyzed gClvemor
design including speed of response, "hunting" ofthe regulatof, and means of synchronizing
several cameras to a single sound recorder. "It is a well-known property ofall faffils ofgovernors
that if they are adjusted to too great a sensitivity the speed instead of remaining constant will
fluctuate up and down around a mean value," Stoller wrote. He acknowledged "the necessity for
avoiding hunting or surging ofthe speed," and clearly understood his speed control as similar to
governors and regulators: "Tllis phenomenon ~s well known in the mechanical governor art and is
described by Trinks in his book Governors and the Governing ofPrime Movers.,,5. The "hunting"
56 Ireland made this observation in his disalssiOD ofBlack's paper in Electrical Engineering., March, 1934.
57 E. D. Johnson, "Transmission Regulating System for ToU CabIes.," BIR 7 (DO. S., January, 1929), 183-87.
sa Hugh M. Stoller, "Synchronization and Speed Control of Synchroniu:d Sound Pictures,tt BSTJ 8 (January, 1929)
184-195. Also see H. M. StoUer and E.1l Morton, "Synchronization ofTclevisio~" BSTJ 6 (October, 1927), 604-
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Stoller mentioned paralleled "singing" in an amplifier. In another paper Stoller explicitly compared
his regulator to a flyball governor, and included a drawing of ~he device in the Eell Laboratories
Record. He used "st2.bility" in the sense ofdynamic stability, noting, "when the sensitivity of the
governor is made too great...an unstable condition is brought about." He added damping to avoid
this instability, to which he also referred as "oscillations." Stoller even used the tenn "feed back"
for the electrical speed regulation in his own circuits. ~9
The presence of Stoller's work at Belll~s and in BTL publications permits four
conclusions about the engineering environment surrounding Black in the late 1920s. First, had
Black looked for it, he would have found analysis and citation of traditional mechanical regulators
in his own organization and its publications. Second, StoUer clearly had access to knowledge
about these governors, and Black presumably would have had similar access. And third, the
analogy between a mechanical regulator and an electronic one would not have been a great leap
for Black, as Stoller made the connection clearly but without much fanfare. Finally, then, we may
conclude that Black did not see his negative feedback amplifier as part of the tradition of
governors, he did not see "stability" in the amplifier in the way people understood "stability" of
mechanical motion, and he did not~ "hunting" in a regulator as analogous to "singing" in an
amplifier.
What was the Amplifier?
This critical look at Black's conception of his amplifier provides some perspective on the
origin myth ofthe amplifier. Black's flash ofinsight, however Inuch it enlightened him on the
structure ofnegative feedback, did not give him an artifact he could sell. But it would be wrong to
suggest that had Black would have found a more receptive audience for his invention had he
realized the amplifier's stability was a key problem, that negative feedback worked similarly to
regulation, that singing in an amplifier resembled hunting in a regulator. These judgments we can
only make with hindsight. The important historical point must be made positively: to Black, what
was the amplifier? It was a means of throwing away gain to achieve linearity in a vacuum tube. It
15. and R M. Stoller "Speed Control for the Sound-Picture Syste~" BLR 7 (no. 3, November, 1928), 101-105. W.
Trinks, Governon and the Goyeminl ofPrime MoYen, (New York: Van Nostnmd and Co., 1919).
59 H. M. Stoller "Speed Control for the Sound-Picture Syste~" BLR 7 (no. 3, November, 1928), 101-10S. Stoller
also publisbed on voltage regulators, H.M StoDer and l.R power, "A precision Regulator for Mternating
Voltqe," TrtJIU. AlEE 48 (1929), 808-811.
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was a way of stabilizing the repeaters in the telephone system where wires were subject to
variation and hazard. On these points he was always clear, consistent, and determined.
Black's 1934 paper, "Stabilized Feedback Amplifiers," presented the negative feedback
amplifier to the world. Before then, Black did not have the resources, intellectual, organizational,
and technical, to sell his amplifier, to make it into a black box, literally "Black's Box" So he
needed to enroll allies, others who could help him in his cause. He attributed the delay from his
1927 insight to the 1934 paper to corporate secrecy, but that can account for at most five of the
seven years. Black's paper, in fact, was not the first word from the phone company on the
negative feedback amplifier; that one, which Black cited and discussed, had appeared two years
before. It was the work ofan ally, to whom Black had turned for help, but who remade the black
box. Harry Nyquist rethought negative feedback by redefining stability.
N)'quist and Bode on Stability
Properly defined, Black's amplifier, with its ultra-low distortion and crosstalk, could find a
place in the network. During the 19208, cables canying voice-band signals were expanding their
role in the system and accounted for most of its increased capacity. The ability to add carrier
circuits on cables, however, would multiply the capacity of the existing network, but carriers on
cable required linear amplifiers with excellent stability. Harry Nyquist, a Swedish immigrant with a
Ph.D. in physics from Yale, brought negative feedback from Black's CUriOSItY into the network.
Nyquist belonged not to BTL but to the Development and Research department ofAT&T; ftS an
outsider he stabilized Black's box by bringing it into the frequency domain. 60
The Morristown Trial
In May of 1928 Nyquist asked Black to join in developing a new carrier system and to
include the negative feedback amplifier in a trial of new transmission techniques. A major project
began in 1929 to test a long distance ofcable with repeaters every twenty-five miles. Known as
the "Morristown Trial," this program installed twenty-five miles ofcable terminating in the
repeater station in Morristown, New Jersey. The many pairs in the cable connected back on each
other at the ends, a total ofthirty-four times, adding up to eight hundred fifty miles of
transmission distance. Seventy-eight negative feedback amplifier repeaters, spaced every twenty
60 Hendrik W. Bode" "Harry Nyqui~"Obituary, IEEES~ April, 1977.
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five miles, were all located in the same laboratory in Morristown. Through this trial, Morristown
repeated its role in the network, fold;ng over the signRl so one place in New Jersey came to stand
for the entire country.
The Morristown cables pushed the limits of transmission stability. Compared to open wire,
underground cables experienced smaller \:ariations in temperature (by a factor of three) more
slowly (by a factor ofseveral hundred), making their transmission qualities more stable. But
greater attenuation in the cables offset this advantage, requiring a correspondingly more precise
and stabl~ transmission. Cables in fact, added the further complication that the variation in Juss
with temperature varied according to frequency, which meant that the signal would become
distorted as well as attenuated as temperature changed, a phenomena known as "twist." Thus the
transmission regulators had to change not only the numeriw gain of the repeater implifiers, but
their frequency response as weD, twisting the signal back. 111 the Morristown Trial an "automatic
tran!;mission regulating system" operated a self-balancing amplifier which drove a motor. The
motor mechanically adjusted electrical equalizer networks to account for the changing frequency
response. This setup also included a "centering cam" to avoid hunting.61 [·Figure 4-11, photo of
f&nistown regulator]
Regeneration Theory
Before his work on the Morristown trial, Nyquist worked on the problem of transmission
stability and regulation. He patented a non-feedback method of"constant current regulation," for
smoothing out fluctuations in power supply voltages, and a means for using pilot wire
61 For a detailed account of the Morristown Trial, see A.B. Clark, and B.W. KenaI), "Carrier in Cable," BSTJ 12
(July, 1933) 251-62, abo O'Neill, ed., Transmission TC(:hnology. Chapter S: "Carrier on Cable." Getting the
system to work as planned proved DO simple matter, but such was the purpose of an engineering trial. Repeater
amplifiers did DOt pose the only problems: cable design (the number, size, and sbitlding ofeach of the many wir~
))Nrs) proved especiaUy critical as well. Shielding, grounding, and interference between signals plagued the
system. Because of the depression, ATclT changed its emphasis from new systems to improving capacity with the
existing plant an engineers had several years to refine the ~ts ofMorristown, and to work on ways IJf
compressing more transmission onto existing wires. But the Morristown Trial did fonn the basis for the "K." type
carrier system, introduced in the late 19305, which carried 12 voice channels on cables at frequencies from 12 to 50
kHz for distances up to 4,000 miles. K carrier furnished 70 percent of the increased capacity in the country, which
doubled from 1940 to 1947 aod remained in service until at least 1980. K-carricr also included a "pilot wire"
transmission resuJation scheme, with an automatic self-balancing regulator and a self-synchronizing motor,
similar to the G.E. sclsyns used in fire control. C. W. Green and E. I. Green, "A Carrier Telephone System for Toll
Cables," BSTJ 17 (January, 1938).
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transmission regulators to compensate for phase shiftS.62 With the Morristown trial, Nyquist
brought thif experience to negative feedback. His 1932 paper, "Regeneration Theory," provided a
rigorous set ofmeasurable conditions which determined an amplifier's stability. Nyquist's earlier
published work had analyzed signals in tenns oftheir frequency characteristics, their Fourier
components, and now he defined stability in terms oftransient disturbances. "For the purpose of
studying the singing condition, it is permissible," he wrote, "to regard the feed-back phenomenon
as a !eries ofwaves.,,63 If all disturbances impressed upon a circuit die out aft£;r a finite period of
time, the circuit is stab/e. If the disturbance goes on indefinitely, the circuit is unstable.64 [*Figure
4-12, Nyquist drawing ofamplifier and waves]
It was intuitively clear that two simultaneous conditions would make an amplifier unstable
and sing. First, the wave coming around the feedback loop would have to be equal to or greater
than the input to the amplifier; Its gain would have to be greater than one. And second, the
feedback wave would have to be inverted compared to the input wave; its phase shift: would have
to be 1800. It: for any frequency, these conditions are both met, then the amplifier is unstable and
will oscillate. Building on Carson's work with Heavyside's operational calculus and on George
Campbell's Fourier analysis, Nyquist turned these conditions into a simple, empirical method for
determining stability. First, break the loop so the amplifier will not feedback on itself: Then
measure its "open loop characteristics," plotting two easily measured quantities, gain and phase,
against each other as they vary with frequency. If the resulting curve encloses the point that
represents a unity gain and 1800 shift, the system is unstable. If the point lies outside the curve,
the system is stable. 6J [*Figure 4-13, Nyquist Diagram]. This plot became known as a ''Nyquist
Diagram;" and remains the "Nyquist stability criterion," or the ''Nyquist criterion." Within
electronics Nyquistts resuit had, in Stuart Bennett's words, "enormous practical significance," for
62 K Nyqui~ U.S. Patent DO. 1,887,599 "Constant Current Regulation;" 1,683,72S, "Phase Regulating System."
Applications filed 1928 and 1926, respectively.
63 H. Nyquist, Discussion ofH. S. Black, "Stabilized Feed-Back Amplifiers," Elec. Eng. (September, 1934), 1311-
12.
64 Harry Nyquist, "Regeneration Theory," BSTJ 11 (1932) 126-47. My discussion of Nyquist'5 paper is based on
Be~ Stuart Bennett, A Riston' of Control Encineering 1930-1955. 82-84.
6S Nyquist, "Regeneration Theory," emphasis original. In 1934, BTL engineers compared Nyquist's criterion to
Routh's test from his 1877 Adams Prize paper on stability in dynamic mechanical systems. They found the two
stability analyses compatible, and thus linked the new feedback theory to the older work on dynamic stability.
Despite this link, however, their work mates DO mention ofapplying feedback amplifier theory to other dynamic
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it reduced a significant amount ofcomplex calculation to a simple procedure, a literary technology
and a tool for engineers to think with. Nyquist patented the method.66
Nyquist's criterion provided an elegant means for engineers to determine the stability of
the systems they were designing. But it still assumed a relatively ideal amplifier. Ifone designed
close to the border of stability, which would produce the highest performance and the most
efficient amplffier, variability in the vacuum tubes or any other parameters could easily push the
amplifier over the limit. It remained for one more BTL engineer, Hendrik W. Bode, to complete
pre-war phase feedback theory. Bode came to BTL in 1926, fresh from a masters degree at Ohio
State, where had also done his bachelors (he received a Ph.D. in physics from Columbia in 1935).
Bode's expertise was not in feedback, nor even really in amplifiers or vacuum tubes, but in the
useful but esoteric network theory.
Feedback as a Network Problem
The theory ofelectrical networks dealt with collections of resistance, capacitance, and
inductance represented as complex impedances. Network analysis, describing the behavior of
existing networks, derived from George Campbell's early work on wave filters. Network
synthesis, formulating a network based on proscribed behavior, was developed at BTL in the
19205 by R.M. Foster, O. Zobel, Thornton Fry, and others.67 Filter specifications included
frequency response, selectivity, phase delay, and the "flattness" of the passband. Network design
techniques compressed a great deal ofalgebra into standardized building blocks for making
complex filters with a minimum ofcomponents and optimized for a variety of parameters.
As the Ben System adopted carrier transmission and began to manipulate signals in the
frequency domain, electrical networks became increasingly critical to telephony. Filters networks
separated specific frequencies out ofthe spectrum. Phase shifting networks aided in single-
sideband transmission. Equalizer networks compensated for the distortion in a transmission line,
systems. E. Peterson, J.O. Krecr, and L.A. Ware, "Regeneration Theory and Experimen~" BSTJ 13 (October,
1934) 680-700.
66 Bennett, A History of Control En.pneering 1930-1955, 83. H. Nyquist, U:S. Patent no. 1,915,440, "Regenemtive
Amplifier." Application filed 1930.
67 s. Millman, eel, AHistory ofEnaineerinc Science in the Bell System: Communications Sciences (1925-1980)
(Murray HilL New Jersey: AT&T Bell Laboratories, 1984), 16-17. Also see O'Neill eel., Transmissiog Technology,
204-208. For a good AIDlmary 01 the wort on network theory in the twenties and thirties, see Karl L. Wildes and
Nilo A. LiDdgIen, A Century ofEledrical Engineering and Computer Science at MIT 1882-1982 (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 198~), Chaplcr 9. "Network Analysis and Synthesis: Ernst A. Guillemin."
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returning the voice signal to its original shape. With these networks, as with repeaters, each
element required proportionally more quality as the size of the system increased. In the early
thirties, Bode recalled, he "plodded through a long program intended to reformulate certain areas
ofnetwork theory related to equalizers as a study ofthe analytic behavi~lr of some particular
classes of rational functions in the complex plane."61 In 1934, he developed and published a
general theory which accounted for all types offilters. 69 Bode called this work "a sort ofalgebra
of the transmission characteristics ofdissipative networks" which construed as design paranleters
the pates and zeros ofthe network's characteristic equation in the complex plane.
In feedback amplifiers, Bode realized, networks became critical because they shifted the
burden ofperfonnance from the active vacuum-tube element to the passive feedback path, itself
an electrical network. His network work merged with feedback amplifiers in the context ofyet
another new transmission medium, coaxial cable. These cables, which had only one conductor
surrounded by a conductive shield, could carry much higher frequencies on a single wire than the
older cables which had bundles of twisted pairs. The millions ofcycles per second (MHz) range
allowed several hundred conversations to be multiplexed together and could also carry the new
broadband television signals. In addition, coaxial cables had much better "stability" of
transmission, that is their losses varied with temperature simply and uniformly. Still, as with the
jump from open wire to cable, the jump to coaxial cables placed heavier demands on repeaters,
equalizer3, and system performance overall.70 In 1934, Bode the network expert was brought in to
design an equalizing network for the feedback path of an amplifier for a coax repeate( which
required IMhz bandwidth. The overall amplifier behaves like the reciprocal of its feedback
elements - when the feedback path divides, for example, the amplifier multiplies. So for an
equalizer, which mimics the inverse of the transmission line to cancel out its effects, the feedback
path had to simulate the transmission line exactly, and to follow the line's complex fluctuations
68 H. W. Bode, "Feedbac~ the History oran Idca.'~
69 K W. Bode, "General Theory ofElectric Wave Filters," J. Math. & Physics 13 (November, 1934), 275-362.
70 L. Espenschied and ME. Strieby, "Systems for Wide-Band Tnmsmission over Cooxial Lines,n BSTJ 13
(October, 1934), 654-79. M.E. Strieby, "A MillioneCycle Telephone System," BSTJ 16 (no. 1, JanlWY, 1937), 1-9.
See also O'Neill, eel., Transmission Technology Chapter 6, "Coaxial Cable," especially 131-139. The system Bode
warted on became known as the Ll; it was tested on a line from New York to Philadelphia in 1936-38 and put into
service just before the war.
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with a single adjustment.71 The trouble was, Bode had to design the equalizer network after the
amplifier had alre&.dy been designed, and such post-hoc modification made the amplifier unstable.
Bode recalled "I sweated over this problem for a long time without success," finally, "in
desperation," redesigning the entire amplifier, applying the procedure for designing an equalizer to
an entire closed-loop system. Where Nyquist had redefined the stability of the amplifier and
provided a simple way to detennine it, Bode began to address the formuJ.ation of the amplifier
itself: and its associated feedback network; a formulation not only ofa stable amplifier, but one
which met desired parameters for performance.
Feedback Amplifiers andMixed Emotions
Bode's 1940 paper, "Relations Between Attenuation and Phase in Feedback Amplifier
Design," remains his best-known and most succirtct contribution to feedback theory. The opening
pages have a decidedly pessimistic tone, as Bode comments that the stability of a feedback
amplifier "is always just around the comer." He begins,
The engineer who embarks upon the design ofa feedback amplifier must be a creature of
mixed emotions. One the one hand, he can rejoice in the improvements in the
characteristics of the structure which feedback promises to secure him. On the other hand~
he knows that unless be can finally adjust the phase and attenuation characteristics around
the feedback loop so the amplifier will not spontaneously burst into uncontrollable singing,
none of these advantages can be actually realized.
He likens a feedback amplifier to a perpetual motion machine, which always works, "except for
one little factor," a little factor which never quite goes away, despite all the tweaking. He sets out
to elucidate the relations between gain and phase change around the loop "which impose limits to
what can and cannot be done in a feedback design. The relations are mathematical laws, which in
their sphere have the same inviolable character as the physical law which forbids the building of a
perpetual motion machine." The conditions for stability, he continues, the price ofusing feedback,
"turns out to be surprisingly high." It "places a burden on the designer," and without new tools
"he is helpless:" "Unfortunately, the situation appears to be an inevitable one. The mathematical
11 H. W. Bode, "Variable Equalizers," BSTJ 17 (April, 1938), 229-244. Black wrote in 1934, "For many types of
frequcnq characteristics it is difficult, and for some impossib;e, to construct a passive network having the exact
inverse characteristic [as the transmission line). With this type of (feedback) amplifier, however, it is only
necessary to place in the feedback circuit apparatus possessing the same characteristic as that to be corrected."
"Feedback Amplifiers," BLR 12 (00. 10, June, 1934), 294.
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laws are inexorable." Bode seems to be addressing Black himself: and those who shared his
uncritical exuberance for the benefits offeedback, regardless of stability problems.72
Bode shows instead that feedback is in ract a rather complicated affair. Nyquist had
recognized broadly that stability was a function ofattenuation and phase, but Bode defined a
specific integral which related phase shift and attenuation, "broadly, that the phase shift at any
frequency is proportional to the derivative ofthe attenuation on a logarithmic frequency scale."
He built on this gain/phase relationship and the limitations it defined "to establish a definite
method ofdesign:" again, a set of simple, graphical techniques for plotting gain vs. phase based
on observed and analytic quantities, which can be used to determine stability. These graphs, which
approximate exponential response curves with easily-drawn straight lines, survive to this day as
"Bode Plots." [*Figure 4-15, Bode Plot]
Bode also refined Nyquist'S graphic, rotating it around 180° to erase the effect ofa
vacuum-tube amplifier (which is inherently inverting and thus adds 180° phase shift). Nyquist'S
stability conditions did not account for variations in vacuum tube perfonnance due to temperature
or manufacturing differences. Bode introduced the concepts of "phase margin," and "gain
margin," which in effect, answer the questions: When the gain reaches 1 how much phase is left
before 180° (and instability)? When the phase reaches 180°, how much gain is left before 1 (and
instability?) These measures "bridge the gap between a purely mathematical formula...and a
physical amplifier, whose ultimate loop characteristics vary in some uncontrollable way."
Nyquist's criterion implied it would be beneficial for the gain to cut-off as quickly as possible
outside the useful band offrequencies. Bode showed that if the gain cutoffwas too rapid, it could
alter the phase in such a way as to induce instability. Thus "the amplifier should cut off: on the
72 H.W. Bode, "RdatioDS Between Attenuation and Phase in Feedback Amplifier Design," BSTJ 19 (July, 1940),
421-4S4. For other discussions of this paper, sec BellDCU, A History of Control Engineering. 1930-19S5, 84-86.
Millman, ~, Communications Sciences. 29-30. O'Neill, Transmission Technology, 68-70. In later years, Bode
displayed some aversion to Black's version ofevents. He wrote to A.C. Dickieson in 1974, after reviewing Black's
account for the HiSIOIy ofEngineering and Science in the Bell System. "this is DOt exactly how one ordinarily
writes formal technical history [interestingly, Bode had some notion of"fonnal technical bistory")...Havc you
thought ofa less personalized treatment in which pieces ofBlack's account are woven in with expository text of
your own? ..lt might be possible to eliminate, for example, the refcrenc:cs to Steinmetz and Hartley, which seem to
me to be irrelevaDcies. In a less personalized account, it might be possible to present basic technological issues in
a more satisfactory way. For CX2IDple, as the paper DOW stands it seems to imply that Black deserves credit for the
pioaecr inve&tiption ofnonlinear effects in loog systems. I doubt wbcthcr this is rcalI)' acc:ur?.Jf.•...1was also a little
disturbed by Harold's claim that be outfaced the U.S. Patent office on every one of 126 c!aiv~. f didn't know that
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whole, at a well defined rate which is not too fast." With a determined cutoff rate, then, the
amplifier actually needed to work in a range higher than the useful frequency band in order to be
stable, and the more feedback, tIle higher that band was extended. Practically, this meant "we
cannot obtain unconditionally stable amplifiers with as much feedback as we please" because at
some point these out-of-band frequencies would become impractical.73 The amplifier which Bode
had originally been asked to examine, for example, would need to work up to 3oMHz just to stay
stable, even though it only needed to amplify signals up to 1Mhz. Bode imposed limits on the
possible perfonnance ofthe feedback amplifier. But he brought the sophistication of the network
designer to the problem and brought the negative feedback amplifier fully into the frequency
domain.
Bode's name is pennanently associated with feedback, but he always linked it to its
network roots, "it is still the technique ofan equalizer designer...1 can imagine that the situation
may well seem baftling to someone without such a background."7. He spent the years between
1934 and World War IT refining his work. He taught an "out ofhour course," at BTL in the
winters of 1938-39 and '40-41, the notes for which were published internally, and ·Nhich became a
book in 1945 (Harold Black taught a similar course on feedback amplifiers in 1935-36). Bode's
title, Network Theory and Feedback Amplifier Design reflects his primary experience in networks,
with secondary application to amplifiers. Before publication, Bode and BTL widely distributed
this manuscript during the war to other laboratories working on control systems.75 Bode
acknowledged a certain amount of"unnecessary refinement," of the design methods in the book,
but explains they were required for telephone repeater amplifiers, with their unusually high
standards for performance.76
Speaking Machines and the TnDsmission or Information
Bode and Nyquist brought negative feedback and the vacuum tube within the realm of
signals, networks, and frequencies - within the emerging communication engineering. A high-
quality, linear repeater effectively separated the message inherent in the telephone signal from then
the Patent Office gave ground that easily. In any ca.se, credit should probably go to the long-suffering pateDt
attorney who wrote all those letten." Bode to Dickieson, September 17, 1974, AIT.
73 Bode, "Relations Between Attenuation and Pbase,1t 426-35.
74 Bode, "The History ofan 1_" 117.
75 K W. Bode, Network Analysis and Feedback Amplifier Desip (New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1945), iii.
76 Bode, Networlc Analysis, iv.
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energy required to transmit it down the line. But the repeater alone did not traJlsform the
telephone signal, it coevolved with a conception of the network as a social device, and of
machines as active speech producers. Technically, this vision incorporated both telegraphy and
telephony, text and speech, into a theory ofprocessing signals, manipulating them in the
frequency domain, and defining the bandwidth oftransmission channels. Even before Black's
invention, Nyquist and Ralph Hart:ey were already addressing the problem oftelegraph channel
capacity, and at work on theories ofmessaging.
The Network Machine
Where repeater amplifiers made the transmission network an active device, validating I.J.
Carty idea of the telephone network as "society's nervous system.," others at BTL thought of the
network in human terms as well. In 1925, for example, a BTL employee with an interest in
amateur microscopy published a pair ofphotographs in the Bell Laboratories Record, displaying a
cross section ofa modem telephone cable side-by-side with a human spinal cord. The similarity,
proclaimed the Record, "may be carried further than mere physical resemblance," when one
considers the function ofthe nervous and telephone systems, "The spinal cord of an individual is
the conduit ofthe main nerves winch go out from the brain and over which intelligence may be
flashed to any part of the body.. .1fn similar manner the long-distance -cables of the modern
telephone plant connect physically the widespread members and conununities ofthe social and
economic structure of the natiofa.,,77 The attribution of"singing" anel "howling" tv the repeater
further illustrates this anthropormphic (or lupomorphic) vision of the system. When the network
became active it quickly acqllir4~ human (or wolf-like) qualities.
While repeater amplifiers redefined transmission as similar to human nervous activity,
during the 1920s automatic switching redefined routing, transfonni1ll8 the telephone network into
an active information system. Al'&T was relatively late to introduex:e automatic switching, but
between 1923 and 1924 the numbt~ ofautoDlatic switching statiol1.s nearly doubled, to just under
one million. By 1927 there were nearly two and a half million. In 1935, thirty five percent of all
phones had dials. 71 For local calls, u~~s now dialed a telephone D1Llmber directly, without the help
77 "The Spinal ConI ofa Nation." BIR 1 (00. 2, October, 192~).
71 AlEE Committee on Communication, Annual Report, "R6tent Advances ill the Communication~" Trons
AlEE 44 (JUDe, 1925) and Annual Report, "Electrical Communication," TrtllflL AlEE 46 (June, 1927). The annual
reports ofall AlEE Committees track a wide range melectrical technologies during this period. For the social
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ofthe operator (who was still needed for long-distance connections). This meant, ofcourse, the
user had to know the number of the party he or she was dialing, or call a central operator to get
the number. Dialing "information" connected the user to a "centralized infonnation bureau,"
where a number ofoperators had telephone books. Automatic dialing replaced the switching
function ofthe human operators, but it still needed the information center as a central storehouse
for the telephone numbers. Bell Engineers paid close attention to both the signal routing and the
ergonomics ofthese facilities, designing them so the operators looked up the numbers as ra.pidly
as possible, using specially designed "information desks.,,79 Added to the neIVous system,
automatic switching seemed to make the network autonomous, even intelligent. In 1926 the
Record called the new automatic network "A Mechanical Brain." The switching network
automatically selected among thousands of possibilities to make the right connection, an activity,
the Record asserted, which clearly indicated intelligence.1O
Repeater amplifiers and automatic switching exemplified the Bell System's constant
redefinition of the human role in network operations (as both "users" and "operators,"), as
machines and people talked to each other in novel ways. Even the problem which drove feedback
regulator design at BTL, talking movies, represented a kind ofautomation, combining human and
machine capabilities and replacing a textual representation (subtitles) with an anthropomorphic
one. Machine-mediated actors' voices also appropriated the sounds of the local orchestra.
Mechanical reproduction ofthe moving image had its own silent mysteryt but adding the voice
truly m'lde the machine come alive - as any number ofpopular reactions to the new technology
argued.11 BTL engineer Hugh Stoller even suggested the governor, while its main goal was
proper pacing of the sound track, might also regulate a silent film, allowing the orchestra
conductor to stay in tight synchrony with the image - rationalizing the orchestra as well as the
machine.
history ofautomatic switehin& see Kenneth Lipartito, "When Women Were Switches: Technology, Wo~ and
Gender in the Telepbooe Industry, 1890-1920," American Historical Review (October, 1994). A.E. Joel, Jr. Ect, A
RistoI)' ofEngineerinc and ScieDcc in the Bell System: Switching Technology (1925-1975) (Whippany, New
Jersey: BeD Telepbooe Laboratories, 1982). Robert J. Chapuis, 100 Years ofTelepbone Switching (1878-1978)
(AmsIerdam: North HoUaod Publishing Co., 1982). Also see Brooks, Telephone, 193.
19 J. F.~ "Improved Equipment for Information Service," BIR 8 (DO. 7, March, 1930), 328-332.
10 "A Mecbanical Brain," BIR 3 (DO. 3, November, 1926), 78-81.
II SbeIdoo_, "What Makes the Picture Talk: AT&:T and the Development of Sound Motion Picture
TecbDology," IEEE r"tIIU. Education 35 (DO. 4, November, 1992), 278-85.
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liThe Invisible Orchestra: " Coupling Users to the Network
In the years before World War II~ engineering research at BTL studied the borderline
between human and machine, where the network connected to its users - the translation between
electrical and acoustic energy. Much of this work had gotten under way during World War I,
when Harvey Fletcher, Ralph Hartley, Thornton Fry and a number ofother BTL engineers
worked on detecting attacking airplanes with binaural sound.82 Engineers at Western Electric
developed microphone detectors and binaural (what today we would call stereo) direction finders
for antiaircraft systems (as in Sperry's sound locator devices), loudspeaking intercoms for
battleships, and telephone sets for fire control applications for both the Navy and the Anny.83
Afterward they continued this work, studying listening and the nature ofspeech. Fletcher studied
noise, intelligibility, the structure of the human ear, and created heating aids and an artificial
larynx - all applying the "matched-impedance" techniques ofelectrical transmission theory to
electro-acoustic systems. Others analyzed articulation, acoustics in auditoriums, and pitch
sensitivity ofthe ear."
From this and related work in electronics emerged the new field ofhigh fidelity audio. The
Director of the Philadelphia Orchestra, Leopold Stokowski~ saw his musical creation as requiring
technological as well as orchestral elements and collaborated with Fletcher and BTL on numerous
high-fidelity projects. On April 27, 1933, the Philadelphia Orchestra played remotely to a capac~ty
crowd in Washington. The music was transmitted via Black's new repeater amplifiers, taken
straight from the Morristown trial.•, Stokowski did not conduct the performance in Philadelphia,
but rather operated electronic volume and tone controls in Washington. "Seated at his controls,
Dr. Stokowski 5Uperimposed his interpretation on that ofthe invisible orchestra" the New York
12 See Fi.DdIey, "The Research Departmen~" and IlV. L. Hartley and Thornton Fry, "The Binaural Location of
Comple.1( SouDdI," BSI'J 1 (110.2, November, 1922), 33-42.
83 "Western Electric Wartime Developments, 1917-1918," ATI 17706 03 01.
u See Harvey Fletcher, "The Nature of Speech and its Interpretation," BSIJ 1 (July, 1922), 129, "Physical
Measurements of Audition and their Bearing on the Theory of Hearing," BSTJ 2 (October, 1923), 145, "Useful
Numerical Constants of Speech and Hearing," BSTJ 4 (July, 1925), 375-386. Robert E. McG~ "Stokowski and
the Ben Tclepbooc Laboratories: Collaboration in the Development of High-Fidelity Sound Reproduction,"
Technology and ClIllIln 24 (DO. 1, January, 1983), 43. BSTJ INDEX Volumes 1-10 (1932) articles under the
lading of Speech, Aooustics, Audition, Sounds of Speec~ Sounds and Words. See also Millman, eel.,
Communic;atioas ScieDccs. 93-102. The tone and loudness controls on modem audio equipment emerged from this
research.
IS Black to Dickicson, August 14, 1974. Stokowski9 Bode, and Fletcher maintained a long collaboration. Stokowski
to Bode, March 8, 1940 and March 30, 1940. Bode~ Harvard University. Box !, Folder I.
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Times reported." Stereophonic hearing, artificial organs, "invisible orchestras," - each stressed,
in their own way, the further integration and extension ofhuman activity by the telephone's
spreading network.
BTL researcher Homer Dudley also dramatically blurred the human/machine boundary. In
"The Carrier Nature of Speech," Dudley iikened human speech to "a radio wave in that
infonnation is transmitted over a suitable chosen carrier." Dudley built two speech synthesizers,
the "vocoder" and the "voder." The first device anal~ spoken language in terms offrequency
components, transmitted each component separately, and then recombined them at the receiver.
The "voder," relied instead on a skilled operator to produce the speech components by tapping at
a typewriter-like device with "spectrum keys." Dudley modeled the human as an integral part of
the system ofvoice transmission, and the transmission media (wire or radio) as replicas of the
human vocal tract. He effectively extended transmission theory into the human brain:
"Communication by speech consists in sending by one mind and the receiving by another ofa
succession of phonetic symbols with some emotional content added.,,81 AT&T displayed the
Yoder with much fanfare at the 1939 World's fair. Sound recording, synchronized movies, high-
~delity transmission - all indicated an increasing facility for generating, recording, and
reproducing sound, now abstracted as audio signals. [*Figure 4-16, Voder block diagram and
photo]
Measuring Text and Speech
While all forms ofelectrical conununication are merely variant adaptations of
common physical phenomena, they can nevertheless be divided for convenience into two
groups. The basis for this division is not, however, one of the methods oftransrnission or
even of the kind ofservice given. Rather it is a differentiation based on our physical senses
of sight and hearing.
Ifat the receiving station the interpretation of the message is conveyed to the brain
through the ear in the DOnnal function ofhearing, it is telephony; if through the eye, it is
telegraphy.
Frank Jew~ to the National Academy of Sciences, 1,35
16 New York Times April 13, 1933. Quoted in McGinn, "Stokowski," 59. According to McGinn, Stokowski
manipulated the controls with such enthusiasm that be sometimes irritated those who preferred the orchestra's
own volume variations.
t7 Homer Dudley. "The Carrier Nature ofSpeech," BSTJ 19 (DO. 4, October, 1940) 49S-~15.
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Parallel to the shifts in human/machine boundaries, the line between text and speech began
to blur as well. Theoretical work at BTL extended the facilities of translation achieved by the
vacuum tube to all messages, beginning with the oldest form ofelectrical communicatio~
telegraphy. Telegraphy had not disappeared with the rise ofvoice communications. In fact the
"Telegraph" in the title AT&T remained far more than vestigial- it represented a significant
source ofrevenue. Teletypewriter service emerged in the early thirties as a new business for
AT&T, which proudly promoted it, along with a multiple channel carrier telegraph syste~ at the
1933 Century ofProgress Exposition in Chicago.u BeD engineers pressed to increase the capacity
oftelegraph lines just as they did voice lines - and they faced the same limits ofattenuation in
the new cables. Still, multiplexing merely made the capacity problem into a speed problem. The
faster you switched between parallel signals) the more lines you could impose on a single wire, but
how fast could you switch? What were the limits ofthe transmission medium which determined
the highest speed oftelegraphy? Carrier multiplexing, which modulates telegraph signals in the
frequency domain, translates the question into one ofbandwidth. How much space does a
telegraph signal require on the spectrum?
From James Clerk Maxwell to the 19208, telephone engineers attacked this problem
empirically: they looked at the shape ofthe telegraph pulses after they traveled down the line, and
adjusted transmission speed so the pulses didn't overlap.19 Few analytical tools existed for relating
transmission to bandwidth - given a certain kind ofline, how fast a signal could you send down
it? Harry Nyquist analyzed this problem in 1924, in "Certain Factors Affecting Telegraph Speed."
He divided time into "short intervals ofapproximately equal duration," and then divided the
message up the same way, into "signal elements" (similar to what today we would call bits), thus
standardizing and rationalizing the signal. Using these basic units, Nyquist examined the ideal
shape for the telegraph pulse, and the ideal code to provide the fastest communication of
intelligence for a given line speed. Morse code, for example, did not effect the most efficient
transmission, because it was optimized for the human ear to discriminate symbols. Other codes
specifically designed for machine transmission did better. Nyquist also defined a "rate of sending
a Coon, American Tel ,lid Tel. 203. "The Bell System Exhibit at the CentuJy ofProgress Exposition" BLR 11 (no.
10, July, 1933). Multiplexing oftelcgrapb signals bad gone on for many decades; Bell was working on a telegraph-
multiplexer when be invented the telephone.
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ofa signal...the speed oftransmission of intelligence." In 1928, further elaborating the modules
"signal elements" and "time units," he related this "speed of signaling" to bandwidth, which
allowed modulating several telegraph signals onto carriers. The bandwidth required, ~Jyquist
showed, equaled halfof the pulse rate. 9O In his analysis, Nyquist freely alternated between the time
the frequency dC'llains, and his results derived from his analysis of the telegraph signal as a steady
state and not a transient wave - just as they would four years later with his work on negative
feedback amplifiers. He also acknowledged that noise or "interference," would slow down the
effective transmission rate, although without quantifYing the effect.91
Theory ofInformation
In 1928, Ralph V. L. Hartley, a Rhodes Scholar who joined Western Electric straight out
ofOxford in 1913, added his own fonnulation of transmission capacity. In "Transmission of
Information" Hartley sought ~a quantitative measure whereby the capacities ofvarious systems to
transmit information may be compared." Acknowledging that "as commonly used, information is
a very elastic term," he eliminated the "psychological factors" of semantics and meaning by
measuring information in a purely physical sense. He declared "The capacity ofa system to
transmit a particular sequence ofsymbols depends on the possibility ofdistinguishing at the
receiving end between the results ofthe various selections made at the sending end." This
definition implies that capacity increases exponentially with the addition of more possible
19 H. Nyq~·R.B. Shanck, and S.I. Cory, "Measurement ofTelegraph Transmission," AlEE Trans. 46 (February,
1927), 367-376.
90 H. Nyqui~ "Certain Factors Affecting Telegraph Speed," BSfJ 3 (DO. JApril, 1924), 324-46. B. P. Hamilton, H.
Nyq~ M.B. Loa& W.A. Phelps, "Voice-Frequency Carrier Telegraph System for Cables." Trans. AlEE 44
(February, 192~), 327-39. 1bis paper (which erroneously lists Nyquist's first initial as N.) also includes a
discussion of the precision governor required for a generating carrier frequencirs for this telegraph system,
suggesting Nyquist bad exposure to regulation before his 1932 paper on feedback, "Regeneration Theory" (he bad
patented line regulating devices). For telegraph ~ling, the main paper was H. Nyquist "Certain Topics in
Telegraph Transmission Theory," AlEE TrtIIIS., 47 (February, 1928), 617-644. See also the discussion of this paper
by Nyquist's son-in-law, John C. Lozier, "The Oldcnberger Award Raponsc: An Appreciation ofHarry Nyquist,"
JOJI",aJ o/Dynamic Syst~lrIS, M~tJ.fUn1Mntand Control (JUDe, 1976), 127-8. Nyquist's measure, that a wave must
be sampled at twice its bandwidth to be transmitted without distortion is still used today, and the sampling rate is
frequently referred to as "the Nyquist rate." A modem CD player, for example, samples the music at44~ in
order to reproduce music in the audible band of about 20khz.
91 K Nyquist, "Thermal Agitation ofElectric Cbarge in Conductors," Pkvs. Rev. 32 (July, 1928), 110-113.
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selections, so infonnation, for Hartley,~e "the logarithm of the number of possible symbol
sequences," a definition Nyquist hinted at ~s weU.92
Employing Carson's work with Heavyside's step functio~ Hartley derived the information
capacity of a channel from its response to a single imposed impulse (including a lucid verbal
description ofthe relationship between steady state and transient analysis). He then integrated the
transient response over time, making a picture of the steady-state system. From this he concluded,
similar to Nyquist: "the maximum rate at which information may be transmitted over a system
whose transmission is limited to frequencies lying in a restricted range is proportional to the
extent oftlbs frequency range." TMt is to say, infonnation capacity is proportional tt' bandwidth,
and also to the product ofbandwidth times time. A narrowband channel transmitting for a long
time has the same capacity as a wideband channel transmitting for a short time (a fact familiar to
anyone today used to downloading dat.a through a modem).
Going beyond Nyquist, Hartley generalized his analysis. He grouped all transmission
media (wire, radio transmission, or even direct speech) under the general term "line," and
characterized each by their bandwidth, or uline-frequency-range." He similarly defined as
"messages," the "symbol sequences" sent over each medium, with a corresponding "message-
frequency-range," which mayor may not equai the line-frequency-range. The problem of
communications, then, becomes matching the two ranges, or squeezing the message-frequency-
range into the available line-frequency-range. For example, if the two have equal bandwidths at
different points on the spectrum, modulation can shift the message up to the band of the line.
More complicated, however, is when the available transmission channel (Iine-frequency-range) is
narrower than the message-freQuency-range. A long time can compensate for a narrow
band" ~dth, so the message may be recorded on a tape and then played back more slowly through
the line. Then ''the frequency range of the message as reproduced from the tape may be made to
fit whatever line-ftequency-range is available" by playing it back at a different speed. This
recording effectively maps the temporal function ofthe signal onto a spatial function over the
92 R.V.L. Hartley, "Transmission of Information," BSTJ 7 (July, 1928),535-63. See brief discussions of Nyquist
and Hartley by E. Colin Cberry, "A History of the Theory of Information," hoc. lEE 98 part 3 (no. 5S, September,
1951) 386, and by J. R. Pierce, "The Early Days of Information Theory," IEEE Trans. on Information Theory ITA<
19 (110.1, January, 1973), 3. Comparing Nyquist and Hartley's work on traDsmissiOll, Pierce writes, without
elaboration, that "It is (Claude) Shannon's feeling, and mine, that Nyquist's wort was more fruirful." Cherry finds
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len~th of the tape. Hart!ey took this idea further with the emerging technology of television. He
divided the picture into a series ofstrips, which he then treated like other signals. The bandwidth
required for transmitting visual images over telephone lines, he concluded, depends on visual
resolution and picture repetition rate.
Hartley and Nyquist's .~1Udies of information began to outline "digital processing," but
conceptualiuxl through transmission media instead of through mathematical calculation. Hartley's
notion ofr~rdin8 data equates to "memory" j~l the way computers use it today, and his
imaginary si,lpUl1 tapes resonate with those of Alan lfuring's vision ofthe general computer a
decade later. Moreover, both Nyquist and Hartley considered the number of possible levels ofan
analog signal, the "number ofcurrent values employed," as equivalent to the number ofsymbols
transmitted down the line. Hartley, for example, acknowledged that being ,able to distinguish an
infinite number ofsignal levels would imply infinite information capacity, an impossible case. He
thus assumed some discrete and finite set ofdistinguishable levels, a fi8'Jre also proportional to
information content (for a picture, this quantity might refers to the number of"gray scales"
distinguishable in the image.) Nyquist similarly showed his own resltlts to be "substantially
independent ofthe number ofcurrent values employed." Because ofhis background and interest
in telegraphy, he generally employed only two levels, corresponding to the key pressed or not
pressed. This awareness, on the part ofboth men, that continuous waves were an idealization
limited by the available bandwidt~ points to the value ofdigital, or binary transmission. Neither
termed it as suc~ but Nyquist did ~se the numbers 1 and 0 for the magnitude of his signal
elements.
Dividing up time into discrete elements, dividing up current into discrete levels, dividing
pictures into strips and dots: these are the foundations ofdigital data transmission and processing.
Through the Heavyside step function, through the Fourier transfo~ and through transmission
thUlry, Nyquist and Hartley related the textual messages of the telegraph to the sonorous
messages of the telephone. By building on the relationship of time to frequency, of transient to
steady-state Nyquist and Hartley related pulses to waves, and words to speech - what today we
would call it the relationship ofdigital to analog.
Hartley's work more general than Nyquist's, and notes "Hartley's has avery modem ring about it. .. lit) may be
~garded as the genesis o( the modem thcoJY of the communPeatioD of infonnation."
Despite the apparent significance ofNyquist and Hartley's work, however, their results
had limited impact. In contrast, Black's innovation, though it required significant theoretical and
practical application, did achieve a certain continuous presence within BTL and the system. Th~
chain from Black to Bode and Nyquist is more or less unbroken from 1927 until 1940, mediated
by engineering trials, publications, out-or-hour courses, and network installations. But the early
theory ofinfonnation spawned no such lineage before World War II. No further papers mention
the topic, Nyquist went on to his feedback work, and Hartley to further work ill communications.
Not until Claude Shannon's 1948 paper, "Mathematical Theory ofCommunication," did the
theory of information, based on transmission capacity, again emerg. In fact, Shannon Cited
Nyquist's two papers on telegraph transmission (1924 and '28) and Hartley's 1928 paper in the
first paragraph of his work as "a basis for such a theory [a general theory ofcommunication]."
Shannon cited no other papers on information or transmission in the remainder of his paper.
Condusion
Harold Black's vision offeedback on the Lackawana Feny in 1927 did not take place in
isolation. It connected at every point to the problems ofthe telephone network, including long
distance transmission, carrier modulation, and the relationship of research to the broader system.
As a governor, Black's feedback amplifier aimed to regulate transmission, to insulate the
perfonnance ofthe technical network from its physical (meteorological) context. But Nyquist and
Bode realized that this long-term stability was straightfolWard compared to the immediate
problems ofdynamic stcability. Self-regulation could rapidly tum to oscillation, and avoiding
instability hence became the driving force of feedback amplifier design. This analytic work, and
the graphical techniques it spawned, had not parallel in the world of naval fire control or Speny's
manufactured controls. Neither had a network, physical, social, or financial, extensive enough to
support the type of"pure" research carried out in Bell Labs. As we have seen, the role of theory
in the telephone network derived not only from the difficulties of technology, but also from its
geographical extent. Nyquist and Hartley initiated a still broader, if still tentative, with their
attempts to quantify infonnatiod. By defining information capacit}, & bandwidth, and equating
transmission lines with that bandwidth, Nyquist and Hartley demonstrated the equivalence of
diverse types ofsignals: telegraph messages, voice signals, and television images. This realization
had important implications, both technical and political. Frank Jewett echoed the equivalence in a
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speech to the National Academy of Sciences in 1935. He rejected a notion ofcommunications
based on technical artifacts, "We are prone to think and, what is worse, to act in terms of
telegraphy, telephony, radio broadcastillg, telephotography, or television, as though they were
things apart." Instead, Jewett argued, "they are merely variant parts of a common applied science.
One and all, they depend tor the functioning ood utility on the transll'jssion to a distance of some
form ofelectrical energy whose proper manipulation makes possible substantially instantaneous
transfer of intelligence.,,93 A unified theory ofcommunication reflected corporate goals: regulation
persisted in making distinctions between media (radio, telephony, etc.), each controlled by "vested
interests." When policy followed science in treating coriununications as equivalent, Jewett hoped,
AT&T, with its "natural monopoly," would emerge as the unified communications company.
Almost without realizing it, AT&T, which from the first had sponsored industrial research to
exclude competition, fostered technologies ofcontrol while in the pursuit of the control of
technology.
93 Frank B. Jewett, "Electrical Communication, Past, Present, and Future,'tt Speech to the National Academy of
Scienc:cs April, 1935, reprinted in Bell Telephone Quarterly 14 (July, 1935), 167-99.
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Figure 4-1: Open wire long distance transmission.
Figure 4-2: Cable transmission and loading coils (at right).
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Figure 4-5: Arrangement of voice freqeuncy and carrier circuits on a single open-\vire crossann.
Carrier multiplexing and "phantom" circuits allow nearly twenty phone conversatit\ns and twenty
telegraph lines transmitted on ten wires. (Mel, Demarest, and Green, "Carrier Systems on
Long Telephone Lines," BST17, July, 1928, p. 592.)
Figure 4-6: Typical vacuum tube nonlinearity. The output anode current is not a linear
function of the input grid voltage.
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Figure 4-7: Nonlinear amplifier causing distortion and crosstalk in a carrier system.
Figure 4-8: Black's original feedfoIWard amplifier (Harold S. Black, U.S. Patent
no. 1,686,792, Figure 2).
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Input
Feedback
circuit
Amplifier System with Feedback
e Signal iDput voltase
Ji Propagation oramplifier ciJcujt (gain)
J.&e Signal output voltage without feedback
11 Noise output voltage without feedback
d(E) Distonion output voltage without feedback
b Propaption offcedbact ciJcuit
E Sipal output vollage with feedback
N Noise output vo1laae with feedback
D Dislorilion output voltage with feedback
Output
~--~.. E+N+D
The output vollage with feedback is E+N+D and is the sum
of~+d(E), the value without feedback plus J.L~(E+N+D) due
to feedback.
E+N+D=~+d(E)+Jl~(E+N+D)
(E+N+D)(l-J1p> -JIt+11+d(E)
E+N+D =- J.1e + " + d(E)
l·~p l~P I-J1P
If~~» I, E·-eJP
Under this condition the amplifJCalion is independent of J.L but docs
depend on ~. Consequedly th: over-all clmacteristic will be
conuoUed by the feedback circuit which may include equalizers
or other com:ctive networks.
Figure 4-9: Harold Black's negative feedback amplifier
(Harold S. Black, "Stabilized Feedback Amplifiers," BSTJ, January, 1934, p. 3.).
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Figure 4-10: Annual variation in line resistance along a cable (E.D. Johnson,
"Transmission Regulating System for Toll Cables," BLR 7 no. 5, January, 1929).
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Figure 4-11 : Automatic
transmission regulator.
Motor adjusts variable
resistances according to
temperature changes to keep
transmission constant (A.B.
Clark, and B.W. KenaII,
"Carrier in Cable," ESTJ 12
(July, 1933)).
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Feedback amplifier
Progress of successive
waves around loop
II""'"
j~
A~
A~
A..
Figure 4-12: Hany Nyquist: "For the purpose of studying the singing condition,
it is permissible to study the feedback condition as a series ofwal"ves... "
(H. Nyquist, discussion ofa paper by H.S. Black, "Stabilized Feedback
Amplifiers," Electrical Engineering 53, September, 1934, 1311)
Figure 4-13: Original style Nyquist diagram, showing gain vs. phase angle plotted on a polar plot.
Since the cwve does not enclo~ the point (1,0), the system is stable. IfcUlVe did enclose that
point, the system would be unstable (H. Bode, "Feedback: The History of an Idea," 114).
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Figure 4-15: Bode Plot
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Chapter 5
"Artificial Representation of Power Systems:"
Control at MIT in the 19305
BuOrd and its contractors developed weighty and intricate fire control systems. Engineers
at Sperry Gyroscope tamed powerful machinery. Bell Labs engineers created a feedback theory
for the telephone network. To these three, dissimilar threads, we add one more group ofengineers
who created a theory for servomechanisms. Researchers at MIT shifted the focus of automatic
control from static to dynamic behavior, a conceptual shift from "regulation" to "control." They
worked neither with communications nor military technology, but with the other large system of
the time, electric power. Servomechanism theory emerged in the struggle to stabilize not turrets
or airplanes, but powerful, distributed, and synchronous electric systems. This chapter narrates
this process and traces its intellectlW background in a conception ofmachinery as a simulation
and a representation ofthe physical world. Through servos, MIT researchers translated problems
ofelectric power systems into problems ofcomputing and data manipulation.
At MIT, Vannevar Bush led and inspired this translation. With his electrical engineering
students, Bush built machines to simulate electrical power networks. Bush's student and colleague
Harold Hazen combined emerging engineering science with the existing culture offeedback
engineering to produce a series ofmachines, the most famous ofwhich is the Differential
Analyzer. Much has been mad~ ofthese devices as early "computers," but they also contributed to
the history ofcontrol. Every stage oftheir development concerned feedback, stability,
servomechanisms, manlmachine interfaces and the control ofmachinery. Their most lasting effects
were not as hardware but ,as a spawning ground: the MIT machines influenced automatic control
primarily through the people involved. Their experience building differential analyzers contributed
to the development ofpersonal technological styles and shaped later work. It also forged an
important connection: in the late thirties the Bureau ofOrdnance became interested in
servomechanism theory applied to fire oontrol and sent junior gunnery officers to study at MIT.
When war broke out, these men became the vanguard ofa massive effon to bring engineering
science to the control ofgunfire.
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Feedback Culture
Engineers at BuOrd, Ford Instrument, or Sperry Gyroscope belonged more to a common
"feedback culture" than to a discrete practice of"control engineering." The latter presupposes a
recognition of"control" as a distinct intellectual, theoretical, and professional activity - a
recognition that only began to emerge in the 19308. Rather, "feedback culture" refers to a set of
techniques, tools, knowledge, and, above all, a group ofpeople who were skilled in applying
feedback mechanisms. 1 Although successful in applying negative feedback mechanisms to a broad
array ofmachinery, feedback culture had two defining characteristics. First, it primarily concerned
regulation and stabilitys the behavior ofmachines in a steady state. One would set the speed ofan
engine, or the course ofa ship, and the regulator or servo would "hunt" back and forth while
settling on that speed or course. The feedback mechanism maintained consistency in the face of
external "disturbances," such as changes in the load on an engine or changes in wind pushing on a
ship. One cared less about the machine's behavior while the setpoint was changing than its
ultimate stability. Hunting was acceptable as long as settled out in a reasonable amount oftime.
Sperry's gyrostabilizer and gyrocompass, for example, sought to stabilize a ship along its roll axis
and about a particular course. Similarly, automatic pilots kept airplanes straight and level, but they
did not provide high maneuverability. Feedback culture emphasized the steady state, and not the
transient or dynanJic behavior ofmachines, systems, and processes. Regulation and stability were
the order ofthe day.
The second characteristic offeedback culture was its reliance on a set of practices,
techniques, and mechanisms, without a unified theoretical framework. Published work in the field
nearly always discussed specific systems not understood to obey the same laws: steam governors,
voltage regulators, automatic steering devices, or autopilots. Few discussed general theory, most
addressed particular applications, "The Sperry Automatic pilot," "Automatic steering,"
"Controlling load, maintaining frequency."2 Some, mostly mathematicians and phys~cists, had
made theoretical analyses offeedback devices, but nearly all examined governors and regulators,
not other types of feedback mechanisms. In 1867, James Clerk Maxwell attempted a taxonomy of
existing regulators and governors. Ma>:weU's paper, "On Governors," Otto Mayr points out, was
I The ooocept of"feahck culture" expands on Donald MacKenzie's idea of"gyro mlture" in Inventing~:
A Historical Sociology ofNuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 31.
2 Tbese are paper titles referenced in Hazen's 1934 papers. See DOte below.
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incoherent in terminology and definition and lacked the idea ofa closed feedback loop so
fundamental to later conceptions ofcontrol. Maxwell had other goals besides understanding and
improving feedback mechanisms; he sought to use mechanical gearing as an analogy to electrical
circuits. Mayr wrote "in the world of engineering, the paper was ignored," and he found no
references to it between 1867 and World War 1.3 Another commentator noted the paper's "terse
and inconsecutive style," and suggested "On Governors" was "probably ~Titten in a forced
attempt to free [Maxwell's] mind from control problems" in order to (10 physics."
Others also presented theories of the stability ofmotio~ relating it to the problem of
stability in mathematical equations. In his paper, Maxwell had called for a straightfolWard way to
determine system stability, and British physicist E.J. Routh responded with such a method.
German Adolph Hurwitz independently formulated the same approach. Any system can be
described by "characteristic equations," taking into account the physics ofthe system itself(e.g.
laws ofmotion) and the forces to which it is subjected. Routh and Hurwitz developed a "stability
criterion" which uses the coefficients ofthose equations to detennine stability without actually
having to solve the equations completely. The Routh-Hurwitz "stability criteria" are in use today
by control engineers to determine the stability ofa given system (with a yes or no answer), but not
to provide quantitative measl~re ofthat stability nor to specify system behavior while the setpoint
changes or during disturb,nces.5 They are analytical tools and not design tools. Furthermore, a
successful theory needs a receptive audience, and much ofthis work remained too theoretical and
mathematical to be ofuse to practicing engineers, who were not widely scientifically trained until
the early twentieth-century and hence could not apply theoretical tools with sophistication.
A 1919 textbook provides a representative window into the state ofengineering
knowledge in regulation theory. Governors and the Governing ofPrime Movers by Professor W.
Trinks ofthe Carnegie Institute 'lfTechnology, aimed to bring a certain unity to the study of
regulating mechanisms, noting that in engineering schools, "instruction in governors is given in a
scattered fashion." One learns about steam-engine governors in a course on steam engineering,
Trinks pointed out, pressure regulators in a hydraulics course; rarely is the subject treated as a
3 Otto Mayr, "MaxwdlaDd the Origins ofCybemetics" in PhiIogmers and Machines (New York: Science History
PublieatioDs, 1976), 168-88.
.. AT. Fuller, "The Early Development ofControl Theory," Trans. ASME, Jour. ofDynamic Systems.
MetlSllnlMnl tmd Control (Septauber, 1976), 224-235.
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whole. He identified the two common functions ofthe governor, measuring some quantity and
then varying an energy supply to keep that quantity constant: perception and articulation. '6A
governor, then, is both a measuring device and a motor." Trinks, extensively citing European and
American publications, analyzed stability, the "promptness" of the governor's return to
equilibrium, the natural period ofvibration, and a host ofother behaviors for a variety of
governors. He raised modem issues in control, always regarding particular mechanisms, never
general systems, and made no mention ofother feedback systems such as autopilots or ship
stabilizers.
An early insight into the theoretical side ofcontrol systems, as opposed to regulators and
governors, came not from Elmer Sperry or his engineers but from Nicolas Minorsky. Minorsky, a
Russian Immigrant engineer, had served in the Russian Navy during the first world war. After
emigrating to the United States in 19!8, he worked for four years as an assistant to Steinmetz at
General Electric in Schenectady, New York. VilllOrsky himself shared Elmer Sperry's interest in
human interactions with machines. At G.E., as well as in Russia, he studied the human eye's
ability to perceive a ship'~ angular motion in deviating offcourse. Based in part on those
observations, Minorsky and G.E. installed a prototype lItomatic steering gear for testing on the
battleship New Mexico (like G.E.'5 fire control system, its automatic pilot posed a commercial
threat to Sperry Gyroscope). Minorsky's 1922 "Directional Stability of Automatically Steered
Bodies," addressed automatic ship steering as a feedback problem.6 In this paper Minorsky
considered not only the desirability of replacing the human operator, but also the naval advantages
ofbetter gunfire, speed, and cruising radius - his analysis seems to have in rrind the Sperry
Gyropilot, also installtXl on the New Mexico. Minorsky debunked Sperry's claim that its device,
or even a human pilot for that matter, "anticipates" a turn in any meaningful way:
It has often been stated that the human intuition ofthe helmsman cannot be replaced by
any mechanical contrivance whatever its nature may be. Such a standpoint seems to be
erroneous, as far as the problem ofautomatic steering is concerned, since there is not so
much question of intuition as ofsuitable timing based 011 actual observation. Once the
S 8enDcU, A.HiItorY ofControl Egineerin& 1800-1930. (London: Peter Peregrinus, 1979). 148.
6 Nicolas MiDor*y, "Directional Stability of Automatically Steered Bodies. I' J. Anter. Soc. a/Naval Engineers 34
(1922), 280-309. See also StuartBe~ "Nicbolas MiDor*y and the AU!omatic Steering of Ships," IEEE Control
Systems (November, 1984). 10-15.
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element ofobservation is removed from the helmsman, there can~ 00 accurate steering
whatever his intuition may be.7
Minorsky understood the human's task as a feedback loop: the qual~ty of his steering depends on
"suitable timing based on actual observation" and not ~me magical factor named "intuition."
Minorsky went on to discuss a number ofdifferent methods of feedback control and introduced
what became famous as the "three term controller." This technique, which remains standard
practice, feeds batk not only the error signal itself: but a weighted sum ofthe error signal, its
time-derivative (i.e. rate ofchange), and its integral (i.e. its accumulation over time); it thus
acquired the name PID for "j)roportional plus integral plus derivative" col1trol. Still, the work Vias
not widely recognized at the time. Later, in 1937, Minorsky published a complete analysis of the
Sperry Gyropilot showing it to be ofthe "proportioo[! plus acceleration" type.!
By the 19305 feedback devices found new uses in a widening array ofmachines. But these
controls, like the Sperry Autopilot, were still built and adjusted by intuition, not based on a
rigorous understanding ofcontrol or stability. Engineers designed their controllers to mimic the
behavior of the human operator. Minorsky's rejection of the idea of"anticipation," represents a
first step away from anthropomorphism and toward mathematics. Now one could understand how
the behavior and stability ofan individual servomechanism related the systertl overall. What
behavior, for example, did the Speny's "phantom" in the gyrocompass, share with the servo that
controlled the rudder, or the larger ship-rudder-gyropilot system? Could one predict the closed-
loop behavior ofa system in a quantitative way? In addition, engineers, increasing mathematically
literate and scientifically trained, were receptive to new Connulations.
Theory or Servomechanism.
In 1934, MIT Professor ofElectrical Engineering Harold Hazen published two papers in
the Journal ofthe F,an/din Institute which began to transform the empirical feedback culture into
modem control engineering. The two papers, entitled "Theory of Servo-Mechanisms" and
"Design and test ofa High Performance Servo-Mechanism" overcame the two limitations of the
1 MiDorsky, "Automatically StecraI Bodies," 282-3. Also sec Bcnoctt, .... History of CoDtrol EI'Kinecrinl. 1800-
1930, 142-47.
• Nicolas MiDorsky, "The Principles aDd Practice of Automatic Control," The Engineer 1937. Sec also Stuart
BeDDett, "Devtlopment of the PID Controller," IEEE Cont1'ol SystelfLf (December, 1993),58-65.
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feedback culture at the time.9 First, Haz~il'~. papers shifted the emphas~s from steady-state,
regulation mechanisms to dynamic systems relying on continuously varying inputs or setpoints
(hence tho IOhigh performance" ofthe secor.d title). And second, the papers proposed a theory of
feedback loops ofall types, from local servomechanisms to large-&eale feedback systems. The
second paper built on that theory by describing the des;gn of the highest performance servo yet
built. Earlier papers on feedback control appe& strange to modem engineers. Hazen's papers so
changed the language of the topic, however, that their methods and terminology are easily
understood by one familiar with present day control engineering. 10
The first paper, "Theory of Servo-Mec;hanisms" provides not only analytical theory, but
definitions and taxonomy offeedback mechanisms. Hazen begins by describing the rise of
automation and how it parallels the rise of mechanization. Where powerful machinery replaced
human muscle power, he writes, automatic machinery will replace h~man operators. Ilis language
resembles that cfSperry Gyroscope at the time, even though h~ primarily discus~~ servos that
"'\ replaced no human function. He distinguishes between "open cycle" and ·'closed cycle" control
(what today would be called open and closed loop control). In open cycle, "control is actuated by
some quantity such as time which is independ~nt ofthe lesult of the control operation. ttll Such
control woula not fall under the definition of "feedback control" but is better termed "remote
control."
The seulOQ type, "closed-cjcle," is Hazen's primary concern. Sensors for providing the
feedback in such a system, the perception function of the governor, are generally low-energy
devices, whereM the mach~~p to be controlled tends to ret~uire higher power for articulation.
Hence the sen'omechanism, integrating perception and articulation, is fundanlentally an amplifier,
amplifYing the relatively weak signal from a sensor to drive a more powerful device. Hazen
defin.es a servomechanism as,
a power-amplifying device in which the amplffier element drivi.'8 the output as actuated by
the difference between the input to the servo and its output.
fIe gives the example ofan automatic s~aip steering device:
9 Harold Hazen, "Theory of Servo-~hanism,., JFJ 218 (September (934), 279-331. Harold~D, "'Design and
Test ofa hi,.h-performaoce Servo-~banism," JFI 218 (November 1934), 543-S80.
10 Smart Bennett makes this observation in his thorough analysis ofHazen's contribution, A History ofControl
Efi&iJgrinC. !930-1955 (London: Peter Peregrinus, 1993), 110.
II ~D, "Theory ofServo-~hanisms,"279.
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Considering the ship-steering example, this disparity [ofpower level] exists between the
energy magnitude associated with the measuring instrument, a compass, and that
associated with driving the rudder. In small craft with a direct wheel-to-rudder drive, the
helmsman serves as a human servo-mechanism. 12
Hazen not only employs Sperry's automatic device as an example but also echoes Sperry's
inherently backward-looking term, "human servomechanism." As with Minorsky's wor~ in these
early fannulations the notion ofthe servomechanism was never far from that of the human
operator. But Hazen's theory extended Minorsky's move, bringing the servo into a more purely
technical world (Hazen cited both the Sperry and Minorsky papers).
Hazen distinguishes as well between "servomechanism" and "control system." In 1873,
Frenchman Jean Farcot introduced a device "to put any motor or engine under the absolute
control ofan operator by the movement ofrus hand." This was the servo-mechanism (meaning
slave-mechanism).13 The servomechanism controls a particular device, which might be part ofa
larger control system. The term servomechanism usually refers to a device that controls position,
as opposed to regulating speed. As in the ship steering example, the servo itself moves the rudder
and maintains its position according to a setpoint. In Elmer Sperry's time, such devices (often
steam-dri'ien) commonly aided the helmsman in moving the rudder, but they could not perfonn
automatit: steering. Another loop attached the rudder servo to a compass or gyroscope in order to
keep the ship on course. Sperry closed this loop by including his gyrocompass, the rudder
servomechanism, and the ship in his Gyropilot control system. This subtle distinction between
servoD1f~hanism and control system eventually breaks down; later in the paper, Hazen notes that
the twc~ are analytically identical.
This "systematic" classification provided the consistenft hierarchy of selVomechanisms
which Maxwell had attempted without success. "Theory of Servo-Mechanisms" defines three
types lofservos: rel.sy, pulsed, and continuous. In a relay or fJn-off servo, "widely used because of
its siJrlplicity" the actuating force is constant in magnitude 'Nhen present. A comm,,)n thennostat
wooo, this way because it only controls the binary state ofthe furnace, turning it on when the
actuaJ tempmltUre is too low (i.e., lower than the desired temperature) and offwhen ~( is too high
(i.e., highe't than the desired temperature). The second type, the pulsed servo, operates during
12 Ibid., 281-283.
13 JOICpb Farcot, 1& seryo-Moteur ou fdoteur Asservi (Baudry, Paris, 1873),quoted in Bennett. A History of
Control Enrrigp;rinc 1800-1930. 100-101.
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regular, fixed intervals, affecting a sort of periodic correction. Although not Hazen's primary
interest, it represents common type of"discrete time" servo used by digital control systems today.
Hazen was among the first to recognize the difference between these "sampling systems" and on-
off relay syste~1ls. 14 His Plimary interest, however, was the third type, continuous control, "in
which the restoring force, acting continuously on the output element, is approximately
proportional to the deviation ofthe output," a technique still known as "proportional control."
"Theory of Servomechanisms" analyzes the three types in turn, evaluating each for
oscillatory respu;lse to an input and for time lag in following an input. He emphasizes time lag
because ofhis interest in dynamic performance; he cares how the servo performs while the input is
changing. He concludes that the continuous type is best "where high-speed response and
smoothness ofcontrol are required," and "has the advantage ofbeing susceptible to rather easy
and complete analysis." As part ofthe analysis, Hazen establishes a unitless "figure of merit" for
servos, which could be used both to evaluate performance and as a quantitative basis for design
(what today would be called "damping ratio"). His "easy and complete analysis" of the (.;()otinuous
type servos also shifted emphasis away from the simpler relay-type systems and toward the higher
performance continuous controllers. He studies the two primary behaviors ofthese feedback
devices, "oscillation and lag." Because ofphysical effects, the output of the servo does not exactly
follow the input, instead it "lags," and ifit is too far of( i.e. input and output are "out of phase,"
the device can oscillate. This situation parallels the phase smft in the feedback network in an
amplifier, which will cause oscillation ifit reaches 1800.
Hazen argues his theory of servomechanisms can be applied to the speed control ofsteam
turbines and water wheels, the stabilization of ships by gyroscopes, the operation ofgyrocompass
repeaters, the automatic stabilization and guiding ofaircraft, and "in fact the automatic recording
or control ofalmost any measurable or measurable and controllable physical quantity." The
mention of this broad field ofapplications shows that he intended his work to be the beginning of
a unified theory, and he adds, "to the writer's knowledge no systematic quantitative treatment of
even the simple common types has previously been given." Hazen's numerous references nearly
14 Trinks described a 64relay" governor as one which used an additional source of power (such as a hydraulic valve)
besides tlle rotating balls to regulate an engine; a definition different from Hazen's. For sampled data systems, see
Eliahu I. JUlY, "On the History and Progress of Sampled-Data Systems," IEEE Control Systems Magazine
(February, 1987), 17.
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all mention control mechanisms for specific machinery or classes ofmachinery; none mention
generality or theory.
Hazen not only proposes a general theory of servomechanisms, but suggests it can be
expanded to a general theory ofsystems. He adds "entire closed-cycle control systems are
dynamically similar to servo-mechanisms and their operation is investigated by the same
methods," thus breaking down the distinction between servos and larger control systems.
Numerous diverse kinds ofmachinery could be considered analytically identical systems.
Still, Hazen's unifying vision did not extend to electronics. While he defines servos as
power amplifiers, Hazen distinguishes them from simple electronic vacuum-tube amplifiers (or
mechanical amplifiers). "The servo-mechanism," he writes, "differs from the simple amplifier in
that the responsibility for the functional relation is Itot placed directly on the amplifying element of
the servo." This statement implies the actual amplifying element in the servomechanism need not
be a precision device (it has no "responsibility for tl:~ functional relation"), as long as it provides
adequate power to bring the feedback signal into correspondence with the input, "such an
amplifier element can be a relatively crude affair." Curiously, however, ",tlen distinguishing his
mechanical servo from an electronic amplifier, Hazen compares his closed-loop example not with
a feedback circuit but with an open-loop amplifier - he did not recognize the servo's parallels
with closed-loop electror~'w dl,lplifiers. His statement that "responsibility for the functional
relation" need not lie with the amplifying element mirrors Harold Black's discovery that a
negative feedback amplifier did not require a high-quality linear vacuum tube but merely a high
quality feedback network. 15 Hazen recalled later he was unaware ofBlack, Nyquist, and Bode's
\vork c,o feedback theory,
At this time I was DOt aware of Routh's and Hurwitz's work. I knew vaguely ofNyquist
and Bode's freq,JeDCY domain work at B.T.L. which I mentally associated only with
communications network theory. I did not recognize at the tin.e the intimate and
fundamental interconnection between this and the transient analysis approacb. 16
Hazen's usociation makes sense, for Bode and Nyquist were known in 1934 for network theory
more than feedback analysis. Bode in particular was working closely with MIT electrical engineer
15 For another discussion oftbe contributions ofHazen's wo~ sec Stuart Bennett, "Harold Hazen and the Theory
aDd Design of Servomechanisms," Int. J. Contro/42 (DO. 5 1985), 989-1012. Bennett's chapter, "Theory and
Design of Savomecbanisms" in A HisIory ofCootrol EnJipeerin& 193O-19SS, presents a similar discussioD.
16 Harold Hazen to Stuart Bennett, October 22, 1975.
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Ernest Guillemin (another Bush student) but only on network synthesis, not on feedback. 17 Even
though he sought to address all feedback systems as similar, Hazen's failure to see the connection
between servos and feedback amplifiers traces the frontier of his vision in 1934.
But within its sphere, Hazen's "Theory of Servomechanisms" overcame the two
limitations ofservo theory at the time. Where previous work had considered primarily "stabilitylt it
considered "high-speed response" as it desirable characteristic. And where previous work did not
address unified theory, this paper initiated the development ofgeneral analytical tools for control
systems. Generally considered fundamental to the field ofcontrol theory, Hazen's work was the
subject of intense study for a generation ofcontrol engineers. The Franklin Institute awarded
these papers its Levy Medal in 1935. In his memoirs, Harold Hazen, soft-spoken to the point of
self-effacement, said only "this theory paper has in fact been a standard bibliography item in every
subsequent paper or book in the field, and is still widely regarded as a classic.,,11 A survey ofwork
in the following ten years confirms this view; nearly all books and papers reference H~en's paper,
many as their first citation. 19
How did Hazen unite this diverse field? What background enabled him to see that different
types ofmachinery could be controlled acc~rding to a siJlgle theory \Ifsystems? What problems
were he and his colleagues working on that led him to this formulation? Oddly, it was not
immersion in the feedback culture. Hazen had little experience with the feedback engineering of
the time, and certainly none comparable to the work at a leader like Sperry. I-Ie had some
industrial experience in electrical power at General Electric, but no evidence suggests he had
worked with governors while there. His doctoral thesis, written only three yecus before his servo
17 After conesponding on network theory (or Guillemin's new~ Bode visited MIT in August. 1933. He visited
again the (ollowing spring and toured the laboratories of the E.E. departmen~ prob&bly inc'uding Bush's
laboratory. During this latter trip be participated in a colloquium on electrical filter theory; the program for the
meeting lists DO reference to feedback amplifiers. Another colloqwum on network theory in 1936 included
Guillemin, Bode, George Campbell and Thronton Fry as speakers. and Bush, Hazen, and many others from the
MIT fac,ulty as atteDdccs, but makes DO mention of feedback in the program. Hendrik W. Bode Papers, Harvard
Univenity Archives, Box 1 Folder 2. Also for a discussion ofGuillemic's work see Karl L. Wildes and Nila A.
Lindgren, A Century of Electrical Euaneerioa and Computer Science at MIT 1882-1982 (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1985), Chapter 9t a for discussion of Guillemin'5 work.
•1 Harold Hazen, Memoirs: An Informal Stan arMy Life and Work (Unpublished manuscri~ MIT Archives,
1976), 3-9.
I!' See, for example, Hubert James, Nathaniel Nichols, and Ralph Phillips, Theory of Servomechanisms (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1947), 16. This book., part of the famous Radiation Laboratory series, was perhaps the most
influential control theory text to come out of the war.
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papers, lists not a single reference to control or regulation.20 No, Hazen's insight was not the
result of long years in the feedback culture, tinkering and adjusting governors and stabilizers.
Rather he came from, and had helped form, a laboratory Culture intent on simulation and
calculation. Hazen's experience designing and building machines that operated as representations
ofthe physical and mathematical world enabled him, indeed directed hi~ to understand control as
a general principle. To trace the background with which Hazen approached the servo problem, we
must first examine the context ofelectrical engineering at MIT in the decade before his famous
papers, and the problems that defined the intellectual climate at that time.
The Stability Problem
By the 19208, regional electric power systems had proliferated throughout the country.
Increasingly, they connected into interregional and national grids, the proposed "superpower"
systems. 21 These networks had a number ofgenerators (at hydroelectric, steam, and coal
stations), each with feedback devices regulating voltage and frequency. Generators drove
transmission lines connected to a series ofloads, including factories, streetr,ar systems, and
residential areas. The characteristics ofthese complex networks, however, were poorly
understood. In the first decades ofthe century, Charles Steinmetz at General Electric laid out
analytical techniques for alternating current machinery in its steady-state, and wrote on a similar
theory for transient phenomena in 1920. By the early twenties electrical engineers recognized the
"stability" ofelectric networks posed a problem but lacked consensus on how to approach it.22
What was the stability problem?
20 Harold Hazen, "The Extension ofElectrical Engineering Analysis Through Reduction of Computational Limits
by Mechanic:al MeaDs" (Sc.D. diss., MIT 1931).
21 For the history oltbe intercoDDeCtiOD of electrical power nctwo~ see 11101085 P. Hughes, Networks of Power:
Electrification in WCSIem Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). For a highly
technical history of the control ofelectric power &}'Stems, from the point ofview of the Leeds and Northrop
Company, see Nathan Cohen, "Recollections of the Evolution ofRcaltimc Control Applications to Electric Power
Systems," AlitomaticQ 20 (2, 1984), 14S-62.
22 Sec Committee on Power Transmission and Distribution, "Annual Repo~" Trans. A.J.E.E. 46 (June, 1927).
This COIDIIIittce iDcludccl Ralph Booth aDd VanDmU" Bush olMIT. For a general review of the sub~ sec C.L.
Fortescue, "Transmission Stability: Analytical Discusrlon of Some Faeton Entering into the Problem," Trans.
A.I.E.E. 26 (Febiuary, 1927),984-994 and discussion 994-1003. For Steinmetz's wo~ Ice Ronald R. Kline,
Steinmetz: Encin= and Socialist (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UnivCbity~ 1992),148-49.
AC machinery would synchronize or destabilize in response to changes in operating
conditions.23 Steady state analyses, based on traditional transmission line techniques, were
reasonably adequate for understanding power distribution during DOnnal operation. But these
methods would not suffice to study the reaction ofthe power network to external disturbances,
short-lived events or "transients," such as lightning strikes, sudden applications of load, and short
circuits. When a factory started up, for example, or a section of the grid tripped off: a transient in
the form ofa traveling wave moved through the network. How would this transient propagate?
Would it exceed the power limits at certain points? How would the system react to the transient?
Ideally, the network would damp the transient and it would die away after a short time. If the
transient initiated secondary effects which caused it to grow, however, it could increase
indefinitely, or until the network was damaged or shut itselfdown. Edison himself had
experienced similar problems with governors on his DC equipment at the Pearl Street station.24
To understand the stability problem, first consider a syst~m with two generators feeding a
transmission line with a load at the end. [*Figure 5-1: Example network] In an AC system (which
these regional systems were), the generators on the line must be synchronized, as they supply
power in the form ofsinusoidal waves which must oscillate together. When a new load is applied
to the line, its incremental power will have to be supplied by each of the generators. They will
slow down and "fall back" in phase, meaning that their rotors are not fully synchronized to the
alternating current in the line. After some period oftime, the governors (themselves feedback
devices) on the engines driving the generators will notice the drop in speed and automatically
increase the energy and hence the torque applied, so slcwly they will begin to come back "into
step." If:he generators on the line are ofdifferent sizes, and thus have different reaction times,
they will come into step differently. Then, as one generator comes into step, it can be "pushed" to
far by another generator coming from behind, and it can overshoot the point of synchronism.
These interactions and feedbacks can continually occur among £!ifferent machines. With many
different sizes, each with its own characteristics and its own speed governors, the machinery on
the system oscillates or hunts about some power point. If these oscillations are small and decay
23 Stuart 8enDdt bas DOled this~ but coacluded --rile problems ofpower-systcm SIability although
ra:opized early did DOt lead to any tbc:orcticaI developments in control systems- in A History ofControl
Enginreinr 1100-1930. 171.
24 Cohen,"_osofthe Evolution of Realtime Control."
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with each successive cycle, they will die out harmlessly. Ifhowever, they grow with each cycle,
the system becomes unstable: progressive oscillations will cause it to shake itself apart or to fail
by exceeding its power limits.
Beginning in 1923, Vannevar Bush, a young electrical engineering professor at MIT,
began to investigate transient phenomena. Bush had come to the institute in 1915 as a graduate
student and earned its fifth Ph.D. in engineering the following year. During the first world war, he
worked on sonar submarine detection and even published on gyroscopic stabilization of ships. 2S
As a graduate student and then as a professor and consultant to Dugald Jackson's consulting firm
Jackson and Moreland, Bush applied Heavyside's operational calculus to power networks. In
Bush's hands, Heaviside's step-function revealed how a "step" input (analogous to a transient)
would affect a system. Bush's first.book, Operational Circuit Analysis, demonstrated how
operational techrtiques could solve any number of engineering problems, especially in electrical
circuits, but in other fields as well. The book included an index by Norbert Wiener on Fourier
analysis and frequency domain techniques. Wiener, on the mathematics faculty at MIT, served as
a mathematical mentor to Bush, and the two continued a close collaboration for many years. 26
Together, Bush and Wiener applied Heavyside's work to "transient analysis" to investigate the
network stability problem. Their work mirrored similar developments at Bell Laboratories in
manipulating electricity as signals, and in transforming between the time and frequency domains.
:[~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~:~[~'~:~[~}::*9ml:~J~f::~~~:::::~I}~[~:~:~[\:~:\:~.:~.\:~:~ ~:\::: :% { } ~m&[~$1.~\.r~(#.t~H9~:~:~'~:~[~I::[j.j:~:~[::j:~:.:~:~I:~I:: :r::~!~#~.P ~&~~;':'~':::':':::'::::'
1921 61 0 0
1922 116 6 5%
1923 125 9 7%
1924 112 10 9%
1925 118 10 80/0
1926 127 10 80/0
1927 143 14 10%
1928 146 17 120/0
1929 149 22 150/0
1930 106 18 170/0
25 Vannevar Bush, "Gimbal Stabilization," J.F.l. (August, 1919), 199-215. Wildes and Lindgren, A Centurv of
Electrical Engineering, Chapter 4.
26 Vannevar Bush, Operational Circuit Analvsis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1929).
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Network stability became a major topic at MIT during the twenties. The table abvve
charts one measure of its importance, the number of theses submitted that addressed stability or
transient phenomena. Much ofthe work at ~T during the period 1924-193 I, especially that
llnder Bush's tutelage, concerned these issues. A number afmen who would later become leaders
in electrical engineering were students during this time and studied power system stability.
One student ofJackson and Bush, Frederick Tennart, would build Stanford's electrical
engineering program and become "the father of Silicon Valley." 21 His 1924 doctoral thesis, "The
Characteristics and Stability ofTransnUssion Systems'~ addressed the proposed "superpower"
systems which would span vast areas ofgeographic space and "must operate under conditions and
near limits not approached by any of the lines now in existence.,,21 He argued the problem of
stability in electrical power networks intimately related to the behavior ofgovernors, regulators,
and feedback mechanisms. Not only did individual devices affect transient behavior, Tennan
wrote, but the characteristics ofthe network itself had much in common with feedback controls.
Terman's study attacked both the relationship between steady state and transient
characteristics of a network and the relationship between electrical and mechanical transients. H~
sought to understand the effects of regulators and governors on the stability of the systenl, and, in
tum, how the behavior of those governors were influenced by the characteristics of the Iletwork.
In doing so, Terman drew explicitly on the feedback culture:
The general problem ofelectro-mechanical transients in synchronous machinery is of long
standing. It first came up in connection with parallel operation where reciprocating steam
engines were used as prime movers and in connection with hunting...The entire reasoning
can be applied to our problem with very little modificati~ giving a very good insight into
the synchronous condenser transient.29
27 Terman's Radio Engineer's Handbook (New York: McGraw Hill, 1943), became a standard text for electronics.
For Terman's later work at Stanford, see Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins, 1993), Stuart W. Leslie and Bruce Hevly, "Steeple Building at Stanford: Physics, Electrical Engineering,
and Microwave Researc~" IEEE Proceedings 13 (July 1~89), 1169-80.
21Frederick Terman, "The Characteristics and Stability ofTransmission Systems" (Sc.D. diss., Mff, 1924), 1.
~id, 168.
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While Terman concluded that the instability oftile in.:lividual voltage regulators was insignificant
compared to electromechanical effects in the generators themselves, he found that the instability
ofthe system overall shared much with that ofan individual governor:
An electro-mecbanical transient develops very similar to the general phenomenon of
hunting in which the over-swing makes the momentary power that is drawn from the
system exceed that of the load alone at times during the transient.
Furthermore, the electrical transient could develop much more quickly than the generators could
respond, and IDOre quickly still than the regulators on the prime movers would kick in:
The ability of the system to hold together under these conditions is detennined by the
instantaneous limits, since the action of the transient is so fast that the greatest danger
comes before the air gap flux [the magnetic field in the generator] can change appreciably
either from annature reaction or regulator pickup and long before steam and hydraulic
governors become active.30
Terman's thesis clearly stated the stability problem as dependent on the complex system of
generators, transmission lines, regulators and governors, each with its own characteristics and
response times. The best one could do at this poi..,t was to identify the dominant features, stabilize
their behavior, and hope that the slower transients would not be a problem.
In 1925, Bush and colleague R.D. Booth published a paper in the transactions ofthe AlEE
entitled "Power System Transients" which put Tennzn:s work into a larger engineering context.3l
Although published later than Tennan's thesis, it was probably written about the same time and
r~presents a similar state of thinking. The authors (who list themselves as Jackson and Moreland
employees) begin by notL'8 the difficulty ofthe problem, and three ways to attack it:
mathematical analysis, test of laboratory models, and experience. These power systems were too
new to have any experience built up for some time, so analysis and test were the favored tools,
being "complementary. The final check of theory is by test, and the final attack on the actual
problems ofsystem design must be by analysis." As their central problem, Bush and Booth ask the
following questien:
What is the degree ofstability ofsuch a network [a system of power stations connected by
transmission IiDes and operating close to its power limits] when subjected to disturbances
of the types likely to be encountered in practice~2
~,274.
J1VaDDeVal" Bush,"~r Sy&lem Transients," AlEE TrtIIU. 44 (1925), 229-30.
31Ibid, 229.
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To address this problem, Bush and Booth propose a "point by point" method of calculatio~
whereby one starts with the steady-state ofthe system and then calculates how it changes for
incremental parameters oftime during a transient. One can then piece together how a system
behaves for a certain time interval. This method requires tedious repetitio~ unless one has an easy
method for figuring the individual points, so Bush and Booth propose a "superposition" method,
whereby graphs ofthe machinery's characteristic curves drawn on paper can be physically
overlaid to determine their operating points (i.e. solve their characteristic equations). In the
context of this laborious calculation Bush first conceived his famous research program in
calculating machines.
Knowledge offeedback control formed a further gap in Bush and Booth"s understanding
ofthe system's behavior. During transient disturbances "the behavior ofexciters, governors, and
regulators comes into play, and the mechanical constants ofmachines as well as their electrical
behavior must be considered. "A problem a.aises, however, because "unfortunately complete
information in regard to the behavior ofaU types ofgovernors is not yet available in the form
nece~."33 The paper's discussants agreed, "A complete paper could be written on steam and
hydraulic governors and Sl!ch a paper would I regret to say df21 chiefly with their shortcomings. I
feel that there is room for a great deal ofimpro\'ement and such improv~ment will come by
studying their characteristics in connection with the problem ofstability."34 More study, of
individual machines, their regu!ation characteristics, and their behci,ior when connected into
systems, was definitely in order.
In addition to Terman, other Bush students examined the stability problem, through a
number ofapproaches. Harold Edgerton came to MIT in 1926 from a period "on test" in the
cooperative program at G.E. His 1927 master's thesis, "Abrupt Change in Load on A
Synchronous Machine," employed the newly developed "Product Integraph" calculating machine
to calculate system stability by the point-by-point method, showing ways to avoid instability by
applying loads gradually. For his doctoral work, Edgerton used a stroboscope synchronized to the
AC power line to "freeze" the poles ofa generator. He attached white cardboard signs marked
331bid., 232.
:w C. L. Fortescue, discussion ofBush and~ "Power System Tnmsients," Trans. AlEE 44 (February, 1925),
97-103. This discussio, from six commentators, provides a good overview oftbc state oftbc stability problem in
1925.
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''N'' or "S" for the north and south poles. Though the rotor was in motion, the letters would
appear to stand still under the flashing light. When a sudden load appeared, the letters seemed to
rotate backward, then slowly catch up, overshoot and oscillate about a certain position as the
governor acted. [*Figure 5-2: Edgerton & generator] Edgerton's 1931 dissertatio~ "Benefits of
Angular-Controlled Field Switching on the Pulling-into-Step Ability of Salient-Pole Synchronous
Motors," presented similar studies but made with a new mercury-arc stroboscope. This device led
Edgerton to his famous work in high-speed flash photography.3'
Kenneth Germeshausen, later founder, with Edgerton and Herbert Grier, ofEG&G, wrote
a 1931 bachelor's thesis "The Effect ofControlled Field Switching on the Pulling-into-step ofa
Synchronous Induction Motor." Cecil Green, philanthropist and founder ofTexas Instruments,
submitted "A Static Study ofthe No Load Flux Distribution in a Salient Pole Alternator," for his
B.S. Emd master's thesis in 1924. Other theses titles give the flavor of the work during this period:
"The Parallel Operation of Alternators Through Long Transmission Lines," "Method of
Determining the Steady State Stability ofSystems Containing Tie Lines,," "A Study of
Synchronous Machines Not Running at Synchronous Speed," "An Investigation ofthe Steady
State Stability ofa Two Generator System," and "A Study of Induction Motors ElectricalJy
Constrained to Run at the Same Speed.,,36 For electrical engineers at MIT in the 19205, the
stability problem, and the behavior ofelectric machinery under transient conditions, shaped the
atmosphere within which students like Harold Hazen matured.
Simulation: ne Network Analyzer
Two innovative strategies were adopted at MIT to deal with the difficul~Jofthe stability
problem, simulation and calculation, and Harold Hazen worked with both. The first roncemed
steady state solutions. After his work on transients with Booth, Bush began thinking ofa way to
35 Harold~ "Abrupt Cbange in Load on a Synchronous Machine" (S.M Thesis, MIT 1927), and "Benefits
of Angular-eoutrolled Field Switching on me Pulling-mao-Step Ability of Salient-Pole Synchronous Motors"
(Sc.D. thesis, MIT, 1931). Wildes and Lindgren, A Centwy ofElcetricaJ Engineering, 145-7.
36 Gordon Brown and Kcnoeth Germcsballsen "The Effect af Controlled Field Switching on the Pulling-into-step
ofa Synchronous IDdudion Motor" (8.B. thesis, MIT, 1931), Cecil Green "A Static Study of the No Load Flux
Distribution in a SaIicnt Pole Alternator" (S.B.lS.M thesis, MIT, 1924), Constantine Barry, "The Parallel
Operation of Altcmaaon lbrough Lonl Transmission LiDes" (S.B. thesis, MIT, 1927), Robert Caruthers and O.P.
McArthy, "Metbod ofDetamining the Steady Stale Stability of Systems Containing Tie Lines" (S.M. thesis,
1928), Sberman Wang, "A Study of Synchronous Machines Not Running at Synchronous Specd"(S.B. thesis, MIT,
1929), George Ackock and Thatcher H. Mawson, "An Investiption of the Steady State Stability ofa Two
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model complex power systems in the laboratory. In 1924, he suggested to Harold Haze~ th~n an
undergraduate, that he write a bachelor's thesis on a small-scale circuit that simulated elll electrical
power network. Hazen had:orne to MIT in the fall of 1920, baTling grown up in Three Rivers,
Michigan; he would remain at the institute for nearly sixty years. As a yOIJth, his Sunday-school
teacher had introduced him to machine shop practice, and he built electromechanical inv~ntions in
his father's basement shop.
Power network simulations were not new; at least one was built at Edison's Menlo Park
laboratory around 1880.31 Between 1919 and 1923 O.R. Schurig ofGeneral Electric had
developed a "D.C. Calculating Table" for analysis ofshort-circuit conditions in networks. When
SchOOg built a more generally applicable AC model, however, the machine itselfhad a stability
problem, "hunting itselfout of syr*Chronism" anJ "shaking apart" when more than a few elements
(e.g. miniature motors and generators) connected together.3• While electrical parameters
(transmissioc lines) could be replicated easily in miniature, mechanical components (motors and
generators) did not scale well, hence the instability. Small rotating machinery just didn't have
enough inertia to represent larger machines. In technical terms a small motor has it has little
energy storage (inertia) comparecl to energy dissipation (friction), whereas a large machine is the
other way around. Thus the characteristics of the simulated systems would not adequately model
the bigger ones, and would be even more susceptible to instability.
Hazen solved this problem, at Bush's suggestion, by building a miniature power network
that substit\.lted "phase shifting transformers" for motors and generators. These devices (built with
parts loaned from G.E.) t.ad the same extemal characteristics as generating stations, but did not
aetua1ly rotate. An operator could adjust them by hand, however, to vary phase shifts, which
corresponded to varying loads and torques. Although the model could simulate only steady-state
problems, ifone used the "point-by-point" method described earlier, the machine could soJ.ve each
"point" in steady state. By r~justing the machine (i.e. the phase shifts ofeach of the
Generator System" (S.BlS.M. thesis, 1921), JeD Kurkuian., W A Study of IDduction Motors Electrically Constrained
to Run at the Same Speed" (S.8. thesis, 1929).
37 Hughes, Networks cfPower. 23. Edwin Harder would employ power systtm simulations and analog computers
to study servo and regulator problems for many yean after We:rId War D. Sec William Aspray, "Edwin L. Harder
and the Aoacom: AoaIoI CompdiDI. Westinghouse," IEEE Annals ofth~History o/Computing 15 (DO. 2,
1993), 35-52.
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transformers) for each successive point, and assembling the points ~nto a curve, one could sol 'Je
for a transient.
With the phase shifting transfonners, Hazcm took a step forNard in his representation of
machinery. His thinking evolved from "models," like architect's Medels as small physicai
representations ofthe world, to "analogs," representations with ditrer~nt ph}-sicaJ fonns bUt with
similar analytical properties. Hazen's network model became an analog, and with it came the idea
that the system's essence inhered in its abstract behavior, not its physical presence. Hazen, with
fenow student Hugh Spencer, presented this work at the AlEE convention in New ~·ork in 1925.
They described the construction oftheir miniature power system, "8 simple, compact, accurate,
easily manipulated laboratory scale means of solving networks." The very titl~ of their paper
"Artificial Representation oCPower Systems," suggests their approach moved beyond "models,"
"miniatures,n and even, perhaps, beyond "ari81ogs" to a newer visio~ a vision ofsimulation.39
How srnall could one make the simulation? That depencied on the accuracy or:e needed
and the quality of the measuring devices used to obselVe the mooel. Attaching a voltmeter to a
fuU-size power network had almost no effect, as 1M meter imposes a negligibly small load
compared to the amount ofpower in the system. In a miniature, however, the loading introduced
by the meters ofthe time ~AlU1d seriously affect the phenomena under study. In other words, one
needed to draw power from the network to drive the needle in the meter. As Hazen put it, "When
you put a voltmeter on [a miniature net\\rork], it's like whacking a factory !o&d onto the actual
power system, and that doesn't do...any parasitic power requirements take a major toll on
accuracy'~ (he might have added that the inductive load oftile meter could also affect stability).
Thus, when building miniature networks, one UL11ed with fhe loading imposed by the meter, and
then scaled the size of the simulation accordifigly. Hazen notes, for exarnple, that "with st.andard
portable instruments, the current [in the miniature] must be 5 or 10 amperes with 200 or 100 volts
31 Harold HazeD and Hugh Spcocer, "Artificial Representation ofPowcr Syste~!' J. AlEE (January 1925), 2S.
Also see Wildes andL~ A Century ofEIectricaJ Engineerin..a, 99 a9d Harold Hazen Interview, March 2,
1977. Oral Hidory CoIIecIion, Computers at MIT, MIT Archives., 9.
39 Hazen aDd Speocer, "Artificial Rqtreacatation ofPowerS~" 24-31. For a discussion of models and
sinu&iatioDs in cqioeerio& see Per A. HoIIt, "George A. Philbrick and PoIypbcmus: 1be First Electronic Training
SimuJat.or," AIIIJDlsof. History ofCo1ftptlting 4 (00.2, April 1982). 144. EugeDC S.F~ Engi_rig and
the Mind's Eye <Cambridp: MIT PR:u, 1992).
~ Hazen 1Dtavicw, 12.
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respective:y to keep error~ safely below 10 per cent.,~l To redress the loading problem of the
meter, th" paper presents in an appendix a proposed design tor L "currentless" meter based on a
vacuum tube (later known as a VfVM or "vacuam tube \'olt meter'). This problem, the loss of
energy (and heilce accuracy) in a simulated sy.nem, would persist throughout Hazen and Bush's
explorations of simulation and calculation. Countering the effects of loading significantly shaped
Hazen's conceptiorl of t:te selVomechanism.
After Hazen's graduation, Jackson and Rush encouraged him to stay on anC: pursue a
graduate degree. At that time, however, the value ofadvanced degret,s was not \vell recognized
by the engineering community, where the noir.on prevailed that one could learn everything
important in irKiustry. Hazen recalled that Jackson and Bush had observed "that once a man got
out from the educational instiiu~inll, he never ~'U1le back. He just stayed with industry.,,42
Nevertheles.~, Hazen went to General Electric "on test" as part ofthe G.E./MIT co-op program,
which allowed him to further pursue the simulation problem (Bush himself had spent a year there).
Thi~ program, a pet project ofDugald Jacwn, reflected his commitme=tt to mprge industrial
experience with engineering education.43 At G.E., Hazen (and Hugh Spencer c;~ well) worked in
the office ofRobert E. Doherty, G.~.'8 chiefconsulting engineer and a close mend ofBush. "fhe
environment was, as Hazen recalled, "shall we say, the high-brow engineering office ofG.E.,,44
The main problem concerning G.E. during Haun's tenure there remained, of course,
power system stability. They company was then studying a 500-mile transnllssion !i~e to bring
Canadian hydroelectric power into New England and New York. This project poseQ a Jifficult
problem which ~ ;ought the field together in focused effort: Bush, Jackson and Moreland~ and
Westir.ghouse all contributed in addition to G.E. In Hazen's word3,
A five hundred mile line, it was soon found aut by those who looked at it, provided a very
soft, mushy eJectri,-a) and energy connection between the generating in far off Quebec and
the load C'Der. And what will happen ifyoojust suddenly throw on a little nlOre load?
·WeD, it will oscillate, and you can throw it out of step. The system will break down.4S
Elsewhere Hazen deS( ribed fLhe problem as,
.IHazen and Spencer, "Artificial Representation oCPower Systems,'· 25.
oC2Haroki Hazen Inteniew, 7.
•3,W. Bernard Carlson, "Academic Entrepreneurship and Engin=ering Educaticn: Dugald C. Jackson and the MIT-
GE Cooperative Engineering Course, 1907-1932," Technology and Cullllre 29 (no.3, July 1988), 536-567.
44IIaro1d Hazen Interview, 20, emphasis original.
4S Ibid.
resemblmg one automobile towing another with a long elastic cable stretched almost to the
breaking point. Under these circumstances any short circuit or sudden addition of load
would usually snap the cable..t6
After spending.several months on this problem in Schenectady, in the fall of 1925 Hazen
-etumed to MIT to continue his investigations as a research assistant, bringing with him
quipment oorrowed from G.E. He eventually entered the graduate program, although he became
so occupied w;th building research machines titat he took four years to get his Master's. Hazen's
1929 thesis, like his undergraduate work, appr~ached the 'letwork problem through simulation.
He built on the experience gained with his earlier machine to produce, in partnership \~th G.E.,
the Network ~\naIyzer, com~\eted in the same year.
Hazen, Schurig ofG.E.! and Professor Murray Gardner (who taught MIT's course in
transient analysis) presented a paper on the Network Anc.aJyzer to the AlEE- in 1930. The machine
comprised a set oftransmission lines and transformers that replicated the steady state behavior of
a complex network in miniature in a laboratory setting. Like the Morristown Trial at Bell Labs,
the Network Analyzer brought a geographically dispersed technical system into a single place,
where it could be studied under controUed conditions. But unlike the Morristown Trial, which
system the machine represented was not fixed: it was, in the Mlt.hor's words, "a network
computing device...sufficiently extensive and flexible to represent numerous actual systems."
Where Hazen's earlier simulator represented a particular network, this machine could adapt to
new problems. Given a basic set ofcomponents, the user could use a plugboard similar to a
telephone exchange to configure 80rt connect the elements to represent any particular system, up
to "eight generating stations, 60 lines and cables or other connecting ele!n~nts, 40 loads, four
ratio-chilllging transformers for closing loops, and any desirable number of synchronous
condensers." 47 Just like the fire control systems G.E. built with their reconfigureable
switchboards, the Network Analyzer was programmable. Hazen referred to it as a "network
computer," in terms that would reappear many years later at MIT with the advent ofdigital
computers.
.t)6 Harold Hazen, Memoirs, paraphrased in Gordou S. Bro~ "Eloge: Harold Locke Hazen. 1901-1980," Annals of
the History ofComptlling 3 (January 1981), S.
47 Harold Hazcn, O.R. Scburig, and M..F. Gardner, "Tbc MI.T. Network Analyzer, Design and Application to
Power System Problems," AlEE rrmu. 49 (July 1930), 872-875. Sec also Wildes and Liodgre~ A Century of
Electrical EnBinccriD& 96-105.
The department intended this programmable network as a public simulation facility. It was
not only "for purposes ofteaching and research" by ~1IT students and statI: but hfor commercial
engineering service in the solutio~ ofnetwork problems for engineers in operating and designing
work." The Network Analyzer served industrial clients and power companies, including the
American Gas and Electric Service Corporation~ General Electric, Jackson and Moreland, Illinois
Power and Light, Union Gas and Electric, and the Tennessee Valley Authority.a It remained
operational in this capacity at MIT until the ecuiy 19505 (when dean Gordon Brown closed it
down).
Hazen's work on power system stability brought him i.-,to COlltaet with the cutting-edge
engineering ofthe time, as it applied increasingly "scientific" methods and academic research
styles to practical problems. The Network Analyzer contained in early form several features which
would characterize compll~~s built at MIT L'ld elsewhere. A large, room-sized device, it required
several operators (usually photographed in lab C4.'lats). [*Figure 5-3: Network Analyzer photo]
Because of its generic structure, users could program the Network Analyzer for any given
application. The simulation matched not the physical fonn ofthe object but rather its analytical
characteristics. Finally, as a centralized facility available to different users, both academic and
industrial, the Network Analyzer (and, as we shall see, the Differential Analyzer) initiated the
institutional fonn ofcentralized computing facilities which would become common in the 1950s.
Through the Network Analyzer Hazen, Bush, and MIT researchers made analytical machines
acceptable and productive parts ofan electrical engineering department's research program.
CakulatiOD: De Product lategrapb
The second approach to the complex: power network problem was calculation, and Hazen
participated in these efforts simultaneous with his work in simulation. Spurred by the high demand
for calculation imposed by the "point-by-point" method ofevaluating transients, Bush began
building mechanical calculating machines to evaluate the high-order differential equations which
described the net'Norks, pLrticularly the integral of the product of two functions. John Carson,
who brought Heavyside's calculus to telephone engineering, had defined this integral as centr21 to
the mathematics of transient phenomena.49
• Wildes and Lindgren, A Century ofElcctricaJ Engineering. 103.
~ John R. Carson, "Theory GfTransient Oscillations in Electric Networks," AlEE Trans. 38 (J919).
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In 1924, Bush, with associates Herbert Stewart, a graduate student, and Gage, a research
assistant produced the "Product Integraph," a mechanical analog computer for evaluating these
integrals. This machine's components refl,:eted the influence ofboth electric power and feedback
culture: the Product Integraph used a standard "watt-hour meter" to integrate electricity over
time, not unlike the devices still in use today for measuring housellOld power usage. Bush, Gage,
and Stewart give examples in their paper calculating the load on a caJltilevered bemn and, of
course, "the problem oftransients in circuits due to an applied alternating voltage." The authors
note this latter problem "is obtained only by much computation unless mechanical integrations
may be readily perfonned in a continuous manner.,,50
Integrating machines had been built before. "Planimeters," which integrated a curve or an
area on a piece of llaper had been in use for navigation and surveying for many years. Thornton
Fry had several such machines in his mathematics department at Bell Labs. Bush and his
associates needed a machine that could integrate not only the area under a curve, but a function
whose upper limit had not yet been defined. The new machine becam~ an "integraph," since it
recorded the result oran integration in the form ofa plot elr graph. 11 Bush's point-by-point
method for transient problems overlaid graphical curves to solve for the operating points ofthe
machines, and the integraph drew those curves automatically.
To those studying power systems, even its transients, the world was smooth and
continuous; the challenge was to build a machine that worl<ed graphically as well, without the
messy translations of numerical data. In today's digital world, analog computing techniques are
seen as unquestionably inferior to digital methods. But BU~ih and his colleagu~s were well aware
ofdigital machinery and digital methods (although they usc~ the tenn "numerical" instead of
"digital"). In fact, for them the analog, continuous nature c.f the machine was a decided innovation
over the "numerical" calculating machines employed in offiices:
so Ibid., 81.
51 VannevarB~ H.R.S~ and F.D. Gage.. "A Continuous InteJgrapb," JFJ 211 (January 1927), 63-84. For
this paper and his other 1927 with Harold Hazen (see below), the Franklin Institute awarded Bush its Levy Medal
in 1928. The term "integrapb," according to Clymer, refers to "a mac:hine for plotting the solution of a given first
order diffcrmtial equation." "Mechanica1 Integrators," S7. For a history of mechanical integrating machines, see
A1Ian G. Bromley, "Analog Computing Devices," in William Asprayeel ComQUtiog Before Computers (Ames,
Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1990). Also see A. Ben Clymer, "1rbe Mechanical Analog Computers of
P..aJlIUbai Ford &Dd William NeweU," lEEEAnnaJs ojlh~ History ojf:ompuling 15 (no. 2, 1993), 19-22 and an
extended treatmen~ Clymer, "Mechanical Integrators," (Master's Th~s, Ohio State University, 1946).
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Business office practice has been revolutionized by the advent ofcomputing machines.
These deal almost entirely in tenns of numbers, as indeed does the business man...Applied
physics, and in fact many~r branches of science, frequently deal, however, with
functions as a whole, and usually resort to figures only as a rather laborious means of
de&d1g with functions or the curves which represent them.S2
Numbers, the "resort to figures," were seen as unnecessary intermediate representations between
the physics of the problem and its solution in the machine. Rather, new machines were needed
"which will deal directly with the functions themselves." Those steeped in the culture of power
system enginetring saYI analog computing as an improvement over numerical computing, not a
precursor to it.
For complex problems involving experimental data (which rarely comes in the form of neat
equations), "the only alternative is the use of the curve itselfas representing the function." The
"functions themselves" took the form ofgraphs. [*Figure 5-4: First integraph diagram] To use the
Product Integraph, two functions were first plotted on paper. They were then fastened to a table
or "platen" which moves in one directiol\ say right to left, at a constant speed. Above the table,
fixed sliders or rods each had a "pointer" which could move vertically across the paper as the
graph moved laterally. Two human operators would use the pointers to fo!low the curves as they
moved from left to right. These pointers were connected to potentiometers which varied in
current according to the pointer position and provided the input for the integrator. "Tlus voltage
drop is therefore proportional to the ordinate of th(; plotted curve when the slider pointer rests on
the cllrve." The watt-hour-meter then integrated the product of the two functions, one in its
armature and the other in its field coil (a power company charges for watt-hours, the product of
voltage and current accumulated over time. Hence the watt-hour meter nleasures the integral ofa
product of two functions). [*Figure 5-5: Photo ofBush & product integraph]
The output ofthe watt-hour meter, however, came from a delicate spinning disk. The
device that measured its output, the next stage in computation (or plotting) needed to avoid
loading it and losing accuracy. This situation mirrored the sensing element of Sperry's
gyrocompass, which needed a "phantom" to follow the output. Similarly, a servo-motor followed
the output of the watt-hour meter "in such a manner that the motor follows exactly the .·ott\tion of
the watt-hour"meter.,,'3 This servo motor then drove the vertical position (or ordinate) ofa pen
52 Ibid., 63.
53 Ibid., 6S.
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on a third graph connected to the same table, and plotted the integral (output) curve as the table
moved by.
Despite these potential loading errors, human operators contribut~J.the most significant
source oferror for the Product Integraph. The input to the device, where humans followed cUlVes
with pointers, introduced errors in tracking ofas much as two or three percent. A number ofother
mechanical and human errors all stayed within one percent. Thus the "following" r~,quired for
input was the greatest source of inaccuracy of the device. Since these errors were the input to an
iptegrator, howev~r, they tended to integrate or average out, provided they were as often below
the proper mark as wove it. Where the human operators of Sperry's antiaircraft computer
integrated out noise in the data, here the mechanical integrator averaged out human errors. In
both cases, as with continuous aim firing, "tracking" became a difficult problem for control.
Building on the experience gained with the first machine, Hazen and King Gould built a
second Product Integraph and completed it in 1927. Key to this second and, eventually, higher
order machines, was tile addition ofa feedback mechanism. A method of"back coupling," tied the
output of the integrator to its input, thus enabling the machine to solve differential equations
rather than just evaluate integrals. Back coupling made the calculator into a computer. Charles
Babbage had recognized the value of taking the output ofone calculation and using it as the input
for the next one (the key difference between his Difference Engine and his Analytical Engine).
With a feedback loop, a machine could operate on its own results - making a mere "calculator"
into a "computer."S4 Similarly, Lord Kelvin realized he could connect chains of integrators to
solve differential equations by adding the feedback loop "Compelling agreement between the
function fed into the...machine and that given out by it."ss As Bush wrote of a later generation
machine, "It is the feedback connection which 'mechanizes' the equal sign in the equation,
because it applies the constraint which forces the machine to operate so as to equalize the two
54 Allen G. Broml~' notes that "The use of feedback here (in Babbage's mechanism] is very similar to that
employed in differential analyzers and analog computers." This feedback~ in fact~ was the primary differ..:.nce
between Babbage's "Difference Engine" and his 4'Analytical Engine" never completed.. Asprayed. Computing
Before Computers. Babbage may have come up with the idea of using feedback in his computer when observing
rotating-ball steam-engine governors while on a tour of factories for his 1832 "On the Economy of Machinery and
Manufactures."
55 W. Thompson, "Mechanical Inregration of the Linear Differential Equations of the Second Order with Variable
Coefficients," Proc. Roy. Soc. London 24 (1876), 269-271 quoted in Paytner, "The Differential Analyzer."
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sides of the equation." 56 This back-coupling also paralleled the continuous cycle ofcorrection
Ford embodied in his 1915 rangekeeper, although with the human operator in the loop; the output
of the calculation was fed back to compare with observed data, causing the system to converge on
a solution.
Working with the back-coupled first machine, Hazen realized it could solve more
complex, second-order, probiF:ms by connecting its output, the rotation of the watt-hour meter
shaft, to the input ofanother integrator. The second machine, essentially a revision ofthe first,
added a mechanical wheel-and-disk integrator ofHazen's design after the watt-hour-meter.
[*Figure 5-7: Hazen/Bush Second Product Integraph] Where all three plotting tables in the first
machine moved together, here they moved according to independent variables, which could be
selected according to the particular problem. Another input platen was added as well, so the
machine could evaluate a more complex integral than the product of two functions, "The net
result... is that any platen may me made to move so that its displacement is equal to anyone of the
three variables x, y, or x."
Curiously, in the second Product Integraph, Hazen did not use Hannibal Ford's integrator.
His fire control work remained secret when Hazen built the integraph in the late twenties. He
recalled Bush "was privy to what Ford was doing when we were working on the differential
analyzer but couldn't, because of sec'lrity, tell us what he knew about wt. ~t was Ford was doing."
57 Hazen still collid have learned about the integrator: Ford had patented the two-ball integrator as
"mechanical movement" in 1919; it was public information. 58 Ford's integrator, more accurate
and capable ofdriving a heavier load than Hazen's wheel and disc design, would have helped
solve the problem of loading, which Hazen took quite seriously. Cascac!ing two integrators raised
the problem, similar to tllat of metering in the network analyzer and to the "pick-of." of the watt-
hour meter in the earlier machine. The second int~grator needed to avoid loading the first stage
and hence losing accuracy, and the second integrator also needed to drive the load of the back..
coupling and the next stage.
56 Vannevar Bush, "A New Type of Differential Analyzer," JFl240 (no. 4, October, 1945),255-326.
57 Harold Hazen Interview, 17,54.
sa Hannibal C. Ford, U S. Patent no. 1,317,915, "Mechanical Movement." Also see Clymer, "Mechanical
Integrators." Curiously, Wildes and Lindgren, A Century ofElecUical Engineering, 89, show a picture of the Ford
integrator, even though it was not used in any of the MIT machines.
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In 1927, the Network Analyzer and Product Integraph were proceeding in parallel, and
Hazen must ha~·~ had both in his head. He and Bush ~tate..; ihe problem and described their
solution as follows,
It is essential that these integrator shafts - in the first stage the watt-hour meter rotor~ in
the second, the wheel shaft [of the wheel and disk integrator] - be free from rJl friction
and load torque, and hence they cannot directly furnish energy to drive the recording
shafts. A servo-motor follower mechanism is therefore useJ to drive each rf:COrdings~
and this not only reduces the necessary ener~ output of the integrator shafts to a
negligible value, but, as mentioned above, practically eliminates bearing friction on these
shafts at the same time. This mechanism is really the key to the success of the machine
from the practical point of view.S9
Mechanical positions in the Product Integraph represented numericai quantities, and the servo
transmitted that information form from one stage to the next without distortion. For Hazen,
problems feedback and servomechanisms first arose in the context ofcalculation.
In light ofHazen's use ofservos as power 'JJ1lpJifiers in the Product Integraph, a theory of
servomechanisms was not as great a leap for him as it would have been for an engineer immersed
in the feedback culture whose primary goal was the stability ofa specific piece of machinery. The
operation ofthe servo in the calculating machine was close to its abstract function as presented in
the 1934 pa~i: it was a power amplifying device, and a means ofmaking a set ofelements into a
system by eliminating unwanted coupling effects between them. The servo made the successive
stages ofth~ integraph into truly modular system blocks -just as human servomechanisms in the
Sperry anti.1ircraft director renewed the information at each su~,essive stage, and just as repeater
amplifiers in the telephone network boosted the signal as it flowed through the network. The
servomechanism, as a coupling between stages, began the abstraction from machinery to
informatiun: no longer were the numbers tied to the shaft positions, rather they could be renewed,
i.e. amplified, with each successive stage. l f his development separated signals, which could be
manipulated on their own, from their representation in machinery, whi~h was tied to mechanical
limits. 'fhe Product Integraph was an "active mathematical instrument.n60 Renewing information
at each successive stage with minimal loss of accuracy meant the size of the machine was no
longer limited by energy or friction. Antiaircraft computers could perform calculations of arbitrary
59 Vannevar Bush and Harold Hazen, "Integroph Solution of Differential Equations," J.1i"1211 (December, 1927),
S86-88.
60 Henry M. Paynter, "The Differential Analyzer as an Active Mathematical I;tSbUmcn~" Keynote speech to the
1989 American Control Conference~ IEEE Control Systems Magazine ~mber 1989), 3-7.
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complexity, telephone signals could travel arbitrary distances, and Bush and Hazen could now
build much larger computers arid systems.
Calculation: The Differential Analyzer
Soon, the two stages of integration in the Product Integraph extended to six. Bush's
mechanical calculators entered their third 6eneration with the construction of the "Differential
Analyzer" from 1928-1931. It could perfonn six levels of integration to one terlth of one percent
accuracy. This machine succeeded as a practical calculating device, and was applied to problems
in a broad range ofdisciplines. Like the Network Analyzer (and at about the same time), it
became a compu!;" g facility at MIT, where scientists from other departments or institutions came
to run calaJlations.
Several institutions around the world built versions ofthe Bush maclrille. The numerous
visitors to the facility sometimes left with blueprints. One staff member remembered being
instructed by Bush not to explain the details of the machine to visitors from Japan.61 Differential
analyzers were reproduced at the Ballistics Research Laboratory of the Army Ordnance
Department in Aberdeen, Maryland, and the Moore School ofElectrical Engineering at the
University ofPennsylvan~a, and at General Electric in Schenectady. These machines continued to
influence the direction ofcontrol technology through World War U (See chapter 1). Douglas
Hartree ofthe lJniversity ofManchester, England built a version out of an erector set. Others
were later built in Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia.62
For the Differential Analyzer, Hazen solved the stage-ta-stage coupling problem with the
application ofa Nieman Torque Amplifier, instead ofa follow-up servo in his previous type.63 The
Nieman device employed varying friction belts on rotating drums (something like a rope around a
capstan 011 a ship) to provide very high amplification of the torque at the output of the integrator,
thus taking the load off the mechanism. Nieman Torque Amplifiers were not servos like the
ccmponents they replaced :>ecause they did not use feedback to hold a particular position.
Nevertheless, they had one key characteristic in common with selVom2Chanisms: amplification
(Sperry Gyroscope licensed the technology to move guns in 1926). In fact, the torque amplifiers
61 Gordon BI'OWIl, intetview.
62 Wildes aDd Lindgren, A Century ofEiectriC31 Engineering, 92, See, for example, the G.E. analyzer, H.P. Kuehni
and H.A. Peterson, 64A New DifI'erential Analyzer," Trans. IRE 63 (May, 1944), 221-28 and discussion, 429-31.
.iJ V8llDCWrBus~ "A New Machine for Solving Differential Equations," JFJ 212 (no. 4 1931),447-488.
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had such high gain (i.e. multiplying factor of input to output), that they could become unstable if
the slightest amount of feedback, such as mechanical vibration, were to couple the output to the
input. Torque amplifiers could become feedback mechanisms by accident. Bush made an explicit
analogy between their behavior and that of electronic circuits:
Now such a torque amplifier is quite analogous to a two-stage thennionic-tube amplifier,
and it has many ofthe properties ofthe latter, including the possibility of self-oscillation. It
was SOOI1 fOllDCl in fact, that when the amplification of such a low-input unit was raised to
around 10,000 it was very prooe to go into a condition of violent oscillation usually ending
in disaster. This was presumably caused by a small part of the output being fed back in
one way or another into the input. This problem ccwsed quite a stnIggle.64
One ofHazen's key insights into servos, that they served fundamentally as amplifiers, thus related
to the mechanisms ofthe differential analyzer, with its amplifying servos. StilJ, although they
recognized the similarity ofmechanical systems to electrical amplifiers in 1,]?-l, neither Bush,
Hazen, nor anyone at MIT plJrsued the connections to the stability issues Bell Labs researchers
explored at the same time.
A machine that could couple stages together without Insing energy, corrupting data, or
compromising accuracy could make a truly general system, infinitely extensible_ The earlier
integraphs had embodied a more or less fixed set ofequations. But the Differential fJlalyzer
soupt "extreme flexibility," its very structure could change. It presented the user with a set of
mechanical elements which corresponded to a mathematical functions and could be arranged in a
different way for each problem. [-Figure 5-8: Differ!:ntial Analyzer language elements] Thus, like
the Network Analyzer, this was a general machine, and a programmable one. Bush compared the
method of programming the Network Analyzer with progiamming the Diff~rentia1 Analyzer:
The scheme ofconneding the machine for a specific problem which has been illustrated is
quite general; more so in fact than it might at first appear. It has certain features d1
common with the "plugging" ofa desired circuit 00 a switchboard, and the resulting
:.JJagI3IIIS have something ofan electrical atmosphere about them.6S
Bush saw the configuration ofthe machine as more than a mere mechanical activity, but as an
intellectual one with some degree ofgenerality. He described the mental exercise thus,
This [the layout ofthe machine] is DK>re than a diagram - it is a process of reasoning, and
as such it is reaxnmendcd to those who seek to import to youth the meaning, as contrasted
with the f~nnalism, of the differential «Iuation.66
64 Ibid., 46S.
Mlbid.,459.
66 Ibid, 477.
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[*Figure 5-9: Differential Analyzer connected for a partirolar problem] By this time the work had
transcended the limited goals of power system analysis, and research focused on calculating
machines in their own right and what they could add to engineering and education. Still,
continuing efforts in computing led Hazen to further work with servomechanisms.
The Culture of Calculation and SimUlatiOD
Hazen's 1931 dissertation, "The Extension ofEngineering Analysis by Mechanical
Methods," examines contemporary problems in electrical en(Yneering and how they might be
adapted to mecluanical solutions. He articulates the philosophy of simulation and calculation that
had emerged under Bush's leadership in the previous years,
It is well to state the sense in which medtanical referring to computations is used in this
thesis. It represents the idea ofexpressing [an] abstract quantity as a physica1lquantity,
such, for example, as length, eledric current, light flux, or angular displacement; of
applying by physical means the mathematical coocept1 1:numerated to this physical
representation ofquantity; and ofobtaining as a result a~ physical quantity which can be
returned to the abstract form.67
This eloquent statement ofthe analog art reveals HllZeIl's deep dedication to that way ofthinking.
For Hazen, numerical computation was not only "costly to apply in involved problems" but also
inelegant, needlessly complex, and divorced from the physical intuition which made simulation so
valuable. Numerical methods, he wrote, "have an artificiality irksome to the physically minded."
Hazen thus displays his antipaihy toward what would later be called digital computation, a
piofound, almost temperamental predisjX>sition.
In 1931 Hazen received his Ph.D. and was appointed Assistant Professor. AJt'llough he
focused more on teaching and less on the Differential Analyzer as time went on, he continued to
incorporate feedback into his work. The Differential Analyzer became popular as a general
computing facility for research at the institute, and pre~}sure mounted to increase its throughput.
Operators input data by curve tracing proved the primary bottleneck. To remedy this situation,
Hazen, with his student Gordon Brown, designed an "automatic cu!Ve follower" which employed
photocells to automatically track the culVe and automate the entry ofdata. This device was
67 Harold Haze~ 'Ibe Extension ofEngincering Analysis," 4.
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exhibited at the Chicago Worlds Fair in 1932-33, attracting large crowds, although it was
probably never used for calculation.61
Gordon Brown had come to MIT from Australia as an undergraduate, and through the
thirties (indeed through much of his career) he followerl one step behind Hazen. Like Hazen, he
would remain at MIT until retirement. Like Haze'!, he cut his teeth on the stability problem,
collaborating with Kenneth Germeshausen on his 1931 bachelor's thesis "The Effect ofControlled
Fi.eld Switching on the Pulling-inta-step ofa Synchronous Induction Motor." In addition to his
work on the curve follower, Brown built a special meter for taking power measurements from the
Network Analyzer. This device employed a negative feedback amplifier of the type that Black was
developing at Ben Labs. Still, although Brown cited Black's work in a paper on the device,
nothing suggests Brown perceived an analogy (much less an identity) betweeJl servomechanisms
and electronic amplifiers with feedback.69 Brown would follow Hazen as MIT's control systems
expert and found MIT's servomechanisms laboratory. Brown then succeeded Hazen in 1952 as
department head ofElectrical Engineering.
Brown's 1934 M.S. thesis and his 1938 dissertation both dealt with the "Cinema
Integraph," a further line of research into methods of integration.70 Norbert Wiener, who advised
Bush's laboratory on calculating machines, suggested a way to further "lighten" the load on
mathematical mechanisms. Plot images offunctions on film, shine light through 'he film, and
integrate the light passing through with photocell. King Gould built an infrared version ofthis
device in the late twenties, and Truman Gray built a visible light machine, the "Photoelectric
Integraph" in 1930. Gordon Brown's device used movie film for images offunctions. Although
the device anticipated the need for faster eiectronic integration, it proved a dead-end intellectually,
and nwer became the general-purpose computing facility the Differential Analyzer did. The
61 Harold H.azca: Jacob J. Jaqcr, and Gordon S. Brown, "An Automatic Curve Follower" Rev. Scientific
11IStnIIrNnls 7 (Scplember 1936), 354-357. Gordon Brown, interview with author, August 26, 1994. In later years,
other IJ'OUPS built automatic curve followers which proved more practicable.
69 Gordon S. Brown, MAn Amplifier Wattmeter Combination for the Accurate Measurement ofWaUS and Vars,"
Gordon Brown papers, MIT Archives. This paper cites Black's "Stabilized Feedback Amp.ifie~" Electrical
Engineering 53 (January, 1934), 114-120 and B.D.K TeUcgeo, "Inverse Feedback," Phillips Technical Review 2
(<A1Ober, 1937), 289·94. See a1ro 0.8. BI'OWD, "Field Testing ofa New Cosmic: Ray Meter in Colorado,n MIT VI-A
News 12 (Au~ 1934), 1-4.
70 Gordon S. Brown, M A PhotoceU Receiver and a Direct CurreN Vacuum-tube Amplifier for the Cinema
Integrapb,99 (S.M thesis, MIT, 1934), Jbc Cinema IntegJapb: A Machine for Evaluating a Pacunetric Product
IntegraL" (Sc. D. thesis, MIT, 1938).
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Cinema Integraph did function, in Brown's words, as "a machine for producing dissertations.,,71 It
also produced Hazen's servomechanism theory.
The mechanically complex Cinema Integraph used a servo to position the film. Since '(he
machine sought to irnprove the speed of the earlier integrators, Brown described it with the
language ofautomation, "The adjustme~ts to the position of the balance shutter, and hence the
operation of the recording mechanism, do not require the attention of the person operating the
machine. They are performed automatically by a small, high-speed selva motor.,,72 The Cinema
Integraph also included a servomechanism to operate a light shutter to accurately measure light
flux through the film by a null-balancing technique. For these problems Harold Hazen designed
the "high performance servomecharusmn he de~libed in hi~ in his 1934 Franklin Institute paper.
At Bush's urging, Hazen generalized the results in the "Theory of Servomechanisms" paper.
Nonethelesa, Hazen himselfdid not see tile Differential Analyzer an inf~uence on his
formulation of servomechanism theory. The emphasis on dynamic behavior, he explained,
responded to the need for speed in the Cinema integraph,
"fhe high performance servomecbanism...was developed in oader to pennit the above
integral to be evaluated as accurately and rapidly as possible as the parameter y was
changing continuously. Thus you will see my interest in servomecban.isms was not
associated \t¥ith the Differential Analyzer work, in l.~lhich I was also very much involved,
but rather wim the ultimately-non surviving Cinema Integraph. 73
This statement reveals a difference between engineers' conception ofhistorical causality and that
of,he present study. For Hazen, the mtluential oontext for his servo work was the project in
which it was immediately applied. Here, however.~ we are ccneemed with the institutional
environment in which he was raised and trained, and the type of problems he and his colleagues
faced. Concerns about feedback, stability, and even selVOS themselves consistently shaped the
atmosphere· ofsimulation and calculation which led to Hazen's papers.
Some~ the Differential Analyzer solely as the first practical means of macltine
computation, a view which overlooks its institutional history and makes it merely a "point" in the
progress ofcomputers, and not a component of power system engineering or engineering culture.
71 Gordon S. Brown Interview. Scc~ for example, John H. Howard, "Measurement and Analysis of Errors in the
Cinema Integrapb," (S.M. thesis, MIT, 1939), and Walter R Hedcman, "Numerical Solutions of Integral
Equations on the Cinema Integrapb," (Sc.D. thesi~ MIT, 1939).
72 Gordon S. Brown, "The Cinema Integrapb: A Machine for Evaluating a Parametric Product Integral," JFJ 230
(142, AIJgust, 1940), 33.
73 Harold Hazen tel StuartBc~ October 22, 1975.
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Going further, Larry Owens has integrated the Differential Analyzer into its educationaJ
environment, writing ofthe l1'~hine as a grCiphita: language, making differential equations
concrete for pedagogical purposes.74 He cites a pas~~ge where Bu£h describf,s the ability of the
Differential Analyzer to provide "the man who studies it a grasp of the innate meaning ofth~
difierential equation." Bltsh recalls how the machinist in his laboratory learned from the machine
without formal mathematical training:
I never coo.sciously taught this many any part oftbe subject ofdifferential equations; but
in ooilding that machine, managing it, he learned what differential equations were
himself....be could discuss the problem with the user and very oft~ find out what was
wrong. It was very interesting to discuss this subject with him because be h&d learned the
calculus in mechanical tenns - a strange approacil, and yet he ~rstood it..~s
We can see the Differential An3lyzer, however, as still more fully embedded in tt.e rich context of
ar.ademic engineering ofthe period.76 Together- the Differential Analyzer and N~ork Analyzer
represent two distinct but similar wayp. ofattaeki'l8 a cor.lp1e: problem. In fact, in the
introduction to his major paper on the Differential Analyzer, Bush himself noted toot the
calculator provided only one class ofsolutions, and that it n~~ed to be complemented by the
simulation machine, "not anyone machine, nor even any one pr~~ ofdevelopment, can Ineet
these [computational] needs.,,77 By this time Bu~h was clearly interested in m~hatucal calculation
for its own sake. Still, th~ crigms ofthe Differential Analyzer are apparent ~n his list of published
work that employed the machine. Seven out often references include the word "stability" in their
title or C'lncerD issues oftransients in power network!:.
Both projects, the Network Analyzer and the Differential Anal~ ~r, typified the state of
engineering science in the late twenties and early thirties, initiated by Karl Comptons'
"Technology Plan:" solving problems oflarge-sca1e interconna.,'1:ed networks, abstracting them
,.. Larry 09A,lJIS, "Vumcvar Bush aud the Differential Analyzer: lbe Text and Context of an Early Computer,~
Technology and CllltIlre 27 (00.1 1986), 87.
1S Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Adion (New York: Morrow, 1970), 262.
76 Owens gives a detailed but staDdard account of the development of the diJferential analyzer, and a n10re
informative acaJWIt of the MIT's~g "facilities" and Org,lniutio~espccia1Jy of the later Rockefeller
Differential AnaJyzer. His main &lgUDIeDI, however, that the Dift"erential AnaI'j'U,r was a "text" for teaching
k grapbk: Innguagc" to engiDcaing students,~ it "cmbodicd an engineering cultur: belonging to the first decades
afoor century," relates oaly to the "graphic language" of mechanical drawing and DOt to the "graphic" nature of
the power.,stem stability computations oor the simulations of the Network Analyur.
77 Bush, "A~MachiDc for Solving Differential EquatiOIJS," 448.
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into systemsJ and working in close connection with industrial ~aboratories.78 The simulator
attracted more interest from the indlJstrial world, whereas the calculator applied more to academic
and scientific problems (only one of the first five of copies of this machine was built by an
industrial firm). Both the Different~al Analyzer and "he Network Analyzer employed machinery as
a representation, as an &1a10g of something else.
In 1932, Hazen wrote a history of mechanical calculating machines and explained the
iritponance of the approach he and Bush had developed. SOlTietimes shnulation may be the
preferred appr\l8ch: "in specific cases~ where a physical problem is involved, models or ~ali)gies
may rtplace the !teed for the solution of algebraic equations as sut:h....A significant exampl(=... is
the alternating current MIT Network Analyzer." Recall ltis aptly-titled paper"Artificial
representation of power systems."79 For Hazen, the atmosphere of simulation and calculation
tightened the coM~ion between machinery and theory~ scmetimes without the intervening stage
of mathe~natics.This persr' ·;tive en&bied him to understand the behavior of the servo as an
independent entivj, divorced from the difficult and ofien distracting contexts of steering si'jps,
st~ilizin8 l'ircraft, or f~gu)af(ng prime movers.
It was the servomechanism, Hazen ';.:rites, with its power amplification, that distinguished
~he MIT machines from previous generations of mechanicai calculators. With characte~s~ic
clarity, he relates the need for amplifitrs in calculating machines ~o the innovative "carry"
m~hanislTl in Pascal'5 ca!culator:
~identaily, dUs problem ofcanyins a figure from Oi1e denomination to the next high:r is
one of the most critical in the design of such machh..es. This may be appreciated by
noticing what ~ust happen when the number one is added to the number 99,999,999. Any
appreciable tiiction in 1M mectdl'lism will J\'.Sult in a locked machine. 1O
Lord Kelvin und"~stood the potent~aI of mechanical integr~tors, but could not incorporat~ theln
into complete systems, or useful ca1cull'.ting devices: "A most serious limitation which Kelvin and
earlier m~~ faced was the discrepancy between tht; ene~·gy 8\ ailable from a delicate, accurate
' ... n&vici Noble, AmericaBy~ (New York: Oxford Uni1~r/tjty Press, 1977). See ~co Carlso~ "Academic
Elitreprencurship and Engineering EdueatJoD," and Alex Soojr..1k-K.im?ang. "Edward BowIe! and !8dio
cnpnecring at MIT, 1920-1940," Hisl. SlIId. Ph.ys. B!~. Sciences 20 (no. 2, 199),313-337, Lany Owens, ~MIT and
the ~ederal 'Anpl:' A.cademic M.t) and }~~'!IJ··Private CooperaliOD Before World War II," Isis 81 (1990), 188-
213.
79 Harold Hazen. "Working ~UtheDll . '1 by Mac~ne:y," Th~ r.chnoJogy Review 34 (May 1932), 326.
Stpeoccr and Hazen, "Anificial R...,~relCn\atioD of Power Systems."
10 MauD, "Working Matilematics by Machinery:~ 325.
calculating mechanism and that required to operate dependent apparatus."ll Hazen placed the
MIT machines into this tradition ofcalculating machines, including the Cinema Integrapll, "At
present this line ofattack is being further developed with the idea ofobtaining a rap·id, accurate
evaluation ofparametric integrals and an effective computationaJ solution ofcertain physically
important integral equations.12 Hazen's work on servomechanisms \\~as intimately relatt:d to the
problem of power amplification in a calculating machine, and hence took a place in ras own
construction of the history ofmechanical calculation.
In light ofHazen's servomechanisms work, then, the Differential Analyzf!r was not only a
calculating machine: it was a/so a control system. It had all the critical elements of the governor.
Human o~ators input data, providing perception and observation. Mechanical and electrical
calculations integrated the data (mathemati.:ally) and the components (systemically). A mechanism
ofarticulation expressed the output, a literary techn\l)ogy which used a servomechanism to move
a pt~n to create an uutput graph. Thus the experience ofMIT researchers applied to control
systems in general, and they i>egan to broaden their scope. Hazen used the Network Analyzer to
model the currents in the Boston city wat~r system and he built a machine to simulate water flows
in the <.~ape Cod Canal.
I)espite this wide ranging application of servo theory, it remained confined to the world of
mechanislns and did not extend into electronics. Hazen and Bush, despite analogies of their
mechanicaf systems to electronic amplifier, did not equate servomechanisms with feedback
i!mplifiers. }{azen's transient analysis retained the time-domain legacy of power system
engineering, iUld llot the frequency-domain tt:,chniques characteristic "f telephone engineering. In
1938, for exoo1ple, Hazen commellted on a paper which described a negative-feedback electronic
amplifier designed to make sensitive meas~~rements on a network analyzer. He discrJssed the
ampJifier feedback in detNIl-tut m&d~ no mention of his servomechanism th~ory. In the ntid-
thirties, however, an :MIT uadergraduate began to change the situation and to merge the two
approaches. John Taplin studied mathemati~.., und(;r Norbert Wiener, electronics under Ernest
Guillemin, and power systems under Murray Gardner. T~plin read Black cuAd Nyquist's articles on
I. Ibid., 34S, sec also Harold Hazen Interview, !2. Lord Kelvin bad also been involved in the genesis of the fire
control systems for DrradDOilut-era banJeshi~tS., and \\ as on the board ofdirectors of the compaay of Anhur
Hungedord PaGeD, woo desipeel thole systems. See John Testuro Sumida, In Defence of' Naval SUPrenm:
Fina'Pi. T\iCbDolgcv, and British Nayal Policy 1889-191 ~ (London: Routledge 1989), 78.,
feedback and recognized the similarity to Hazen's work. As he recalled in a recent interview,
"They were all studying !he same thing but they called it by different names." Taplin consulted
with Nyquist on the telephone, and designed a servomechanism using frequency domain instead of
the MIT transient analysis techniques. I3 Taplin himselfleft MJl-- for an industrial career when he
graduated in 1935 but beginning with him, slowly and hesitatingly, theories of servomechanisms
and negative feedback amplifiers began to merge.
The Rockefeller Differential Analyzer
While servo theory began to generalize in the late thirties, MIT's calculating machines also
extended their reach. The Differential Analyzer, despite its success as facility and its flexibility for
diverse problems, had a critical limitation. Every time the machine ran a new problem, it had to be
disassembled and rearranged according to the new equations, a cumbersome, time consuming, &MId
failure prone-task. Each new problem meaJlt building a new machine. In 1935, Bush initiated a
project funded by tile Rockefeller Foundation to automate tese rearrangements. Instead of
rotating shafts to intercoMect the calculating units, this new machine would transmit its data
electrically. Calculating units, such as gear ratios for division and multiplication could also be set
up "by remote control." A central "switchboard" interconnected all the units, which could then be
rearranged simp):" by resetting the switches, just like in naval fir~ control.
This new machine, known as the "Rockefeller Differential Analyzer," prov~d both more
complex and more versatile than the earlier machines. It took more than five years to build, and
did not go into service until 1942. It had 18 integrators, could be e,<panded to accommodate
thirty, and worked to an accuracy of one part in ten thousand. The integrators, similar in structure
to Hazen's earlier wheel and disk type, now used a glass disk for better accuracy. The
mathematical units connected together through a compact, single-unit servomechanism, which
used Hazen's recent work to implement much higher performance than the earlier servos (and the
proportional-integral-derivative type control first proposed by Minorsky). Viscous dampers in the
system improved stability. The central switching function was implemented by a crossbar switch,
borrowed from the telephone network, "A trunking system similar to telephone practice is~sed in
12 Hazen. "Workinl Mathematics by Machinery," 34S.
13 john Taplin, interview with author, August 10, 1995, Wellesley, Mass. Notes in author's posession. Also see
Bennett. A Miston' of Control Ena_riDIL 1930-1955. 90. Taplin is mentioned in James~ Nichols, and Philiips~
neon: of Servomechardsms. 16.
order to provide paths by which any [data] transmitter can reach any receiver. Bell Labs, in fact,
dnnrted their prototype crossbar (which connected any inp'ut to any other output) when they
completed their development of the device." 14 The Rocke~eUer Differential analyzer, with its
combination of servos and telephone switches, combined control and communication.
A user could set up any mathematical problem mert~ly by selectively opening and closing
the switches. That selection was determined by a punched paper tape, which contained "a four
digit code," determining the relay switch closures and hence the configuration of the machine.
This paper tape represented the program of the analog computer. The "automated" Rockefeller
Differential Analyzer translated the process of setting up the machine from physical rearrangement
to punching the right codes in the paper tape. The mact-aine pro1juced its output as numerical
printouts on an ffiM electrical typewriter which "'reads' the storage relays and writes down the
result." A centralized "supervisory control panel," could run the whole thing by "remote control."
[*Figure 5-10: Rockefeller DiE rential Analyzer]
With its switched routing ofanalog signals, The Rockefeller Differential analyzer was a
hybrid analog/digital machine. It mirrored hybrid systems in the other insti:utions examined in
previous chapters. Naval fire control routed analog information from instruments of perception
thrcugh siiniJar banks ofswitches, reconfiguring the system for different situations. The Bell
System learned to manipulate conversations, tele·Jision pictures, and telegraph messages as
abstract signals, routed by "intelligent," banks of relays. And MIT's calculators manipulated their
mathematical quantities through a "trunking system" according to a generalized program punched
on paper tape. Each ofthese systel..Js derived, directly or indirectly, from the basic governor
structure of perceptio~ integration, and articulation. And each spawned, through institutional,
intellectual, and personal connections, the transformation of control, computing, and
communications that would come with world war.
One further MIT student articulated the potential of the hybrid systerri. Claude Elwood
Shannon had come to the institute as a resea~ch assistant on the Differential Analyzer in 1936
after earning dual bachelor's degrees in mathematics and electrical engineering. Shannon wrote on
the mathematical theory of the Differential Analyzer, bu.t he also became interested in the relays
themselves and their potential for computation. Shannon's J937 Master's thesis, "A Symbolic
U Busb, .,.A New 1)lJe of DifI'erentia.~ Analyzer."
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Analysis ofRelay and Switching Circuits," examined the logical structure and synthesis of relay
circuits "in automatic telephone exchanges, industrial motor-control equipment, and in almost any
circuits designed to perform complex operations automatically."I~ BtJilding on the structure and
nolation ofelectrical network theory, Shannon applied Boolean Algebra to systems of relays, and
showed they could be analyzed and synthesized with binary arithmetic. These relay circuits were
one source from which Shannon's work would evolve into information theory, via the route of
fire control.
Blocked Out by the Fog or War: Naval Control Systems at MIT
It would take a war, however, to solidify these continuities, connections, and analogies.
The wartime transformation began for Harold Hazen and control at MIl' in 1936. The Bureau of
Ordnance, recognizing the importance ofHazen's wor~ asked him to develop a course on
servomechanisms. The request flowed from a minor but continuous connection bet\veen the Navy
and the institute. Bush had long served as an officer in the Naval reserve, and, as Hazen later
recalled, "through his [Bush's] Navy coMectians, he knew that the scllving of the differential
equations for trajectories of projectiles underlying the production of range tables for artillery
could be handled by this device [the differential analyzer]." 86 Indeed, in the twenties Bush did
reserve duty on the battleship Texas, which tested the fi.·~·t Ford Rangckeeper prototype in 1916.
Bush and Hannibal Ford never met, but in his memoirs Bush acknowledged Ford'~ machines
could do nearly all of what the differential analy~r could do but many years earlier. Hazen too
joined the Naval Reserve, and spent his only time on active duty in i 936 working with the Buteau
of Ordnance learning about fire control. His memoirs give no flavor the experience, probably
owing to secrecy.'7 But BuOrd was having trouble with the stability ofturre\ servos connected to
rangekeepers~ particularly in the Mark 37 director. The bureau 'Nished to send four officers per
year to MIT to learn :'bout the new servomechanism theory and study its application to fire
control problems.
85 Claude E. Shannon, "A Symbolic Analysis ~fRelay Switching Circuits," Trans. AlEE 57 (1938). "Mathematical
1beory of the Differential Analyzer," Jou,. Math. and Phys. 20 (DO. 4, December, 1941). Both reprinted in N.1.A.
Sloane NId Aaron D. Wyner, ed., ely. Elwood Slytnoon: Collcettd PaJ)crs (New York: IEEE Press, 1993).
16 Harold Hazen Interview, 17t 54.
17 Harold Hazen, Memoirs. Vannevar Bus~ Pieces oCtile Actii>D (New York: Morrow. 19,0), 183
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In 1938 t Hazen began planning a special course in controls but soon 'landed the work over
to Gordon Brown, who had just joined the faculty.1I Hazen's 1934 papers marked the end of his
direct involvement in research; his withdrawal from teaching in 1938 resulted from the parallel
technical and institutional progress of con~rol at MIT. That year Bush, who had been Vice
President and dean of the engineering school at MIT since 1932, was named president of the
Carnegie Institution in Washington D.C. He relinquished his MIT post in the beginning of 1939,
initiating an administrative reshuffiing. Edward Moreland, then head of the depanment of
electrical engineering, replaced Bush as dean of engineering, and Hazen replaced Moreland as
head ofelectrical engineering, a post he was to hold until 1952.
course and research in control at this cr~tical time. Brown began teaching control systems to four
naval fire contra; officers from the Bureau ofOrdnance and a two students from Charles Stark
Draper's lab in the fell of 1939. The four Lieutenant~, Edwin Hooper, Lloyd Mustin, Alfred
Ward, and Horacio Rivero, sometimes called the "four horsemen," stood at the irltersection of
two major pre-war threacis ofcontrol systems: naval fire control and servomechanism theory.
Partly because of their fortuitous arrival at this intersection, and partly because of how they
applied what they learned at MIT during World War 0, all four became admirals. They had
graduated from the Naval Academy in 1931 or '32 Md served as gunnery officers in the fleet for
several tours. At the time, gunnery represented the high-profile career for bright young officers,
"before the real surge ofglamour of naval aviation," Hooper recalled. He had been accepted to
MIT in Mechanical Engineering but went to Annapolis instead. Rivero had rejected Rhodes
Scholarship in favor of his oommission. He struggled to get into gunnery ~. 'om a career in
OOmRlunications, because uOrdnance was the thing in the navy, the exciting thing, especially when
you go to Ylac ~;d fight.,,19 During their tours, they had intimate contact with technical details
"com~any representatives spent time on 'ooard ironing bugfi out of the new fire control, the
remote control ofguns, and other new devices." ~J four had been sent to postgraduate ~hool in
88 Gordon BI'OWIl: interview with author, August 27, 1994.
19 Edwin .8. Hooper, Oral History Interview by Richard T. Glascw and NelsonW~ August 22, 1978, and
InttrvieYi by AB. Ch.~ Febura.ry, 1971, Edwin B. Hooper Papers, Oral Histories Folder and Box 10, Library
of Congres&. Horacio Rivero Oral Hi5lOry Interview by John T. Mason Jr., May 20, 1975, Naval Operational
Archives. Also ICC admiral'. biographies for Hooper, Rivero, Mustin, and WarcL Naval Operational Archives and
Edwin Hooper Oral History Interview by John T. tt&lson Jr., June, 23-26 1970 in tile IJooper bioBJ3Phy folder.
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gunnery at the Naval Academy in 1938, a typical stop fur a rising career. After a year of"PG"
work at the academy, the head of the ordnance group at the postgraduate school selected them
for an atypical stop, the nev; course, "Fire Control," at MIT. They arrived in September, 1939,
Unsule of what to expect.
MIT had numerous IUlval officers as students, but mostly in a\iation and construction. The
Bureau ofNavigation and not BuOrd ran the postgraduat~ program at MIT, so when the four
horsemen arrived at MIT, t".'Y didn't quite fit in. The university did not tllink they had enough
time, in two semesters, to get Master's degrees, and the navy captain in charge at MIT agreed.
But the four Lieutenants insisted, causing some frietiOil with their superior. They soon found they
had taken on a bit more \han they could handle. Although the previous year at Annapolis had been
s~nt preparing for the MIT course, it proved inadequate; Hooper, Mustin, Ward and Rivero had
to do remedial work m mathematics to keep up, making for a grueling schedule. They took
Gardner's course on transients in linear sy~ems and Samuel Caldwell's course on numerical
analysis. What really excited ~hem, however, was Charles Stark Dra~r's new work on
gyroscopes, which seem~ to have applications in fire contriJi. Halfway through the year, Draper
agreed to teach them about gyroscopes instead of the planned lectures DO av~ation io£!ruments,
and cred~ted them for the original C'~urse without infonning the navy.90 Gordon Brown taught the
four horsemen and several ~~ .madents what may have been the first course ever in
servomechanisms and control !~~eory. They studied Minorsky and Hazen's papers and applied the
principles to r..avaJ tift control. As Brown later recalled, the existing "Ford [fire control] machines
used up enough -mergy they couli praeticall)' drive the battleship" so servomechanisms would be
useful as r.unplifiers, unburdening computationaJ elements to drive large machinery, just as the
servos did in the MIT mathematical Machines. In the spring semester, Brown and his students
began setting up a laboratory, partly with equipment borrowed fi·onl Sperry Gyroscope. 91
Hooper and Ward wrote their Muter's thesis from this course, on controlling large turrets
with small electric signals. Where voltages commanded the position of large guns (as in the
General Electric systelTd), Hooper and Ward realized they could apply Hazen's conception of the
!10 This account comes primarily from Rivero'5 Ora! History with additions from Hooper Oral History in the Naval
Op-utional Archives.
91 Gordon Brown, interview wi=.b author, August 27t 1994. Also see the manuscript version of Wildes and
L~ A C;ntwy ofElectricaJ EncineeriDS in the Wildes Pape~ MIT archives, S-10 to 5-1S.
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servomechanism as an amplifier. Hazen's 1934 papers were the first two citations in their thesis,
which described fire control as a "pyramid2 J system" with several different le'rels of signals,
several different sources of power, and several layers offeedback. They designed a servo to
amplify a signal from 1/200th ofa horsepower to eight horsepower, but pointed out it could be
used up to a hundred horsepower. The design employed a variable-sp"'oo hydraulic drive
produced by Sperry subsidiary Waturbury Tool Company. Hooper and Ward borrowed much of
their electronics from existing MIT macnines, noting the "electrical amplifier is essentially the
same as that used for ttle motor (lrive i.n the electrostatic servo...used in t:le new Differential
Analyzer.,,9:l This thesis addresses what we might call the "classical" probleln of Naval fire
control, how to direct a ship's guns at long range against a target, taking into account the ~:tips
pitch, roU, and velocity, as well as the range and velocity of the target. This was the problem that
the Navy had originally intended to work on when it first approached MIT in 1936. Hooper
recalled Gorde.l Brown asked him to reword the acknowledgment of his involvement in the
project so Brown could use the results in his own work.93
The other two students in the Navy course examined a still newer problem which was
rapidly becoming tlrgent. By the rtart of the fall semester in 1939 war had begun in Europe, and
the Brifjsh Navy was beginning to realize th1t its sllips were vulnerable to German aircraft, "'hose
speed made them difficult to hit with antiaircraft fire. Lloyd Musti~ a pistol shot expert, had
worked in Llti-aircraft before coming to MIT. For their thesis, Mustin and Rivero analyzed ships
under attack by short-range, high speed airplanes, especially dive-bombers) strafers, and torpedo
planes. They brought to their analysis the systematic, transient approach ofBush, Haze~ and
Brown. Mustin and Rivero wrote, "as far as is known, no control device for the short-range
problem has been developed anywhere which pret ~nds to solve the three-dimensional problem
involved. tt 94 Antiaircraft fire control was replacing long range fire control and power system
stability as the primary driver for control sy~tem technology.
Mustin and Rivero's thesis focuses on light antiaircraft machine guns which can follow
rapidly moving targets. It clearly shows the influence ofHazen's emphasis on dynamic
performance and trans· emt analysis:
92 E.B. Hooper and A.G. Ward. "Control ofan Electro-Hydraulic Servo Unit." Master's thesis., MIT. 1940.
91 Hooper tval bit.tory, Naval Operational Archives.
94 H. Rivero and L.M. Mustin, "A Servo Mechanism for a Rate Follow-up System." Master's thesist MITt 1940t 2.
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There can be DO compromises as to speed; the solution must be delivered at the point of
application, and in its 'mady state' within a fraction ofa second after the device has
gotten OIl its target...a final requirement is that the solution be prodliced at a power lev~ ~
5ufficientJy high for it to be ,1pplied automatically and directly to the point of use.95
Because of the vibration and smoke produced by these guns, the controllers should be located at
some distance frL'm the gullS themselves, hence the guns should work under "remote control."
Mustin and Rivero analyzed how a gyroscopic device.. based on the commercially-available
Pioneer Tum Indicator for aircraft, might predict the path of an oncoming airplane. The basic
problem was to derive the "rate" or angular velocity of the target and then to calculate the lead.
But differentiating 2& funet~on is a difficult task, highly susceptible to error. In an integrator,
extraneous noise, like the errors due to human operators in tracking the curves on the Bush
machines, get3 averaged out. A pure diffeientiatoi a.l1plifies nais.; but a gyroscope could be
rigged with a spring to calculate lead ang!~s in a smoot~ stable, and accurate measurement. When
Mustin and Rivei'Ci went to Draper for help on the analysis of this problem, however, the
professor "froze," and "shut up like a clatn.,,96 Mustin and Rivero had stumbled into another of
the pre-war threads ofcontrol systems, also coming to MIT for help: Sperry Gyroscope.
For several years, Draper had been consulting for Sperry Gyroscope on aircraft
instruments, including turn indiCCitors, blind flying apparatus, and engine instrumentation. While
Hazen and Brown were defining the new discipline ofcontrol, Draper created his own field,
aircraft instrumentation, embodied in his Instrument Laboratory. Draper's wor~ like that in
control, 'Nas characterized by an emphasis on transient phenomena, models and analogs of
physical systems, and graphical solutions. It was also characterized by industrial relationships.
Before comt,ng to MIT, Draper had worked at Sperry Gyroacope, and he retained his contacts
there, especially with chiefengineer Preston Bassett, president Reginald Gillmor, and Director of
Research Hugo Willis. In the mid-thirties, Sperry began supporting and funding Draper's work,
coRmtercializing the products of his research, and hiring graduates of his laboratory. During the
fall of 1939, as war broke out in Europe, Draper thought to apply a gyroscopic turn indicator he
had developed to an instrument tor computing the lead angles for guns on tanks. It was this
project he was working on when Mustin and Rivero brought their idea for a lead computing sight
9S Ibid, 10.
96 Pjvero oml bistoJY. Gordon Brown interview.
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for antiaircraft guns. 97 No evidence documents what caused Draper to tum fi·om the tank-sight to
an antiaircraft sight, but it may well have been Mustin and Rivero's the~is. It is clear, hov/ever,
that in June of 1940, with a contract from Sperry Gyroscope, Draper turned his attention to
antiaircraft fire control.
In the spring of 1940, the four horsemen stressfully completed their degrees and returned
to the navy. MIT's work in control from the preceding decade thus began to diffuse into the
military - through fhe dual conduits of industrial relations with Sperry Gyroscope and military
liaison with the Rureau ofOrdnance. At that point, servo theory, its usefulness for fire control
established, diS\ppeared behind a veil of military secr~ - and remained invisible until i 945. The
Mustin and Rivero tllesis, given the vague and deliberately uninfonnutive title"A Servo
Mechanism for a Rate Follow-up System," was classified when written, arId remained so until
1972. Brown recalled "by 1940 the development of rigorous methods ofanalysis and synthesis
had reached the stage ofadolescence, when suddenly the work was blocked o~t by the fog of
military security.,,91 That year Brown wrote a paper incorporating his control research and
teaching experience. "Transient Behavior and Design of SelVomechanislns," presented a general
summary of the field to date, introduced iL.i basic principles, discussed transient response and
analysis and presented design examples. Its second footnote cited Hazen's two 1934 papers.
Brown also discussed Black and Nyquist's work on feedback ampHfiers.99 Brown planned to
present this paper at the annual meeting of the American Society ofMechanical Engineers in
1940.
As it happened, Brown did flot present to the ASME. The paper, in fact, would not see
publication for five years. In July, of 1940, a few months before he planned to present it, BrO'Nn
greeted an important visitor and ex;>lained to mIn the current state of servo research. He sho\\'ed
91 Lloyd Mustin, Memorandum introducing S.M. thesis upon declassification, 1971. Mustin recaJle(j that "Though
Dr. Drape, did not sugest any gun control applications at that time, be later acknowledged the contribution of this
thesis to the development ofms own concepts." FDr a detailed account of Draper's relationsrnp '0 Sperry in tbe
thirties, see ~..iichael DewiJ~ "A Change of Suue: lDC poiiticai cui~~ of technical practice at the MIT
Inst.nunentatioo Laboratory and the 10hns Hopkins Applied Physic§ Laboaratory, 193-45," (ph.D. dissertation,
Johns Hopkins University, 1991), Chapter 2, ~nd C~~r 4 for the lead-computing gunsigbt. For an example of
the collaborative MIT/Sperry research, sec C.S. Drapel, G.P. Bentley, and H.H. Willis, "The M.I.T.-Sperry
Apparatus for Measuring Vibratio:l,"j'j J. Aeronautical Sciences 4 (no. 7, May, 1937),281-85.
91 Gordon S. Brown and DDnald P. Campbell, Principles of Servo Mecbamsms: Dynamics and Synthesis of Closed
Loop Control Systems (New York: John Wiley cl Sons, 1948), 9.
99 Gordon S.B~ "'TnwsiCDt Behavior aM Design of Servomechanisms,"
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the visitor the differential analyzer and the center for analysis. Brown explained the previous
year's fire control course and the contributions the four naval gunnery officers had made. He
complained his work would move more quickly but for problems of personnel and e.quipment.
The visitor had been sent by Vannevar Bus~ who had just fonned the National Defense Research
Committee (NDRC). His name was Warren Weaver, an~, just a few weeks before he had been
asked to setup a special NDRC division devoted to fire control. When the committee met in 1940,
it quickly classified Brown's paper and issued it as a restricted report. With that news, however,
came a contract for Brown to extend his research and found the Servomechanisms Laboratory.
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Figure 5-1: Simplified system layout for stability problem (redrawn from Bush and
Booth, "Transmission Line Transients," AlEE Transactions 44 (1925), 236).
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Figure 5-2: Harold Edgerton studying power system stability with a stroboscope.
Note "frozen," Nand S poles on generator (Wildes, A Century of Electrical
Engineering, 146).
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Figure 5-7: Second Product lntegraph Graphic Layout
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Figure 5-5: Vannevar Bush (left) and the Product Integraph, late 1920s. Harold Hazen is second
from right. Note electric motors driving plotting tables, vertical boards containing
servomechanisms, and automobile radiator hanging above to cool precision resistance
instruments (Wildes and Lindgren, A Century of Electrical Engineering, 79).
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Figure 5-8: Standard Symbols for Mathematical Function Units in Differential Analyzer
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Figure 5-9: Differential Analyzer set up for a particular problem.
Note that bus rods rotate and transmit data from one unit to another.
FOa this problem, no real-time inputs are needed~, all data is input as
initial conditions. Input table is provided so value for gravity can be
easily changed.
Setup shown is for solving a basic falling body problem:
(V. Bush, "The Differential Analyzer. A New Machine for Solving
Differential Equations," Journal althe Franklin Institute 212 (no. 4, 1931), 457).
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Figure 5-10: Rockefeller Differential Analyzer, principle of (!peration
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Chapter 6
Arquiring Control:
The f4~ire Control Divisions of the NDRC
In the spring of 1940, as the school year ended, Mustin, Rivero, Hooper and Ward
finished th~ir theses at MIT. The four officers then embarked on a "cooks tour," visiting
industrial, military, and re~'earch laboratories working on fire control. In September, the navy,
mobilizi~g in response to events in Europe, cut short the tour and sent the four horsemen to their
new assignments: Ward joined tht; Naval Inspector's office at the Ford Instrument Company,
Hooper did the same at G.E., Mustin went to the Naval Gun Factory, and Rivero to BuOrd's Fire
Control Stdion.
These men were at the fore ofa broad convergence as World Y/ar II brought together the
four traditions, centered on problems offire control and a new research agency. Sperry and its
gun directors spawned ambitious efforts in tire control, electronic ClJmputing, and integrated
systems. MIT's work in servomechanisms led to power controls which harnessed guns to human
operators and computers without the danger of instability. Bell Labs' feedback amplifiers brought
the fire control problem to an entirely new level ofsophistication and merged it with telephone
engineering. The Bureau ofOrdnance and its contractors provided a mature industrial base for
control systems, as well as a pressing demand to defend vulnerable ships against attacking aircraft.
Wartime Research and The Anti-Aircraft Problem
During World War II, a broad research program brought engineers, ideas, and machines
together inn~ combinations. The resulting synergy produced military devices and spawned
derivative threads in control engineering, systems engineering, information theory, and
cybernetics. The fire control divisions of the National Defense Resource Committee (NDRC),
formulated the program, divided it up into separate projects, and oversaw the research. From
guns and bombs to signals and systems, military technology required precision and power.
Innovations in technologies ofcootrol paralleled inventions in the control of technology.
Historical work on wartime science, however, tends to focus on the war as origin: of nuclear
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standoff: of the information age, of science policy. 1 Science plays the leading role. Rarely have
historians examined the continuity ofwartime research with what came beforft, rarely have they
looked at wartime technological change as anything but subsidiary to scientific change, and rarely
have they examined the practitioners who forged and experienced these changes. Dominant book-
length works on wartime research remain official histories written in the forties. 2
Recently, historians have begun to revisit the origin myths and to open the black box of
wartime technology. A. Hunter Dupree placed the NDRC within a much longer history of science
and the federal government. He identified "the great instauration of 1940," as the key period,
eighteen months before Pearl Harbor, ,vhen the scattered military science of the thirties coalesced
into Vannevar Bush's new agency, the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC). Dupree
pointed to the significance of the research contract in shapillg the universities' role, and to
import&:.W!ce ofthe NDRC division chiefs and their staffs, who personally connected scientific ideas
to the military. He also emphasized the NDRC's focus on "the total system of radar and radio
connected to weapons.,,3 In a similar vein, St;holars have argued the 1940 "watershed" was as
conservative as it was revolutionary.4 The NDRC conducted, by dollar value, only a fraction of
wartime research. Bush had to fight numerous boundary battles to maintain the autonomy of his
1 As examples, see: Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of A Scientific Community in Moder-n America
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1988). Hennan H. Goldstine, The CCtmputer: From Pascal to von Neumann (princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1973). For discussions of wartime~~h in the context of modem science policy, see
Paul Fonnan "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as ~ Basis for Physical Research in the United
States, 1940-1960," Hist Stud. Phys. Bio. Sciences 18 (no. 1, 1987), 149-229. Andy Pickering, "Cyborg History
and the World War nRegime," Perspectives on Science 3 (00. 1, 1993) 1-48. These works, particularly Kevles,
Rhodes, and Forman, do make significant contributions to our understanding of wartime physics and postwar
science policy and practice, but they do not help us understand wartime technology on its own terms.
2 James Phinney Baxter, Scientists Against Time (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1946). IrvinS~ Organizing
Scientific Research for War: De Administrative History of the Office of Scientific Research atld Development
(Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1948), 322. Baxter's book was the "short version," oCthe official history. The long
version was published as separate volumes; the most relevant to this chapter is Joseph C. Boyce, New Weapons For
Air Warfare: Fire-Control Equipment Proximity Fuzes.. and Guided Missiles (Boston: Little Brown and Conlpany,
1947). Henry Guerlac, Radar in WWII (New York: American Institute oCPhysics, 1987).
3 A. Hunter Dupree "The Greallnstauration of 1940: The Organization of Scientific Research for War," in Gerald
Holton eel., De Twentieth-century Sciences: Studies in the Biography ofIg (New York: W.W. Norton and Co.,
1970), 4'9.
4 Natban Reingold, "Vanncvar Bush's New Deal for Research: or the triumph oCthe old order," Rist. Stud. in~
Pbys. and Bio. Sciences 17 (1987), 299-344.
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agency.5 And the NDRC/OSRD may have been "counterproductive" to bush's vision of post-war
research.6
Most important, historians are slowly recognizing the technology component of ihe
OSRD, the role ofengineers in additioll to scientists. Bush himself created some of the bias, as he
used the mantle of science to distinguish his organization from companies like Sperry and Ford,
When I came to work closely with the anny and the navy I found it essential to intrcxluce
all ofmy people as scientists, for the word engineer to than meant to often the sales
engineer coming from one of their contractors. This finally went to the point where every
man in my organization got called a scientists, although it was fortunately well penneated
with engineers.7
As Larry Owens puts it, in the OSRD "engineering was often more important than science,
practice more important than theory, and the ability to mediate, to move comfortably among
university, government, military, and industry....most important ofall."s Owens's recent overview
ofthe OSRD provides a framework for closer analysis. Michael Dennis puts a piece in that frame
with his comparative study oftwo wartime laboratories. Both Owens and Dennis make extensive
use ofthe remarkably complete official records ofthe OSRD.9 That the records were declassified
less than twenty years ago helps explain the silence.
Owens and Dennis begin to open up the int~.na1 workings of vlartime technology beyond
the Manhattan Project, Science the Endless Frontier, and the ENIAC. The following close
examination ofthe OSRD's work on control systems attempts to answer further questions: When,
and how, did wartnne research acquire the expertise ofits predecessors? How did the OSRD
relate to the military services? To industry? How could it innovate where others had failed?
Where did it fail? What was the social fabric, the organizational culture, which allowed the OSRD
to oversee these interactions? Starting in 1940, how did the government control technology?
S Carron Pw'seu, "Science Agencies in World War D: The OSRD and Its Challengers," in Nathan P~ingold 00.
The Sciences in the American Context: New Perspectives (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1979), 360-
78.
6 Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar Bush and
the Office of Scieotific Research and Development," Business History Review 68 (Winter 1994), 515-576.
7 Busb to Hoover, April 27, 1945. Bush 1=.11, Library of Congress, Box 51 Folder 1261.
I Owens, "The Counterproductive ManaBCJDCot of Science," S370.
9 Michael Dennis, , "A Change of State: The political cultures of technical practice at the MIT Instnunentation
Laboratory and the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, 1930-4S," (ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins
11nivenity, 1991), 3S7.
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Organizing Research and liThe Antiaircraft Problem"
The original impetus for the NDRC arose, at least in part, from what Vannevar Bush
called "the anti-aircraft problem." He left MIT for Washington in 1938 to assume one of the
central positions in American science, head of the Carnegie Institution. From this lofty vantage
point he could ~urvey the landscape of scientific research with unusual breadth. An additional
position as Chairman of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) focused
Bush's attention on the dramatic strides in military aircraft and their fearsome implications. In the
spring of 1939, while Europe was still at peace, he grew alarmed about "the anti-aircraft
problem." Bush wrote to his hero, the retired engineer-president Herbert Hoover, for help. As
Chairman of the NACA, Bush \\Tote, he saw the rapid progress aircraft were making toward
higher speeds and greater altitudes. He also understood that such progress made airplanes
difficult, if not impossible, to hit with traditional gulL,ery. High-frequency radiation research at
MIT and Stanford (early radar, partially supported by Sperry Gyroscope) held promise as a way
to detect and locate aircraft, !Ie continued, but no one was coordinating the connection of such
equipment into systems which could direct "the precise and rapid control ofguns."lO
Hoover had no advice for Bush, but he found support from other colleagues closer to
home. He wrote to Frank Jewett, then president afBell Labs, that his interest in national defense
arose from both NACA work and "a private conviction that antiaircraft is not receiving the
attention it should have.,,11 With the outbreak ofwar in Europe in September, 1939, the blitzkrieg
dramatically demonstrated the airplane's central importance in modem warfare. In 1940, Bush
proposed his idea for a council to coordinate defense research, much as the NACA coordinated
aeronautics research. He wrote to President Roosevelt that, while the NACA "correlates military
and civil research aCtivities on aeronautical devices, no similar agency exists for other important
fields, notably anti-aircraft: devices."12
011 June 27, 1940, as the four horsemen turned in their theses at MIT, President Roosevelt
approved an order establishing the NDRC and directing it to fund scientific research into military
problems. The conunittee consisted of leaders in American science and engineering: Bush, Jewett
10 Bush to Hoover, April 10, 1939 and April 29, 1939. Bush Papers, Library of Congress.
II Busb to Jew~March 23, 1939. Jewett folder, Bush file, Carnegie Institution of Washington records quoted in
CarroU Pursell, "Science Agencies in World War D: The OSRD and Its Challengers," in Nathan Reingold eel. The
Sciences iA the American Context: New Perspectives (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1979), 360.
12 DraftMemo~n.d., OSRD, Central Classified File.
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(now also President of the National Academy of Sciences); James Conant, President ofHarvard;
Karl Taylor Compto~ President ofMIT; Conway P. Cae, Commissioner ofPatents, Richard C.
Tolman ofCaltech, and one liaison each from the War and Navy departments, initially Major
General G.B. Strong and Rear Admiral Harold G. Bowen (MIT graduate and post-war founder of
the Office ofNaval Research) . The group tilted toward academia (even Jewett's BeU Labs had a
decidedly academic flavor), and NDRC work overall would heavily favor MIT. This bias would
be simultaneously the NDRC's strength and its weakness. Ph.D. scientists and engineers brought
fresh ideas and a vigorous quantitative approach to military problems. Many professors and
researchers, however, were novices in fields in which others had already built careers. The
NDRC's eagerness could rapidly shade into arrogance, both intellectual and organizational: army
and navy laboratories, industrial contractors, and any number ofgovernment agencies would seek
to restrict their influence. 13 "There were those who protested that the action of setting up NDRC
was an end run," Bush wrote in his memoirs, "a grab by which a small company ofscientists and
engineers, acting outside established channels, got hold of the authority and money for the
program ofdeveloping new weapons. That, in fact, is exactly what it was.,,14
D-2 andDivision 7
To structure his organization, Bush surveyed the armed services for pressing problems and
set up the NDRC in four divisions: Division A, Annor and ordnance under Tolman; Division B,
bombs, fuels, gases, and chemistry under Conant; Division C, communications and transportation
under Jewett; and Division 0, radar, fire control, and instruments under Compton. 15 Bush also
included a "Uranium Committee" which would later transfer to the army and become the
Manhattan Project. Division D divided into four sections:
D-l, Detection and radar
D-2, Fire Control
D-3, Instruments
D-4, Heat Radiation.
13 PurseD, "Science Agencies in World War fi."
14 Vannc:var Bush, Pieces of the Action (New York: Morrow, 197), 31-32, quoted in Owens, "The
Counterproductive Management of Science," 522.
IS OSRD7, Office files ofKarl Taylor Compton, folder NDRC Misc., bas several early organization charts for the
NDRC which do not include any section devoted to fire control, although Owens reprints a chart Bush shared
informally with colleagues in June, 1940, before Roosevelt's executive order, which includes a division for fire
control, "The Counterproductive Management of Science," 523.
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This chapter outlines the work of0-2 and its successor, Division 7, which had NDRC
responsiblity for control and let eighty research contracts. 16The following three chapters examine
key aspects ofthis research in servomechanisms, radar and systems engineering, and computing
and ulfonnation. D-2 and Division 7 sought to fuse the four pre-war lines of control systems: the
Navy's fire control, Sperry's feedback controls, Bell Labs' electronic amplifiers, and MIT's
servomechanisms. They fostered the convergence by funding projects in fundamental and applied
research - using changing definitions of"fundamental" research to define their organizational
role. Serving as a kind ofcentral technology bureau, the NDRC transferred information between
groups, set standards, and charted new directions for investigation. The members of D-2 and
Division 7 had to crat1: this role carefully, however, employing a combination of research
contracts, technical authority, and political power. They did not always succeed.
For fire control in particular, the NDRC records paint a detail.d picture of the technology
and its politics as they unfolded. Every time committee members VIsited a facility, attended a
meeting, had an important phone call, or even made a relevant observation, they wrote up a
"diary" entry and distributed it to the rest ofthe group. Harold Hazen (who headed Division 7)
recalled, "These diaries, automatically circulated to all division members, were entirely highly
classified internal documents, and hence gave free scope to uninhibited expression by creative
individualists. They were often brilliant, salty, and very flavorable.,,·7 Division members did not
hesitate to discuss sensitive or unpleasant personal and technical matters in these classified and
credible memos.
Technical reports, produced in the normal course of research as well as at the end of the
war, illuminate the technical aspect of the work. These reports and all NDRC documents were
secret when produced, a fact which produces unforeseen benefits or the historian. The NDRC
carefully tracked its classified documents, so the process oftechnology diffusion can be recreated
in detail; Knowledge was carefully tracked as it moved through organizations and across
16 For the official history ofD-2 and Division 7, see Joseph C. Boyce, New Weapons For Air Warfare, Chapters 111-
IX. The sources for these chapters are the personal histories written by the section members for Boyce in National
Archives Record Group 227 t Division 7 (hereafter referred to as OSRD7), General Project Files (hereafter referred
to as OP), History File. Boyce published these accounts virtually intact, but be edited out much of the most
interesting material on institutional frictio~ confli~ and competition. I will therefore cite the original members'
histories wherever possible, although only for general observations. for the actual chronologies ofcoounittee
activities, I will wort from the original committee documentation, on which the members' histories are all clearly
based.
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institutional boundaries. Gordon Brown's 1940 paper on servomechanisms, for example,
culminated MIT's work ill control theory during the 1930s. When the NDRC began its work in
1940, it immediately classified the paper and, under controlled distribution, used it to bring
researchers who were new to the field quickly up to date. Brown's document defined the
boundaries of the technical community. Chapter 8 traces where it went, whe~ how it was
received by those who read it, and how they incorporated it into their work.
Making fire cODtrol a science
Getting Started: Weaver Assembles the Section
To head section 0-2, Bush chose his colleague Warren Weaver. Weaver like Frank
Jewett, had been a student of physicist Robert Millikan. He spent the twenties and early thirties on
the Mathematics faculty at the University ofWisconsin. In 1932, Weaver moved to New York to
become director ofthe Natural Sciences Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, a job ofcentral
importance in the interwar scientific community. II It was here, in 1935, that Bush met and
befriended Weaver, and when he began sponsoring Bush's computing machine, the Rockefeller
Differential Analyzer. When Bush moved to the Carnegie Institution in 1938, the men became
peers. Weaver, a talented teacher and administrator, brought a mid-western pragmatism to
foundation science patronage. Despite the fiustrations of the depression, he crafted a role as a
"manager of science" at the Rockefeller characterized by interdisciplinary programs and project-
oriented grants. As an administrator, Weaver worked as "an active partner in setting research
agendas."19 He brought these practices to the NDRC, producing a style offederal patronage, at
least in the critical early months, which confinns Nathan Reingold's assessment ofBush's
"instauration," as "the triumph of the old order."
17 Harold Hazen, Memoirs. MIT Archives, 3-34.
II Warren Weaver, 8ceDe ofCrbange: A Lifetime in American Science (New Yo~ Charles Sribner's Sons, 1970),
45.
19 Robert E. Kobler, Partners in Science: Foundations and Natural Scientists 1900-1945 (Chicago: University of
Chicqo Press, 1991), Chapter Ten, "Warren Weaver and his Program," is a detailed exploration ofWcaver's
patronage at the Rockefeller foundation in the 19305. Kohler writes "The system of federal patronage which
evolved mainly out of militaly research programs of World War 0, differed in important ways from prewar
foundation programs,tt (404) which is lIDdoubtedIy troc, but Kohler does DOt examine Weaver's wartime work,
which establisbes a significant continuity between prewar-private and wartime-federal patronage styic-s. Reingold,
"Bush's New Deal," (32S) oomments that Bush's proposal for NSF contracts derived from a combination of
Weaver's Rockefeller strategy and the OSRD contract, but without explicitly noting Weaver's role in the two.
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Indeed Bush's selection of Weaver underscores the NDRC's initial continuity with the
pre-war world. Bush selected men of his own status or higher - the scientific elite. While
intellectually equipped to deal with technical matters of fire control, Weaver had no experience
with either the military aspects of the problem or with the previous years' work in feedback
controls and theory (he had done some work on gyroscopic stabilization during the first world
war). At first, the government's agents were to be gentleman scientists, skilled in the arts of
private patronage and applying those skills to the distribution offederal dollars.
Weaver assumed chairmanship ofD-2 in early July, 1940 and immediately began
assembling experts. He invited Thornton C. Fry and Samuel H. Caldwell to join as members ofD-
2. Fry, Bell Labs' mathematical research director, had been a colleague ofWeaver's in the Math
department at Wisconsin. Caldwell, head ofMIT's Center for Analysis, had been Bush's graduate
student and had collaborated with him on the differential analyzer. Edward J. Poitras joined D-2
as ChiefTechnical Aide. Poiras a former student ofBush and Hazen, went from MIT to the Ford
Instrument Company, at Bush's suggestion, to design controls for the Mount Palomar
Telescope.20 Security clearances for these men took some time, so Weaver spent the summer on
his own and with the main NDRC committee gathering information.
On July 9, Weaver met with Busl!, who briefed him on the history offire control. The first
directors had been built for heavy naval guns before World War I, Bush told him, by Hannibal
Ford, and the first antiaircraft fire control had been built about fifteen years ago. Weaver began
thinking about setting up committees under his auspices; he divided the field into Electronics,
Optics, Mechanical Design, and Mathematics. This early plan included no separate effort for
servomechanisms, feedback, or theory.21 The following week, Weaver met with Colonial Taylor,
head of the army's Anti-Aircraft Artillery Board. Taylor described the Sperrry directors and
relayed the army's disappointment with "human servomechanisms:"
At several pod in the [fire control] process, operators are necessary to match dials. This
is true of the actual laying ofeach gun in altitude and azimuth, of the fuse [sic] settir.g, and
apparently at several other points. Much, if not all, ofthis could obviously be eliminated.22
Taylor pinpointed the difficult problems with the Sperry machines. Power controls for moving the
guns, Taylor explained, were a particular weakness.
20 Ronald Florence, The Perfect Machine: Building the Palomar Telescope (Harper Collins, 1994) J~O-'!!.
21 WW diary, July 9, 1940. OSRD7 OP.
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To explore the academic side ofthings, Weaver visited MIT and met with Gordon Brown
and Sam Caldwell. Caldwell and Weaver d·iscussed the differential analyzer work and the Center
for Analysis - an official entity which inClJrporated MIT's computing facilities (Caldwell was
supervising the new differential analyzer YJhich Weaver, through Rockefeller, was funding).
Brown briefed Weaver about MIT's program in control, including the the four fire control
officers.23 The day he returned from his MIT visit, Weaver came up with a tentative agenda for
the first meeting of section D-2. The topics he listed as "pressing problems" show how his
thinking had progressed in four weeks:
1) Developement ofmuch more rapid, reasonably accurate, automatic controls for lighter
AAguns
2) Possible improviement ofexisting fire control equipment for ~vier guns
3) Increaa accuracy by (a) simplification ofequipment or procedure (b) by combining
units (e) by substituting automatic for manual controls
4) Consideration ofany specialy problems referred to us by the Fire control groups of the
Anny or Navy (e.g. automatic fuze setting, irnprovment of rangefinders)
S) Theoretical analysis b)' (a) overall analysis oferrors (b) analysis ofcomplex systenlS of
servomechanisms, particularly a determinatioo ofmost effective and simplest type of
intercoupled damping to sercure stability when several servornecbanisms are connected in
series (c) analysis offunctioo ofcomputer, including higher order derivatives (d)
probability analysis of risks involved in various dispositions ofequipment
6) Basic program ofdevelopment ofservomechanisms (MIT group, Brown & Caldwell)
Here Weaver already understands much ofthe pre-war work and moves toward a conception of
fire control as a system. He includes the mechanism for D-2 to respond to problems raised by the
services, an~ unlike his listing a few weeks before, he sees the need for special attention to
theory. "Intercoupled damping" and connecting servos in series referred to stability problems with
the Mark-37 antiaircraft director. Bush had chosen the right man; Weaver quickly grasped the
salient problems ofthis complex field - demonstrating the competence as a "science manager" he
had developed at Rockefeller. While somewhat self-fulfilling, this early memo predicts the
important work ofthe next five years.
D-2 as a fonnal committee or "section" held its first meeting in Hanover, New Hampshire
in September, 1940, when the members were in town for a meeting of the American Mathematical
Society. This meeting had a special session on "War preparedness among mathematicians," and
connected academics with military research. Also at the meeting, George Stibitz ofDell Labs
22 WW diary, July 18. 1940. OSRD7 GP.
23 WW diary, July 29, 1940. OSRD7 GP.
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demonstrated the remote operation of his "Complex Number Computer" or "Model I Relay
Computer" over a telephone liae to New Yor~ credited as the first instance ofcomputing through
the network. Stibitz had been experimenting with telephone relay calculators since 1937, and his
research director (now D-2 member) Thornton Fry urged him to build a complex number
calculator to aid electronic filter design at Ben Labs. Those who attended Stibitz's demonstration
included Norbert Wiener and John Mauchly (later designer of the ENIAC), among others,
probably including the members of section D_2.24
The following wee~ Weaver made one more visit without his committee, to the army's
Aberdeen proving ground in Maryland with Bush, Compton, and the NDRC's army and navy
liaisons. Alfred L. Loomis also attended, a wealthy New York lawyer with an interest in
microwave radio who now headed section D-l on radio detection. The group saw the Sperry M-4
director, which was at Aberdeen for testing with new electro-tlydraulic power gun controls.
Weaver observed the problems with the Sperry servos, "there is no hunting, but the motion is
frequently jerky and the rates are slow." The navy representative, noted Weaver, "who is, of
course, familiar with the Navy automatic control, takes WW to one side and agrees that this is a
pretty unsatisfactory device.,,25 The day at Aberdeen demonstrated the limitations of Sperry's
interwar antiaircraft progr~ and a naval officer was only too eager to point out weaknesses in
the army's technology.
In later months Bush, Compton and the members of the NDRC proper would not be so
directly involved as this day at Aberdeen. At this early stage, however, the remained small enough
that a few men could attend to the whole thing, particularly as Bush was concerned about
antiaircraft from the start. Also, Weaver would need unprecedented access to military and
government facilities for his upcoming work. Bush, with Roosevelt's executive order behind him,
helped pave the way.
24 Brian Randell, The Origins ofDiptal Compulcrs: Selected Papers (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982), 241-45.
Stibitz's paper presented at this conference does not survive, but RandeU's volume reprints a similar paper from
1940, 247-~2. George Stibitz's memoir has reprints the program of this meeting, The Zeroth Generation: A
scientists RC9!JectiODS (1937-1955) from L.c early Binary Relay Digital Computers at Bell Telqlhone Laboratory
and OSRD to a fle4&1ing Minicomputer at the Barber Coleman Company (unpublished MS, 1993), appendix I-S to
1-6. Courtesy Paul Ceruzzi.
25 WW diaIy, September 18, 1940. OSRD7 OP.
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Learning the Field
Because of the navy's clear advantage in fire control, Weaver and D-2 initially
concentrated on the anny's problems ofland-based antiaircraft fire, especially for heavy
antiaircraft artillery. Service attitudes influenced the choice; Naval fire control had a well..eamed
reputation as a closed technical community. The anny, however, unhappy with its equipment,
extended a welcoming hand to the NDRC. Until late in the war, in fact, BuOrd and navy fire
control would remain outside of the NDRC's domain. It would cost them their lead in the
technology (see Chapter 8).
Colonel William S. Bowen, president ofthe anny's Coastal Artillery Buard (CAB)
agressively recruited the NDRC help on fire control (no relation to Admiral Harold Bowen,
NDRC member and later founder of the Office ofNaval research). On October 3, Weaver and the
committee (Fry, Caldwell, and Poitras) visited Bowen at Fort Monroe in Virginia. Bowen
explainoo the "dissatisfaction" in the service with ih~ r..urrent M-4 director, and especially with
Sperry Gyroscope as the sole manufacturer ofsuch devices. Directors incorporating electrical
rather than mechanical techniques had been proposed by BeD Labs, added Bowen, but such
equipment would need to be very rugged to be useful. Microwave detection techniques had also
been proposed, but their present accuracy was not suitable. Bowen listed limitations in the
accuracy ofexisting fire control. Tracking oftargets with handwheelsj for example, was not
smooth enough. Weaver noted Bowen had strong opinions about the automation, and lack of it,
implemented by Sperry in its directors:
The use ofpersonnel for the matching ofgun dials is quite undesirable, large errors
ocurring under conditions offiring...Tbey [CAB] feel that mechanical loading of the guns
is a step in the right direction to minimize and make more constant dead time.
Once again, Weaver and D-2 saw that for all its strides, Sperry's replacement of human operators
by servomechanisms had still not gone far enough. Bowen was also concerned about the reliability
ofautomated machines:
Again it was emphasized [Weaver noted] that servos are to be used wherever possible in
place ofmanual matching ofdials. The saving ofmanpower in this way is not important
but lhe accuracy is ofgreat importance. It was pointed out that with the increased use of
the automatic equipment, the number ofmen required for servicing such equipment tends
to offset the saving in operating personnel.26
26 WW diary, October 3, 1940. OSRD7 GP. Emphasis added.
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loey could not have had a more succinct statemen~ of the problems ofmilitary automation.
And, ofcourse, D-2 visited Sperry. They met with Reginald Gillmor, Sperry Gyroscope
president Preston R. Bassett, Director ofResearch Dr. Hugo Willis (now a member ofNDRC
section D-lon radar) and Director ofFire Control Development Earl Chafee. Chafee explained
the details of Sperry's fire control computers and the advantages of their "plan prediction
method." Sperry was currently modifying its M4 director, Chafee added, to incorporate the
suggestively-named "aided laying," which partially automated tracking. They were also increasing
the M-4's range and including provision for microwave tracking inputs.27 D-2 thus examined the
results of Sperry's pre-war program with the anny which, despite its flaws, served as a baseline
against which to compare new approaches. 0-2 designed their research program accordingly.
Weaver and D-2 did not see naval fire control as pressing as the anny's problem, but D-2
did everything it could to incorporate information from that tradition ofcontrol. At the Naval Gun
Factory they examined directors, computers, and rangekeepers, and were given copies ofthe
manuals for these machines.21 They went aboard the USS Ouincy, interviewed its gunnery officer
and examined its Ford Rangekeeper, its thyratron servoss and its antiaircraft directors. 29 At RCA
in Camden, New Jersey, D-2 discussed the company's work on electronic computing for BuOrd
gun directors.30 When the committee visited General Electric in Schenectady, they met Edwin
Hooper, one ofBrown's four navy students, now with the Naval Inspector's Office at the
company. D-2 observed G.E.'5 switchboards, rangefinder stabilizers, electronic computers, and a
wide variety ofservoS.31 At Ford Instrument in Long Island City, the section saw the company's
delicate rangekeepers and a machine for making ballistic camS.32 Caldwell visited Edwin Land at
Polaroid to discuss the optics of rangefinders.33
Finally, D-2 learned about electronics, feedback amplifiers, and communications
engineering. They visited Bell Labs in New Jersey, which was already at work building an
27 WW diary, November 6, 1940. OSRD7 GP.
21 WW diary, October 9, 1940. OSRD7 OP.
29 D-2 Diary, November 10, 1940. OSRD7 GP Box 70 collected diaries volume 1. The~ sank in the Battle of
Savo Island in Guadalcanal in 1942. In 1992 the author was part of an expedition which located and photographed
the wreck.
J(' WW diary, October 23, 1940. OSRD7 OP.
31 WW diary, November 8, 1940. OSRD7 GP.
32 WW diary, November 7, 1940. OSRD7 GP.
33 SHe diary, November 1, 1940. OSRD7 GP Box 70. collected diaries volume 1.
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electronic director incorporating feedback amplifiers (see Chapter 8).34 In New Jersey, at Fort
Monmouth, the Signal Corps research lab was supporting the Bell Labs wor~ and hoping to
integrate it with their "microwave detection" sets, ofwhich they had 450 on order.35 The army
still had a cultural bias against electronic equipment, which they believed too unreliable for field
service. The prevalence of radio, however, and the anticipated importance of radar were forcing
greater acceptance ofelectronics.36
D-2'5 busy first months demarcated the landscape, both geographic and technical, offire
control as it existed at the beginning ofthe war: industrial firms, military sites, and one university.
The bulk ofthe NDRC's fire control work (and the bulk ofNDRC's contracts overall) would
occur within the confines ofthe industrial region bounded by Virginia on the South (Ft. Monroe),
Massachusetts in the North (MIT), concentrated in New York and New Jersey. Central technical
problems were those Sperry had failed to solve, those which could be taken from the navy and
applied to other fields, and those which arose from new technology in other fields, especially
electronics. In this initial investigatio~ D-2 tapped the knowledge of the four pre-war traditions
ofcontrol systems. Military users, academic scientists, and industrial engineers explained the
problems offire control and how scientific and engineering reSearch might contribute solutions.
0-2 absorbed this diverse technical knowledge into its own fledgling organization.
With key problem areas identified, and a budding core ofexpertise, D-2 began to define its
program. At an October meeting Weaver outlined critical areas and assigned responsibilities. Fry
would coordinate systems, statistical analyses oferrors, and research in selVomechanisms.
Caldwell and Poitras would investigate electrical analogs for mechanical computers and work on
servomechanisms. The whole committee would look at problems of optical rangefinders, evaluate
rangefinder operators, perform efficiency studies ofmanual procedures in loading guns, and
improve instruction books for antiaircraft systems. Also, a standardized graphical language for
mechanical computers (similar to the one Bush designed for the differential analyzer) w('~ld allow
more consistent notation across projects. Claude Shannon, now a post-doc at Princeton was
suggested to create that language, as he had previously created similar notation for MIT's
34 WW diary, October 24, 1940. OSRD70P.
35 WW diary, October 2S, 1940. OSRD7 OP.
J6 CaldweU, "A History of Section D-2, NOr:," February 21, 1946, 7. OSRD7 Office Files ofHarold Hazen, Box
116.
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computers and for relay circuits. In a similar vein, the committee suggested adopting a stand8ld
nomenclature for the antiaircraft problem itself: and compiling a table ofequivalent symbols used
by the army and the navy.37 Weaver soon circulated a memo by Thornton Fry with suggestions for
this new language ofcontrol.31
In November 1940, after this short but intensive two months of study, section D-2 began
letting contracts for research in control. Before examining these projects, however, and D-2 and
Division 7'5 management ofthe technology, it is worth considering the remarkable novelty of
these arrangements. How could a group ofuniversity professors and industrial researchers direct
one ofthe military's most secret and most complex technologies? How did the government
acquire and mobilize this expertise? What resistance did this new approach meet from established
groups? In short: who controlled the technologies ofcontrol?
D-2 's Fresh Approach
During these early months, D-2, a civilian group, acquired proficiency in a highly-
technical, highly-specialized, and highly-classified military technology. For at least ten years,
Sperry, the nation's leading control systems company, had tremendous difficulty making progress
in this complex field. D-2, in contrast, identified the pressing problems in less than three months
and began directing research toward their solution. The members ofD-2 had at least three
advantages which enabled them to tap new sources of innovation. First, they were either Ph.D.s
or academically-trained engineers. Weaver and Fry were among the country's top minds in
applying mathematics to practical problems, and Caldwell among the most experienced in
applying calculating machines to science. Even Poitras, although an engineer'Mth a master's
degree who worked at an industrial firm, had emerged from the engineering science world of
MIT, still :ill unusual pedigree for engineers. This academic background enabled D-2 to use
mathematics and theory which were largely absent from previous military and industrial
approaches to the problem.
The section's second advantage stemmed from the highly secret and compartmentalized
nature offire control. Backed by a presidential order and hotdog the strings on a large purse,
these men had unprecedented access. Even in their first two months, D-2 mernoers achieved an
37DiaJy ofS«:tioo 0-2 meeting, October 16, 1940. OSRD7 GP.
31 WW to D-2, November 4, 1940. OSRD7 OP.
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overall view offire control that few, ifany, had previously enjoyed. They were shocked to find
almost no communication, indeed outright hostility, between anny and navy fire control designers
(section D-l, the radar committee, had a similar experience, noting the army and the navy were
unaware ofeach other's programs).39 Third and finally, Weaver, Fry, Poitras, and Caldwell were
new to the problem, as yet unencumbered by institutions or traditions. They brought not only
fresh perspectives, as Harold Hazen later recalled, but also "a range and breadth ofexperience
over a variety offields that could see relations between fire control and many varied fields of
endeavor that, superficially viewed, are unrelated to it.,,40 Such seemingly-unrelated fields
included telephone engineering, mechanical computing, and applied psychology. These men began
to see fire control as a particular case ofa general problem ofcontrol: a feedback problem, a
computer problem, and a stability problem.
The NDRC Reorganizes
Within a year of its founding, the NDRC spent more than $6 million (it would spend more
than 5500 million between 1941-46), and had grown to such a size and complexity that it needed
reorganization.41 In June 1941, an executive order created the Office of Scientific Research and
Development (OSRD), which incorporated the NDRC along with a number ofother committees,
including medical research. NDRC's responsibilities expanded to include more design, pilot
production in some cases, and less fundamental research.
In December, 1942, the NDRC itselfreorganized into a more bureaucratic form. 42 The
earlier four divisions now became seventeen, numbered instead of lettered, D-2 now became
Division 7, still responsible for fire control. Other divisions included ballistics, missiles, subsurface
warfare, and electrical communication. Harold Hazen headed the new Division 7. Possibly
because offiiction at D-2 (see Chapter 7), Warren Weaver moved to head the newly-created
19 Guerlac, Radar in World War IL 249 and 2S2, note 20.
40 Harold Hazen, Summary Tc:chical Report ofDivision 7. NDRC Volume I: Gunfire Control (Washington: Office
of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense~h Committee, 1946), S.
41 Inin Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War: The Administrative History of the Office of Scientific .
Research and Development (Boston: Little Brown aDd Co., !948), 322. Owens, "The Counterproductive
Maoqement of Science," bas comprehensive statistics for OSRD funding.
42 Early in 1942 Weaver became afraid the powing size of the NDRC would mean "it will spend a great deal of its
eDeIJY solving problems which it itselfcreates." He lamented to Bush his longing for the days of July, 1940, when
"the NDRC was small, indefinitely Oexible, mobile, and unafraid." WW DiaIy, "'darcb 19, 1942. OSRD7 GP Box
70, collected diaries volume 3.
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Applied Mathematics Panel (AMP), which collected mathematicians to provide analysis services
to the divisions. Weaver remained a member ofDivision 7 as an advisor and as liaison with AMP.
In late 1942, Weaver and Hazen planned the transition of leadership. All ofD-2's projects
were transferred to the new Division 7, except for several "ofan essentially mathematical
character.,,43 These went to the Applied Mathematics Panel, which Weaver headed alocg with
Thornton Fry. The AMP embodied ofFry's vision for the Mathematics Department at Bell Labs,
of the industrial mathematician as "a consultant, not a project man. n44 \Veaver' s new position was
no doubt more suited than the messy industrial world ofmilitary control systems contracting to
his preference for fundamental research and his talents as a science manager.4S
Divi~ion 7 became more established, more bureaucratic, and more procedural than D-2.
Hazen, the engineer, administrator, and department head replaced Weaver the science manager"
Division 7 meetings became more budgetary and contractual than the mix ofadministration and
engineering which characterized D-2. The division funded no "fundamental" research which did
not show immediate promise ofcontributing to the war effort, and indeed canceled several
significant projects.46
The character ofthe contracts reflected the shift away from fundamental work: Division
7's research became more industrial than 0-2's. Offifty-two control contracts let before 1943,
founy-four percent went to academic institutions, the remainder to companies (including
industrial labs). Under Division 7, only eighteen percent went to universities. Committee logistics,
and hence committee culture, continued the trend toward industry. Under Weaver, D-2 had met
fifty-five floors above New York City in the lush Rockefeller Center headquarters of the
Rockefeller Foundation. Under Hazen about half the meetings remained in New York but the
other half rotated between the industrial organizations on which the division depended, including
Sperry Gyroscope, General Electric, the Franklin Institute, the army's Aberdeen Proving Ground,
and MIT's Radiation Laboratory. Usually such gatherings lasted two days, including laboratory
..] WW diary\ November~, 1942, and November 12, 1942. OSRD7 GP Box 72, collected diaries volume S. WW to
Heads ofDivisioDS 4,~,6,7,14, December 10, 1942. OSRD Applied Mathematics Panel General Records, E-151,
Box 16.
44 Thornton C. Fry, "Industrial Mathematics," BSTJ 20 (00.3, July 1941), 258.
• 5 Lany Owens, "Mathematicians at War: Warren Weaver and the Applied Mathematics Panel, 1942-1945," in
David E. Rowe and John McCleary eels., The History ofModem Mathematics Volume D: Institutions 8I1d
Applications (Boston: Academic Press, 1989) 287-3G~. Also sec Warren Weaver, Scene of Change: A Lifetime in
Ammcan Science (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 87.
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tours and equipment demonstrations. Despite its different style, Division 7 carried on D-2's wor~
retNning its cont~s and letting new ones. The easygoing Hazen recalled Division 7 meetings as
"'family affairs' ...among friends in which the discussion was often brutally frank and in \\'hich no
punches were pulled." 47
Division 7 divided into a numbJ~r ofsubsections. [*Figure 6-1: Division 7 photo] l"heir
organization indicates the growth in complexity and variety offire control problems in the two
years since Weaver's initial assignments:
7.1 Grmmd-based antiaircraftfire control.
Chid: Duncan Stewart, President of the Barber-Coleman Company
7.2 Airbomefire control systems
Chief Samuel H. Caldwell, MIT
7..3 Servomechanisms and data transmission
Chief Edward J. Poitras, Ford Instroment Company
7.4 Optical range finders
Chief Thornton Fry (replaced by Preston C. Bassett, President of Sperry
Gyroscope)
1.5 Fire control analysis (administrative~OD to Applied Mathematics Panel)
Chief Warren Weaver
7.6 Navy fire control with radar (added in 1944 as liaison with the Radiation Laboratory).
Chief Ivan A. Getting, MIT Radiatioo Laboratory
Other Division 7 members and technical aides included J.R. Ragazzini ofColumbia, George
Valley, Karl Wildes and Charles Stark Draper ofMIT, George Stibitz ofDell Lab lratories,
George Philbrick orthe Foxboro Company, Walter MacNair ofBell Labs, John Taplin (who had
identified the similarity of feedback amplifi2rs and servomechanisms), and John D. Tear, Director
ofResearch at the Ford Instrument Company."
Management Style
For five years, 0.2 and Division 7 supervised the research and development ofcontrol
systems applied to wartime problems. During their t~nure, D-2 and Division 7 let eighty contracts
46 Division 7 Meeting minutes, December 18, 1942. OSRD7 GPt Box 72, Division 7 ~Jftetings Folder.
..7 Harold Hazen, to IJvinS~ Janwuy 31. 1946, OSRD7 E-82t Office Files of Harold Hazen Box 6. This memo
contains Hazen's personal observations on the operation cutd management ofDivision 7 and is the basis oCtile
chart inS~OrpniPDI Scientific Research For War. 12.
.. For a fuIllisIinI ofDivision 7 memben, consultants, and technical aides, see United States Office of Scientific
Research and DeYeIopm:al NatiooaI Defease Research Committee, Swnnwy Tec;mical Rew.n.m.DiYision 7.
NDRe yol"ml: Cjt.nfim Control, (Wasbingto, DC, 1946), 168-169. Hannibal Ford bad been mentioned as a
poaibIe member of D-2 IUd DivisioD 7, but be played only a peripheral role. At least three Ford Instrument
Company~ however, Ed Poitras, J.D. Tear, and RE. Crooke~ officially associated with the fire
control division.
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totaling a bit more than ten million dollars.·9 [*Table 6-1: Division 7 Contracts] These contracts
fonned the core ofcontrol systems work in the United States during the war, and incorporated
the four pre-war threads into a synthesis ofcontrol, communications, systems, and computing.
Projects originated in several different ways. Sometimes the services requested work on a difficult
problem. Sometimes the army or the navy turned over existing research projects for the NDRC to
administer. Others tlCose from committee discussions which pointed to a promising or neglected
path of inquiry. Sometimes contractors made proposals oftheir own. Often ideas came up
informally, with preliminary arrangements made through members' personal contacts. '0
The "research contract" itself represented a significant institutional invention. Traditional
government procurement practice dictated the delivery ofsome physical equipment or even piece
ofpaper. Sperry Gyroscope financed its development ofantiaircraft devices in the 1930s by
selling pilot production lots to the government. "Instead, the research contract assumed that the
end item was research and development itself:" NDRC contracts freed wartime research from the
strictures of procurement and assured a free and flexible control ofmoney. To safeguard this
separate sphere, Bush consistently resisted requests from the military for the NDRC to produce
the machines it designed (except for small, temporary, and urgent runs). Preferably NDRe
contractors (companies or universities) would tum production blueprints over to another
organization when research contracts finished. These arrangements also allowed scientists and
engineers to remain in the employ ofuniversities or companies rather than become military
personnel.'lMore important, the government would pay thefull cost o/rEsearch, which included
not only equipment and salaries, but also indirect costs, the now-famous factor ofoverhead.
Division 7'5 standard questionnaire, used to review the status ofprojeets, conveys the
NDRC's goals. Even fundamental research was expected to lead to military applications:
I) Date ofcompletion ofFirst Phase:
2) Date oftramitioo to development:
3) Date at which Mr. Gordon's office becomes involve4: [This was the 'engineering
transition office, charged with "few quick" pilot production]
4) Date offirst field trials:
49 General information on Division 7 contracts comes from OSRD7, General Project.Files. Financial infonnation is
from the NDRC iDdex card fiJ~, National Archives Record Group 227, Index to Contracts.
50 Ibid
51 Dupree "The Great InsttlJlration of 1940" in Gerald Holton cd, The Twentieth-century Sciences: Studies in the
Biography of Ideas (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1970),459. See alsoS~ Organizing Scientific
Research for War, Chapter xm to :d Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science," 521, 525-6.
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S) Date of first effect on military or naval action (few quick in action):
6) Date ofextensive use (effect of mass production):
7) What is the status ofprocurement ofdevices or equipment the new device will supplant?
8) Ifyou had more money and men, what time schedule would result?
9) What is the section estimate of the miltiary significance of the work?
10) Is there a shortage of personnel, equipment, or materials in the research or
contemplated program?52
D-2 and Division 7 members, however, served as more than contract administrators. The
group developed its own methods ofoperating distinct from those ofother divisions. Several
created central laboratories for their work. Division T, the effort to produce a proximity fuze, set
up a lab at Johns Hopkins, which later became that university's Applied Physics Laboratory.
Similarly, Division 14 (radar), concentrated all its resources in a single institution, the MIT
Radiation Lab (the most expensive NDRC project). The members ofDivision 14 served primarily
as contract administrators; the technical work occurred exclusively at MIT (or its
subcontractors).53
D-2 and Division 7 took a hands-on approach, acting in Hazen's words as "a closely knit
group ofexperts...studying, analyzing, and Cannulating service needs in terms ofpossible projects,
then obtaining and directing rontractors in the carrying out of such projects.,,'4 Hazen ran the
division from a special office at MIT, Poitraa managed the main Washington office. Members
took to the road supervising contracts, observing demonstrations, and meeting with military
services. Every month or so the ilivision would meet to discuss projects, report progress, solve
problems, and discuss technical direction. This C'rrangement embodied a more multiple and flexible
appro3ch than the other efforta, but the lack ofa centralized laboratory also had disadvantages.
Outside of its small group ofmembers, D-2 and Division 7 could not build up an institutional
culture, a potential source ofboth stagnation and synergy.
Like Bees Pollinating Flowers - Diffusion and Standards
Still, 0-2 and Division 7 were intensely involved with a wide array ofcontracts, industries,
and services. They sponsored the technology not only as a funding source or technical consultant.
"Like bees pollinating flowers" the members transferred information, techniques and equipment
'2 Edward J. Poitras, "Tentative Calendar of Instnuneutal Developments Section 0-2," April 27, 1942. OSRD7
(~ce Filel of WURD Weaver, Index Folder.
:~l See Dennis, "A Change ofStatc," aDd Guerlac, Radar in World War ll.
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between the contractors, the services, and the other research groups who had not previously been
in contact.55
D-2 clearly articulated this role at a meeting in July of 1941 that the committee held with
consultants to define its relationship to existing industrial contractors. Ed Poitras and Warren
Weaver met with Hannibal Ford and R.E. Crooke ofFord Instrument, William L. Maxson, owner
ofanother military contractor, Preston Bassett, President of Speny Gyroscope, and AI Ruiz of
General electric. Poitras told the consultants "NDRC can make contracts which are decidedly
long shots which the [military] services can hardly do." He offered to help the companies make
university contacts for mathematical studies andhelp them plan and finance test programs. To
Bassett, the most valuable thing the NDRC could do would be to standardize testing proc.edures
for gun directors. Hannibal Ford emphasized the need for "coordinated designs ofdirectors with
microwpve and/or optical rangefinders." Weaver agreed, stating "the NDRC might serve either as
an equivalent to the Bureau ofStandards or as Consumer's Research; those present had in mind a
working arrangement comparable to the Bureau of Standards." Industry envisioned the agency as
an infonnation bureau, providing intellectual infrastructure.
To build this infrastructure, 0-2 and Division 7 standardized symbols and vocabulary,
creating a common language offire control (though not one uniformly adopted by contractors).
More important, the NDRC developed a means oftesting fire control devices, creating a standard
measure for new machines. The NDRC's broad view ofthe secret activity in a number of
laboratories, induStrial, academic, and military, provided a potent source oftechnology transfer,
innovation, and synthesis.
Yet the wartime climate constantly opposed knowledge diffiJsion. D-2 and Division 7
confronted military secrecy, proprietary inaustrial information, and lack ofcooperation between
the army and the navy. These struggles could get rather heated: despite their large budgets and
frenetic activity, Division 7 and the NDRC controlled only a portion ofwartime research.
S4 Hazen to Stewart, January 31, 1946. National Archives RG 227, Office files of Harold Hazen. This letter was
Hazen's personal history ofDivisioD 7 for Stewart's Organizing Scientific Research for War.
55 I borrow this phrase from Menitt Roe Smith, who used it to describe bow skilled workers and supervisors
transferred knowIedF about precision arms manufacturing among government arsenals, private arms makers, and
other iDdusIriaI firms in the mid-nineteenth century, "The Militaly Roots ofM&ss Production: Firearms and
American IndustriaIizatio, 1815-i913," unpublished manuscript. 1995. Dennis has written the OSRD resembled
"a large scale consulting agency," serving as an advisory liaison between indusb'yand militaly. But that view is too
narrow, because it is based only on a study oftbe atypical Section T (which developed the proximity fuze).
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Government laboratories and industrial firms carried on their own relationships with the services.
Finns and universities worked together as well; turfbattles often ensued. Some con:apnies had
much to lose from the new agency: for several decades they held a monopoly on expertise in fire
control. Sperry, for example, made no contracts with Division 7. The company already had a
relationship with the army and was funding research at MIT (b~, Charles Stark Draper and Gordon
Brown) under a navy project (see Chapter 8). Similarly, Ford Instrument had no NDRC contracts,
continuing instead its decades-old relationship with BuORd.
The Contracts
When D-2 began letting contracts in November of 1940, it was still more than a year
before Pearl Harbor, but the country's scientists and engineers were mobilizing. The shock of
December, 7 1941 is barely visible in the NDRC's working documents: by that point its members
had been on a wartime footing for many months. Pearl Harbor surely strengthened the case for
advanced control systems. Before the Japanese strike, few questioned the need for antiaircraft
defenses, but few also had f'Jund it urgent. Afterward, the fear ofair attack was etched into
American consciousness.
The character and distribution ofD-2 and Division 7's eighty contracts map the world of
control systems. Twenty-nine contracts went to academic institutions, the remaining fifty-one to
industrial firms or laboratories. The largest contract cost 51,273,000 (Bell Labs' gun director
work) and the smallest 52,000 (for Norbert Wiener and his assistant), the average was about
SI45,000. The longest lasted nearly five years, the shortest four months, and the average about
two years. More than halfofDivision 7'5 contracts went to institutions along the east coast ofthe
United States, the remainder mostly concentrated in t~e Midwest and California. Most of the
contracting organizations remain familiar today: Western ElectricIBell Labs, MIT, Caltech,
Princeton, the Franklin Institute, Eastman Kod~ Polaroid, Foxboro, RC~ Bausch and Lomb,
Bristol, and Leeds and Northrup, to name but a few.
A Systems Approach
"One must always remember that a fire-control system is more than the sum ofcomponent
parts," wrote Harold Hazen at the end ofthe war. "It is an integrated whole with interrelated
functioning ofall its parts and one is safe in considering the parts separately only ifone always
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keeps in mind their relation to the whole. ,,~6 Before the war an engineering vision ofcontrol as a
general principle had been taking shape, and the NDRC completed the formulation, taking a
"systems approach" to organization, contracts, and engineering.
When the NDRC began operations, Sperry Gyroscope had defined the components of
antiaircraft fire control. [·Figure 6-2: AA System]. Input devices, in the form ofoptical
rangefinders and tracking teleSC\)pes, provided range, bearing and elevation of the target. As the
war progressed, radar took over these functions, at first just for rangefinding and later for
tracking. A central computer or gun director integrated these data with settings for wind, terrai~
and predetermined ballistics, which depended on the particular gun and shell. The director
predicted the future location ofthe target based on its speed and direction and calculated an
output azimuth and elevation for aiming the guns as wen as a fuze setting (the time after firing
when the shell would explode). These data were transmitted to the guns, which pointed
automatically with hydraulic or electric power controls or manually based on "follow-the-pointer"
indicators.
The NDRC came to see this system through the lens of the general feedback device or
governor: instruments ofperceptio~ integratio~ and articulation. Ofthe eighty projects D-2 and
Division 7 funded, more than sixty addressed one ofthese components of the land-based
antiaircraft system. Some built individual elements, some worked on interconnection, some
studied the human operator, and some worked out theory. Most projects attacked the anny
version of the problem; some added speed, pitch, and roll sensors for the navy. The remaining
projects concerned gun controls for airplanes, torpedo and rocket directors, regulators and
governors, and bombing and bombsights (a bombsight is really the reciprocai ofan antiaircraft
computer), and guided bombs.
Surveying the Contracts
Division 7 contractors developed several new gun directors, building on the Sperry
systems or taking entirely new approaches (project numbers 2,30) (see Chapter 9). A combined
project with Divisicn 7, the Radiation Lab, and General Electric built an integrated control system
56 Harold Hazen, "Fire Control Activities ofDivisioD 7, NORC," in Summary Technical Report of Division 7.
NORC Volume I: Gunfire Control. 4. Stuart Bennett has noted the "systems approach" in his comparison of
British and American fire control work during the war in A History of Control Engineering: 1930-1960 (London:
Peter Peregrinus, 1993), 125.
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for naval fire control (71,79,85,86) (see Chapter 8). One project modified Sperry directors,
adding features and integrating them with radars for which they were not designed (S I). The
Bristol Company designed plotting boards to layout the geometry ofan engagement on paper,
similar to those in naval gunnery (64). Several projects addressed fundamental or theoretical
aspects of the fire control problem, including new types of prediction (4, 11 ,12,78), simplified
mechanisms (68), or controllers for new types ofguns. Many studied or improved optical range
finders for various types ofdirectors lind gunsights. The Barber Coleman Company modified the
British MS or "Kerriso~"director for easier production and put together conversion kits to
update the units in the field for higher performance (31). Western ELectric similarly modified the
Sperry M7 (51).
0-2 and Division 7 put a great deal ofeffort into instruments of perception, improving
classical optical ranging and tracking. Polaroid developed a "short base" rangefinder for use with
small guns or aboard an airplane (32). Barber Coleman combined traclrJng telescopes and
rangefinders into a single unit (52). Eastman Kodak and Bausch and Lomb studied improved
optics and geometries for ranging devices. They found a major source oferror to be optical
distortions caused by temperature differential ofair within the sight itself: Filling the devices with
helium markedly improved their accuracy; the American Gas Association provided its testing lab
for this work and designed seals and pressure reliefvalves for containing the gas (41). Other
sources oferror included haze, camouflage on targets, low light levels, and misalignment and bad
calibration. Some studies considered optical design, reticule patterns, illuminated reticules, and
eyepieces (44,58).
"Lead computing sights" moved the gunner's reticule to automatically lead the target for
gunners defending against close in attack (61,73). The McMath-Hulbert ObselVatory at the
University of Michigan studied pneumatic controls for these sights (40), as did Eastman Kodak.
The Bristol Company designed an antiaircraft rocket director (38), Bausch and Lomb and Barber
Coleman antitank sights (59,66), and a stabilizer for an aerial camera, and General Electric a
torpedo director (72).
Even at the start ofthe war, microwave ranging techniques (later called radar) showed the
potential to automate perception and replace optical tracking. Still, the technology remained in its
infancy, and many feared the enemy would dev~op suitable countermeasures and render
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microwave detection useless. 0-2 let a contract to Bell Labs for a "radio ranging device" which
would replace the most ~nreliable input to a director. The result of that project, the SCR-547
radar, was nicknamed "Mickey" because its separate parabolic antennas for send and receive gave
it the look ofmouse ears. This de' ice detennined range only, and needed to accompany telescope
tracking (14). Westinghouse ~aui1t a radar which could measure the velocity ofa shell as it left the
muzzle ora gun (65,83), but most radar work was taken over by the MIT Radiation Laboratory
under NDRC Division 14.
Division 7 did not have a c..,ntrallaboratory of its own, but two Division 7 contractors had
large laboratories for certain types of fire control problems. Eastman Kodak completed a broad
range ofwork under a single contra..,1 including rangefinder improvements, lighting studies, and
pneumatic controls (17). The Franklin Institute was became a central laboratory for airborne fire
control and conducted studies in torpedoing, bombing, gunnery, rocketry, and integrated systems
(33).
Testing posed a major problem for all types ofantiaircraft devices. At the start ofthe war,
no quantitative comparisons could be made ofthe relative performance ofnew technologies. The
Barber Coleman Company built the "Dynamic Tester" which generated "perfect" inputs for gun
directors and compared their outputs to ideal solutions (25). George Stibitz at Bell Labs made
three digital relay computers for testing, using easily-changed paper tapes as the sources for target
aircraft trajectories (60, 63,54) (see Cha?ter 9). The University ofTexas built a simulation facility
for airborne devi,es (50), another lab developed a means for measuring the smoothness ofa
turret's motion (75) for manufacturing testing.
Division 7'5 most lasting research concerned the integration component ofthe control
system, particularly in the areas ofmathematics and computation (see Chapter 9). Norbert Wiener
ofMIT studied a statistical method for predicting the future trajectory ofan airplane based on its
past performance (6,29). As a part ofthe testing program, George Stibitz built computers that
interpolated intermediate points into trajectories and calculated the ideal output for a fire contra}
system (70,74). RCA studied the feasibility ofelectronic computing methods (48). Engineers at
the Moore School ofthe University ofPennsylvania continued to improve their Vannevar Bush-
style Differential Analyzer (62). Differential analyzers at the Ballistics Research Lab, at MIT, and
at Penn did computations for a variety ofstudies, under a contract with the Franklin Institute (39).
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Division 7 also referred a few projects to the NDRC's applied mathematics panel such as
Columbia University's work on bombing statistics (23) and one for the general analysis ofaerial
combat (47).
Division 7 also funded the articulation component ofcontrol, letting sixteen contracts for
investigations in servomechanisms. The MIT Servomechanisms Lab studied fundamental theory
and designed a number of servos (1,35) several ofwhich were put into large-scale production (46)
(see Chapter 8). Barber Coleman did research in clutch-type servos (27). The United Shoe
Machinery Corporation developed boosters to aid gunners in moving machine guns aboard
bombers (IS), and did fundamental research into hydraulic servos for the gun mounts (16). Other
projects, at Leeds and Northrop, for example, developed motor regulators for use aboard aircraft
(81). Two projects extended the methods ofantiaircraft gunnery to coastal defense, where the
units ofthe control system were separated by long distances and required devices to transmit data
back to a base station (20, 34).
Combining perception, integration, and articulation led to an overall view ofthe system.
Harold Hazen suggested studying the human operator "as an integral component ofan automatic
control system" during the development and design process.'7 Fire control spawned seminal
studies on what today we would call "human factors in automation." Seven contracts studied a
broad array ofpsychological and physiological factors in rangefinding and tracking perfonnance
(10,43,45,37) (see Chapter 10). All except fatigue produced negative results, showing no effects
on ranging or tracking (36,42). Other work sought standards for selection of rangefinder
operators including height, vision, intelligence, mechanical ability, interpupillary distance, and
coordination. This work sought to put what had previously been an ad hoc informal process,
namely matching the capabilities ofthe human to the characteristics ofthe machine, onto a
scientific, psychological, and physiological foundation.
Beyond the Contracts
This summary ofthe 0-2 and Division 7 projects outlines the scope of the research
program and conveys a sense ofthe problems it attacked. As a unit ofanalysis, however, the
57 HuoId Hazen memorandum to Warren Weaver, "The Human Being as a Fundamental Link in Automatic
Controls~" May 13, 1941. OSRD7, Office files of Warren Weaver.
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contract can be misleading; they wert far from equal. A number produced significant advances
and were consistently extended. Others showed no promise and were unceremoniously
terminated. Many successfully completed their initial assign~ents and ended. A few created
important machines that went into production and into combat. Typically, contracts produced
prototypes, pilot studies, and reports. Some projects had been initiated redundantly as "insurance"
against the failure of larger, more central efforts. When the primary approaches succeeded, the
backup designs were not needed.
Together, the eighty contracts presented a technical and administrative challenge to the
members of the sections and their aides. This view alone, however, paints an incomplete picture.
Many contracts were small, short, and insignificant. Some were so broad and lengthy that they
encompassed many smaller projects. To understand more completely how the wartime work in
control systems, we must examine some D-2 and Division 7 projects in more detail. Institutional
cultures, individual engineers, and international events all shaped the technologies ofcontrol. The
military services, the contractors, and the NDRC - both in tension and in synergy - aU sought
the control oftechnology.
Chapter 7 narrates the NDRC's evolving relationship to MIT &nd Sperry which generated
friction over ownership ofnew technologies. Sperry, the pre-war industrial leader in control
systems, had a tense attitude toward the NDRC as the new organization usurped the company's
expertise in fire control. Furthennore, Sperry had established relationships with the services
themselves and didn't need to rely on D-2 and Division 7 for rnilitary projects.
0-2 and Division 7 oversaw a number ofprojects to integrate new radar tracking de'vices
with gun directors to make automatic "blind firing" systems. Chapter 8 compares the two m.JsL
successful of these efforts, the M-9, produced by Bell Labs for the army, and the Mk 56,
produced by General Electric for the Navy Bureau ofOrdn81Ice. Both included radars from the
MIT Radiation Lab, and both eventually became fully operational systems. The two evolved
rather differently, however, due to their differing institutional origins and the technical and
organizational worlds they entered. The M-9 was the first control system produced by the
telephone company, as well as the first electric fire control device. The Mk 56, in contrast, was
built by the established naval fire control industrial base. The Radiation Lab and Division 7's,
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through liaison Ivan Getting learned how to manage large, integrated technology projects in a way
that would later be called "system engineering."
To improve the performance and accuracy of these fire control systems, engineers and
mathematicians at MIT and BeD Labs began to study the flow data throughout the system as a
problem ofcommunications. Chapter 9 shows how this stance, that the true "signal" could
somehow be separated from lextraneous "noise," (even when the noise was generated by the
human operator), began to urlufy problems ofmachine control, communications electronics, and
the manipulation ofinformati()n. This evolution, although incomplete at the end of the war,
brought many different technologies, from electric generators to hydraulic power drives to
indicating dials, under the control ofa single set oftheoretical tools. Division 7 endeavored, with
varying success, to to understa1'ld fire control as a complete system including the human operator,
mechanica1linkages, electronics~ servomechanisms, and computation.
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TABLE 6-1: NDRC 0-2 & DivisioD 7 Contracts 1
Supenilor
"
ntle Contractor IIIvestietor StArt lad Cost
I Sen1Jl8eCWilDl. MIT IIazea IJP 11/1/40 9/1/41 56,721
Z Electrical Directetr WFJBTL Fletdaer DJS 11/6140 9130/43 5224,468
3 Methods of Improving Cal. Tech. Bowen TCF 12/1/40 1/1/43 5127,500
Optical Ran-mnders
4 Geometrical Predictor Cal. Tech. Bowen DIS 1211/40 2/1/42
~
, GeHrai Matbematical MIT WieBer WW 1211/40 1/31/43 528,209
11Ieory~
PredictiM ud Applicatioal
7 Matllaladcal Studies Priacetoa SbuDOll WW 121V40 10/1/41 53,044ReI., to Fire Coatrol
8 Studies ofFile Control Princeton Flood TCF 1211/40 1131/43 $271,509
Equipment
and PcrsoDDeI
9 Mathematical Stuides U. of Wisconsin Skolnikoff WW 211/41 8I1S/41 511,730
10 Psychological and Tufts Carmichael TCF 3/1/41 6130/42 S89,S~
Physiological Factors
of Importance in Fire Control
11 FuadUlelltai Director WElBTL Fletcher DJS 2110/41 11130/45 5166,061
Stlldia
11 PmIictioa Devices Iowa State Atuuoff Tep 3/1/41 11/2142 528,168
CoIleIe
13 Height Finder (MibaIyi) Eastman Kodak: Bishop TCF 3/1/41 S/I/43 539,909
14 Optically Tracked Radio WcJB1L Bown SHe 4/4/41 4/4/42 $38,324
Range Finder
(Mickev)
IS Hydraulic Controls for Small USMC Roberts EJP 2/1/41 3131/42 S50,000
Caliber Guns
16 Hydraulic Servos USMC Roberts EJP 3/1/41 3/1/42 $24,388
17 Fire Control Research EK Bishop TCFI 611/41 11130/45 S24,364
DJS
18 SI,19S,604
19
20 Data Transmission System WFJBTL Clark EJP 5/1/41 211/42 $56,137
(Seacoast)
21
22
23 Statistics ofTrain Bombing Princeton Williams WW 1/1/43 8131/44 SI23,.503
Bombradiers Calculator Columbia Williams
u. ofCalil Nevman
24
2S DyuIaic Tater BC Lilja BLB 1110/41 I13V4S 564,779
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SeapeniJor, ntle CODtnctor laveldetor Start Ead Cost
26 Simplified Electrical GMLabs McMasIer DJS 9/26/41 213/42 $4,113
Predictor
(Elcc. multiplier (or T·21 t
used in WA2)
27 Savoemecbanisms BC LiJjz EJP 4/1/43 12131/44 59,546
28 Intermedialc DiRctor Be
29 IltnpOIadoa, IBterpoiatioll MIT Wlaer WW 2/1/41 1013J42 52,000
udS~i·1
~5t!1tiourJ n.e Selia
30 Electrical Director (8U ll) WEIBU F1ctcbcr DJS 11/10/41 11130/45 S6OO,183
31 Simplified Director (Type Be Lilja HLH lO/IS/41 31-oct $87,000
Be)
32 Shon Base Range Finder Polaroid LaDd TCFI 1211/41 8/31/44 S14O,000
DJS
33 Air-Bome File Control Franklin Inst McClarren SHe 2/1/42 101:\1/45 ~lt070,OOO
Equipment
34 Pilot Model. Data- Leeds .t. Northrop Quereau EJP 211/42 6/jO/43 S29,521
Transmission Svstem
JS IIBpnwe.ellt til Serw for MIT Browa IJP 2/1/41 4130/43 S41~73
37 ud 40_ Gus
36 Effects ofFatigue on Space Dartmouth Pearson TCF 2/1/42 3131/43 $13,500
Perception
37 Effectiveaas or COIItroi. lo_ret Bristol TCF 3/10/42 1131J4S 5247,11%
udDataP_
38 Rocket Director Development Bristol Bristol DJS 4/15/42 6130/44 $50,387
39 Computations Franklin Inst. Allen WW 3/27/42 8131/44 S24,701
40 Gyrscopic Director U. ofMichigan McMath EJP 5/15/42 11130/4' $75,000
41 Helium Retentivity AGA Testing Lab Conoer TCFI 5/1/42 8131145 $64,391
PRB
42 Relation Between Fatigue aDd Tufts CoUege Carmichael TCF 7/1/42 7131/43 S204,000
TnckinIc
43 Acuitites in Telescopic Vision HamIrd U. Holway TCFI 7/1/42 12131/45 SI42,994
PRB
44 EmoIion in Military BrownU. Graham TCFI 7/1/43 8131/45 $38,999
Performance Rdicle D:si~ PRB4' Stereoscopi Acuity Ohio State U. Bridgman TCF 7/1/42 11130/43 514,767
46 Saws for Medium-Caliber Westinghouse Wolfert EJP 5125/42 2/29/44 $81,438
Guns
47 Air Warfare ADaIysis CoIumbiaU. Hotcllinl WW 7/1/42 8131/44 $513,000
41 EIectnMUc ee....1 RCA Zworylda OJS 7/1/42 !2IJ,J41 520,000
Dmca lor ~redicton
49 Fire COD-JuI Analysis Dcvia: Stanolind Oil et Silverman SHe 7/25/42 4130/43 $10.12;
Gas
~ TestiJ1i Plane to Plane Fire U. ofTexas LaCoste SHe 9/1/42 11130/45 $935,000
Control Equipment
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Supenilor
II TItle Coatrador IDvestisator Sttirt Ead Cost
SI M_~M-7 WaJBTL Fldeller DJS 9/1/41. 211/43 S29,94S
Director for field
CMve....
52 CombiDed Tracking and ~C Lilja HLH 9/1/42 8/31/'" 512,978
Ran~efi.ncIin~ Devices
S3 TorpedoD~r mM Daly SHe 9/1/42 3/1/43 $34,954
S4 And-Aircraft Fire Control U ofN. Carolina Ruark! DIS 3/10/42 lOI3!/4S S124,88O
TeWna Shearin
SS Gyroscor1ic Computer Wilcolator Co. Taplin EJP 10/15/42 6130/43 $4,954
(pneumatic)
56 Invar Bar for M-2 Height Bausch &. IAmb Bausch TCf 10/1/42 SIl/43 $2,392
Finder
S7 Air-Bome GunDery GE Bowman SHe 11/1/42 9130/4S $16S,OOO
Conqtuters
~8 Raqe Finder JUdsign EK Bishop TCFI 2/1/43 3131/45 $222,143
ML Bausch m
Keuffel " Esser K.eufrel
59 Anti...Tank Dire=tor BC Peterson ElI' 11/1/42 212814S $21,174
60 PIuIdIed Tape DyllaaUc Wl'JBTL Seibel DJS 11/10/42 10131145 5376,094
Tater
51 ADti,Aircraft Computing Pitney-Bowes Bemart DJS 1211/42 SI31/44 $2',000
SiJdlt
62 blprtWalalt 01 Dilreradd U. fA Pen. Bn.iJlerd WW 12/1/42 8/31144 518"-
Aulyzen
63 Data Ra:order WPJB11., Dow DJS 11/1/42 12131144 SI79,800
64 Cbart Type Data Smoother..t Bristol Waidelich DJS 1/10/43 8131/44 S57,305
RmaDsmitter
6S Muzzle Velocity~'Dt Westinghouse Hanna lAG 111/43 10131/45 $31,634
66 Tank Fire Control Bausch &. Lotnb Bausch TCF 211/4) 8131/44 SII.6~:
67 Vector Gun Sight cl Assesing Jam Handy Org. Campbell SHe 4/1/43 9130/45 ~~iS,820
Camera
68 Mechanical Director Byrant Chucking Rose D.JS 7/1/43 10131/45 $63,874
69 Steerirc Mechanism for Foxboro Howe EJP 8/1/43 9130/4S $50,000
T~
70 Relay 'jaterpolator WElBTL Dow WW 7/1/43 8/31/44 512,075
71 Gyro Unit for MS6 Director GE Coutant lAG 811/43 8/31/44 $48,639
72 Torpedo Director GE Coutant lAC 7/1/43 913OJ4S S39,227
73 Course IuvuiaDt Sights BakcrMfg. Baker DJS 811/43 11130/45 $80,000
7~ AAA BoanI c..Pllter Wl'JBTL Dow WW 9/1/43 9J30/4~ 5108,110
15 Mecbanism to Measwe the Waugh Labs no, EJP 11120/43 8I31/4S S16,117
Smootbnraof
CoatroI of Aircraft Tw1CtS
"'i6 Fire C:mtrol Elewonic:s Columbia U. Rapzz;ni SHe 11/1'/43 9130/4S $85,000
77 Redcsip ofGun Diftctors MIT Edwards ALR 11/1/43 8131/44 SS,773
Mk49
78 Secoad~ Curvature WFJBn. Fletcher DJS 1211/43 12131/4S $21,179
AuaebmcDt
for M9 Director (1'17)
" G.- Dlnctor Mk 5' GE Lefta lAG 1/1/44 10131/45 51,273,532
SupeniJOr
II TItle CHtractor IDvaticator Start End COlt
80 AiJaaft Fire Control Analysis Northwestern Calved SHe 2115/44 10/31/45 $485,000
- Patuxent
81 Speed kcgulator for Motors Leeds & Northrup Lane EJP 2/1/44 8131/45 S12,76Q
and Motor Generators
82 Control Elements for Fire Lawrance Young EJP 6/1/44 9/30/45
Co~troI Aeronautical
AppIieatioos(pncumatic)
83 Cbrooopapb T4 Westinghouse Osbon lAG 7/1/44 10131/4S
84 Components for PDot- Bristol Mabey SHe 7/1/44 9/30/4S
Operated SiJd!ts
8~ Computer for Mk 56 (m Libk8SOOPC lAG 9130/44 10/31/45 5348,247
86m Armour lAG
Tow S11,090,s95
I Source: NDRC !:lda Card File. RG-227. National Archives, Index to Contracts.
NOTE: Sow! COIIl1'act mmtbers not ",.d
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Chapter 7
"Fire Control for the Masses"
and the Senromechanisms Laboratory
The NDRC's research program in control systems, though extensive and far-rangin& did
not cover the entire field. 0-2 and Division 7, in fact, supplemented more than appropriated the
existing technological landscape. They brought in institutions, researchers, and technologies that
had not previous1y,been involved in fire contro~ contracting, for example, with MIT and Bell
Labs, not Sperry Gyroscope or Ford Instrument. The prior infrastructure did not wither or
evaporate. In fact, the Bureau ofOrdnance radically reorganized its research and development,
partly seiDng control ofthe technology from its clique ofcontractors, themselves scrarnilling to
meet the production demands ofa wartime boom. Wrth the vast resources ofwartime ordnance
procurement to back it up, BuOrd's new research division posed a formidable rival to the
immature NDRC.
BuOrd would only rival the NDRC however, ifthey competed for the same resources.
Money was not the issue, there was plenty, ifnot too much, for all. Nor were materials; research,
even with its need for special tools and machinery, made modest demands compared to
production. Manpower, however, especially scientific manpower, proved the bottleneck over
which competing wartime research agendas clashed. Individual scientists and engineers retained a
degree ofchoice, hence they faced local competition and made personal decisions. The contested
terrain, however, proved to be where scientific manpower meets material resources: the
laboratory. In controL one laboratory stretched in more directions, pulled by more actors, than
any other. It was founded by 0-2'5 very first contract, developed close relations with Sperry
Gyroscope, and joined ~omechanisms with telephone engineering: MIT's Servomechanisms
Laboratory, founded by Gordon Brown. Brown simultaneously defined a new laboratory, a
professional specialty, and an academic subject.
Through the Servomechanisms Laboratory (Servo Lab for short), changes in the cootrol
oftechnology bore on technologies ofcontrol. When the NDRC classified and appropriated
Brown's 1940 paper, it plucked servomechanism theory out ofthe civilian sector and deposited it
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into the secret world of military research. This action privileged the theoretical work tnat h.ad
been done at his institute during the 1930s over an existing industrial culture of regulators and
governors. As Brown's paper made its way through the military and its contractors, it recruited
researchers and engineers into the new field. We can reconstruct its path in detail because the
NDRC itselfcarefully tracked the classified document.
The paper, however, accompanied a laboratory, preceding and representing it. When they
classified the paper, D-2 granted Brown funds to found the Servo Lab. Through his laboratory,
Brown created a space within the university for a vision ofcontrol as a general, abstract principle,
possibly the first of its type. "Fundamental studies)" ofselVomechanislns began to merge the
servo theory developed at MIT by Hazen, Brown, and their colleagues with the feedback theory
develope! at Bell Labs. This combination entailed a shift from time-domain analysis, which still
retained the legacy ofpower system transient studies, to the frequency domain, characteristic of
amplifier design. Nevertheless, throughout the war, "fundamental,~' remained an unstable category
- from both the labs' and the NDRC's perspective.
General, fundamental studies and the seemingly pure space ofa lab devoted entirely to
servomechanisms could not exist on their own. Their ~'ery generality and seeming purity, in fact,
depended on an extensive supporting infrastructure ofmilitary applications, commercial interests,
and pressing wartime emergencies. The navy had failed to prepare itself adequately for defending
its capital ships against aircraft, and it eagerly put into production any technology which could aid
that defense. BuOrd reorganized its own research and development, one result ofwhich produced
a fire control research section akin to the NDRe's own. The new organization, staffed with
professional fire control officers, claimed ownership offire control technology - a claim which
inevitably clashed with the NDRC. Such contests characterized the Servo Lab in the first years of
its existence as it struggled to find a foothold on the shifting ground ofcontrol.
DefininK the Outside: ne Professional Culture or CODtrol
At D-2'5 second meeting in October 1940, the committee reviewed the recent work at
MIT on servomechanisms. It decided to obtain a copy ofMustin and Rivero's thesis on fire
control against short-range attacks by high-speed aircraft, written in BroWl~'s course.· The day
after the meeting, Caldwell wrote to Brown requesting that his paper, "Behavior and Design of
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Servomechanisms," not be published for "open circulation" by the ASME. The NDRC, instead,
will "undertake limited publication at its own expense.,,2 Thus the curtain ofmilitary secrecy
descended on servomechanisms, or at least MIT's version of it, just as Brown was about to
present it to his professional peers.
What was the state ofcontrol engineering at the time, and how the NDRC reconfigure it?
The main professional group in America, to which Brown belonged, was the ASME's Committee
on Industrial Instruments and Regulators (the American Institute ofElectrical Engineers dealt
with automatic control only through its committee on automatic substations). As the title
suggests, the group related primarily to industrial controls, factory instrumentation, and the
various pressure, temperature, and flow regulators those arenas employed. Despite, and perhaps
because of: Brown's withdrawal from their 1940 meeting, the ASME became aware ofthe
NDRC's activities. Its president, Edward S. Smith (who founded the group in 1936), wrote to D-
2 in early 1941 offering the services ofthe organization for the wartime effort. He sent a
membership list and an evaluation ofthe members (rating each one with an ~ B, or C) which
outlined the character ofthe organization at the time. Ofthe eighty-nine members, forty-one were
associated with companies, seventeen with universities, and three with government agencies.
Twenty-six listed no affiliation, being either independent consultants or maintaining profe~~ional
membership as individuals and not through their employers.
Unaffiliated members may also have worked for fire control companies who did not wish
to be associated with feedback. None were listed. Those companies which did appear tended to be
either large process-oriented firms like chemical producers (Dow Chemical, Gulf: Monsanto,
Standard Oil) or smaller firms which made instruments for those processes (Bristol, Taylor
Instnunent, Foxboro, Leeds and Northrup). Although EIma- Sperry Jr. belonged to the group,
neither he nor any other member listed as an affiliation Sperry Gyroscope, Ford Instrument, Anna,
or any oCthe Sperry Company subsidiaries (one member was from General Electric). The
university members included Gordon Bro~ H~"old Hazen, Charles Stark Draper, and Professor
Trinks from the Carnegie Institute ofTechnology. Government representatives came from the
I Diary mSedioa 0.2 JDfIdioa. October 16, 1940. 0SRD7 GP.
2 CaIcIwdI toB~ October 17, 1940. OSRD7 GP, Project #11, Box 1. GordonB~ "Behavior and Design of
Servomechanisms," OSRD 39, Report to the Services 2, The Massachuscus IDstitute ofTeclmology, November,
1940.
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National Bureau of Standards, the u.s. Patent Office, and the U.S. Navy Postgraduate School at
Annapolis (the only member with a potential fire control connection). Overall, Smith's list shows
that in 1940, control engineering as a professional group was dominated by industrial process
control. In addition, Smith supplied the NDRC with a bibliography of relevant literature \vhich
reflected a similar bent. Nearly all the twenty six entries relate to process controls, except for n\lo
ofDraper's papers on aviation instruments. The bibliography did not include papers by Blac~
Nyquist, Bode, or either ofHazen's papers on the theory offeedback.3
What would Brown's paper, "Behavior and Design of Servomechanisms," have brought to
this community? It represented the high performance, transient, and analytic approach which
originated in MIT's power systems studies, which Hazen had applied to servomechanisms, and
which Brown and his navy students had developed. It would have brought control to a
community still defined by regulation. But it was not to be; D-2 classified the paper and kept it
from public view. The ASME group and their companies, with the exception ofthe university
researchers, would play almost no role in the NDRC's control systems work over the next five
years. In 1943, for example, Weaver and Hazen killed a proposal to hold a session on
servomechanisms at an AlEE meeting, declaring even that "it is undesirable to use the words
servomechanisms or even automatic control in the announcement or program ofthe symposium."4
D-2'5 action defined the community of con~rol negatively: it was still not clear who would take up
feedback as a wartime cause, but it would not be this established, professional, industrial, civilian
group.
Defining tbe Inside: BrowD'S Initiating Test
With this outside defined, the inside began to take shape behind a curtain of secrecy.
Brown's paper became the initiating text for a new community of military control systems. When
an administrator, researcher, military officer, or company first became associated with section D-
2, they were sent a copy ofBrown's paper. Controlled distribution meant this textual proce::s
l E.S. Smith to T.e. Fry, Febnwy 10, 1941, and attached "Membership List: Process Industries Division,
Commiuec on Industrial Instruments and Regulators.," and D-2 Diary, "Conference with Mr. E.S. Slni~
Chairman. A.S.M.E. Committee on Industrial Instruments and Regulators," February 14, 1941. OSRD coUected
diaries, Box 70. Also see Stuart 8enDeU, "The Emergence ofa Discipline: Automatic Control, 1940-1960,"
Automatica 12 (1976), 115, although Bennett mostly covers the period after 1945.
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carefully documented itself: A list in the NDRC archives ofwho signed out Brown's paper tracks
the growth ofthis new community ofcontrol in detail from 1940 to 1945.' Ofcourse, all
classified papers were similarly tracked, but no trail in D-2'5 files displays the care and breadth of
this paper's path. It was the first, the foundation, the initiation.
Consider the first few entries, for the latter halfof 1940 when D-2 was organizing and
building its network. The first person to sign out the paper was "Dr. Weaver," followed by "Mr.
Poitras." The next six all went to "G.B. Davis, Bureau ofOrdnance," demonstrating the early
interest ofnaval fire control in Brown's work. The next eight papers went to Brown's BuOrd
students from MIT (two each): Hooper, Ward, Mustin, and Rivero. Soon thereafter telephone
engineering applied its methodology to fire control; number seventeen went to Donald Parkinson
and Thornton Fry ofBeD Labs (see Chapter 8). Papers nineteen through forty-three went to
Gordon Brown himself Before the end of 1940, recipients ofthe paper included Brig. General
Somers ofAnny Ordnance, Ray Steams ofGeneral Electric, Thomas Doe, President ofFord
Instrument Company, Arthur Davis, founder and President ofAnna, Harry Vickers of Sperry
subsidiary the Waturbury Tool Company, Theodore von Karman orCaI Tech, Sam Caldwell,
Carron Wilson, and "Dr. Bush." The distribution ofBrown's paper traces the diffUsion ofcontrol
technology, at least in the flavor developed at MIT in the 19305, as it covered and defined the
secret wartime landscape.
SulidifyiDI the Paper's Absence: De Servomechanisms Laboratory
This canonization ofBrown's paper helped spread his ideas and enhance his reputation,
but it also stripped his control ofthe process. Brown no longer possessed the academic's primary
tool for selling an inteUectua1 program, publication. But he needed to sell, for in early 1940 Brown
and his navy students had begun to set up a laboratory, with equipment donated by Sperry
Gyroscope. When his students graduated, Brown soon g,ew frustrated over a lack of manpower
and equipment; without official wartime duties he woultd be unable to get either. Warren Weaver
visited MIT on his initial tour in July, and Brown seized the opportunity, giving him a proposal for
the NDRC to fund projects in servomechanisms.
4 ww diary, October 8, 1943, WW to Prof. CI'OIDWC1l, New Y'3rk University, Octuber 7, 1943, and Hazen to
Edward Momaod, October 11. 1943. OSRD £-151 Applied~_ Panel general records, Box S
ScrvomcchanillDl Folder.
5 "DisIributioD List: 'Behavior and Design ofServomecbanisJns," OSRD7 GP Project t# I, Box 1.
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Brown's proposal, academic to the point ofpedantry, discussed highly technical aspects of
control and circuit theory, and made no mention of military applications. He proposed, "a broad
exploration ofthe properties ofbridges, tuned circuits, non-linear tubes, reactors, materials,
frequency modulation, frequency proportional to signal systems, television principles, from the
viewpoint of their possible usefulness in establishing error, error-derivative, and error-integral
signals for actuating control devices in servomechanisms.,,6 His l~guage held little interest for
those not immersed in the detailed problems ofservos. It would have been hardly comprehensible
to Weaver at the time, and certainly of little note to anyone in the military. This summer, before
0-2 classified his paper, Brown remained a civil scientist. Weaver nonetheless saw the worth of
MIT's control systems expertise, and Brown learned quickly. He submitted anothel, rewritten
proposal which displayed considerably more acumen in trying to attract government support.
Brown began,
There DOW exists at the institute [MIT] a backgrouDd ofexpericDce which bas come first,
as a resuh ofthe work conchacted here during the past decade OIl calculating machines and
associated mechanisms, and second, as a result ofa formal program ofteaching and
graduate research OIl servomechanisms inaugurated a year ago in connection with a
program ofgraduate training for U.S. Naval Fire Cootrol Officers.7
Invoicing ten years ofexperience at the institute, Brown emphasized facilities, personnel,
experience, and direct military relevance: uthus the foundation on which we could build a program
ofresearch on fundamental problems in Fire Control in a relatively short time, and the talent
available for consultation and guidance of such a program are really appreciable." Brown's phrase
"fundamental problems in Fire Control," today reads like an oxymoron - basic research into an
applied problem - but Brown was cannily defining his boundaries. He reached outward and
inward, connecting his work to military problems, and addressing it to the essence offeedback.
Almost as a consolation for classifying the paper, Weaver recommended an appropriation
for Brown's laboratory. MIT would pursue five projects in "fundamental" studies of
servomechanisms. First, a study of relay servomechanisms would attempt to quantify this most
simple and standard type ofservo. Second, Brown would study "the problem ofthe control ofan
hydraulic gear used as a rouow-up system for military purposes." This would extend the earlier
servo theory to hydraulic controls, as well as extending Hooper and Ward's thesis on gun turrets.
6 Gordon Brown, "ProposaL" July IS, 1940. OSRD7 GP Box 1, Project ##1, Box 1,.
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The third project would develop a servo for "for the automatic guiding of an ultra-shart-wave
target locating apparatus," that is, control a radar antenna to track a moving target. Fourt~ and
perhaps most difficul~ Brown's lab would conduct,
an investigation ofmeans for measuring and indicating time rates ofchange oferror in a
servomecbanism when the error is indicated by some electrical quantity such as direct or
alternating voltage or by a mechanical quantity such as angle or velocity ofa shaft. This
problan might be statal as the general problem ofdeveloping anticipation networks.
The "rate follow up" in the earlier Sperry directors had first raised this problem. When tracking a
tar8~ how do you determine how fast it is going? It sounds simple, except that a tracking signal
is jerky and noisy, and noise gets differentiated into very large errors. Studying "anticipation
networks," relates to this problem, as a good velocity signal is needed for the prediction in fire
control (Norbert Wiener would seriously examine this question). Fifth, the MIT lab would
investigate high-power continuous control servos, up to 500 watts.' On November 1, 1940, the
NDRC allocated 524,500 for this work: D-2's first contract, Project #1. On November 9, Poitras
visited Brown at MIT and pickot up his paper on servomechanisms to take it back to Washington
for restricted publication.9
Brown proposed a program not in distributed or integrated control systems, nor even in
mechanical computing, but one exclusively concerned with servomechanisms themselves: devices
to control the position ofheavy machinery by precise1 low-power signals. A selVomechanism is
not a computer or a system or an idea, but a thing, akin to a motor. Brown's program did not
explicitly continue MIT'5 previous experience in computing and infonnation systems, but it did
inherit the common threads of rotating machinery, transient phenomena, and engineering science.
At this point things should have carried on smoothly. Brown had achieved official recognition,
backed up by funding, ofhis servo work in the previous years. IfD-2 had been looking for a
central laboratory, they found the ideal candidate. The Servo Lab, in effect, was set up as the
nation's primary facility for "fundamental" studies ofservos, control systems, and control theory.
But Brown was a practical man, he loved the immediacy ofmachinery; "fundamental studies," by
7 GonIonB~ "A Preamble to a List ofProjects for &II MI.T. GfOl1' Working on servomechanisms," D.d
(about AugusI-Sc:pIembcr, 1940). 0SRD7 OP, Project '1, Box I.
I Wam:o Weaver, "Rccommcndatioa for Appropriatioa," November 1, 1940, OSRD7 OP, Project Nl, Box 1. Tbe
aetuaI coatract was Mt aped UDtiI JUDe 10, 1941, but this was typical procedure for the NDRC at the time. Most
~ spccifiaIboGS arc IIid out ill tbcIc iaformaI "'Rec:ommendatioa for Appropriatioo" memoranda.
FJP Diary. November 9, 1940. 0SRD7 OP Project • At Box I.
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themselves would be a dry contribution to the war effort. He had other suitors besides the
govermnent, and much to the irritUion oCthe NDRC, be did not drop everything for fundamental
research.
Besides appealing to Weaver for support, Brown had also pursued an industrial avenue:
Sperry Gyroscope. Sperry had become interested in Brown's work through Draper, and the
company aggressively courted him when Brown expressed interest in working with General
Electric. The summer of 1940, when Weaver visited MIT, Drown consulted at Sperry and Ford
Instnunent. He returned to MIT wf'..h the tnmk orhis car full ofhydraulics and servo equipment.
Industry gave him what he needed: equipment, pressing problems, relevmce. Brown's original
NDRC proposal., in fact, closely follows Sperry Gyro~pe'~ own research agend, at the time.
The "automatic guiding ofan ultra-short-wave target locating apparatu~" for example, matched
Sperry's work on radar. Similarly, Brown's proposed study ofa "means for measuring and
indicating time rates ofchange oferror," had much in common with Draper's work on a "rate
gyroscope" \0 detect rates ofchange ofmotion for lead computation in a gunsight, already in
process at MIT under Sperry direction. In fact, Brown probably originally prepared his proposal
not for Weaver but for the Sperry Company. Brown crediis Sperry's Willis with sparking his
interest and giving him the term "fresh fundamental approach" to servomechanisms. 10
Sperry Bon-oWI Browa
Sperry had a project underway wit:h the British Merchant Marine to design defettses for
ships traveling up the coast ofNorway to the Russian port ofMurmansk. Norway was by then in
Genn.1n hands and threatened the British with air Ilttaek. 11 As part of this project, in the summer
of 1940, I>rclper was hard at work for Sperry to afJply his "rate oftum gyro" to a lead-computing
sight for Ii~ naval antiaircraft gun,. Draper calied it "a disturbed line ofsight" device. When
calculating the lead, the device would offset the reticule, so all the operator had to do was keep
the target in the crosshairs and the lead would be applied automatically [*Figure 7-1: Mark 14
I°Gonloo S. Brown. Computas at MIT oral history iDlerview with Alex Pan& July 24, 1985, MIT Archi~ SO-S2,.
6'. In a meeting with Karl Compton in October, 1941, Weaver obscrwd that Brown's original proposal was made
for Sperry, altbouIh it caJlOOt be takaI as autboritllM sinte Weaver aDd Brown were at the time at each other's
tbro8b. _ WCI\'a"'._ matches the corrdaIioa mBrown's proposed projects with Sperry's interests
aDd BlOMl'sOMI_ Sec WW cIiaJy, 0cI00cr 30, 1941. 0SRD7 GP Box 70, oolIeacd diaries volume 2.
II Gordoa Brown. iDlaview with auda"f AlJII& 27, 1994. Brown also tdIs this story in his Computers at MIT oral
hisIoIy, 66.
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Diagram]. The ~ght mounted on ~ "dummy" platform, and its motions (still controlled by a
.human tracker) transmitted via a sel!)'ll to a gun (or guns) which "'as some distance away.
Servomechanisms then "slaved" the gu~ to the dummy platform with the sight. By the fall of
1940, Draper completed theoretical work on this idea and Sperry undertook a full development
program.
Be-:.ause ofSpeny's experience with Gordon Brown that summer and his clear credentials
in control, Speri)· resEMch director Hugh Willis wanted Brown's help with the servos for moving
the remote gun. Brown's servomechanisms paper, which Weaver harl sent to Sperry in November,
made it still clearer that Brown's analytical skills with seriomechanisms would be useful to
Sperry. 12 In December. Sperry and MIT's Division ofInd~striai Cooperation signed a contract,
.lust like~ NDRC's, for "fresh, fundamental research" into servomechanisms. 13 Brown was
already obligated to the NDRC, so Willis and Draper pro~'lsed to D-2 that Sperry "borrow"
<: Jrdon Brown for help with Draper's sight. They argued Brown was hiving good luck
sssembling engineers for his Servo Lab, but the work was proceeding slowly dUf; to lack of
equipment) (~thout extensive aid from the services. or industrial concerns, progress with Institute
projects will be very slow.,,1.. Indeed, by this time BrC'wn had reauited a respectable staff Albert
C. Hall, a gradlWte student from MIT's measurements laboratory, Donald P. Campbell, a new
gradwe student from Union College, and George Newton, an undergraduate. l' Eventually
Brown added Jay Fonester, Robert Everett and Wtlliam Pease to the list. But Brown seemed to
be having difficulty making the milliary and industrial connections necessary to acquire the
unusual equipment reqlJired for hjr work. The infant laboratory ~as growing as a group of
t>eOple, but it was stillborn as a set of instruments.
Weaver, responding to Sperry's request, asked MIT President and NDRC member Karl
Compton tllu Sperry be allowed to borrow Brown from his NDRC work for three months.
Because oCtile difficulty acquiring the appropriate equipment, Weaver wrote, "Professor Brown's
program is r.ot going forward efficiently at th~,s time...The Sperry Company, on th~ other hand, is
12 Gillmor to Weaver, November 19, 1940. OSRD7 OP Project Ill, Box 1. This letter thanks Weaver f<if receipt of
the paper, although Gillmor doesn?t appear on the distribution list
13 Manuscript venion ofWiJdes aDd Lindpen, A Centuy ofJ;Jectrical Engineering Kart Wildes P81Jers. MIT
arcbivcl, CbapIcr S, 1001S. For an overview of the Saw Lab IDd Drapcr'slab, sec John Burchard, O.E.D.: MIT in
World War!I (New York: JoIm Wiley 4 80M, 1948) Chapter 9, '70 Make the Guns Behave."
14 Diary ofvilit rATa, SHe, aDd EJP at MIT, December 5, 1940. OSRD7 GP Project #11, Box 1.
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in a position to furnish Professor Brown immediately with all of th~ equipment necessary to
undertake the important job which they propose." Weaver predicated his willingn~s to release
Brown from NDRC contracts on his continuing to teach navy students, and 011 the er.tire lab
returning to its NDRC servo work after three months. During that period, the NDRC would try to
procure the necessary equipment on loan. In Brownt s ab~nce, Harold Hazen would run the
Servo Lab, which would tOcus on building an automatic fuze setting machine. 16 Weaver then
wrote to Bush, releasing Brown of his NDRC responsibilities for three months. 17 But Brown's
attentions, as it turned out, could not be so cleanly divided.
Sperry wanted Brown's help driving guns from Draper's new sight. The company
produced power drives for the Anny's 90mm gun to go with its antiaircraft director, and was now
working on servos for the anny's 37mm antiaircraft gun. The 90mm drives were having terrible
problems in production, and the company wanted to avoid similar troubles with the new device. 18
In ihe fall of 1940, the anny's Watertown Arsenal provided a 37rnm mount for Brown's
laboratory, and he installed it in a confined basement room at MIT.
Designing a fast, powerful, and yet stable servo posed a considerable challenge. Existing
devices suffered from a number ofperformance defects, key among them "velocity lag." This
en~or occurred when the gun tracked a target and was commanded ~Nith continuous motion. While
It moved, aetuaI gun position would fall a fixed amount behind commanded or desired position, in
a "steady-state error. U Sperry's practical feedback artists could not solve this problem, but it feU
within the range of the more theoretical MIT engineers. Here was a chance to apply Hazen's
theory and its fiuits to a practical military and indunrial problem. Sperry had little expertise in
servo theory, but it understood where to find help.
IS Wildes A Cenn,D' of Electrical Engineering manGSCript, Chapter S, 16.
16 Sperry's drvelopment program of the 19305 had produced directon that were accurate enough that the biggest
source oferror wai the "dead time" between when the firing solution was oompleted and when the sheli was loaded
into the gun. Not only was this a sourceof_ delay, but with manual shell loading it varied from shell to
shell. Sbonening and standard.izing, i.e. meclw1izin& the setting and loading (or "ramming") the fuze was thus
the surest way to reduce this uncertainty and improve accuracy.
11 Weaver to Compton, December 12, 1940. OSRD7 GP Project Ill, Box I. Weaver!oB~ December 12, 1940.
OSRD7 GP Project M1, Box 1.
II Sperry Company Report, "Power Controls," February 7, 1944. SOC, Box 40. Sperry's devices Yiere designated
M2 (for the 4.T gun), MJet.M4 (for the 90mm pIn) and T9 (for the IOSmm gun). The controls the Army
eventually asked BI"09iD for help with were Ml and M5 for the 37mm and 40mm guns, respectively.
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Brown and a student, Jay Forrester, solved the problem ofvelocity lag with a special
correction mechanism. Forrester, raised on a cattle ranch in Nebraska, came to the Servo Lab in
January, 1941 after a year at MIT's High Voltage Laboratory. With the help of Sperry's Patent
Attorney, Forrester and Brown patented their controller and assigned it to the Sperry Gyroscope
Company. 19 In the spring of 1941, they tested it with the Army 37mm gun. At Fort Heath in
Massachusetts, a Draper sight, connected to a selsyn data transmission, drove a gun which fired
live ammunition over Massachusetts Bay. An operator directed the sight by hand to track and
airplane and the gun mount moved remotely to follow the sight. The tests rocceeded. The precise
gyroscopic instrument rapidly directed the large gun several meters away, and the servos held up
to the shock and vibration ofthe gunfire. The delicate sights, physically offset from the guns, were
also immune to the aun's effects.20 The SperrylDraperlBrown arrangement had paid oft: Draper's
instrument ofperception drove Brown"s articulated gun, through a human operator who
integrated the system. Precision harnessed power.
Smug Attimdes aad Practical Esperieace
As Sperry's three-month "borrow" ofBrown neared its end early in 1941, Weaver grew
concerned ttw Brown was ignoring his NDRC contracts. He did not profit financially from his
work for Sperry, etrning only a token consulting fee ofone dollar, but his commercial work did
overlap his contract for D-2. Sperry treated Brown's results as proprietary information and would
not allow Brown to release them to Weaver's group. This withholding directly threater.f~ D-2's
selfdefinition as a disinterested clearinghouse for information and controller ofsecret kntowledge
about fire control. Weaver wanted to use any and all products of Servo Lab work for the NDRC's
purposes, which naturally a1anned the Sperry company. Just because the company supp<)rted
some work at MIT, they argued, didn't mean all their technology should belong to the
government. Weaver appealed again to Karl Compton, who declared all members ofSection D-2
should have complete access to all research and development work done at MIT for Sperry by
Draper anld Brown.21
19 Gordon S. Brown and Jay W. Forrester, U.S. Patent 2,409,190, "Remote Cootrol System." The patent lawyer
signing the document was Herbert Thompson, Sperry's patent lawyer of many years.
20 Wildes manUlCri~ A Ceotun' ofElcctrical Enpncering Chapter S, IS-18 quotes Brown's accounts of these
tellS.
21 KTC to aSB, CSD, SHe, WW, TCF and PRB. March 1, 1941. OSRD7 GP Project Nl, Box 1.
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Compton's dictum upset Sperry, which tried to protect itself from the "capture" of its
technology by the NDRC.22 After significant wrangling, Caldwell, Compton, and Brown finally
agreed to cancel those parts ofBrown's NDRC contract which overlapped with Sperry. Brown
consulted with his mentor Harojd Hazen (temporarily in charge ofthe Servo Lab) and agreed the
more "fundamental" aspects ofservo control, and "reducing to practice" ideas already developed,
should renu,lin under MIT auspices, with the more applied work going wholly to Sperry.23 Brown,
who liked tt.1e immediacy ofthe industrial work, dived deeper and deeper itlto Sperry projects and
continued to avoid his NDRC contracts. The original MIT servomechanisms project was slated to
terminate in ~'ieptember of 1941. While many ofD-2 and Division 7'5 other contracts were
continually e',:tended, Project #1 terminated as scheduled on September J, 1941. The contract was
rewrittcm to include only the work already don.e; Brown had spent only about one-quarter of the
budgeted funds.U
This friction between Weaver, Brown, and Sperry ill\.~~rates some ofthe difficulties D-2
faced in beginning its development program. The new organization could work as a clearinghouse
between mutuall}' .lgfeeable organizations with common interests, but established military
contractors lwllittle to gain from the NDRC. To Sperry, infonnation exchange meant loss of
ownership. From their point ofview the NDRC knew little about the company's technology, and
would only appropriate it and give ~l '!O others. Sperry made its reputation developing advanced
and proprietary technology. WI1ether classified or not, the company placed heavy emphasis on
trade secrets, local knowledge, and patents. They were not about to let the technology out of their
control just bectJlse the government had a new agency for research.
~;perry must have been particularly sensitive in the area of fire control, in which they had
put so Rluch effon and had so little to show. In these months, from rrud-1940 to mid... 1941,
Sperry'SI dominance (indeed its monopoly) in land-based antiaircraft fire oontrol steadily slipped
away. Itl the company's eyes, this erosion stemmed largely from the efforts of the NDRC and its
fife control committee. Studies under D-2 contracts showed Sperry's solutions to be inadequate,
22 SHe diary, March 8, 1941. OSRD 7 Projea ##1, Box 1.
23 SHe diary, "Coaf'treoce with 0.5. Brown," March 5, 1941, MConference of Dr. Compto~ 0.8. Brown, and
SHe," March 5, 1941, "Confercoce with H.L. Hazen and G.8. Brown," March 6, 1941. OSRD7 GP collected
diaries, Box 70.
24 NDRC index card file, OSRD7, Index to Contracts. For a briefsnmmary of this episode from the MIT point of
view, sec Wildes manuscript, A Century ofElq:trical Ee&inecrinc Chapter 5, 15-16.
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ifnot plain wrong. Several D-2 contracts explicitly analyzed and corrected flaws in Sperry
antiaircraft directors. D-2 was funding an electronic version of the director at Bell Labs which
would end Sperry's business in the area altogether (see Chapter 8). Already in 1941 Sperry
Gyroscope was transferring plans for its M-4 antiaircraft directors, the pride of its pre-war
development program, to Ford Motor Company for quantity production. Company president
Preston Bassett lamented, "Sperry gets nothing out of this dea1.n25 While Sperry had begun
promising projects in radar in the late thirties, the NDRC, with its newly-established Radiation
Lab, threatened to usurp that technology as weD. Sperry's relationship to D-2 and Division 7,
while not strictly one ofcompetition, began in tension. Despite Sperry's leading position in
control systems before the war, and even despite their continued involvement during the war, it
made no contraet5 with D-2 or Division 7.26
Experienced industry hands saw NDRC members as novices in the coolplex (and not
entirely rational) world offire control contracting. The scientists, for their part, saw this world a5
bureaucratic and inefficient. Weaver had the impression that Brown's project for Sperry was
replicating work done several years before by the Ford Instrument company. In describing the
situation to Compton, he articulated the NDRC's tense relatiol'.ship to the secret politics of
military contracting during this early period of 1940-41 :
It is somewhat peculiar that the relations between the Sperry Company and t.~ Ford
Instrument Company are such that the Sperry Company needs to go to an outside man to
get a job done which could have been done (and very probably better done) by engineers in
the Ford Instrument Company...To the best ofmy knowledge~ two factors have brought
about this situation. First, and most important, the Ford Camp.my is a Navy Contractor
and the Sperry Company an Army contractor, and they have aiways been instructed that
information was to be kept secret between the two companies. But it is also true, I am let
to believe, that the Sperry Company has frequently taken a somewhat smug attitude that
they had a great deal ofpractical experience and that there was very little n~sity for
25 8as&cU ~1aiDcd his anxieties to Caldwell during a visit to the company. SHe diary, SqMember S-6, 1941.
OSRD7 OP coIIecIed diaries volume 2, Box 70. Also see WW to KTC, May 1, 1942 which reports a meeting when
"the younger Sperry men talked rather frankly concemiIJg tbc relationship between D-2 and the Spcrry company
with respect to (antiaircraft) developments." Tbcy felt the NDRC was "more or less ducking the Sperry Company."
C·~RD7 Office Files of Warren Weaver, Box 4, Sperry Gyroscope Folder.
26 The company and the committee did, however, ~ocilc. Weaver noted in May of 1942, "Mr. Bassett of the
3perry Company appeared at the door with t10wers in his band, love in his~ arul kisses on his lips." At that
point Sperry officialJy admowIcdgc and supported the NDRC's efforts in fire control. WW Diary, May 21, 1942,
OSRD7 GP collected diaries volume 3, Box 70. This memo ~rds Speny and Earl Chafee's experience licensing
production of its mechanical gun cIiRdor to other manufacturers. When Hazen took over as bead of Division 7, be
jmmrdiaMIy appointed Bassett as a "part-time" member, formalizing the peace. HLH to PRB, December 1 and
December 8, 1942, 0SRD7 ()fficz Files ofPRston Bassett, Box S3.
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them to lQlll from other source!;. This later point, I believe, has some bearing 011 their
opinion ofSection D-2.
Weaver asked Compton, whom he later described as "a special expert in the Sperry attitude
toward the NDRC," to try to break down the barrier between the "information and experience" at
Ford and the "definite need for material on the part of Sperry Company."27 Nearly ten years after
their integration under a single company, Sperry Gyroscope and Ford Instrument remained
separate universes, largely due to their different military sponsors. When Ed Poitras raised this
issue with the company, Preston Bassett, President of Sperry Gyroscope, pointed to old wounds,
"due to the work of the Sperry Company being ofa commercial nature the Bureau ofOrdnance
had a1\\'ays been reluctant to do business with the company...he suggests that ifanything is to be
done regarding interchange of information it should be done through the Bureau ofOrdnance. ,,28
As a vehicle for the "exchange of information," then, the NDRC was directly replacing BuOrd's
strict controls; the contractors reacted with caution. Furthermore, the lack ofcommunication
between Ford and Sperry mirrored that between the navy and the army. The NDRC, acting as a
clearinghouse, was trying to bridge both these gaps at the same time. To the engineering
administrators, efficiency dictated these walls should break down, but tradition and commercial
interests conspired to keep them up.
While Weaver's perception of Sperry's "smug attitude" because of"praetical experience"
in control systems was probably accurate, they had to have been well aware of the problems with
their control systems. They were having trouble producing stable selVOS for their power drives.
On a typical visit, iI. May of 1941, Bassett, Chafee, and Willis told Ed Poitras of their problems
stabilizing servos. They "avoid the cascading ofservos. If three servos in cascade are required in
an instrument they plan to make the intermediate one a human servO.,,29 The company, especially
Willis, recognized academic control research could help Sperry out of these stability problems.
Draper and Brown held the keys to Sperry's regaining dominance in fire control- hence its
willingness to push the NDRC and demand Brown's time.30 Ultimately, both the NDRC and
27 WW to KTC, March 3, 1941. OSRD7 GP. For the "special expen" commen~ see WW to KTC, May I, 1942,
OSRD7 Office Files of Warren Weaver, Box 4, Sperry Gyroscope Fold:!".
21 EJP diary, Visit to 8~rryMay 14, 1941. OSRD7 OP coUectcd diaries volume 1, Box 70.
29 Ibid
~r seems not to have experienced the friction Brown eocowltered, perhaps because Draper's fiei~
aerooautics, was SIill controlled by NAC~ a more cstablisbcd organiution (recall that the NDRC's charter
excluded all NACA terrain). On Draper's relationship to the NDRC, with whom be bad no contracts, see Michael
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Sperry wanted Brown to solve the same problem: the earlier inadequacy ofmech&nical gun
directors. If the NDRC owned the solution, it could go to any contractor for production. IfSpeny
owned it, they might regain the favor of their old patron, the Bureau ofOrdnance, grown rich
with emergency.
BuOrd'. Antiaircraft Revolution
While the NDRC had to confront existing interests in fire contro17 those interests
themselves were hardly static. In fact, in the year before Pearl Harbor BuOrd changed radically -
responding both to internal shuftling and to wartime events. William Furlong harJ been chiefof
HuOrd since 1937. He headed the Fire Control Section after World War Land introduced
General Electric and synchronous electric systems to fire control7 with the corresponding ouster
ofSperry (see Chapter 2). Despite his earlier innovative role, twenty years later Furlong
represented the conservatism ofan established technology and its organizational structure. In
1940 BuOrd could boast ofits tine systems for main battery control and heavy antiaircraft
directors. But it had no similar technologies for directing machine guns, no fire control radar, no
antiaircraft directors for small ships. Cause and symptom ofthe3e problems, BuOrd relied entirely
on its captive contractors; it had no development or test facilities ofits own. The intense,
frightening first year ofEuropean and Asian war brought home the threat the airplane posed to
the navy. Gennany's invasion ofPoland and the Battle ofBritain dramatically demonstrated the
role ofthe airplane in modem warfare. Pearl Harbor and the sinking ofthe British battleship
Prince ofWales and heavy cruiser Repulse showed that role might mean the death ofthe capital
ship so beloved by the navy.
The navy defended its ships with guns, technology, and administration. In 1940 a new
chief radically altered BuOrd's policies for fire control7 for antiaircraft7 and for research and
development. Wdliam H. P. Blandy a had been raised ~ll1ong the technologies Furlong himself
helped introduce. A 1913 Naval Academy graduate, Blandy was a certified member of the "gun
club." He served as gunnery officer on the battleship New Mexico, which had one of the original
Ford Rangekeepers, and also aboard West Vtr&inia,. which had a new General Electric system. In
these posts 81andy pushed automation and computers as a replacement for manual plotting,
Dennis, "A CbaDge ofSlate:~ political cultures of teehnic:al practice at the MIT Instrumcntation Laboratory
aud the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, 1930-4S," (ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University,
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winning his ships numerous gunnery trophies.31 Ironically, in 1938 Blandy saw the future of naval
warfare while commander ofone of the oldest battleships in the fleet. The Utah had been
converted into a floating antiaircraft gunnery school and a target for aerial bombing practice.
Sitting on the bridge as the passive recipient ofsimulated air attacks instilled in Blandy a passion
for new defenses against dive bombers and torpedo planes. He came to BuOrd in 1940 to
coordinate ant~aircraftwork and to expedite antiaircraft gun production.
Blandy's personal mission became a top priority for the Navy. An Antiaircraft Defense
Board, headed by Rear Admiral Ernest J. King reported in December, 1940 that "the lack of
adequate close range antiaircraft gun defense ofexisting ships ofthe Fleet constitutes the most
serious weakness in the readiness ofthe Navy for war.n32 In February, 1941, Blandy, the navy's
antiaircraft expert, was promoted over a hundred senior officers to head BuOrd; at age fifty,
Blandy was the youngest line Admiral in the navy. Antiaircraft was to define BuOrd's mission
during the war: the u.s. Navy underwent a veritable antiaircraft revolution. BuOrd spent S4
billion on antiaircraft defenses during World War IL its largest single expenditure. Ships began to
bristle with antiaircraft guns. [*Figure 7-3: AA Refit diagram] At the center of this revolution
were light, close-range antiaircraft guOS7 not only because they could fend off dive-bombers and
torpedo planes, but also beca'ise they could be added ad hoc to existing ships. In contrast, large,
centralized directors, no matter how accurate, could be installed only during new construction or
major refits.
Blandy was fiustrated by the conservatism ofthe fire control clique and found the
companies disconnected from practical problems.~~jstorian's observation ofgun technology
in the thirties applies to fire control as weD, uGunnery lost the vision to succeed. Instead of
leading, it went on the technological defensive.,,33 Ford Instrumerlt, G.E., and Arma all had
machine gun director projects underway, but they produced ponderous, impracticable solutions.
1991), Chapter 4.
31 Wbcn Sperry was having production troubles in 1917, Van Aukcn offered to Elmer Sperry to detail Blandy to
the company aDd help smooth out production. Van Auken to Elmer A. Sperry, November 10, 1917. Blandy Papers,
Library ofCongress, Box 1, pcrsoaaI QHTCSPODdcDCC folder. For biographical information on Blandy t sec "The
Navy's Gun Man," Sunday Star, Magazine Section, WashinglOll DC, April 19, 1942. 8landy Papers, Box 1,
BiograpbicaI aDd GcoeaIogicaI Folder, aDd a host ofother clippings in tbal folder.
12 Quoted in Buford RowIaDd aDd William B. Doyd, U.S. Haw Bureau ofQrdnana; in World War n (Washington,
DC: 6uRau ofOrdnance, Department of the Navy, U.S. Government Printing~ 19SJ), 220.
n W.J. JUJeDI, "The Evolulioa ofBattlesbip Gunnay in the U.S. Navy, 1920-1945," Warmip Intemational (00.3,
1991), 265.
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The main antiaircraft director in the tl~ the Mark 37, was having bad problems with stability of
its servOS.34 Decades ofsecrecy, isolatio~ and peacetime had divorced the contractors from the
changing tactical threat. and the pressures ofproduction had frozen complex designs in an
obsolete or inadequate state. Blandy wrote to a coUeague,
When I arrived here I found the Fire Cootrol Section and all of the civilian engineers of tile
commercial companies could think only in tenns of the complete solution, namely: to make
the 1.1 [inch gun) capable ofbringing down any plane 011 any bearing and any position
angle...Well, as you can imagine, such a director involves enough gyros~ cams,
potentiometers, etc. to make your bead swim, plus a great deal ofweight, cost, and time to
deliver.
In peacetime, the contractors produced elegant, complete solutions under expensive contracts.
Blandy agreed on the need for an ultimate solution, but immediate circumstances required
compromises to make antiaircraft directors small, light, and capable ofmass production. "I want
something in a hurry" he pressed, "which will take care of the much simpler problem of repelling a
dive bombing attack on a ship.,,35
BuOrd ReorgaDizes
Toward this goal, Blandy reorganized the bureau. Before the war, BuOrd remained fairly
small, consisting ofonly forty seven officers at the start of 1940, and vertically organized: one
section for fire control, another for mines, another for each type ofweapon. Each section oversaw
research, development, test, production, distribution, and maintenance for its particular
technology. Each reported directly to the chiefofthe bureau. But as the bureau grew (to 309
officers by Pearl Harbor, more than 600 in 1942), the advantages of this concentrated
responsibility dissipated - especially with numerous new and inexperienced personnel. The
section heads were weak; too much responsibility burdened the chief In April, 1941 J then,
following the example ofthe Bureau of Ships, Blandy imposed a vertic;a) organization and
delegated more authority to seni(lr officers. Divisions now had functional responsibility such as ~
].4 These became gun directors Mart 44, 4~t 46, and 47. Most were di5cootinued during development. some
advance models entered die fleet but were quickly rclDOYCd. See FriMman • US Naval Weapons (Loodon: Conway
Maritime~ 1983),243. Friedman's table is largely derived from United States Navy, The U.S. Naw in World
!lar.!L Volume 79, File CopqoIlExcg1t RP"!r). For a Jood summary oldie stale ofBuOrd's wort at the start of
die war, aod its problems, sec Ed Poitras' Data OIl after JJIOl:tiol with Comdr. Franceof~ February 27, 1941.
coUected diaries volume 1, OSRD7 GP Box 70. Although Poiuas amgbl have favored his employer, Ford
IDstrumeDt, his assessment was still bleak.
3S BIaDdy to 1.R. Palmer, Commander, USS llJI!), November 10,1940. BIaDdy Papers, LibraryofCon~ Box I
PenonaI~ Folder.
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production, fleet maintenance, administration, and research and development. The Research and
Development division (designated "Re") conducted fundamental studies, design, and also
production engineering, so it employed all the bureau's en~neers.36 "Re" divided into a number of
groups, with Re14 responsible for fire control design cmd Re4 responsible for fire control. To
initiate him into the new world ofscientific control, Comdr. M. Emerson Murphy, in charge of
Re4, immediately received five copies ofGordon Brown's paper on servomechanisms. Thus
BuOrd permanently supplanted the expertise of the fire control clique. In Murphy's words, it
ended, "the condition where we are totally dependent on a few fire control companies, such as
Ford, Arma, Sperry, and General Electric, for fire cootrol development."37 BuOrd created a
single, specialized organization in charge ofall fire control research and development; the navy
now had its own ~"ersion aCthe NDRC's 0-2.
Still, Re4 had important differences from its civilian counterpart. As a military
organization, it !'.ad much closer contact with the line operations it sought to improve. A number
of its reserve officers had been engineers as civilians, and they often went to sea to gain
experience with problems and equipment, experience which made them, in Murphy's words,
"view things from a much more practical angle.,,3. Unlike D-2 and Division 7, BuOrd had its own
research laboratories, seventeen in all. BuOrd also contracted for private research, spending about
$34 million on research at 162 industrial organizations during the war. It also spent almost
$700,000 in educational and research institutions, much of it at MIT.39 BuOrd did work with the
OSRD which Murphy viewed it as a device "to put the laboratories and scientific agencies of the
country at the disposal of the Army and Navy." Section T, in fact, which develcped the proximity
36 The reorganization had actually begun before Blandy was named chiefof BuOr~ but it was his plan that his
predecessor Furlong began to execute. Julius Augustus Forer, Administration of the Navy Department in World
War n (Washington: United States Navy, 1959), 319. Blandy describes the reorganization in detail, as well as
much of the 811I1*I'. work during his tenure as chid: in "Final Report of present CbiefofBurean ofOrdnance,"
December 9, 1943, Blandy Papers, LibI'8J)' ofCon~Box 1 Official Correspondence FQlder. For the official
history, see United States Navy, The U.S. Navy in World War 0, Volume 13, Research and Development 6-10.
For a list ofBuOnI officers at the start of the war, see Directory, Officers on Duty and Civilian Personnel, Bureau
ofOrdnance. W.E. Furlong Papers, Library of Congress, Box 4, General Correspondence, Military File.
37 M E. Mwphy, "Memorandum: R.qJfJrt ofFile Control Section (Re4), Summary of Activities and
Accomplishments and RA:commendations for the Future." Reprinted as Appendix A of United States Navy, The
U.S. Nayy in World War n, Volume 79, Fire Control <Except Radar), 330.
31 Ibid.
39 United States Navy, U.S. Nayy in Wood War 0, Volume 73, 10-41 contains a remarkably frank discussion oftbe
organization ofn:searcb and its problems; 153-157, "Administration ofResearcb Activities andCon~"bas
contracting procedures and numbers.
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fuze (BuOrd'! primary cooperative project with the OSRD) became a virtual extension ofBuOrd.
Not all projects, however, were as clearly delineat~ technically or organizationally as the fuze.
Part ofBuOrd's antiaircraft revolution required new guns. Because they defended against faster,
closer, and more agile targets than existing guns, new guns needed new controls.
Fire Coatrol for the Masses
Blandy pushed the procurement oftwo new antiaircraft guns which would cover American
warships for the duration oCthe war: the Swedish 40mm Bofors, and the Swiss 20mm Oerlikon.
At the start ofthe war, the navy used 1.1 inch and 30 and 50 caliber guns to defend against close-
in aircraft. The first was just not a good gun, the latter two too weak. Both were aimed by tracer
bullets, which made the gunners feel good but whose seeming accuracy proved illusory. In
comparison, the 40mm Bofors C8lt():\ was powerful and fast, firing a 21b projectile at 160 rounds
per minute - but it needed a director to be accurat~ against moving targets. [*Figure 7-4: 20mm
OerIikon] [*Figure 7-7: 40mm Bofors] It became known for its ruggedness and reliability,
mounted in single, double, and quadruple mounts. The Oerlikon, more like & heavy machine gun,
fired 450 rounds per minute and V'f'as light, easily maintained, and reql~ired no externaJ power so it
could be bolted down anywhere on a ship. A man could freely swing \the gun in all directions with
his own muscle power. Blandy recommended adopting both the Oerlikon and the Bofors while
still head ofantiaircraft, and in November of 1940 Furlong concurred.~~ The Oerlikon began
entering service in late 1941; nearly 150,000 were produced during the war. The Bofors, though it
was adopted by the Army as weli, faced difficult production problems, and entered the fleet in
mid-1942, with nearly 40,000 produced during the war.41 These guns put antiaircraft defense in
the hands ofthe common sailor. Now Murphy needed "fire control for the masses.,,42
Here BuOrd's investment in an MIT connection began to payoff To help with
pr(lduetion, Blandy assigned gunnery officer and former MIT student Lloyd Mustin.43 Blandy also
set up a special anti-aircraft section which reported directly to him, under t,he direction ofballistics
expert Captain E. E. Herman. And at the head ofBlandy's new "Radar D€~~" was Mustin's
40 Norman Friedman. US NayaI Wgpops. 7s-81.
41 Sec RowIaDcIIlid Boyd, 8JIrgu ofOnlpnq in World War n. Chapter 11, for a detailed disalSSion of tile
pnxIuclioa~ thae IlIB
42 MU1rpby,_: Report ofFile CootroI Set1ion (Re4)." J11.
o Bladdy to Palmer, Jamwy 6, 1941. Blandy Papers, Library ofCongrcss, Box 1, personal correspondeut:e folder.
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master's degree partner, Horacia Rivero. Rivero mentioned to Herman that Professor Draper at
MIT had been working on a gyroscopic sight, which might be small enough to fit the new 20mm
Oerlikon. Murphy and Rivero went to see the sight in May of 1941, and followed soon after with
Herman and other Navy officials." They were favorably impressed &Ctd supportoo Sperry and
Draper's continued development of the device, both as a gunsight and as a small director for a
remotely controlled gun. In June, twelve pilot models of the sights were ordered, eight fOl' the
individual 20mm mounts, and four for remote 40mm mounts.4' In October, 1941, BuOrd ordered
2,500 ofthe sights for its 20mm Oerlikon guns, and officially designated it the Mark 14 Sigh!,
also known as the Sperry-Draper sight (more than 85,000 were eventually produced). When the
devit;e operated the remote gun, it became the Mark 51 director (about 14,000 were produced). 46
[$Figure 7-2: Mark 14 Sight] [*Figure 7-5, 7-6: Mark 51 Director] [Figure 8-11: Mark 51
Director]
The Mark 14 succeeded not because ofthe quality or precision of its computations, but
rather because of its compromises. Range was the most significant shortcut. Rather than using a
'bulky and slow rangefinder, the operator merrly estimated range by eye and then dialed it in by
hand - a rough approximation when the range was changing rapidly, as it inevitably would with
an attacking airplane. But such errors diminished in significance as the target got closer (in
contrast, in pre-war directors close ranges exacerbated errors). The Mark 14 sight hit the right
combination of precision, ease oruse, and simplicity in the tactical situation for which it was
designed. It represented the return of Sperry Gyroscope to naval fire control, and also the triumph
ofthe company's simple tight COUpWlg ofoperator and machine over the complex, integrated
systems produced by the fire control clique (actually, Sperry and Draper had originally proposed a
"barber chair" setup where the operator literally sat inside the director, but the navy rejected the
option).
44 Horacia Rivero, oral history interview, 113. Admiral's biographies, Naval Operational Archives.
..sF~ US Naval Weapons,. 86.
46 A number ofaccounts of this project survive. The most contemporary is M E. Murphy, "Memorandum: Report
ofFire Control Section (Rc4)," 312-14. For the view from Speny Gyroscope, see Thomas A. Mor~ "The Navy's
Mart 14 Gyro Gun Sigb~" Spenysco~ 10 (no. 8, August, 1945) IS-17. See also RobertW~ "Gunsigbt Mart 14
and Gun Director Mark 51,91 House Report, January 20, 1944. SOC Box 40. Michael Dennis narraIeS MIT's role in
the transition from instrument to production, "A Change of State," Chapter 4. For the Mark 14 in the context of
BuOnI file amtrol, see United Stales Navy, The U.S. Nayy in World War II, Volume 79, Fire Control (Except
R.r), 160-68. Also see Wildes and Lindgren, ~ntwy ofEIed.rica1 Ea&inecri0C 214-15.F~ lIS Nmval
We:pg. 86.
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These compromises, and the innovative coupling ofoperator and machine, expressed in
solid fonn the combination ofindlUtrial, University, and military technology: the Mark 14
embodied relationships between Sperry, MIT, and BuOrd. These relationships existed entirely
outside of the auspices oftfle NDRC and its Fire Control Committee. BuOrd, with its new R&D
organization, its recent MIT connections, and a private contractor, remained the cutting edge of
naval fire control. You could see it in the gunner's hands.
De Sen'G Lab'. CODtilP'~iDIWork, Oilgear Senol
While BuOrd's ti~ with university researchers blossomed, Brown's relationship with
Warren Weaver soured. The two simply did not get along. D-2 and Division 7's records show no
pattern ofdisagreement a~ consistent as ~hat between these men. Weaver thought Brown "acted
like a baby," and was difficult to work with. But in the fall of 1941, Brown still needed legitimacy
for his new lab, and the NDRC could provide it. He still wished to do servo work for D-2, and
may even have been tiring ofhis relationship with Sperry.·' Weaver distrusted Brown's interest in
fundamental research, "it being WW's opinion," he wrote, "that B. will never be satisfied, having
once tasted blood [i.e. industrial work], to deal exclusively with a patient long-time academic
general program.,M Hazen proposed extending its contract to include some funding for graduate
student work in Brown's absence, but Weaver blocked the move.49
Despite this personal friction, Bro\Yn's work was going well, and he was learning a great
deal from his Sperry experience. He took small, high power electro-hydraulic motors Sperry was
producing and included them in servos for tanks and aircraft turrets.~ He recognized such a
lightweight, portable servo could be deployed in large numbers in war machinery. Rather than
propose a project to his nemesis Weaver, however, Brown brought it up with Compton. Brown
.7 Brown called Caldwell in September of 1941 to "do a little unofficial weeping." Caldwell noted "he is not at all
happy about the way things are going willi Spell)' and himself: but SHe did JHlt press for details." Despite the
unofficial nature ofBrown's weeping, Caldwell wrote it up as a memo and distributed it to the committee. SHe
diary, September 8, 1941. OSRD7 OP, Box ##1, Ptoject File fl.
41 WW diary, October 30, 1941. OSRD7 GP Box 70, coU~ diaries volume 2.
.f9 HLH to WW, August 15, 1941, WW to HI..H, September S, 1941, OSRD 7 GP Project N1, Box 1. Meanwhile, the
original project (agreed to have continued to Brown's absence) to built! an automatic fuze setter did near
completion UDder the leadership ofDonald P. CampbeU (and the oversight ofHarold Hazen), DorWd P. Campbell,
"Report au a Relay CootrolIcr 10 Provide Proper Fuze Time on the Fuze Setter, M8, Corresponding to Director's
Fuze Raqe," OSRD7 GP Project ## 1, Box 1.
50 For a summa')' of the Servo Lab's work in late 1941, see EJP diaIy, December 8, 1941. OSRD7 GP Box 70,
coIIecIed diaries volume 2. And Gordon Brown quoted in Wildes manuscri~ A Cennuy ofElectrical Engineering
Chapter 5, 16.
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predicted the Army and Navy Air Corps might need as many as a qUar!er to a half a million urits;
he displayed a notably non-academic, non-"fundamental" interest in production issues. The
Vickers company ofDetroit made a good hy(lr.wlic device, but it was not amenable to quantity
productioll- unless a new producer was fOUIUI, the device cou!d not contribute to the war effC'°rt.
"It seems impossible," wrote Brown, "for me tO I .10 anything more th~'l bring this matter to the
attention ofsomeone who might be able to brinll a question of this kind into the open."S! Brown
noted that Ed Poitras ofD-2 shared this opinion and had suggested writing the note. Compton
read between the lines - Brown wished to do Clore NDRC work but he could not propose it
directly to Weaver. Two days later Compton passed the message to Weaver.S2 He also gave
Erown'5 letter to VMDevar Bush, with support from the Army Air Corps and Ordnance
Department.
Brown's proposal matched an Anny interest. In early 1941, they adopted the British fire
control system built around the "Kerrison Predictor," named after its inventor, along with power
drive for the gun. The system drove a 40mm Bofors antiaircraft gun, the same one the navy had
adopted. The Army starldardized the Kerrison ta...~ the 1~5 D;rector and Brown witnessed a
demonstration of the ~Is~em in the summer of 1941. Sperry, already under contract to do pilot
production, was assistinlJ Singer Sewing Machine and Delco to go into full produeti:>n.'3 But the
anny was concerned ab<'ut manufacturing the hydrauli,: pump Mci motor which drove the guns.
Firestone Tire and Rubber had a model in production ·which barely worked at all. It had problems
with velocity lag, and it lost power at low speeds. Brown could solve tm3 problem; he at'ld the
Servo Lab were working with a servo designed by the Oilgear CompC:'ny ofMilwaukee which
might re~lace the troubled British design. Hazen prot>Osed an NDRC project for the Servo Lab to
study the problem, Division 7 let contract #35 to Gordon Brown and MIT tQ begin 011 FebrJl'ry 1,
SI It's worth oobD& that Brown's proposal involved placing the servo in production in competition with the Vickers
compzny, a Sperry subsidiary, giviq weight to the 8!~nt that Brown's relationship with Sperry had soured.
WW to KTC, Dcccmbcr 18, 1941. OSRD7 OP Project N35.
52 K·rC to WYl, December 20, 1941. OSRD7 OP Project ##1, Box 1. Two months previously, Weaver had wrir&CD to
Joseph Boyce at MIT, asking him to report on Brown's work. WW to Boyce, October 14, 1941. OSRD7 GP Project
NI, Box 1.
S] Sperry Gyroscope Company, "Memo: MS and M6 Director," Box :J3, Fire Control Folder~ Hagley Museum and
Library. Few the Kerrison predictor in England, see General Sir Fnmick Pile, Ack-Ack, Britain's Defence Against
Air Attack f)qrioC the Second World War (London: Hanap, 1949), 246-7, and 240 for a picture of the predictor in
action. For a diagram of the internals of the Kenison predictor, see .~bdn G. Bromley, "Adalog Computing
Devica," in William Aspray eel. Computing Before Computers (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1990),
IlltJ-89.
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1942, "For studiee and investigaticlls looking toward the immediate improvement of the: British
Oilgear gervo ofthe 40m n gun and the design ofa speed gear servo for .lpplication to the 37 and
40mm gun mounts" - a long way from the "fresh, fundranental research," ofthe previous
contract. Brown's group redesigne~i the Oilgear serIo to eliminate velocity lag and made it
interchangeable with previous SYltems. Fi,,-e months later, the Oilgear servo was SIJccessfully
tested in the laboratory, at the !"\.herdeen Proving Ground and at the Antiaircraft: Artillery Board,
h1 1'1orth Carolina.'4
The NDRC then contracted with Westinghouse to complete a product~.on design, but the
company ran into trouble (project #46). Brown wa:lttZd t~ help smooth out the problem. Weaver
adamantly belie'/ed the NDRC should stay out of production - to him Brown remain~ an
NDRC researcher. Army Ordnance aI!.o felt the NDRC had no appropriate contribution to make
to production desi~ or manllfacturing, and \\ anted them out of the project." Tlie tension
~tween the two men, which had been stewing for nearly two years, came to a head in the
summer of 1942. Weaver, by his own account, "umcrtunately loses his temper and tells Gordon
Brown several things which shOUld have been made clear for him by his mother long ago...This-
has to be charged over against war nerves." Weaver concluded ofthe project, "this whole
business has been completely messed up by the fact that...Gordon Brown is constitutionally
incapable ofcoliaborating in a sensible or adult manner with an}·one.,r'6 Weaver recommended the
project be discontinued, and poitras then refused a request by Brown for further funds. "
Brown's leb continued to help Westinghou~ unrler the direction of Army Ordnance. Tll~
company, it tuined out, ~ad built th~ pistons in the pumps to too close a tolerance. Olle of
~ HLH to EJP, Jauuary 24, 1942. OSPD7 OP, Box 30, Project j35. See also Gordon Brown Computers at MIT oral
history, 59-61.Mr_of Agn~n\ent.Febnwy I, 1941. OSRD7 GI', Box 30, Project #35. This wording is
slightly inaccurate, because the OiIgear servo was .Mlt British. Hazen, Sunmwy Techni.al Report, 40. GSa to EJP
July 3, 1942. OSRD7 OP Project '3S. For the official NDRC history of the pro~ see Lawton M. McKenzie and
Ed Poitras, "History, ktiOD 7.3," 4-7, Marrb 22, 1946, OSRD7 E-82, Office Files of Harold Hazen, Box 6. For
the Servo Lab's history of this pro~ as Wf.:U as the final report on the servo, sec "Report of Swdies on Remote
Control Systems M-I and M_~,n MIT Servo Lab, Division Of Industrial Cooperation Project 6047, November
1942, Servomechanis-ns Laborato:y Papers MIT Archives AC-151 (hereafter referred to as Servo Lab. These
papers were.he office files ofRobertEve~ and are fairly incomplete as documentation of the Servo Lab). Box 2
Folder 8. The Servo Lab devised separate controls for the 40mm gun to be driven by a computer from a data
transmission ~ysIem, and by a human operatl'f with '1 "handlebar input tt See Servo Lab reports in Folder 6 and 7,
respectively.
55 WW to Alan Waterman (Vice Chairman, Division D), August 28, 1942. OSRD7 GF Box 30 Project 113S.
36 WW diaIy,. August 20, 1942, OSRD7 GP.
57 GSS to EJP, AUglR 22, 1942 and EJP to GSB, August 26, 1942. OSRD7 OP Box 30 Project '35.
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Brown's students showed that oil leaking around the piston was equivalent to a damping term in
the servomechanism, which actually improved stability, so making th~ pistons to a wide". tolerance
actually improved perfonnance. For Brown, finding this problem was the ultimate contribution of
an academic lab to the war effort, and oftheoretical study to practical problems ofservos, "If
there hadn't been any MIT [people] leaning over their shoulders, if there hadn't been people
looking at these equations long enough and [who] had some insight into all of the factors that
contribute to the instability" the device never would have worked. ,.
That such similar tensions flared between Weaver and Brown on two success,ve projects,
suggests something more than personal conflict. The two men simply had different ideas of how
the NDRC, and the research it sponsored, should contribute to the war effort. Brown saw little
distinction between his role as a consultant and as a professor. In wartime, he would do whatever
he c.ould to make automatic control useful in the field - even if it meant working on a factory
floor. Weaver, in contrast, he~,d a more traditional view, consister: with his background as a
"science manager" before the war. Brown's work proved etfectiv~ at the level of the individual
researcher but his seemingly casual crossing of institutional boundaries was unacceptable as
NDRC policy. With institutional threats coming from every cornel, not least from BuOrd's new
research division, D-2 would have to carefully define its role to avoid becoming dissipated as yet
another wartime industrial bureaucracy. Bush called his engineers "scientists," so the military
would distinguish them from "the sales engineer coming from one of their contractors." Brown,
Weaver believed, needed to behave more like a "scientists," and les~ like an engineer.
Larger forces intervened to help resolve these differing philosophies. In the NDRC
reorgmization in December 1942, Weaver left D-2 to head the Applied Mathematics Panel. D-2
became Division 7, headed by a man who could not have been more fiiendly to Brown and his
program: his mentor and department head, Harold Hazen. No evidence suggests a causal link
between Weaver's departure from l~ing D-2 and his disagreements with Brown. But Karl
Compton, NDRC member and president tlfBrown's home institutio~ often mediated between
Weaver and Brown. Compton certainly had Bush's ear, so a causal link is within the realm of
possibility. Still, Vleaver remained a consultant to Division 7 and continued to voice his opinions
sa Gordon Bn:..wn, Computers at MIT oral history, 63.
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on Brown. It remains a remarkablt, coincidence that in a time of intense conflict, for the powerful
position of sponsor, Brown's harsi'~st ~ritic should be replaced by his closest friend.
What Wu the Servo Lab!
When D-2 stabilized as Division 7 in late 1942, the Servomechanisms Laboratory's
identity stabilized as weD. Brown tad spent two years carving an institutional and conceptual
space for servomechanisms, servo engineers, and the S~rvo Lab. "We were seeking an identity,"
Brown recalled ofthe period. 59 Until late in the war, the identity he found did not encompass
broad notions ofsystems or computers, but only the servos themselves: powerful motors,
harnessed by feedback to move with precise elegance.
What was the Servomechanisms Laboratory? Despite the capital letters, it had no formal
status within MIT. It was a place, 81 first rJ a basement lab and then in a much larger building on
the MIT campus. Servo Lab was al~ a label fur about a itundred people, including engineers,
students, machinists, administrators, and a handful of professors. Under Brown's direction the lab
maintained an educational mission; young engineering students managed major projects. The
Servo Lab was equipment: gun mounts, electric and hydraulic servos, measuring instruments, and
a rolling platfonn to simulate a ship at sea. "There was no tormal announcement," recalled Brown
of the Servo Lab, "it just grew, because people had a kind ofcompetence that fitted the bounds of
a particular application." And during the war, this competence acquired a reputation with the
army, the navy and industrial firms.
No company related to the Servo Lab like its original sponsor. Sperry ('~9scope's
association did not end with the Mark 14 gunskght. The company and the lab remained intimately
connected throughout the war. Sperry personnel worked full-time in Brown's laboratory, where
they were treated "altnost...as part ofthe family." For Brown's part, "we appreciated, I know, the
chances and privileges ofgoing d\lwn to Sperry [in Long Island]."60 With Sperry as a "catalyst,"
the Servo Lab also retained a close tie to Draper's "C;:>nfidential Instruments Laboratory." Partly
as a result of the Mark 14 and Mark S1 projects, Bro""n's group were seen as the "servo arm" of
DrGper's gunsight work, building the power drives that responded to Dr8per's delicate calculating
59 Gordon S. BI'OWIl, ::Omputel'f at MIT oral hisIory, 75-76. For one description ofthc Servo Lab's operating
eDViroDment, sec Kent C. Redmond and Thomas M. Smith, Project Whirlwind: The History of A Pioooer
CoIIUNICr (Bedford, Mass.: DEC Press, 1910), 10-12.
60 G«doD S. BI'OWIl, Ccmpl1len at MIT oral history, SO, 65..
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~hanisms -- a position Brown looked on with favor. Draper already had re?utation and
prestige, Brown was building it, and the association could only benefit his new laboratory. Brown
explicitly imitated Draper's laboratory procedures, especially the practice of building the pilot
models ofnew devices.61 In contrast, the Radiation lab built up its own servo group; while it let
some small contracts to Brown for servo design, tile devices were not used in practice (See
Chapter 8).
Hams and Ball: Senros as Feedback Amplifien
The Servo Lab's growth paralleled an intellectual transformation, from transient analysis
to the frequer.cy domain. For Brown, lab and ideas were intimately connected; he considered
frequency response techniques "very important to the growth of the Servo Lab and the
development ofserva theol),.,,62 Initially, Brown and his engineers used transient analysis, derived
from his and Hazen's work. They worked directly from the differential equations that specified a
system, adjusting design parameters to get the desired transient response. Brown and Forrester's
early work for Sperry on the 40mm power drives utilized transient techniques exclusively, as did
nearly all Servo Lab work until the end of 1942.63 Typically, engineers would get an existing
servo as a sample from a company or military service and test it for transient response to a step
input, or a constant velocity input. It was quite difficult to translate these responses into
meaningful design criteria, especially when working with an existing system. The inadequacy of
the transient approach, then, related to the Servo Lab's institutional position: it derived from the
lab's practice ofclosing feedback loops around existing actuators.
Radar also stressed the limits of the transient approach. One ofthe Origiilal projects
defined by the Servo Lab was to make a radar drive a servo to move the antenna and track a
target automatically. But radar produced unruly electrical signals with noise fron1 a number of
sources. A servo would try to translate this noise into motion, producing grinding gears, jerky
motions, and pfJssibly instability. Servo Lab member Albert C. Hall remembered simultaneously
the intrusion ofnoise and the attack on Pearl Harbor,
61 Gordon S. Brown, Computers at MIT oral history, 6S-67, 71.
62 Gordon Brown, Computers at MIT oral history, 97.
63 See, for example, "Description and Operating Instructions of the Speny MIT Automatic Remote Control System
for the T-36 Gun Carriage," Division of Industrial Cooperation Project 6041. August ii, 1942, and several similar
reports in MIT Scrvomeclwlisms Laboratory,. MIT Archives, AC-lSl, Box 2 Folder 4. This report was not
declassified until 1962.
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I well remember an instance in which MIT and Sperry were cooperating on a control for
an air-bome radar, one of the first such systems to be developed. Two of us had worked all
day in the [Sperry] Garden City laboratories on Sunday, December 7, 1941, and
consequently did not learn of the attack on Pearl Harbor until late in the evening. It had
been a discouraging day for us because while we had designed a fine experimental system
for~ we had missed completely the importance of noise, with the result that the
system's perfonnance was characterized by large amounts ofjitter and was entirely
unsatisfactory.64
Control engineers the~ needed a new way to conceptualize feedback. Signals were the key. Hall
noted "the advent of racllar required the controls engineer to design equipment to operate well in
the presence ofsignals that he could not even describe mterms then in general use.,,6' The advent
of radar, with its close affinities to communications electronics, required that designers understand
control systems in the frequency domain.
Herbert Harris explicitly drew the analogy between servomechanisms a.'ld feedback
amplifiers. The NDRC published Harris's "Th~ Analysis and Design of Servomechanisms," like
Brown's original paper, as a restricted report.66 It applied the notion offrequency response, Hused
in the radio and telephone arts," to a servomechanism. Building on the work ofTaplin and
Brown, Harris brought together MIT's servomechanisms with Bell Labs' feedback amplifiers,
"The recognition ofthe similarity between servomechanisms and feed-back amplifiers makes
available to the automatic control engineer many valuable analytical tools developed by
communications engineers." Harris proposed a general visiol~ ofcontrol, b~d on the functions of
a system's blocks and not 011 its physical structure. In servo design, frequency response provided
"a powerful aid in thinking about the various factors that can produce stability or instability in a
system." lie employed Black's characteristic equation, Nyquist's stability criterion, and Bode's
magnitude··phase relationship to discuss, probably for the first time in print, a mechanical system
with the tenns and methods of th-e communications engineer. When he left MIT in the spring of
1942, Harris went to w,ork for Sperry Gyroscope.
604 Alben C. Hall, "Early HiSktry of the Frequency Response Field," reprinted in Ralph Oldenberger ed., EmmeJ!£Y
Respogsc (New York: MacMiUan, 1956) 4-5. Much of this volume is a reprint of a special edition ofASME Trans.
76 (DO. 8, 1954). The other Sel"VO Lab engioccr with Hall that day was George Newton. See Wildes manuscript, A
Century ofEledrical Enldoeerig Chapter S, 19.
tiS Hall, "Early History," 4.
66 Herbert Harris Jr., "The Anal)sis and Design of Servomechanisms," OSRD 454 Report to the Services 23, The
Massachusetts Institute ofTeclmt)logy. nis paper was revised and published as "The Frequency Response of
Automatic Control Systems," AJE"E Trans. 6S (1946), S39-46.
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Following Harris7 Albert C. Hall explored in detail the implications of 3 frequency
response approach to servos. His 1943 dissertation, "The Analysis and Synthesis ofLinear
Servomechanisms," formulated "a servomechanism design procedure based primarily on an
analysis of the system response to sinusoidaJ inputs ofvarious frequencies" (the language
"analys~ l and synthesis" alludes to classic& electrical network theory).67 Unlike Harris, Hall did
not build his analysis on the analogy between servos &Ild feedback amplifiers. He acknowledged
the similarities, but also some important differences: servo designers are concerned with precision,
amplifiers designers are not, and servos work in a much lower frequency range than feedback
amplifiers, so the electronic~ are much easier. Hall recognized a complex oftradeoffs between
transient and sinusoidal representations. For example, frequency domain data was easier to
ob~ but servo performance was ultimately specified in the time domain, as transient response.
Hall's analysis reflects the realities ofworking in an academic lab tied to industrial
concerns. He does not offer a rigidly defined design technique, but rather a set ofguiding
principles for the servo designer, "It is not possible to ~'-et up a formal, well-defined system of
servtJ design because ofthe individual nature of specific applications." He developed a number of
graphical 8JId analytical techniques wNhich the designer could use as tools including a "transfer
)O<.;us" plot, compensating networks, lead controllers, and integral controllers. Reflecting the
Servo Lab's abiding interest in reducing the velocity lag of tracking seIVOS, Hall devoted two
significant sections to "minimum velocity error servos." 61 More than most academic writing,
Iiall's wor~( conveys the limitations oftheory in a practical environment.
Harris acd Hall's work fundamentally changed the practice of control system engineering
at the Servo lab. Using frequency response, Servo Lab engineers injected sine waves of varying
frequencies into servos under sturly and plotted the magnitude and phase of the response. Until
67 Albert C. Hall, The Analysis and Synthesis of Linear Servomechanisms, (Cambridge: The TechnCllogy Press,
MIT, 1943). Hall's thesis was published as a restricted report in 1943, and then reprinted in 1947 when it was
declassified. For a technical discussion ofHall's paper, seeBe~ A History of Control Engineering, 1930-1960
(London: Peter Pegrinus, 1~3) 140-43.
61 In a version of his thesis pubIisbcd as a paper in 1946, Hall overcame his hesitation at retaining the distinction
between servos and fccdback amplifiers, and acknowledged his~er locus," to be identical to the Nyquist
diagram. He even changed his title to "Application of Circuit Theory to the Design of Servomechanis~" further
eroding the boundary between electronics and servomechanisms. Albert C. Hall, "Applica ',on of Cirout Theory to
the Design of Servomecban:sms," JFI 242 (no. 4, 1946) 279-307. A close comparison ofth..s paper with Hall's
thesis, tbougb beyond the scope of this chapter, would detail the further merging of electronics and servo theory
during 1943-46.
36tl
1943, Servo Lab reports f.resented only transient analysis. After Harris and Hall, the reports all
include frequency response plots and Nyquist diagrams.69 Ironically, control engineers at MIT
used a graphical technique borrowed from another discipline to define their own technological
practice.
Condulioo
In addition to building servc~ lhemselves, the Servomechanisms Laboratory defined servos
as a field, both intellectual and institutional. It was born through exclusion, as the NDRC
appropriated the theory offeedback controls from the civilian engineering world. During the
course oCtile war, the NDRC distributed two hund'fed ninety four copies ofBrown's paper to the
industrial, academic, and lTillitary organizations, establishing and defining a new landscape of
control. Recipients included:
The United Shoe Machinery Corporatioll, which manufactured power drives for antennas and
guns
Chrysler Corporation, which made Sperry antiaircraft directors and tracking radars for the
Radiation Lab
The US Navy Postgraduate School at Annapolis, for instruction in fire control
John B. Russell end J.1l Ragazzini, NDRC researchers at Columbia Univelsity
The Franklin Institute, which studied airborne fire control for the NDRC
The Navy Department's Coordinator ofResearch and Development
English and Canadian control systems f\.'Searchers
John G. Brainerd ofthe Moore School o;Engineering at the University ofPennsylvania
The Manhattan Engineering District.
The MIT Servo Lab, then, became the founding member ofa new control engineering,
defined by war, and characterized by coUaboration ofacademic engineers and industrial concerns
on high-perfonnance, fiist-aa1ng mechani!l11s. No longer were distant battleships the prin.ary
targets, no longer were fire control computers large, centralized machines, no longer was servo
behavior studied as a purely transient phenomenon, and no longer did the navy's fire co&trol
69 See, for example, Stephen R Dodd Jr., "Design and Test of a Hydraulic Tl3J1SmissioD," MIT Servo Lab, 1945.
Servo Lab Files Box 1 Folder 2; "Automatic Control C_cs ofa 0.682 (;ubic-inch per revolution Oilgear
Hydraulic Trammicsiml," JUDe, 1943, Servo Lab Files Box 2 Folder 2; boIh of these reports present frequency
domain auaIysiI. The only Servo Lab report in the archives which UICS frequency response before 1943 is a project
for stabi.IizinI a radar antenna on a ship done under CODU'aCt to Raytheon. The project report lists DO author, but it
was likely doDe by Hall or Harris, siDce this W2S the type ofproject which led them to their fmquency response
work. Servo Lab Files Box 1 Folder IS.
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clique have a monopoly on the field's technical secrets. The Servo Lab rode broad and converging
trends in the technology ofcontrol and the control of technOlOgy.
Initially, the Servomechanisms Laboratory understood servos as manifestations ofthe
classic.al governor. The lab built drives which represented only a ~ingle component of a larger
control system: articulation. Pumps and olotors articulated the output from perception and
integration instruments design~ by the Servo Lab's coUaborator3, Sperry and Draper. The
laboratory's vision remained local, tied to particular artifacts which embodied feedback control as
powerful, precise motors. Harris and Hall began to expand this local vision with their frequency
domain approach. Now the mechanisms themselves became processors of sign2Js, just like any
other component in a larger system. This vision drew heavily on telephone engineering, and it was
telephone engineers who explored the utility offeedback control for designing overall systems
rather than just individual servos or amplifiers.
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Figure 7-1: Theory of operation of
Sperry/Draper Mark 14 lead
computing gunsight. ( "Gun Sight
Mark 14, Gunner's Operating
Bulletin," United States Fleet,
Headquarters of the Commander in
Chief, Sperry Gyroscope Company
Papers Box 20, Hagley Museum and
Library).
Figure 7-2: Mark 14 lead computing
gunsight connected to Oerlikon
20mm antiaircraft gun (Hagley
Museum & Library)
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Figure 7-3: The Blandy Antiaircraft Program~ Growth in antiaircraft weapons on typical battleships
during World War II. Note the removal of 5"/25 and 3"/50 guns and the addition of 40mm Bofors
quadruple mounts, dual 5"/38 mounts, and 20mm Oerlikons (B!andy Papers, Library uf Congress,
and Rowland and Boyd, US Bureau of Ordnance in World War 11,243,246).
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Figure 7-4: Gunners with 20n1n1 Oerlikon guns and Mark 14 sights defending the USS Hornet,
February, 1945. (Charles Kerlee, from Christopher Phillips, Steichen at War (New York: I-Iarry
Abrams, 1981, 95).
Figure 7-5: Mark 15 sight (n1odified Mark 14 for greater range) integrated into Mark 52 director,
with handlebar controls. Operator follows target with director which remotely drives 40111111or 5-
inch gun 1110unt. (Photograph by the author aboard USS Massachusetts, Fall River, Mass.)
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Figure 7-6: Gunners operating a Mark 51 director, connected to a 40lTIlTIBofors gun off to the
right (from Christopher Phillips, Steichen at War, New York: Harry AbrmTIs, 1981).
Figure 7-7: 40mn1 Bofors antiaircraft gun, operated ren10tely from the Mark 51 director. (from
Christopher Phillips, Steichen at War, New York: Harry Abran1s, 1981).
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Chapter 8
Automation's Finest Hour:
Radar And System Integration
It is nearly as hard for practitioners in the servo art to agree on the definition of a servo as
it is for a group of theologians to agree on sin.
Ivan Getting, 1945
At first thought it may seem curious that it was a aeu Telephone Laboratories group
which came forward with new ideas and techniques to apply to the AA problcnlS. But for
two reasons this was natural. First, this group not only had long and highly expert
experience with a wide variety ofelectrical ~hniques... Second, there are surprisingly
close and valid analogies between the fire control prediction problem and certain basic
problems in communications engineeling.
Warren Weaver, 19451
Engineers at the Servo Lab refined the articulation component ofcontrol; at Bell
Telephone Laboratories they merged electronic messaging with system integration. They extended
the convergence Frank Je\vett envisioned before !he war, where the general notion of"signal"
represents the characteristics ofall machines. Under D-2's Project #2, Bell Labs designed and
built a gun director which employed electronic circuits and servomechanisms for calculation. The
device replicated and replaced the Sperry mechanical directors. B~lI Labs engineers used feedback
to describe not only the amplifiers in their machine, not only its servos, but the behavior of the
system overall.
A new instrument of perception, radar, gave added impetus to this new approach.
Integrating gun directors \\ith radar raised problems of the system's response to noise, the
dynamics of radar tracking, and jittery echoes. Bell engineers then, in conjunction with their rivals
and collaborators at the Radiation Laboratory, learned to engineer the entire system's behavior
from the beginnin'g, rather than just connecting individual, separately-designed components.
I Ivan Getting, "Introduction," in Hubert M. James, Nathaniel B. Nichols, and Ralph S. Phillips Theory of
Servomechanisms (New York: McGraw Hill, 1947) Radiation Laboratory Series 1#2S. Warren Weaver, foreword to
"Final Report: 0.2 Project 1#2, Study ofErrors in T-IO Gun Director," OSRD7 Office Files Of Warren Weaver, 3.
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This new system logic reflected institutional relationships and evolved to suit their shifts.
To the Radiation Lab it meant the designing the system around its most critical and sensitive
component - the radar - and not the director, computer, or gun. By the end of the war then,
the Radiation Laboratory, in competition with a number of other research labs, assumed control
of system design. The Rad Lab ran the war's only successful project to design a fully automatic
radar-controUed fire control system, the Mark 56 Gun Fire Control System. Still, the existing
tangle ofarrangements between the Rad Lab, Division 7, and the Bureau of Ordnance did not
give the Rad Lab the responsibility it sought. Ivan Getting, director of the Mark 56 project,
redefined his organizational role and invented the job of system integrator, a tecttnical,
institutional, and epistemological position.
The Western ElectricIBeU Labl GUD Director
The Myth ofOrigin
The Bell Labs project has its own mythology of origin, starting with the dream ofa staff
member, physicist Donald B. Parkinson. In the spring of 1940, Parkinson \vas working on a
device to record the logarithm of an applied voltage on a strip of paper. It solved a simple
equation, y=log(v), by a logarithmically shaped card wound with wire. An electrical wiper swept
across the card and developed an electrical resistance which varied with the function on the card
(it was thus a "logarithmic potentiometer"). Parkinson's circuit connected to the pe~ and "to all
intents and purposes this small potentiometer could be said to control the motion of the pen.,,2
"I had been working on the level recorder for several weeks," Parkinson recalled,
when one night I had the most vivid and peculiar dream...1found myself in a gun pit or
revetment with an anti-aircraft gun crew...There was gun there... it was firing occasionally,
and the impressive thing was that every shot brought down an airplane.' After three or
four shots one of the men in the crew smiled at me and beckoned me to come cloSf;r to the
gun. When I drew near be pointed to the exposed end of the left trunnion. Mounted there
was the control potentiometer ofmy level recorder' There was no mistaking it-it was the
identical item...It didn't take long to make the necessary translation-if the potentiometer
coold control the high-speed motion oia recording pen with grea: accuracy, why couldn't
a suitably engineered device do the same thing for an anti-aircraft gun!
2 For Parkinson biographical info, see Wisconsin Bell Magazine, D.d., AT&T Archives Box 60 04 01.
D.B. Parkinson wrote an account olms dream on January S, 1975, which is in the AT&T archives and partially
rtprintaI in M.D. Fagm cd., A History of Englgrinl and Science in the Be" System: National Service in War
and Peace (192S-19rn (WhippatlY, New Jersey: Ben Telephone Laboratories, 1978), 135-36.
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To Parkinson, an antiaircraft director was a laboratory instrument engineered for the field. About
June 1, 1940, he proposed the idea to his superior, Clarence A. Lovell. Parkinson outlined three
BTL technologies which could contribute to an "electrical predictor for automatic control,
calculation, and pointing ofa small anti-aircraft gun or mac~jne gun:"
1) A coil winding machine which can \\ind p<>tentiometers on any shaped card thus giving
a rotation \\ruch was a rational function of the voltage applied.
2) An electrical differentiator proposed and tested for another job... capable of
measurement ofextremely small angular velocities.
3) We have desi~ extremely high-acceleration electrical servos, [basedl on electrical
feedback circuits which operate at high speeds and are critically damped. It should be
possible to extrapolate them to larger size and make them swing the gun arounU
automatically. 3
With no pri()r experience in fire control, Parkinson had quickly grasped the essence of the
problem. It reql\ir~ a means of solving equations electrically (#1), a means of ~erivillg rate for
prediction (#2), and a means of moving the guns in response to firing solutions (#3).
Lovell liked Parkinson's idea, and proposed to his boss, Mervin J. Kelley, then Director of
Research ofBTL (later, as president ofBTL, Kelley would direct the project which led to the
transistor). Kelley, in tum, presented the proposal to Frank Jewett, now at the National Academy
of Sciences, who brought it to the Anny Signal COrpS.4 Later in June, Parkinscn, Lovell, Kelley,
and several other BTL engineers met with representatives from the Signal Corps at Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey, which at that time was working on radio detection of aircraft. There the
BTL group inspected a Sperry M4 director and other fire control eq1lipment, and received
manuals and books on antiaircraft and fire control. ' The Ben engineers also presented their ideas
to the Navy, which, content with its own directors, had no interest in the project.6 Colonel Roger
30.8. Parkinson, N<'tebook MI6413, Project File 23140, ATI. For other notebooks on this prQ.~ect. see B.T. Weber,
#16042, K.D. Swartzel, Jr., N17S12 & 16312~ C.A. Lovell, #17665 & 15627,0.8. Parkinson 16413, and B.T.
Weber, 18009. The control system also required an instrument of perception, and here Parkinson repeated a
mistake made by both Arthur p(,l1en and Sperry in their first forays into fire control. He had an idea for a long-
baseline rangcfinder, where two widcly-separate operators trdCked a target and a data transmission system
connected them. With more than one target prexnt, however, it proved nearly impossible for both trackers to stay
on the same one (this idea was soon dropped).
.. For detailed chronology of this project, see "Cbeck list for use in connection with record of laboratories work on
N.D.Re. and O.S.R.C. contracts, DO. NDCrc-127." Project File 23140, ATI.
S E.C. Wente d.iar)', July 3,1940. Project file 23140, ~~TI. For another chronology ofthesc events, see RB. Colton
to M.l. Kelley, October 6, 1944, OSRD7, Project #2 Folder, Office Files of Warren Weaver.
6 These two mccti.ngs were on June 27, 1940 and August S, 1940. Ibid.
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Colton oCthe Signal Corps, however, strongly endorsed the BTL gun director to the vrny's Chief
Signal Officer.'
During their initial period of exploration, Parkinson and Lovell put together a group of
BTL engineers for preliminary analysis. Their study, "Electrical Mathematics," examined the
mathematical functions required for fire control equations: addition, subtraction, multiplication,
division, integration, differentiation, and looking up tabulated data. Lov'ell recorded in his
notebook an idea fer a machine based on el~trical feedback mechanisms. I He described how
"servomechanisms may be used directly in making transformation from one coordinate system to
another without the necessity for setting up scale models having to be considered." He picked up
a general knowledge of the Sperry directors at Fort Monmouth a few weeks befrJre.
Sperry systems incorporated servos in their calculating units (replacing the follow-the-
pointer operators), but only to transmit information between stages. Lovell's servos actually
calculated, with a mathematical element directty in the feedback loop. Servos "solved" equations
by their tendency to reduce the difference between their two inputs, the error, to zero. This
application echoed BTL's use of telephone feedback amplifiers as equalizers to invert the
distortion ofa transmission line (see Chapter 4). Bell engineers commonly referred to it as
"electronic," but they acknowledged it was really "electro-mechanical" - the servomotor t~med
a potentiometer, whose output voltage was a function of the angular position. Lovell noted his
innovation, modeling mathematics with servomechanisms, could make not only a gun director but
general calculator. He saw his Ir-omputing elements as analogous to the mechanical ones used in
eari;er computers,
:..h.e availability ofaccurate diff~rentiators and servo-mechanisms make possible the
solution ofdifferential equations... machines of the same character as the Differential
Analyzer of Bush and CAldwell can be made to operate ~lectrically by the use of the means
at our disposal aLd that a macrJne can be built to solve systems of simultaneous
differential equations in particular multi-nlCSh network equations.9
In his notebook, Lovell sketched an equivalent of the Difterentia.t Analyzer, made entirely out of
servo-mechanic&1 computing devices.
-------_-..--
7 Colton to ChicfSignal Officer, September S, 1940. OSRD7 GP Box 67, Antiaircraft Artillery~ Project
1214, Test ofElec1ric Antiaircraft Director T-10 folder.
a C.A. loveD, June 18 1940, Notebook M1S627, Project File 23140, 1..TI.
9 C.A. loveD, April 14, 1~41. Notebook 115627, Project File 23140, ATI. C.A. Lovell, July 1" 1940, l"otebook
N15627, Project File 23140, ATI.
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ParkiflS(\n worked on similar problems. While his original idea included a wire-wound
pot~~tiometer for solving ~uation" !ii had intended it only for mathematical functions, such as
sines and cosines. He soon realize.'j the potf:ntiometer could look up duta ill ballistics tables,
So far we have not giv~ a grem deaJ of thought to any method of building into the director
the charact~ristics ~f the particu!ar gun \\ith which it is to be used othei than to considt'4
the use of either a ballistic cam or a space potentiometer as suggested by KDS [BTL
&.gineer K.D. Swartzel].IO
Like LoveD, Parkinson displayed growing understanding office control and computing. He
suggested a variation on Sperry)s ballistic cam, a "space potentiometer" wt'aich would solve
functions of two variables rather than the single variable of his "logarithmic potentiometer." Bruce
Wd>er, another BTL engineer, e."amined Lovell and Parkinson's ideas from the standpoint of
feedback amplifier and stability theory so familiar at BeD Labs. 11
D-2 Funds the BTL Director
During this time, while the Bell Labs group sketched ideas, Warren Weaver was
assembling S~ion D-2. The committee learned of the BTL project from the army; soon D-2
visited Beli Labs and met with K:lley, Lovell, Parkinson, Harvey Fletcher, and other Bell
engineers. The group explained electrical computing, show~ schematics of their circuits,
demonstrated a machine for winding potentiometer cards ofany shape, and displayed a sinusoidal
potentiometer. 12
Weaver and D-2 lik~ BTL's proposal. An electronic machine would provide a needed
alternative to Sperry's directors, whose shortcomings were b~ming clearer every day. Bell
engineers argued that electronics worked with great~ accuracy and speed and at lower cost than
m~tumical computing. The NDRC, however, was interested because art electronic fire control
computer would be eas~er to reconfigure 8~d correct in~ of errors in its solutions (equivalent
components could be rewired) than a mechanical computer, whose algorithm tightly connected to
its physical structure. Furthermore, an electronic director could be built by the 'last manufacturing
capacity ofWestern Electric, which was at the time underutilized for war production. Sperry's
resources, as weU as those of many precision mecltanical manufacturers, were already stretching
10 D.B. Parkinso~ July 23, 1940. Notebook #16413, Project File 23140, ATT.
n Bruce T. WdJer, August 7-october 2~, 1940. Notebook M16042, Project File 23140, ATT.
12 WW diaJy, October 24, 1940. OSRD7 OP, Projett 1#2.
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thin. 13 In additio~ unskilled workers could build an electronic director with existing components,
whereas Sperry ballistic cams required complex nr~ chining. The idea was also beinb proposed by
scientis:s from a successful laboratory with a good reputation, an organization familiar to the
members ofD-2. BTL's founder and former president, Frank Jewett, was a director of the
NORC.
The army, although willing to fund the BTL project, proposed to Weaver that the NDRC
take it over, "during the developmen~stage, when flexibility of contract is important." Weaver
agreed. The Fire Control Design Sectio~ oCtile Frankford Arsenal (which had directed Sperry's
work in the thirties) would act as liaison. 14 D-2 let a contract, Project #2, effective November 6,
1940 (until then, Bell Labs had funded the project intemally).l~ BTL would construct an electriCal
gun director, designated T-IO, to drive a 90mm gun via (Sperry) hydraulic power controls. An
opti.".a) rangefinder would provide altitude input, but the machine would include the provision for
radar inputs. It would also keep the constant altitude assumption of previous directors, and
include the "aided laying" feature of the ~IS Kerrison director.
Over the next few months, BTL engineers continued gathering information. They studied
army training courses, director operating manuals, and ballistics t~!>les. Lovell visited the army'~
training schOOlS for antiaircraft gunners and the ar~na1s responsible for technology development.
He requested samples of their telescopes, synchronous transmitters, receivers and other
eqaipment. 16 Frankford Arsenal sent him blueprints for the tracking mechanisms in the Sperry M4
director, and drawings of the M2 director. 17 Ed Poitras of0-2 sent Parkinson copies ofGordon
Brown's paper uBehavior and Design of Servomechanisms," (numbers seventeen and eightetn)
thus admitting BTL to the secret world ofwart;me control, engineering (behind only Warren
Weaver, Poitra.\, the Bureau ofOrdnance, and Brown's four navy students). 11 In less than six
13 Sec WW to General &>mcrs, October 24. 1940. OSRD7 OP, Box 67, AAB Project 1214, Test of Electric AA
Director T·10 folder.
14 WW diary ofpbooe call to Somers, November 6, 1940. OSRD7 OP, Project #12.
IS WW to KeUey, November 9, 1940, Md Memorandum of Agreement between NDRC anU Ben TelepboDf:
Laboratories, May 19, 1941. OSRl' 7 OP, Project #11.
16 C.A. Lovell to Ordnance Dept, Janlla!)' IS, 1941. Project file 23140, AlT. See also Lovell and Parkinson. "An
E1«:trical Director," August 30, 1940. OSRD7 GP Box 67, AAB Project 1214, Test of Elect1ic AA Director T-10
foli.a.
17 C.A. Loven diary, December 21, 1940. Proj':ct file 23140, AlT.
II FJP to Parkinso~November 27, 1940. Project file 2314U, ATI.
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months, BeD Labs electronic director had transformed from an individual's dream to one of the
leading control systems projects in the country.
During most of 194 i, Lovell, Parkinson, and their colleagues designed and built the T-1 0
director, with help from the Mathematical Research group under Hendrik Bode. Throughout, they
conceived and described the problem in the language of rk...u ..~nications. As one engineer put it,
"A servo, in general, involves a carrier, and a means for modulating that carrier according to some
funetio~" using terms radio and telephony. 19 Since the .nathematical quantities in the T-10 were
all represented by C'C voltages, the amplifiers and servos needed precision and stability to
variations in temperature, age, moisture, or any other number of factors - just like the
requirements for telephone repeaters Harold Black had addressed near~y fifteen years earlier.
Inside the T-JO
Figure 8-2 shows the block diagram for the T-10 computer. [*Figure 8-2: T-10 block
diagram] The basic algorithm and data flow closeiy resemble that of the mechanical Sperry
directors. Warren Weaver, in a foreword to the final report on the T-IO project, explained the
:iimilarity,
When this project was first undertaJreo the notion ofan electrical predictor was DeC'essarily
and prop:rly subject to some doubts. It therefore seemed sensible to construct a predictor
which would be a rather close electrical counterpart of the mechanical pre?.ietor which was
the army~s then standard for heavy AA. In this way one would get the most direct and
easily interpretable comparison between the mechanical and electrical ways ofgoing at the
problem.20
Just like the Sperry schemes, the director takes three inputs: azimuth (tAJ, elevation (e:) and range
(r). It produces three outputs for the guns, azimuth (~), elevation (Ep), and the fuze setting/ti1jne
of flight (6T). Box I converts the slant-range input to a voltage, and box II combines slant-range
with elevation to derive its height component. Box III combines the target height with azimuth to
derive the target position in rectangular coordinates (x,y, and v for vertical height). Box IV
performs the actual prediction, deriving the target velocities (i.e. differentiating the position
components with respet=t to time), multiplying the velocities by the time of flight (~T) and adding
them to the original polsitions. As in the Sperry system, the time of flight parameter closes a
feedback loop around the predietioll calculation. The output ofBux IV, then is the predicted
19 KD. Swartzcl, Jr., April 9, 1941. April- June, 1941. Notebook N17S12, Project file 23140, All.
3ft3
position of the target, x" y" and vp. Blocks V, VI, and VII then convert this set of three voltages
representing rectangular voltages back to polar coordinates, represented now by angular shaft
positions. The servomotors do both angular conversion (multiplying by a sine or cosine) and
electrical to mechanical translation. [*Figure 8-1: Lovell feedback servos]
The T-10 had four servo motors, each with a sels}n transmitter for sending firing data to
t~~ gun, thirty DC &"1'J1plifiers, five power supplies, and a host of voltage regulators, adjustment
panels, and controls. The er·.ire unit weighed 1,600 pounds. The human operators sat on a small,
rotating "tracking head," mounted th~ telescopes, which transmitted its data to the "computer," a
rack of electronics on a !Jleparate trailer. ["Figure 8-3: M-9 Tracker] Overall, the system was
"ballistcally complete," i.e. it included all known factors into the ballistic calculation, and
"approaches the ideal ofcompldel/ automatic operation. The only manual processes involved in
its operation are the tracking function! for deriving suitable input data.,,21
Bell engineers envisioned the T-10 director as a f~back system at every levei: troln
amplifiers to servos to the computer as a whole. As engineers at the Servo Lab used frequency
response methods to study their servos, so BTL engineers eroded the distin~ion between servos
and feedback amplifiers, "servo performance is r~ily studied by the highly developed metllod of
feedback analysis. That a servo is a feedback system becomes apparent from a com~)arison of its
action and that of the feedback summing amplifier.,,22 A section in the T-10 final report, "The
COlnputer as a SelVo" explains the feedback in the prediction loop. Were it not for the many
corrections and firing data within that loop, the report notes, the entire prediction could be
performed by a single servo. Overall) "the S}stem has a structural resemblance to a feedback
amplifier with multiple loop feedbac~ and may be analyzed by the usual feedback methods.... the
whole system is stable whenever there is a physical solution, provided the individual servo loops
20 Wanen Weaver, forewortl to "Final Repon: D·2 Project #2, Study of Errors in T-IO Gun Director," OSRD7
Office Files OfWarreo Weaver, 3.
21 Ibid., 129. Consuucting this electrical computer proved DO easy task. Among the many difficulties, none proved
as cballenging as the shaped potentiometers. Tile wire that wrap,oed them needed unifonn resistance all down its
length, and m maintain consistency des,Jite temperature changes. The oddly shaped potentiometers whicb stored
the firing tables required new eqwpment to smoothly wind their wire. Fletcher to RR Williams, May 21, 1941.
Project File 23140, AIT. For a more detailed discussion of the wire winding machine, see Fagan ed., A History of
Engineering 200 Scieoce in the Ben Si'Sfe~!l 144-45.
22 "Final Repon: 0-2 Project '2, Study of Errors in T-IO Gun Director," OSRD7 GP, Project #2, ?7.
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are stable."n Feedback methods developed for the T-I0 became "operational amplifiers," among
the most common building blocks in modem electronics.24
"A Rather Devastating Device: II The Dynamic Tester
The T-I0 posed a problem for D-2: they had no way to ja:.dge it. With antiaircraft
directors, a considerable amount ofdebate surrounded any new de"ice. Did it work better than
older machines? Did it work at all? What did "better" mean? In the words of Sam Caldwell, "It
was literally impossible to make a decision regarding any fire-control equipment from an
appreciation of realistic, quantitative data."~ Before D-2 or Bell Labs c.ould evaluate the T-I 0
prototype, they needed a way to compare, and hence define, perfonnance. One method, live firing
tests, towed a sleeve or sock from an airplane as a target. Gunners tired at the target and
theodolites and cameras observed the smoke from shell explosions. In this chaotic and
uncontrolled scheme, nu01"'-OUS parameters chmged from test to test and even from mfJment to
moment. Different operators produced different test '-esults, as djd thr same operator on different
days. Standardized teSiing became the ideal contribution for the new NDRC group. The function
matched industry's wish for a kind of mi!.\tary National Bureau of Standards. Measuremeilt also fit
the self-image ofthe largely-academic D-~.
A soiution came in 1941, the "Dynamic Tester." Duncan Stewart, President of the Barber
Coleman Company ofRockford mnlois, wanted to work in fire control. Barber Colem~ a
medium-sized manufacturer (1800 employ~s) ofm:lchine tools, textile machinery, small rotary
to")ls, and air-conditioning accessories, had experien~ with temperature controls, follow-ups, and
other types ofclosed-loop devices. Stewart, whom Harold Hazen described as "a very shrewd
savvy Scot" designed an antiaircraft director and presented it to the army. Unimpressed, they put
him in touch with D-2 and Warren Weaver, who had known Stewart as an instructor at the
University ofWisconsin. Weaver, though equally unimpressed with the director design, thought
23 Ibid., Appendix IL "Stability r~nsideration.s.'"
24 The 1947 paper by IUgazzini, Randall, and Russen (also NDR.C researchers) whicb wined the tenn ~'ope.?tional
amplifier" acknowledges the authon drew inspiration from "the circuits emplO}ed in the Western Electric M-IX
antiaircraft gun director (the operational velsioD of the T-IO)." John R. R.agazzini~ Robert H. RauJalI, and
Frcdcri:k A RusselL "Analym ofProblema in Dypamics by Electronic Circuits," Proc.I.R.E~ 3S (tAay, 1947),
444. Also see C.A LoveD, "Continuous Electrical Computati~" Bell Laboratories Record 24 (DO. 3) March,
1947.
2S CaldweU, "A History OfSc:ctiOD D-2, NDRC," february 21, 1946, 10. OSRD7 Office Files ofHarold H1ZCD., 80,:
##6.
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Stewart and the company had promise.26 With the T-IO director nearing completion, D-2 needed
a means for evaluation. In August, 1941, they let a contract to Barber Coleman for a fire control
testing machine, known as the Barber Coleman Dynamic Tester (Project #25).
The Dynamic Tester simulated the inputs to an antiaircraft director by mimicking the hand
motions ofa "pelfect" human operator. Servos turned the handwheels and cranks on the input of
the director. The Dynamic Tester generated the movements from predetermined test flight profiles
for an imaginary target airplane, "programmed" with a set of machined cams. Three cams
determined a particular flight profile in azimlJth, elevation. and range. Programmed courses
included dive bombing, level flight, and close-in attack. The output of the director then fed back
into the Dynamic Tester, which compared it with an ideal output calculated from iL'1other set of
three cams, deriving the "error" for the director and recording it on a chart. Different flight
profiles could he simulated by changing the cams In the tes:er, which also had a "perturb" switch
to add noise to th~ data. The machine cO'lld also measure the director's response to transient
inputs or sine waves ofdifferent frequencies. Thus researchers could characteme the director's
"transfer function," both in the time and frequency domains, to determine its mathematical
behavior as a control system. The machine was not intended to replace live-firing tests, but rather
to measure ideal performanr.e. [*Figure 8-4: Dynamic Tester]
The Dynamic Tester became a fixture at Fort Monroe; groups involved in fire control
brought their machines to be evaluated by the device. D-2 and its contractors could now
q'lantitatively compare control systems under laboratory conditions. The Dynamic Tester allowed
them to make fine distinctions between new techniques. Caldwell recalled, "The Dynar~jc Tester
was a rather devastating device. It had no respect for the opinions ofexpens, including those
within section D-2, and it gave no credit for lucky hits.,,1:1 Barber Colem~'l buiJt a several copies
of their machine and distributed them to contractors, including Sperry GyroS';ope and Ford
Instrurrtent.
The NDRC, through the Dynamic Tester, brought fire control into the laboratory and
under the control ofscientist-engineers. It redefined fire control as a feedback system, a black box
26 WW diaIy, December 5, 1940. D-2 diary ofvisit to Barber Coleman Co., January 3, 1941. OSRD7 collected
diaries, Box 70. TCF to General RH. Somers, March 10, 1941 givtS a brief history of the initiatinn of this project.
OSRD7 GP, Project '25.
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with inputs that could be simulated and outputs that could be measured. D-2 redefined successful
performance: n~t hitting practice targets, but achieving measurable transient and dynamic
performance (mantlest as traces on paper) in a controlled setting. D-2 acquired the authority to
conlpare new t~hnologies and determine their veracity. With this machine, the NDR.C literally
built its expertise in fire control. The Dynamic Tester's paper tapes, ho~'ever, did not yet
persuade the anny.
Making it Work- Delivery and Testing ofthe T-10
The first T-IO prototype, after several months delay, shipped to Fort Monroe for testing
the day before Pearl Harbor.28 Tests showed the T-IO performed about as well, or perhaps a bit
worse, than tile Sperry directors, which were tested at Fort Monroe at the same time. Duncan
Stewart, who had now joined D-2 as a member, oversaw the ~roject with BTL. To him the test
data were inconclusive, and "there was litt[e to choose between any of these [Sperry 01' BTL
directors] on the basis ofresults.,,29 George Stibitz afBell Labs, now a member ofD-2 as well,
shared Stewart's ieservations. He believed "the mechanical inaccuracies in T-IO are completely
swamped by poor use ofdata," and that a "smoothing network" or other method ofeliminating
noise and jitters would improve performance. In Sttbitz's view, the army, overly impressed with
Bell Labs and the new machine, was foolishly rushing into production, "! cannot emphasize too
strongly my own feeling that, since at least $2.5 million will be spent on the first few directors,
every effort should be made to improve this part of the predictor, and this effort should be made
as promptly as possible. ,,30
The Antiaircraft Artillery board rep'Jrted the Fort Monroe tests as showing the T-10 to be
about equal to the mechanical directors. D-2 agreed and argued the device should not go into full
production but rather that a pilot proouetion lot be made quickly for field trials. The army,
however, did not believe in the tester's paper tapes; it accorded little authority to D-2's
27 Caldwell, "A History of Section 0-2," 23. For Hazen's comments ons~ see Harold Haze~ Memoirs: An
Imermal Story or My Life and Work (TJnpublished manuscript, MIT Archives, 1976), 3-38.
21 Duncan Stewart~ "It is imponant to bc2r in mind that the Bell Telephone Laboratories, willI unselfish and
patriotic motives, bas undertaken the development and construction of this instrument in accordance with a
program which DOt only would be foolish under normal circumSWlCeS but is entirely at variance with the Bell
Telephone Laboratories ordinary development procedure." DIS diary, September 20, 1941. OSRD7 OP, Project ##2.
KeUey to WW, December 17, 1941. OSRD7 GP, Project 1#2.
29 DIS to HLH, WW, EJP, GRS, December 31, 1942. OSRD7 OP, Project N2. This memo summarizes Stewart's
numerous objections to the B1L ps-oject.
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quantitative test results. Advantages of production md procurement outweighed deficiencies in
performance. In November, of 1941, the army announced an order for 200 of the directors. The
army did not wait for Bell Labs to complete its own tests; th~ army did not care about D-2's
approval; the army did not do any of its own testing.31 They told Weaver "ifa good suppl}' of
instruments [the T-IO] were available which were not even a1} good as the Sperry M-4, [Army]
Ordnance would still feel compelled to purchase this supply."32 In mid-February, 1942, the army
standard~~ed the T-I0 as the M-9 director. In these tense w~ks after Pearl Harbor, the army
needed quick action on new technology. D-2'5 instrumental approach to fire control could not
counter army procurement imperatives in (1 national emergency.
The army's decision to buy without tf>st results threatened D-2's status as experts. "There
is some unhappy evidence,Jt Weaver reported, "that the higher BTL authoritie~, although perhaps
motivated by patriotic convictions that further delays are not warranteu, nevertheless seem to be
more interested in production than they are in improvement.,,33 To remedy the situation, D-2
acted the only way it could, within its own domain. It extended DTL's contract (named Project
#2c) for improvements in smoothing and error reduction in the T-10 before production. This
work, in the spring of 1942, achieved its intended results, in two '''/ays. It brought the T-IO's
performance to a level that satisfied D-2 and it allowed D-2 to sign off on the device without
losing face. Duncan Stewart, for his pan, remained concerned that the ~!-9 would have
"prohibitive" field troubles.34 Recall, however, that Stewart had proposed a director of his own~
his animus toward the BTL machine contains a hint of residual resentment.
In October of 1942~ the M-9 first came offWestern Electric production lines, inciuding
components from subcontr~tor'i Ford Instrument and International Harvester.3' [*f~gur~ 8-5: M-
9 System] During the war, Western Electric prl)duced more than 1500 of the M-9 director and its
derivative models modified for different ballistics (M-8, M-IO, M-12, M-13 and M-14). The
following year, BTL held a public demonstration of the automatic director at its sjt~ in Murra)'
Hill for a group ofarmy brus, BTL management, and 1,500 BTL employees. ~rhe chief of Army
------------------------ ------~,------
30 GRS diary, Dcc:ember 2S. 1941. OSRD7 GPt Projed ##2.
11 WW to KTC, November 11, 1941. OSRD7 OP, Projed N2.
32 WW to F1etcher, October 31, 1941. OSRD7 G:', Project '2.
33 WW diaty, February 2S, 1942. OSRD7 GP, Project *2.
34 DJS to HLH, WW, EJP. GRS, December 31, 1942. OSRD" ~P, Project #2
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Ordnance told the crowd, "The M9 director,; electrically operated, is, we feel in Ordnance, nne of
the greatest advances in the art of fire control made during this ~var," and he cited its combat
successes in the Pacific. 36 The T-1OIM-9 director was the primary NDRC fire control techno!ogy
to become operational during the war.
The T-J5 Director
The T-10, the result ofa rush project to design an electrical dir..'ctor and get it into
production as quickly as possible, introduced no innovations in computation. It used the same
algorithm as the Sperry M-7, but with electrical components. The Sperry algorithm, however, had
basic problems. Most important, the "Plan Prediction Method," derived the target's velocity
". '. ectly from its position, by differentiating. Observed position data, however, unavoidably
contained roughness, due either to the jerky nature ofhuman tracking, or to electrical noise in a
radar signal. Thus the instantaneous rate or velocity derived from this signal fluctuated wildly.
Smoothing could average out the errors, but only over some time period, introducing delays
which sent stale data to the predictor.
To overcome these problems, in February, 1941, only months after the T-IO began
production, D-2 suggested an electrical director based on new algorithms. This became Project
#11 with Bell Labs, "Fundamental Director StudieSA" BTL designed a new machine, the T-15,
under the direction ofWalter MacNair. Hendrik Bode, as part ofMcNair's team, applied his
experience with electrical networks and feedback amplifiers to smoothing networks for the T-15,
which used AC and not DC electronics. Instead of the Plan Prediction Method, the T-15 worked
entirely in polar coordinates and employed a "memory point ~nethod" for deriving rates. The
director stored an initial data point for the target in a mechanical "niemory." For any future tinle,
it derived the target's velocity by subtracting the initial from the currellt position, and the dividing
the difference by time. The memory point method required no differentiation and inherently
smoothed out perturbati(lRs. It would prove about as good as Norbert Wiener's "optimal" design
35 WW diary, January 23, 1942. OSRD7 OP, Project #2. See also D1S diary, October S, 1942. OSRD7 GP Box 71,
collected diaries volume 4.
36 For BTL accounts, see "~~elopment oftbe Electrical Director," Bell Laboratories Record (Janwuy, 1944) 22S-
240, "Electrical Gun Director Demonstrated,tt BIR (December, 1943)157-67, "Biow Hot - Blow Cold: The M-9
never failed," BIR (D«;ember, 1946) 454-6. For production numbers, see William J. Wuest, "History ofHeavy AA
Fire Control and Materiel," (Ft. Bliss, Texas: U.S. Anny, The Artillery SChool, Antiaircraft and Guided Missiles
Branch), 1951. In A'IT folder 84 05 0203.
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(see Chapter 9). Because it used lthe difference between the current position and the predicted
position (0-2 came to call this tht~ "one plus" method), it dealt with quantities of relatively small
magnitudes, which required less 8t:curate computing mechanisms.
When the T-15 design was completed in November, 1941, D-2 gave BTL a contract
(project #30), to build the device. t:ompleted about a year later, test results showed the T-15 to
be more accurate by about a factor oftwo than the T-10, and to settle on a solution two to three
times more quickly. T-IOIM-9 was ,already in production, hflwever. The army never adopted the
T-15. Still, the T-15 project produCt~ some useful results. It used the saine assumption of
constant course and altitude as the S,perry and the T-I0 dir~aor, but T-15 engineers began to
consider the possibilities of predictin!~the position ofairplanes taking e',asive action, or "curved
flight prediction." 0-2 let further con1:r.lcts to BTL to study this problem. And the T-15 did
advance electrical computing and anal~V1:ical understanding of the fire control probleln. 37
Radar and System Integration
With the T-IOIM-9, the director, as a system integrator, exceeded the accuracy of its
instruments of perception. Thus attentior.\ turned toward improving and automating perception.
During the thirties, the Army Signal Corp~\ tried to incorporate new "radio ranging" devices into
existing mechanical gun directors. In 1937, this work produced the SCR-268 radar (which
T,Vestem Electric began producing in 1940), designed to supply fire control data to Sperry's M-4
director. 31 [.Figure 8-7: SCR-268] The SCR-268, although deployed in large numbers,
imperfectly matched the M-4, which was designed for optical equipment. These early radar sets
performed similar to the old sound ranging equipment they replaced: useful for detecting
incoming aircraft and providing an idea where they were, but nci as precision inputs to fire
37 National Defense Research Committee, "Antiaircraft Director T-lS," Report to the Services No. 62 (Contractor's
Report on OEMsr-3S3), August, 1943. See also Fagan eel., A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell
System. lS1-1~5; Fagan's account is account based on this NDRC report and on C.A. Lovell, memo to M.D.
Fagan, January 3, 1974, Folder 84 O~ 02 03 ATI, and on M.D. Fagan, "The War Years," manuscript in the same
folder.
31 Roger B. Colton, "Radar in the United States Army: History and Early Development at the Signal Corps
Laboratories, Fort Monmouth, N.J.," Proc. I.R.E. (NOVt:mber, 1945), 740-53.
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control systems. The SCR-268, howt~ver, worked much better than acoustic devices, and could
direct searchlights to track a target.39
The SCR-268's poor accuracy derived in part from its relatively low-frequency, 10ng-
wavelength of 1.5 meters. Existing vacuum tubes could not generate higher frequency (shorter-
wavelength) signals at high enough powers for aircraft detection. So in 1940, shorter
wavelengths, or "microwaves," were part ofVannevar Bush's solution to the "antiaircraft
problem." When the NDRC began operations in 1940 it included microwave research, under
section 0-1, the "Microwave Committee." D~Jring the summer of 1940, when Weaver and D-2
toured the field and learned about fire control, the Microwave Committee did the same for radar.
Like the fire control group, the committee realized neither th~ army or the navy were aware of
each other's work. They found very little research on tubes capable of producing waves below
one meter, and none for "microwaves," with wavelengths below ten centimeters.40
American radar radically changed in September of 1940, when a British technical mission,
the "Tizard Mission" came to the United States and met with the NORC. In a remarkable act of
technology transfer, the Tizard Mission revealed the "cavity magnetron" to the ~ficrowave
Committee. The device could produce ten kilowatts ofmicrowave power at a wavelength often
centimeters. Not only did high frequencies produce more accurate echoes, but their small antennas
could be carried aboard aircraft. The Tizard Mission intended for Bell Labs and Western Electric
to begin resear~h and productinn in magnetrons. Vannevar Bush and the NDRC, however,
continuing their "end run," set up a central laboratory for microwave research at MIT, the
"Radiation Laboratory," or Rad Lab. It become the NDRC's largest project.
Ofthe Rad Lab's initial three projects, Project II sought automatic fire control. Louis
Ridenour headed the project and recll1ited Harvard physicist Kenneth T. Bainbridge. Bainbridge
brought a junior fellow from his laboratory, a young physicist named Ivan Getting. Getting, the
son ofCzeckosiovakian diplo~nats, had grown up in Europe and Washington, DC. He attended to
MIT on scholarship and did an undergraduate thesis in physics under Karl Compton in 1934.41
39 Guerlac, Radar in World War n (New York: Tomasb Publishers I American Institute ofPbysics), 103-110. A
similar device developed by the anny, the SCR-270, with a wavelength of2.S meters, was designed as an early
waminglDd search system. It was deployed in Hawaii in August, of 1940, and detected the attack on Pearl Harbor
at a dislance ofover a hundred miles.
.4() Guerlact P"'af in World War 0, 243-2SO.
41 Ivan Getting., AU in a Lifetime: Science in the Defense ofDetn<M.-13CY (New York: Vantage~ 1989), 37.
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After completing graduate work in physics as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, he returned to the
United States as a member of the Harvard Society ofFellows. In November, 1940 Getting joined
Proj~~t IT, "to demonstrate automatic tracking ofaircraft by microwave radar ofaccuracy
sufficient to provide data input to gunnery computers for effective fire control of ninety-nlillimeter
guns.".t2 Getting was put in charge of the "synchronizer" the master timing device "which tied the
system's operation together.,,·3 The group also included electrical engineers Henry Abajian and
George Harris, and physicists Lee Davenport and Leo Sullivan.
At this time, tracking targets with radar remained a manual activity; it required "pip
matching," the radar equivalent offollow-the-pointer. The operator viewed radar return signals on
an o~illoscope screen and used a handwheel-controlled blip to select which radar echo was
indeed the target. Then the blip or "pip" and not the actual radar signal went on as the valid range.
The operators worked like the "human selVomechanisms" in Sperry's directors: distingui~hing
signals from noise. Bowles and Loomis, aware ofMIT's strength in automatic control, suggested
Project II mechanize this task for "automatic tracking." If the radar signal itself could drive servos
to move the antenna, the radar would follow the target as it moved. Project II set out to automate
the work of the radar operator.
To solve this problem, the Rad Lab developed "conical scan," which rotated an off-center
beam thirty times per second to make an precise "pencil-beam" for tracking. If the target was "off
axis," i.e. off the centerline of the beam, a feedback loop moved the antenna to return the target
"on axis" to the center of the beam. If the target was moving, like an airplane) the antenna would
thus track its motion. The Rad Lab obtained a machine-gun mount from General Electric to move
the antenna, and G.E. engineer Sidney Godet to design the selsyn servos for tracking. They first
tested conical scanning at the end ofMay, 1941 on the roof the Walker Memorial building at
MIT.« By February, 1942 the Rad Lab built a prototype, the XT-l; they bought a truck and
modified the radar to fit inside.
42 Getting, All in a Lifetime, 107.
43 Ivan Getting, "SCR-S84 Radar and the Mark 56 Naval Gun Fire Control System," IEEE Trans. Aerospace and
Electronic Systems AES-il. (110.5. September. 1975),924.
.. Getting, "SCR-S84 Radar." For a technical discussion oCtile 584 servos, see Hubert M. James, Nathaniel B.
Nichols, and Ralph S. Phillips Theory of Servomechanisms (New York: McGraw Hill, 1947) Radiation Laboratory
Series ##25, 212-224. Stuart Bennett, A History oeControl Enpneering: 1930-1955 (London: Peter Peregrinus,
1993), 143-6, which includes Godet's servo.
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The truck added more than mobility; it added enclosure. Earlier army radar sets (the SCR-
268), mounted displays and operators directly on the rotating antenna platform, much as the
Sperry directors had in the thirties. [*Figure 8-7: SCR-268] This arrangement reflected the army's
conception of the radar operators: they were soldiers on the battlefield operating a piece of
equipment like a radio. To the Rad Lab, it seemed foolish; the operators' eyes could not adjust to
see the cathode-ray displays in bright sunlight; exposed to rain and snow, their hands got too cold
to precisely tune the equipment. 4' Getting and his engineers saw the operators as technicians,
reading and manipulating representations of the world. The AI-l truck brought the operators
inside a darkened, air-conditioned trailer: a oontrol room, a laboratory.
Enclosure allowed their eyes to adjust to the delicate blips on the CRT; it freed their
hands from cold; it isolated their ears from the sounds ofbattle. Glowing radar screens presented
a captivating simulacra of the world outside. Earlier oscilloscope (or "J-scope") displays showed a
single horizontal trace ofthe radar echo over time. These were replaced with a "plan position
indicator" or PPI: a round tube displaying a rotating beam tracing out a virtual map of the area
being scanned. Now radar operators and their commanders could perceive and manipulate the
field of battle as a map and not as electrical reflections. Radar created an analog of the world,
collecting data from a broad area and representing it in compressed form. These systems were
among the first in which an operator controlled a machine based on visual input from a cathode-
ray tube - an act akin to our own interaction with computers.
After testing the army reported, "The Radio Set XT-1 is superior to any radio direction
finding equipment yet tested by the Coast Artillery or Anti-aircraft Artillery Boards for the
purpose of furnishing present position data to an anti-aircraft director.,,4{) In April of 1942 the XT-
1 was standardized and went into production as the SCR-584 radar system; the army ordered
more than a thousand units from General Electric, Westinghouse, and Chrysler. [*Figure 8-6:
SCR-584] [*Figure 8-8: SCR-584 control] As an "early warning system" it could scan the skies
"s Getting oral history interview by Frederik Nebeker, June 11, 1991. IEEE Center for the History of Electrical
Engineering, Radiation Lab Oral Histories, available on the World Wide Web at
btttp:/lwww.ieee.org:80lhistol)'_ccnter/oral_historieslob_rad_lab_mcnu.btml
46 "Report of A.A.B. Test on XT-l at Fort MoIlJ'OO, Virgini, February, 1942," Radiation Laboratory Report DO.
3S9. For first-band accounts oftbc XT-I/SCR-S84 development and its field deployment, sec Hemy Abajian oral
histoty interview by Frederik Nebeker, June II, 1991. Lee Davenport oral history interview by lohn Bryant June
12, 1991. Leo Sullivan oral bistol)' interview by Frekerik Nebeker, June 14, 1991. IEEE Center for the History of
Electrical Engineering. Radiation Lab Oral Historics.
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up to 90,000 yards and then track an aircraft to one-twentieth ofa degree to a range of 32,000
yards. It provided output signals for azimuth, elevation, and range which could feed into the
Sperry M-4 or M-7 directors, or the BTL M-9 director. The SCR-584 became the most
successful ground radar of the war, with nearly 1ioo units eventJ-Jally produced.47
The SCR-584 by itselfwas a remarkable d~pvice, "the answer to the antiaircraft
artilleryman's prayer."" Rad Lab Project II, however, aimed at more than a tracking radar: it
sought automatic fire control. Marching toward that goal, however, tread on D-2's terrain. Early
on, Warren Weaver recognized the potential for overlap. He wrote to Loomis of his desire for "a
reasonably definite understanding of the location of the fence between our two regions of
activity...a wire fence, through which both sides can look and a fence with convenient and
frequent gates. '7 Weaver proposed the relationship between the organizations mirror that of radar
to a computer, ofperception to integration, "The boundary between the activities between the
two sections I would suppose to be fairly well defined by saying that your output (three
parameters obtained from microwave equipment) was our input (input to a computer or
41 F(\r a summary of SCR-S84 projects, including a number of modifications, see National Defense Research
Committee, NORC Division 14 Final Project Repon. MIT Archives, 2-41 to 2-68.
48 The SCR-S84 proved 00 simple devices to manufacture. It required 140 tubes, a host of specialized electronics
parts, weighed ten-tons total, and cost about S100,000. It did not go into full production until mid-l943 . For the
difficulties of producing the SCR-S84 see George Raynor Thompso~ Dixie R Harris, Pau1il:~eM. Oakes, and
Dulany Terre~ The United States Army in World War n: The Technical Services, The Signal Corps: The Test
<December, 1941 to July 1943) (Washington, D.C.: Office of tile Chief ofMilitaJy History, United States Anny,
1957), 265-274; Getting, All In A Lifetime, 121-127; Guerlac, Radar in World War 11,481-83. Getting, Harris,
Abaj~Davenport oral histories. For the operational history of the SCR-S84, see George Raynor Thompson and
Dixie R. Hani~ The United States Army in World War U: The Technical Services, The Si~ Corps: The
Outcome lMid-19431brouah 1945) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of MilitaJy History, United States
Anny, 1966), 474-477. ~rIac, Radar in World War n 480-496,853-862,882-897, 1018-1025. Rugged and
versatile, field commanders employed the SCR-S84 for numerous uses beyond the one originally envisioned. It
could track mortar sheDs back to their source, so anny units could attack mortar positions. It tracked V·2
trajectories, so American bombers could go after their launch facilities. In combination with automatic plotting
boards, it enabled air controUers to "talk" fighter planes to their targets - prefiguring the automated air defense
systems oCtile Cold War and the air traffic control systems of today. During testing at Fort MO~llOe, it tracked shell
fired from the anny'5 90mm guns and led to the discovery of a significant error their firing tables. The firing table
bad been calculated on a Bush differential analyzer, but its operator bad setup its gearing incorrectly. These errors
bad then been built into all the Sperry M-7 directors, bu~ since the T-10 was still in developmen~ it could be
properly com:cted. The army used it during the battle of the bulge for tracking enemy vehicles as well. It was also
used to track remote controlled planes for auto~ bombing attacks (like the one in which Joe Kennedy was
kilJed). A number were given to the Soviet Union, and for many years Soviet Radars incorporated many of the
SCR-584's design features. Getting, All in a Lifetime, 130-3S. Also see Abaj~Davenpon, Harris, Getting oral
histories.
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predictor)."49 Karl Compton, in charge ofdivision 0, agreed and set up a special committee,
known as D-l.5 to represent its liaison between D-I (radar) and D-2 (fire control). It consisted of
Bowles of0-1, Ridenour and Getting of the Rad Lab, and Caldwell and Fry ofD-2. This group,
only in existence for about a year, conducted a comprehensive survey of all radar development in
the U.S. and Canada.
Where did Sperry fit into this new domain? With its background in fire control the
company should have been the obvious choice to build new integrated systems. Its work with the
Varian brothers on klystron tubes gave it an advantage in radar as well. The army, however, just
beginning to fully understand the shortcomings of the Sperry mechanical directors, distrusted the
company's ability to develop a new system. It requested Sperry, then, only to integrate its existing
M4 director with the SCR-268 radar, both ofwhich the army already possessed in large
numbers. 50 The army and the NDRC, however, drew on Sperry corporate knowledge in another
way. Sperry's fire control director, Earl Chafee, joined the Ordnance Department and was
assigned to survey existing technology and propose "the best all-around fire control system which
could be put together out ofequipment on which the basic research is now completed." Chafee
was to work with 0-2 and examine not only individual components but "The emphasis is to oe
placed on the over-all aspects ofthe system... on the role which radar should play in such a unified
system.,,'1 The so-called "Chafee Inquiry," did not lead to a new development program but it
clarified the problems involved in automating traditional instruments of perception with
microwave radar, problems Bell Labs and the Radiation Lab already faced. 52
49 WW diary, December S, 1940, meeting with Loomis. WW to Loomis, December 10, 1940. WW diary, December
13, 1940. OSRD7 GP Box 70 collected diaries Volume 1.
so see TCF diary ofmeeting with Col. Bowen, July 3, 1941, OSRD7 OP Box 70 collected diaries volwne 2. And
Earl W. Cbaf~ "Memorandum of Conference in Fire Control Departmen~" September 24, 1942. OSRD7, E-83
Office Files of Warren Weaver Box 4, Sperry Gyroscope Folder.
SI UnderliDe origiDal, WW diary, November 12, 1942. ORSD7 OP Box 72, collected diaries volwne 5. WW to
Loven, November 23, 1942. WW to Cbafee, December 1, 1942. OSRD7 E-82 Office Files ofHarold Hazen, Box 9,
Rad Lab folder, see other correspondence to Weaver from Fry, Hazen, and Caldwell as input for Cbafee's repl~
many ofwhich are more informative on issues of"coordination" between $)'stem elements than the report itself.
52 Earl W. Cbafee, "Study of the Requirements for a Satisfactory Antiaircraft Fire Control System," Febraury IS,
1943. Sperry Gyroscope Compmy Papers, Box 33, Hagley Museum and Library. The report can also be found in
OSRD7 E-82 0fIice Files ofHarold Hazen, Box 9, Rad Lab folder. The Cbafee Report includes the most
comprehensive hisIory of Sperry's pre-war antiaircraft development program in the historical record. A meetinS
held at Sperry Gyroscope in February, 1943 covers similar issues, with input from Rad Lab officials (Ridnaur,
Grigs), the Ford InstnuDeDt Company (Tear, Jahn), Sperry (Draper, Bassett, Hoischuh, Willis, 'White). John B.
Russell diary, OSRD7 OP Box 70 oollected diaries volume 3.
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Ivan Getting, who had learned of the Bell Labs director project during the D-I.5 survey,
began working with BTL to connect his XT-l tracking radar to the T-IO. Weaver's uwire fence'?
worked fairly weD in this case. The T-IO and XT-l designs proc~ejed together, and throughout
BTL stayed in touch with the MIT group. Ridenour and Getting of the Rad Lab and Stib;tz and
Lovell ofBTL visited back and forth, exchanging information and discussing interfaces between
the machines. Getting was particularly interested in "time constants," measures of how quickly the
T-10 could respond to inputs. When design2ng his antenna and tracking unit, he had to know how
fast the T-10 could keep up with incoming data - its frequency response. ~3 The T-10 final report
touted the value ofcoordinated work, "Close liaison should be maintained between director
designers and designers of radars and other tracking equipment. The specifications on each unit
should be written with full consideration of the features and capabilities ofthe other.,,'4 During
this project, the idea emerged that a system might be more than the sum of its parts~ the added
element was noise.
What difficulties did the Rad Lab and BTL face in trying to connect their instruments? Just
as Albert Hall had found at the SelVo Lab, fi\lise posed the biggest problem. Servos worked fine
as calculators when input data was smooth and ideal. Errors in tracking, however, "would
produce prediction errors ofdominating proportions;" differentiating the prediction signal tended
to emphasize high-frequency noise.55 Radar signals had several sources of noise, making the
problem especially bad. For example, as a radar beam reflected off an airplane, it would shift from
one part ofthe plane to another (analogous to the airplane "twinkling" in the sun). A data
smoother could eliminate short, high-frequency perturbations from the input data, but with
tradeoffs. Smoothers introduced time lag, so the smoothed data was no longer current when sent
into the predictor.
How could one determine the optimal smoothing versus time lag for a network? Could
one reduce the time lag for a given network? How did the smoother distinguish proper tracking
data from erroneous inputs? What effect did the time lag of a smoother have on the dynamics ofa
S3 WW to Fletcher, February 28, 1941. Project file 23140, ATf. Ridenour to Lovell, September 24, 1941. Project
file 23140, ATf. GRS diaJy, May 21, 1941. Ridenour to Lovell, August 6, 1941. Lovell to Ridenour, September
23, 1941. OSRD7 OP, Project '2.
S4 "Final Report: D-2 Project 112, Study ofErrors in T-I0 Gun Director."
55 "Study ofErrors in T-IO Gun Director," 72. For a Rad Lab study ofjitter in a tracking servo from radar data, see
"Data Smoothing," Radiation Laboratory Report no. 673.
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feedback loop? Would smoothing avoid or induce instability? These questions resembled those
telephone engineers had been asking for at least a decade. As Nyquist and Bode had shown, and
as Harris and Hall were applying to servos, the answers depended on the frequency response of
the system's components. Warren Weaver put it best when he observed that building radar
controlled systems raised, "certain basic problems in communications engineering.... if one applies
the term signal to the variables which describe the actual true motion of the target; and the tenn
noise to the inevitable tracking errors, then the purpose ofa smoothing circuit (just as in
communications engineering) is to minimize the noise and at the same time distort the signal as
little as possible."j6At BTL and the Rad Lab, just as at the Servo Lab, building control systems
meant rethinking the nature ofelectronic information. Using radar to close a feedback loop
required paying attention to connections as well as to components. With radar, control
engineering became a practice of transmission, of signals, ofcommunications.
Neither the Bell Labs director nor the Rad Lab's radar had been designed from the first
with such a practice of "systems engineering." Rather, two groups tried to connect two separate
machines, neither having fannal responsibility for coordination. Still, the cooperation paid off In
the fall of 1942, the army held a competitive test of radar-controlled "blind firing. ,,~7 The XT-l
WclS matched against two other radars, all connected to a T-10 director and Sperry power drives
on a 90mm gun. The XT-} performed best and competing programs were canceled. Although
problems remained, particularly extraneous electrical noise in the cables, the system demonstrated
that a radar-controlled director could track a target, figure a firing solution, and aim the guns
(although it still required human input for target selection, pip matching, and a number ofother
tasks). By 1944, the M-9/SCR-584 combination entered service in the European theater as an
automatic antiaircraft fire control system.
The T-IOIXT-l program gave Getting new ideas for engineering systems. Technical
success brought him new responsibility and the opportunity to articulate his vision: the Radiation
Lab reorganized, dividing into a number of divisions for components, support, research, and
S6 Warren Weaver, foreword to "Final Report: D-2 Project '2, Study of Errors in T-IO Gun Director," OSRD7
Office Files Of Warren Weaver, 3.
57 The competiton were a similar BeD Labs radar, the SCR-S4S (which was produced in limited numbers), and the
Canadian GL-m.c, which bad been designed in response to Tizard's initial assignment for gunlaying. The SCR-
~45 was the closest rival to the Radiation Lab _ and included a long-wave search radar along with its microwave
tracker. SHe diary, March 26, 1942, and 1.8. Ridenour Diary, April 4, 1942. OSRD7 GP, Project '2.
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"systems." Ivan Getting took charge ofDivision 8, responsible for all army gr,,/und radar and
naval fire control. Ralph Phillips headed a special subsection for mathematics and servos which
included on its staffWalter Pitts and Paul Samuelson. While this group seemed to violate
Weaver's cordial fence between division between D-1 and 0-2, Getting believed system design
orbited around radar; under his direction the Rad Lab would become the center ofgravity for
integrated systems.
The Difficult Stepchild: Radar and Fire Control in the Navy
The source of that gravity, however, would not be the army but the old fire control expert,
the Bureau ofOrdnance. In 1943, the M-9/SCR-584 combination gave the anny the most
automated fire control system in the war, leapfrogging the navy with help from the NORC.
BuOrd, for its part, had done little work with D-2, Division 7, or the Radiation lab. Still, the navy
was pushing radar; automated perception radically altered naval fire control. Naval control
systems, especially for heavier guns, changed more slowly than equivalent army technology,
however, because they depended on modifying ships instead ofjust sending systems into the field
on trucks. This momentum, combined with the conservatism ofBuOrd and its contractors and
their failure to take immediate advantage ofthe NORC, meant that in 1943 the bureau came to
Division 7 and the Rad Lab for help designing a new automated system. Before examining
Getting's handling of this project, however, and hence his definition of system engineering, we
must understand BuOrd's difficult cultivation offire control radar.
The Naval Research Lab had done some of the earliest work with radio ranging in the
19305; it produced sets and installed them in the fleet in 1940. But these devices, intended for
search and navigation, came under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships, and like the early army
systems, used long wavelengths too inaccurate for fire control. BuOrd, to add radar to its control
systems, had to pry the technology away from BuShips; only in the summer of 1941did BuOrd get
complete and official cognizance over fire control radar.!1 By that time, however, BuOrd had de
facto control ofthe technology. It had the only officers in the navy with academic training in
control: Gordon Brown's four former students. One, Horacio Rivero, brought radar into naval
fire control.
51 Rowland and Boyd, The U.S. Navy Bureau ofOrdnance, 415-6.
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When Rivero came to BuOrd in the fall of 1940, he was assigned to examine radio ranging
research at the Naval Research Lab (NRL) to detennine ifit had utility for fire control. He
immediately recognized the device's potential as input for a fire control system. No one in BuOrd
understood the technology, so Blandy gave the young lieutenant a free hand. Rivero recalled, "I
was then the first man in charge ofRadar in the Bureau ofOrdnance." Along with Samuel
Tucker, head ofBuOrd's antiaircraft section and Jim Smith, an engineer on loan from Bell Labs,
Rivero initiated a major program in fire control radar research, design, and production (Tucker is
credited with coining the term "radar"). Their work got underway in the fall of 1940, just as the
NDRC was organizing, and as the British Tizard mission brought the cavity magnetron to the
U.S. Rivero immediately began directing BTL to build radars for fire control (they were working
on a search radar for the Bureau ofEngineering).'9 Before BTL even had a prototype, Rivero
ordered production to begin, much as the army had ordered the T-10 from BTL before testing. As
each set came otTthe assembly line at Western Electric, Rivero assigned it to tile fleet and had it
urgently shipped for installation.60 In these early years ofthe war, responsibility for radar roughly
divided along service lines: army radar came out of the Rad Lab, navy sets from Bell Labs and
Western Electric.
The first fire control radars entered the fleet in July, 1941. In the hands ofskilled
operators they fundamentally changed tire control. Suddenly naval gunnery became a truly closed
loop system: the new instrument ofperception could track targets, follow shells along their
trajectories, and display shell splashes for spotting. Spotting aircraft were soon removed from
battleships.61 Edwin Hooper, another ofMIT's four horsemen, exemplified the early application
S91bis became the CXAS~ or FA when applied to fire control. For prewar development of fire control radar, see
L.S. Howeth, History of Communications-Electronics in the United States NaVY (Washington: US Navy Bureau of
Ships and Office ofNaval History, 1963) 463-7. W.C. Tinus and W.H.C. Higgi~ "Early Fire-Control Radars for
Naval Vessels," BSIJ 25 (no. 1, January9 1946), 18. For operational experience and differentiation between model
and mod numben, lee "Resume of Shipboard Fire Control Radar," CIC Magazine, Au~ 1944, World War II
Command File, CNO, Naval Operational Archives. Also sec Fagan cd., A History of Engineering and Science in
the Ben System Chapter 2~ radar. The table of radar development programs on pages 68-69 shows the first
antiaircraft fire control radar initiated in October, 1940, a Rivero project. For a comprehensive list of naval radars
and Mark numbers, see NormanFri~ Naval Radar (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 14S-182.
Rowland and Boyd, The U,S, Nayy Bureau ofQrdnance, Chapter 17, "Fire Control Radar."
60 Horacia Rivero, oral history, Admiral's Biographies, Naval Operational Archives. Early in 1942, Rivero left
BuOrd for duty in the Oeet, and be brought a new radar set to his ship the San Juan. With this~ he wak:hed
night battle of Savo Island in Guadalcanal the foUowing August.
61 W.J. Jureaa, "The Evolution ofBattJeship Gunnery in the U.S. Navy, 1920-1945," Warship lntemational (00.3,
1991), 2~S.
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of radar in the fleet. Hooper joined the gunnery staffof the battleship Washington, which soon
received the first two main battery fire control radars and four of the first five secondary battery
(antiaircraft) sets. Hooper adapted it to the user and the ship: "Y'ou had not only to organize
things...but even fannulated your own procedures to handle this new equipment. n62 The radar
display was designed to go into the director tower; Hooper moved it down into the plotting room.
The antenna was to be cranked by hand; Hooper designed a servo to drive it, "so that it will
operate coupled in dynamically with the rangekeeper." He remembered an exciting, innovative
time, "the greatest difficulty we had was in drilling through this Class A armored deck on the
Washington." 63 Spotting, previously done by telescopes and rangefinders, now became a matter
of matching the target blip to the blip from the shell splashes. The gunnery officer thus controlled
a feedback loop, integrating perception from the radar into inputs for the rangekeepers.
For twenty years, the gun club had developed fire control in peacetime, but Hooper tested
his system in combat. OffGuadalcanal in Nove.nber of 1942, the Washington, with Hooper at the
gun controls, sank the Japanese battleship Kirishim~ from a range of 18,000 yards - the first
surface victim ofa U.S. battleship's guns since 1898. Throughout the encounter, Hooper recalled,
he understood the behavior ofthe new feedback loop with concepts from "my ~rudies at MIT in
servo-mechanisms and in dynamics.',64
But not all gunnery officers, few in fact, had Hooper's training and creativity.
Furthermore) while radar easily transfonned the comparatively slow (and mature) main battery
fire control, antiaircraft stressed the technology to its limits. It could 110t track automatically or
lock onto moving targets. Operators read offvalues from an oscilloscope and cranked them into
existing directors or rangekeepers. While the technology vastly improved the navy's powers of
perception, it would take considerable effort to make fire control automatic, turning automated
perception into action at a distance.
62 Edwin Hooper oral history, Admiral's Biographies, Naval OpenltionaJ Archives. Hooper later became Historian
of the Navy. See, for example, United States Naval Power in a Changing World (New York: Praeger, 1988).
63 Hooper oral history, 94-5.
64 Ibid., 81. After the battle, historian Samuel Eliot Morison came aboard the Washington and Hooper gave him
the ran8d'ecpers' pIoIs of the battle. See also Ivan Musican~ Battleship at War: The Epic Story orThe USS
Washintrtnn (New York: Harcourt Brace Javonovich, 1986) Chapter S, for an account of the battle from the
Washing's perspective and Hooper's role. Erling Hustvedt gives a personal account of the gunnery room aboard
the South Dakota durinI the same battle, "Battleship Gunfire Control," (unpublished manuscri~ University of
Mary~March 15, 1990), Courtesy John Testuro Sumida.
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Rivero's work added the Western Electric Mark 4 or 12 radar (or both) to the Mark 37
director, the most common antiaircraft system in the fleet. The combination was first tested
abC'ard the USS Roe in Sept~mber, 1941 with an audience of navy brass and scientists (including
Rivero and 0-2's Poitras and Caldwell). Caldwell recalled "The firing was entirely wild and was
probably due to lack oftraining ofthe director crew. The gunnery officer thought that tlle trouble
was in the failure to obtain a solution at the computer.,,65 Nevertheless, this system served tile
navy successfully through much ofthe war (over 600 were eventually installed), and defended US
Navy ships in the Pacific. Its limitations became crippling when the Japanese introduced the 600
mphjet-propeUed suicide bontb, Baka, near the close of the war.66
Still, in the words ofan official BuOrd history, radar was "a stepchild slow to win
affection." Typically, as with the Mark 37, it augmented existing tire control equ;pment not
designed for electronic inputs. During the war, BuOrd's tough love spawned twenty seven
different fire control radar designs, only ten entered production, seven actually saw action, and
only three (Marks 3, 4, and 8) became widely available.67 They had problems with reliability,
maintenance, short ranges, and target discrimination. Only intense human mediation - similar to
the old "human servomechanisms" - could produce high-quality electronic inputs for
rangekeepers. Operators needed to "pip match" to eliminate noise, and to manually follow the
target with the antenna, much as with traditional optical rangefinders and telescopes. They
routinely switched between optical and radar tracking, and the combination threatened to
overload their attention. Optical tracking remained necessary because tracking radars frequently
jittered between closely-spaced targets; they had particular trouble locking onto airplanes
attacking low across the water - a weakness Japanese pilots used to tactical advantage. Radar
underscored the navy's problems with antiaircraft fire control in general; it worked fairly well
against high, straight targets, but broke down when confronting fast, maneuverable, close-in
attacks. Still the navy dreamed about ftdiy automatic "blind firing," which could accurately shoot
at night or through overcast (the anthropomorphic "blind firing" echoes the early use of radar for
"blind landing" ofairplanes).
65 SHe diary, September 30, 1941. OSRD7 GP Box 70 coUected diaries volwne 2. EJP diary, September 30, 1941,
OSRD7 GP Box It Project file '1.
66 Rowland and Boyd, The US Nayy Bureau ofOrdnance, 377-8. Fagan cd., A History of Engineering and Science
in the Ben System, 67-72. Friedman, US Naval Weapons. 83-84, 243.
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Several projects tried to adapt existing control systems for blind firing. In 1941, the
Bureau supported the Rad Lab's developm~nt ora radar (Mark 9) to work with a director (Mark
45), then under development at the Ford Instrument Company. The Mark 9 became the first
Radiation Laboratory set to go into production, but BuOrd soon canceled the program when it
dropped the inadequate Mark 45. Similar fates befell other projects at Ford Instrument, G.E., and
Ann.a (tdarks 49, 46, and 50, respectively). The Rad Lab, working with NDRC Section T, added
radars to the SperrylDraper gyroscopic sight and its derivatives, b~t for range-only, manually-
~ded tracking. This project produced an operational director, the Mark 63, where an operator
moved the director manually, aided by a red circle in the sight corresponding to the target's
location.61 Still radar played the fiustrating stepchild - BuOrd, with its established contractors,
sinlply could not produce a director and a radar at the same time. "Blind firing" remained an
elusi\?e goal.
Ivan Getting believed he could bring the stepchild into the family and build a blind firing
system. He redefined the system: no longer a set ofseparate components connected together, but
a single, dynamic entity. Signals, dynamics, time constants and feedback needed to be specified
first - this was the system. The physical equipment and mechanical components merely solidified
these relations. As with Brown's Servo Lab, Getting's vision entailed a new role for his
laboratory. BuOrd's earlier attempts at blind firing had failed, he argued, because they lacked a
central, coordinating technical body which could oversee the integration of the system:
1) There was DO attempt made to integrate the radar and the computer into a functioning
whole
2) The gross engineering was done by the Bureau of Ordnance, whereas the detailed
engineering was done by the company who was not infonned of the problem as a whole.69
61 RowIaDd and Boyd, The US Navy Bureau ofOrdnance, 421, 429.
61 For a detailed rAeach of these projects, see Administrative History oCtile U.S. NaVY in World War II, Volume
79, File Control, Chapter IV, "Antiaircraft Fire Control." M. E. Murphy, "Memorandum: Report of Fire Control
Section (Rc4) Summary of Activities and Accomplishments, and Recommendations for the Future." Reprinted as
Appendix A ofUnited States Navy, The U.S. Nayy in "Varld War II, Volume 79, Fire Control (ExcePt Radar). Ivan
Getting gives the most pessimistic assessment of the sitWtbOn in, "Draft History, Section 7.6," 1946, OSRD7 E·82
Box 6 Office Files ofHarold Hazen. Getting provides the perspective ofa BuOrd outsider but also ofan interested
party frustrated with the Bureau. The discussion in Getting's memoir, All in a Lifetime. 165-7 is based on this
account For the Mark 9 radar, see Guerlac, Radar in World War II, 279-81. "Mark lSI Director," Marc~ 1946,
Radiation La'Joratory Report DO. S-7~. Division 14 Final Report, 4-54.
~G to KTC, "U.S.N. AA Director Mk. 56," December 29, 1943. OSRD E-39, Office Files alKarI Taylor
Compton, Box S1, Division 7 folder.
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The fire control clique still saw the computer and the radar as comprising the "functioning
whole." But to Getting they were subsidiary to a more abstract notion of the system. Similarly
BuOrd, with its highly specified and compartmentalized contracting, still believed it could break
the fire control problem into component parts, technically and contractually ("gross engineering,"
and "detl'iled engineering"). Getting wanted to redefin~ the boundaries between components and
between organizations in, "a totally integrated effort starting from basic principles.n70
GettUlg'S vision found willing allies in t'le NDRC and BuOrd. When the NDRC
reorgani7~ in the end of 1942, Harold Hazen, head of the new Division 7, recognized the value
ofcoordinating radar and fire control design (he had, after all, grappled with related systems
problems ten years before with the Differential Analyzer). Among Division 7's priorities, Hazen
announced, would be "the overall design offire control systems and the optimum use of radar on
navy directors.,,71 To smooth relations with the Rad Lab, he invited Getting to join. Soon
thereafter, Division 7 began discussing a blind firing director for the navy's 5" 38 guns with
Emerson Murphy, head offire contr 31 research at BuOrd.72 Getting proposed"Ajoint project
under Division 14 and Division 1...[for] c.ompact blind firing director for heavy machine guns, 3-
inch guns, and 5-inch guns fr.Jr the U.S. Navy." Murphy, attending a Division 7 meeting, endorsed
the idea. BuOrd chiefBlandy concurred, designating the project Gun Fire Control System Mark
56.73
Now Getting could start from scratch, defining the machine and defining his position. The
NDRC would go one step beyond its usual role ofdesigning equipment, building prototypes, and
preparing drawings. It would now oversee the selection and preparation of manufacturers, and
oversee a production run This would allow the NDRC complete technical control of all phases of
the projed. But which part ofthe NDRC? A radar-driven fire control device fell within two
domains: Division 14 (the Radiation Lab), and Division 7. Division 7 members argued the
Radiation Laboratory didn't have sufficient experience with fire control, and that the project
should use M-9 director technology developed for the army (BTL was then building for BuOrd
70 Getting, "The SCR S84 Radar," 932.
71 Division 7 Meeting minutes, February 3, 1943. OSRD7 GP Box 72, Division 7 meetings folder.
12HLH Wary, April 20 &21, 1943. OSRD7 OP, Office Files ofHarold Hazen, Box 70.
13 Division 7 Meeting minutes, April 28, 1943. Guerlac mistakenly recounts these events as the Summer of 1942,
in Radar in World War n, 490, based on a misunderstanding of Getting's letter to Compton ofDecember 29, 1943.
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the naval equivalent of its electrical director, an electronic Ford Rangekeeper).'4 Getting's idea for
the new system, however, had radar at its core.
To connect radar and fire control, Hazen created a special section ofDivision 7, dubbed
7.6 "Navy Fire Control with Radar." Ivan Getting would head Section 7.6 as a member ofboth
Division 7 and the Radiation Lab's systems division. He described the new section flS "an attempt
by Dr. H. L. Hazen to bring together the necessary elements which had been more or less
artificially separated by organization, personality, and history."" Getting questioned the
traditional lines between subunits: the NDRC's divisions dated from a time when fire control and
radar were separate technologies. For earlier projects, such as the M-9/SCR-584 combination, the
arrangement worked well, given a high degree ofcommunication between Bell Labs and the
Radiation Lab. From that experience, however, Getting learned the value ofcoordination at the
design stages and all the way through production - and the value ofcontrolling that
coordination. Section 7.6 absorbed a few other Division 7 projects relating to navy fire control
and undertook a number of small contracts, but the Mark 56 fonned its major work. Getting
called the project, "the first fully-integrated radar fire control system that was not restricted by
history or by prejudices."76
Yet he took advantage of history. For the new section, and for the Mark 56, Getting
tapped members ofBuOrd's fire control clique. He included Vice Presidents from Ford
Instrument and Arma, AI Ruiz orG.E, Charles Stark Draper, and Rob~rt M. Page, who had done
the early radar work at the Naval Research Lab.77 The committee did not actually meet until
January of 1944, by which time the Mark 56 project was well underway. Section 7.6's primary
function then became "supplying a forum where communications between the principals, including
the Bureau ofOrdnance, could be provided openly."'· By this date, most 7.6 members were
already overloaded with other work, and those from industry were further constrained. They had
7"Getting, "History ofDivision 7.6," 7. See Fagan ed., Miston' of Engineering and Science in the Be" System. 158-
62. 8lL built a prototype of this computer, designated Mark 8, which directly replaced the Ford Instrument Mark
I, but it was never put into productjon.
75 Getting, "History ofDivision 7.6,'" 7.
76 Getting, Oral History Interview.
77The CoDq)1ete 7.6 membership was: George Agins., Vice Presiden~ Anna Corporation; RF. Cooke, VP, Ford
Instrument ,--..ompany; C.S. Draper, MIT; A.W. Horto~ Bell Telephone Laboratories; R.M. Page, Naval Research
Laboratory; E" T. Poitras, Division 7 (Ford Instrument Company); RB. Roberts, Section T, OSRD; A.L. Ruiz,
Division 7 (C'..e--.,'I31 Electric).
7'Getting. AU in a Lifetime. 201.
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other contracts with BuOrd and could not discuss status or technical details. Nor did they wish to
share such infonnation in a forum in which their commercial competitors participated. The world
ofnaval fire control, with its multi-layered secrecy and its seeming archaism, fiustrated Getting,
used to the heady and open world ofmicrowave radar in its early days. 79
And despite Getting's vision, nothing inherent in "coordinated design," dictated a radar
group should capture and hold the terrain. He and Division 7 confronted not only BuOrd's fire
control establishment, but also other centers of technical expertise. "Blind firing" became the high
prestige project for BuOrd, and several groups vied for the technical spotlight. An argument could
be made that Draper's gyro culture was best positioned for system engineering, or Bell Labs,
where research shared a corporate umbrella with Western Electric's manufacturing. Getting
bitterly opposed bringing in Western Electric even as a manufacturer; he disparaged his earlier
work with the telephone company, "In fact the Radiation Laboratol)' and Bell Telephone
Laboratories are not complimentary but rather the same type oi ;ctOOratories," he wrote to Karl
Compton and threatened to resign from the Mark 56 project if production contracts were given to
Western Electric.to The contracts, instead, went to General Electric, with whom Getting had
worked so successfully on the SCR-584.
The most serious threat to Division 7's hegemony in fire control, anti hence Getting's
systems vision, came from within the NORC. Section T, named after its leader Merle Tuve,
developed the proximity fuze which entered production in 1943. Tuve built the Johns Hopkins
Applied Physics Laboratory in parallel with the fuze, and he sought to capitalize on the success.
For Tuve and his staff: in Michael Dennis's words, "fire control was the future.,,11 Section T's had
little experience with control systems, but it did have an intimate and unique relationship with
BuOrd. Tuve" in fact, reported to the bureau and not to Bus;l. By 1943 Section T resembled an
R&D version ofthe Ford Instrument Company: it wished to become "the secret fire control
design section of the US Navy," that Ford had been decades before.
79Getting, "History ofDivisioo 7.6" 10.
80 tc;Ao to KTC, "U.S.N. AA Director Mk. 56," December 29, 1943. OSRD7, E-39, Office Files of Karl Taylor
Compton, Box 51, Division 7 folder.
II Michael Dennis, "A Chanse of State: The political cultures of technical practice at the MIT Instnunentation
LaboratOIy and the Jolms Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratol)', 1930-45," (ph.D. dissertatio, Johns Hopkins
University, 1991), 341. Getting had actually collaborated with Section T on these fire amtrol pro~ and did not
share Division 7'5 animus toward him. Still, Getting needed Division 7 for his own pro~ so did nothing to
resist their fight with Tuve.
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Blandy requesioo Tuve's group, in conjunction with Draper and Sperry, to develop a blind
firing director for 5" 38' guns. Bush asked Division 1 to aid Tuve, raising the committee's ire.
They resented Section T's relationship with BuOrd, an intimacy neither D-2 nor Division 7 ever
enjoyed. After heated discussion, Division 7 resolved, "We recommend that the apparently
anomalous relationship of Section T to OSRD be discontinued and its status as a Naval agency be
clearly reco~." Division 7 considered Tuve "an extraordinarily able man with a great deal of
energy but is wild and irresponsible," and refused to work with him, but would "give any possible
assistance," ifbis group were officially placed within the navy. The situation was, in Caldwell's
words, "pretty sour," and concerned the Division throughout 1943.12 Bush quieted the impasse by
decreeing Section T should undertake a short-term solution, helping Draper put his Mark 52
director into production and attempting to modify it for blind firing (section T went on to design
several radar-controlled directors, Marks 57, 59, 61, and 62). Meanwhile, Bush directed, Section
7.6 would "undertake the development ofa new fully integrated radar fire control system ofan
'ultimate,' type.,,13 In this project, "The Radiation Laboratory under the direction ofDr. Getting
would act as central integrated clearing point...Division 7 acting as consultants."u Getting's
vision, of radar designers at the center of systems' design, thus survived a serious challenge, bu\
by a narrow margin. The ambiguous division between long-term and short-teon research blurred
as the war drew to a close. Still, Getting won the ideological victory: Tuve's group would
combine existing components, while Section 7.6, seeking the ultimate integrated system, would
build from fundamentals.
Bt,.pming in 1943 the Rad Lab undertook the Mark 56 program. [*Figure 8-9: Mark 56
Layout] Its conical-scan, X-band (3cm wavelength) radar could search broadly for targets, and
then automatically track them, even at low-angles. A "line of sight gyro," in the Mark 56
established a refer~lce as the line between gun and target. Radar operations took place below
decks; two sailors in the director itself could acquire and track targets optically. For the
computers, the Rad Lab did not defer to prior experience, over Division 7 objections. Instead,
Czech exile and fire control expert Tony Svoboda in the Rad Lab designed a wholly new type of
12 Division 7 meeting minutes, April 9-10, 1943, July 7-8, 1943. Sec 21so Dennis, "A Change of State," 340-46 for
bow this dispute played out in Section T.
I] (jetting, "History of Division 7.6," 8.
14 Division 7 meeting minutes, ApriI2S, 1943.
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mechanical computer, using innovative fouf-bar linkages. The MIT Servo Lab modified their
Vickers servo to drive the director, but the devices were never used. In August, 1943 Division 7
let a contract with General Electric's Aero and Marine Division in Schenectady for the gyro
assembly (project #71). General Electric contracted to do production design on the radar based
on a Rad Lab prototype (project #79). The Librascope Corporation ofCalifornia (chosen over a
competing proposal from Ford Instrument) produced the ballistic computer (project #85). The
device was first tested on a specially-construeted rolling platfonn at Fort Heath north ofBoston in
the Spring of 1944. The first full-up test, including guns, took place the following December.l~
The project's radical character adversely affected its timing. BuOrd, tuned for wartime
production and deployment, allocated its priorities solely by anticipated delivery date. The long-
term Mark 56 fell low on the list and its schedule suffered. Despite Bush's compromise with
Section T, however, Getting saw his "ultimate" system as a crash program to get blind firing to
the fleet as soon as possible. He lobbied ChiefofNaval Operations Admiral King, who pushed
BuOrd to let produetiorl contracts. But King voiced the fleet's tiustration with previous automatic
tracking radars and demanded the new system include optical as well as radar tracking - a
further source ofdelay. When the war ended, Division 7 had five prototypes on order from
General Electric, two ofwhich neared completion. When the NDRC closed down, it transferred
the contract to BuOrd in October, 1945, whnch ordered one hundred systems. Further problems,
delays, and changes by the Bureau delayed lvlark 56 production models from reaching the fleet
until 1947. It did however, proliferate widely in the fleet and remained standard through the 1970s
(never firing a shot in anger).
Throughout the Mark 56 project, Getting continued to redefine the work ofbuilding
control systems. This entailed two parallel moves: transforming the Rad Lab from a radar group
to a system integrator, and transforming the human operator into a dynamic component. For the
first, Getting elaborated the Rad Lab's earlier position between the government and its
contractors as a coordinating technical body. Earlier in the war, the urgency of the antiaircraft
IS For the design history of the Mark 56, see lAG Diary, "Conference on Mark 56 Director," June 10, 1943, "Mk
56 Radar Discussions at Bureau ofOrdnance," July IS, 1943, "Mk S6," July 2, 1943, 44Mk S6," July 26, 1943"
OSRD7 OPt Box 72, lAG Diary folder. Division 7 "Minutes of Rochester Meeting," JanU8IY S, 1944, OSRD7 GP,
Box 72, Division 7 Meetings folder. Getting, All in a Lifetime, 177-81. FOi an operating descliption ofttiC system,
see Naval ()rdnaDce and Gunnery. Volume 2: Fire Control (U.S. Navy Bureau of Personnel, NavPcrs 1(/798),318-
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situation tended to smooth over political problems, and the NDRC's novelty provided a certain
temporary authority. Furthermore, a new f~eld like radar had no established expertise to resist the
scientists' designs, so Getting had "complt}te technical control." Late in the war, however, as
things became more established, routine, ~:nd industrial, they also became more complicated.
Getting was used to dealing with the army, a low-tech service still awed by electronics; now he
took on the Bureau ofOrdnance, among the most technically sophisticated - and entrenched -
groups in the services. Getting wanted to control not only engineering but production (a move
parallel to Gordon Brown's). Otherwise the role oft.he Rad Lab would evaporate as the Mark 56
design neared completion. Toward this goal, Getting continued to cross established boundaries.
He had joined Division 7, he had merged it with the Rad Lab (7.6), now he reached into the belly
of the beast and sought to place a liaison within BuOrd. Warren Weaver, by now experienced at
compromise with the services, thought the plans too ambitious, "discussed in over-pretentious
tenns," and suggested "the way to work with the BuOrd is, so to speak, to work with the
BuOrd.,,16 Still, Getting got his way and made himselfliaison he desired. In March, 1945,
Radiation Lab Director Loomis ordered that Getting be assigned to the Bureau ofOrdnance, "to
devote your time and efforts to technical problems on fire control and ttleir application to
radar.,,·7
Within BuOrd Getting acquired the long-sought authority to delineate the role of the
Radiation Lab. He formalized the Rad Lab's job ofsystem integrator, which had previously been
merely infannal. Now the Rad Lab would,
1) Make all technical information available to GE and the navy
2) Check and criticize designs at all stages ofdevelopment
3) Send skilled representatives to participate in conferences
4) Report to the BuOrd OIl the progress oCthe project
5) Participate in testing ofprototypes
6) Test pre-production models
7) Assist in establishing test and alignment procedures for manufacturing and acceptane<.;
tests
8) Assist in training programs
340. For project bistoty, see Division 14 Final Re,port 4·SS to 4-63. For Svoboda's relay computers, see "Eloge:
Antonio Svoboda, 1907-1980," Annals ofthe History o/Computing 2 (no. 4, October, 1980 284-92.
16 WW to lAG, January 16, 1945. OSRD7, Office Files of Ivan Getting, Box 62.
11 Loomis to lAG, March 9, 1945. OSRD7, Office Files of Ivan Getting, Box 62.
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Engineering, production, testing, alignment, training: these activities comprised Getting's systems
vision as much as time constants and signal spectra. To carry out these functions, the lab would
have the foUowh~g privileges
1) Receive copies ofcorrespondence between the navy and contractors
2) To receive copies ofdrawings and specifications prepared by contractors
3) To be notified when significant tests are carried out so representatives of the Laboratory
may participate
4) To be notified ofteebnica1 conferences and conferences where technical decisions are to
be made so that representatives ofthe Laboratory may be present
5) To be given the opportunity to examine and criticize production designs O! models
before final design specifications are frozen
6) To have access to the establishments oCthe contractor and subcontractor by
appointment, to confer with engineers or to inspect equipment
7) To receive one ofthe first production models for test and study ifdirected by the Navy!!
Correspondence, drawings, specification, tests, conferences, inspections: these embodied the
relations between institutions. Getting needed to control them as much as the signal flows
between components. These remarkable lists reflect the experience Getting had acquired in a few
years ofdoing research and managing contraet5 for the NDRC. Each point seems to correspond
to a particular episode where he lacked necessary authority: being excluded from meetings, not
receiving correspondence, not having access to factory facilities. Getting redefined control
engineering as an organizational as well as a technical task, and he vehemently argued BuOrd by
itselfwas not up to it. Rather, Getting argued, the Radiation Laboratory had the best overall view
ofautomatic control.
Where Getting appropriated authority from contractors, designers, and manufacturers, he
also appropriated the work ofhuman operator. Unlike system integrators who organized and
coUated different types ofdata, Getting's operators functioned purely mechanically, like "human
servomechanisms." In 1945, while fighting for his project's priority, Getting wrote to Admiral
Furer, the navy's Coordinator ofResearch and Development, connecting his ideas for designing
new integrated systems with the principle of"automatic operation." Getting argued wartime
experience had demonstrated the value ofautomation:
1) Human judgment introduced wrong guesses
2) Human operators succumbed to battle fever
3) The human mind reacts slowly compared to modem servo equipment
·Statement ofRclationships between the Bureau ofordnancc, U.S. Navy and the National Defense Research
Committee, OSRD, on the Development and Production of the Gunfire Control System Mark 56,tt reprinted in
Getting. All in a Lifetime, 186.
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4) The intellectual processes were incapable of utilizing most efficiently all the observable
data. 19
Radar burdened rather than relieved the operator by radically increasing the amount of
information he had to sort through. Radar brou~~t such complexity to military control that it
strained human attention to hold the system together. Getting's automation would rein in that
human involvement - a strategy which resonated with plans for demobilization, when men left
the services but the machines remained.
To make his point, Getting invoked the success ofthe anny's automated antiaircraft fire
control. The M-9/SCR-S84 system had entered the field, and Getting used the authority he gained
by its success to sharply criticiz.e the Navy's lack ofautomation, "In short the Navy is an order of
magnitude behind the anny in heavy antiaircraft fire control and radar." The solution, ofcourse,
was to grant highest priority to Getting's Mark 56, "a wholly integrated operational system." But
to what experience did he refer? How did automatic cootrol perform in combat? What had been
the experience ofthe human operators, whose behavior Getting now used to make his claim for
automation? The M-9/SCR-584 combination did see service in the war. What were its successes?
Where were its limitations?
Automatic Control's Finest Hour
As Getting promoted and composed his new project, the first automated antiaircraft
system, the Radiation Lab's SCR-584 combined with Bell Labs' M-9 gun director, made its way
off the production line and ooto the battlefield. It was first successful at the beachhead in Anzio,
Italy in March, 1944, when two of the radars and sixteen directors systems were deployed on the
beach to cover the landing force. Together the SCR-584 and the M-9, combined with Sperry
power drives to move the 90mm guns, shot down enemy aircraft which had been harassing the
landings.90 On D-day, thirty-nine systems landed in Normandy (floated ashore in waterproof
boxes) to protect the invasion force against air attack.
The M-9 still maintained the "constant altitude assumption" of the pre-war Sperry
directors. Rushed into production in 1942, it did not incorporate the latest results on predicting
curved flight from work at BTL and MIT. The M-9 worked best, then, against attackers that flew
straight and level - a tactic enemy bombers quickly learned to avoid. In June, 1944, however, a
19 Getting to Furer, April 26, 1945, reprinted in, All in a Lifetime, 182-8S.
90 Leo Sullivan from the Rad Lab accompanied the SCR-~84 to Anzio. See Sullivan oral histofY.
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new threat emerged from Nazi engineers which perfectly matched the constant altitude
assumption, exactly because it had no human operator. This threat itselfrelied on an automatic
control system to fly, and hence was the perfect target for the automatic antiaircraft gun: the first
operational robot bomb, the V-I.
Germany unleashed the "V-I Blitz" against London in mid-1944, and launched almost
7,500 "buzz bombs" against the English capital during the following eighty days. In the words of
the British commander ofthe Antiaircraft Command, "It seemed to us that the obvious answer to
the robot target ofthe flying bomb...was a robot defense.,,91 Here the M-9/SCR-584 combination,
to paraphrase Churchill, saw its finest hour. In anticipation ofthe V-I blitz, and in response to a
special request by Churchill, Radiation Lab engineers rushed systems out of production, on to
ships and accompanied them to England. The original SCR-S84 design group (Getting,
Davenport, Abajian, and F~s) and other Rad Lab staff members traveled along the English
coast from battery to battery, aligning equipment, training crews, and tuning the radars -
conveying tacit laboratory knowledge to crews in the field.92
One other technology completed the system: the proximity fuze, developed by Merle
Tuve's Division T before their foray into fire control. The proximity fuze (known as VT or
variable-time fuze) placed a miniature radar in each sheD which sensed when it neared the target
airplane and set off the explosion.93 Until then, antiaircraft, with all its feedbacks and controls,
remained an open-loop system once the shell left: the gun. The proximity fuze closed the loop -
making each shell a one-dimensional guided missile, capable of reacting to its environment.
Buzz bombs posed no easy targets. Smaller than a typical airplane, they tlew faster than
bombers oCthe day (380 mph), and at low altitudes, averaging about 2,000 feet (indeed fast and
low would become the classic radar-evading strategy). And they proved remarkably robust to
91 Geoeral Sir Fredrick Pile, Ack-Ack. Britain's Defence Apinst Air Attack During the Second World War
(London: Harrap. 1949), 314-15. Also see Pile to George C. Marshall, quoted in Bush to Hazen, August 31, 1944.
OSRD7 E-82 Oftice Files ofHarold Hazen, Box 9 Rad Lab folder.
92 Getting, Davenport, Abajian oral histories.
93c4Antiaircraft Artillery Fire Control," Prepared by the Bell Telephone Laboratories for the Ordnance Departmen~
U.S. Army in fitlfillment ofContraet W-30-069.Qrd-1448, May 1, 1945. ATI, 14. Those manning the batteries
were often slow to recognize the value of the fuze. If the vr fuzed S~US didn't find a targe~ they exploded after
some fixed time-out period due to a Idf-elestruction mechanism. Because these explosions were likely to be far
from tile tarpts, the proximity fuze did DOt pI1JCIute large numbers ofexplosions ncar the targd like time fuzes did.
Insttad., IUJUIGI would see very few explosions near tile target and many explosions far beyond il '70 those used
to seeiqlarp numbers Gfbursts arouDd the target from time fuzed ammunition, this distribution ofbursts makes
tile perfOl1lllllCe of tile battery look very poor," despite much improved~.
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shellfire, sometimes taking several hits before falling. Still, between June 18 and July 17, 1944, the
automated guns shot down 343 V-I's, or l00At of the total attac~ and 22% of those shot down
(the others were hit by aircraft, barrage balloons, and ships). During this period the AA batteries
were deployed in a ring south ofLondon; and their ability to fire was limited to avoid hitting
fighters that also pursued the buzz bombs. "fhe guns could fire only on positive identification of
the target and ifno fighter were in pursuit, giving aircraft the first chance to shoot down the
missiles. In mid-July, the AA batteries moved to the coast where ~hcy could fire without limit over
the channel. From July 17 to August 31, the automated guns accounted for 1286 V-I kills, or
34% of the attac~ 55% ofthose shot down (the improved success rate probably also reflects the
effects of the Rad Lab members' assistance).94 That October, the M-9/SCR-584/VT-Fuze
combination defended Antwerp from the V-I with similar success. In this tense confrontation of
robot weapons, the automated battlefield, which even today remains a dream of military
technologists, began to take shape.
Despite its success, the system had seams in its automation. Radar's new way of seeing
did not immediately replace ocular vision. ThrOlighout the war, automatic and manual perception
had an uneasy coexistence - translating between the two proved difficult, error-prone, and
fatiguing. A detailed assessment ofthese issues came not from Ivan Getting but from his rivals
and fonner collaborat~rs at BeD Labs. In July and August of 1944, a group of four army officers
and two BTL employees, including Clarence A. LoveD (who headed the T-I0&.1-9 design team),
traveled to Europe to tour antiaircraft batteries and observe their operation against the V-I s. This
group's report set out requirentents for future antiaircraft systems. Unsurprisingly, the BTL report
criticized the Rad Lab radar because the SCR-584 could not search and track simultaneously
(BTL's rival SCR-545 could).95 BTL also reported the system demanded unreasonable
concentration from its operators, "there are too many sources of present position data for the
computer," because it allowed radar, optical trackers and a rangefinder, or a combination.
Operators had to judge and juggle these alternate instruments. Manual tracking, for example, was
94 GuerIac, Radar in World War II, 859. For a personal account oftbc automatic system vs. the V-I, sec Abajian
Interview.
9SwAntiaircraft Artillcl)' Fire Control," 9.
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still necessary because of interfering ground echoes (for targets low on the horizon), closely-
spaced targets which a radar might not be able to distinguish, and the possibility ofjamming.9G
The M-9/SCR-584 was more a comb:nation oftwo separate units (the BTL director and
the Rad Lab radar) than an integrated system. Radar trackers sat inside a trailer while optical
trackers and rangefinders (on the director) sat outside. BrL'S report proposed adding a means for
switching between radar and optical tracking. Ultimately, it argued, any new system should mount
optical instruments right at the radar station so operators could "track either optically or by radar
without changing their positions or the controls which they employ."97 [*Figure 8-10: Proposed
optical/radar station] BTL's report recommended combining tracking and computing in a single
unit, similar to the integrated, blind-firing system Ivan Getting proposed to the navy in 1944.
Getting built that case on the success ofthe SCR-5841M-9 combination, and on the
seeming inability ofhuman operators to keep up with the data flow. Much of the trouble, of
course, arose not from the limits ofhuman performance, but from relationships between design
organizations divided among perception, integration, and articulation. Getting's Mark 56, the
"wholly integrated, operational system," proposed to overcome these difficulties by defining a
new institutional role, the system integrator, supervising tighter coupling of radar and computer,
design and production, operator and machine.
More nan the Sum of its Component Parb: Dynamic Systems and Militnry Contn-cting
Radar's new subtlety accompanied new expertise; the Radiation Lab staked out a role as a
system integrator. Organizational relationships solidified as technical systems, at first the partially-
integrated but combat-tested SCR-584 radar, and then the integrated Mark 56 Gun Fire Control
System. The Rad Lab also embodied its claims as knowledge, among its most lasting
contributions. After the war, the laboratory, with OSRD funding, published a twenty- seven-
volume series on radar to distribute the results oftheir wartime work. Three of ttlese twenty seven
volumes emerged from the work ofGetting and his associates: Louis Ridenour's Radar System
EnlPneering, Tony Svoboda's Computing Mechanisms and Linkages, and Theory of
Servomechanisms by physicist Hubert M. James, Rad Lab Division 8 selVO engineer Nathaniel B.
Nichols (who had come from the Taylor Instrument Company), and Division 8 mathematician
96uAntiaircraft Artillery Fire Control," 10.
"Ibid., 29.
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Ralph s. Phillips.9I Along with similar volumes from Bell Labs and the Servo Lab, "James,
Nichols, and Phillips," became a canonical post-war text of control engineering - introducing a
generation ofengineers to newly constituted discipline.99
For the Rad Lab scientists and engineers, the boundaries of this knowledge derived from
the boundaries of radar-driven fire control. The book opens, "The work on servomechanisms in
the Radiation Laboratory grew out of its need for automatic-tracking radar systems." Ivan
Getting's introduction reviews the basic definitions of servomechanisms and the history ofdesign
techniques. Noting the field's lack ofstahl.: epistemology, Getting observes, "It is nearly as hard
for practitioners in the servo art to agree on the definition ofa servo as it is for a group of
theologians to agree on sin." Getting and his co-authors certainly acknowledged their
predecessors; the twenty-page introduction cites Hazen, Bush, Minorsky, ~Jyquist, Harris, Brown,
Hall, Wiener and Bode. Still, the book reflects Radiation Lab culture: design examples include the
SCR-584 radar, numerous au!omatic and manual tracking schemes, filters for radar signals, and
methods for dealing with noisy echoes. The Rad Lab volume, while stabilizing control systems as
a coherent body ofknowledge, defined that stability by the systems vision of radar scientists.
Their notion ofthe system as a dynamic entity, however, conflicted with the pre-war
vision, which saw a system as a "sum ofcomponent parts." Once Harold Hazen defined the
modular blocks ofthe differential analyzer, for example, he could be manipulate and recombine
them ad infinitum. Hazen articulated the newer approach in his 1945 preface to Division 7's
"Summary Technical Report,":
One must always remember that a fire-eontrol system is more than the sum of component
parts. It is an integrated whole with interrelated functioning ofall its parts and one is safe
91 Hubert M. James, Nathaniel B. Nichols, and Ralph S. Phillips Theon' of Servomechanisms (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1947) Radiation Laboratory Series '2S. Antonio Svoboda, Computing MechanislDS and Linkages
(New York: MdJraw Hill, 1948) Radiation Laboratory Series #27. Louis B. Ridenour R4dar System Engineering
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1948) Radiation Laboratory Series #1.
99 Gordon S. Brown aDd Donald P. Campbell, Principles of Servomechanisms (New York: Wiley, 1948). Leroy
MaceoU, Fundamental Theory of Servomechanisms (New York: Van Nostrand, 1945). See Chris Rissel,
"Textbooks and Subtexts: A sideways look at the post-war oontrol engineering textbooks, which appeared halfa
century ago," IEEE Control Systems 16 (DO. 2, April, 1996), 71-8, for an account of the post-war publishing effo~
and a comparative discussion ofcontrol textbooks. CGmparing degrees of importance (Gf these books is, of COUlSe,
spliUina hairs, although Bissel calls the Rad Lab volume "perhaps the most influential of aU the American
publications of the 19405."
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in considering parts separately only ifone always keeps in mind their relation to the
whole.100
In a dynamic control system, each component affected the others. Computer desi~ for example,
depended on the bandwidth ofthe radar, its noise spectrum, and the capabilities of the human
operator. But the J.)()litical economy ofmilitaIy technology was built on the older model where
systems were decomposable. BuOrd divided up problems, assigned pieces to separate
contractors, and assembled the pieces into systems. That approach only worked, however, if a
system really was the sum ofcomponent parts; noise proved it was more. The NDRC's are
control division, and then the Radiation Lab's Ivan Getting, reconfigured the structure l)f
contracting to suit a dynamic, noisy, error',prose model ofa system. To embody their model in
working systems, however, they needed a set ofengineering techniques to complement
institutional relationships. Those techniques began to emerge during the war as well, driven by
similar problems of radar noise and feedback loops, gradually defining a general quantity to flow
through integrated systems.
100 Harold Hazen, "Fire Control Activities ofDivisioo 7, NDRC," in Summary Technical Report ofDivision 7,
NDRC Volume I: Gunfire COntKol, 4. Stuart BenDeU bas DOted the "systems approach" in his COmpariSOf of
British and American fue control work during the war in A History ofConttol Engineering: 193O-19S~ l' 12S.
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Figure 8-3: M-9 gun director, tracking head with operators. One follows the target in elevation,
the other in azimuth. The unit and the operators rotate with azimuth tracking. (AT&T Archives)
Figure 8-4: Barber Coleman Dynamic Tester for antiaircraft directors. Specially-shaped cams at
right provide data to drive director inputs with shafts at left (Summary Technical Report,
Division 7, National Defense Research Committee, 1946).
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Figure 8-5: Automated system versus robot weapons. M-9 antiaircraft director with power
supply, computer, tracking head, and servo-driven 90mm gun With the SCR-584 radar, this
machine fought the V-1 (AT&T Archives).
Figure 8-7: Army SCR-268 Fire control radar (Louis Ridenour, Radar System Engineering (New
York: McGraw Hill: 1947).
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Figure 8-6: SCR-584 Fire control radar with control van. Note tracking operator's console at
left in van, and range operator's console at right (Louis Ridenour, Radar System Engineering
(New York: McGraw Hill: 1947),209).
Figure 8-7: Traces on screen and traces of writing, recreating the plotting room in the field.
Interior of control van for SCR-584 radar. Note radar operators at left and master plotting board
for mapping successive radar tracks. The manual plotting board was later replaced by an
automatic, servo-driven plotter built by Bell Labs (Louis Ridenour, Radar Systen1 Engineering
(New York: McGraw Hill: 1947),239).
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Figure 8-9: Layout of Mark 56 Gun Fire Control System. Two operators track optically from the
deck positions, and two more work at the console in the control room below deck. (From Naval
Ordnance and Gunnery: Volume 2. Fire Control (U.S. Navy, Bureau of Personnel, NavPers
10798, 1955, 319).
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Figure 8-10 (left): Optical sights integrated into
radar console in the M33fire control systen1,
proposed by Bell Labs at the end of the war but
never produced. (fron1 Fagan, ed., A History of
Engineering and Science in the Bell System, 365).
Figure 8-11 (below): While auton1ated fire
control fought robot bombs in Europe, ren10te
controls in the pacific faced another novel
human/machine con1bination: Kan1ikaze attack,
here on battleship Missouri. The quad-mounted
40mm gun at lower left (number 9) is under
control of the Mark 51 director at center right
(also 9). Similarly, the 40mn1 mount 11 is under
control of the director at right (from Edward
Steichen ed., US Navy War Photographs (New
York: Crown Publishers, 1980), 89).
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Chapter 9
The Tum to Information
Bell Labs, the Servo Lab the Radiation Lab, with their work in noise and system
integration, brought together pre-war threads ofservo theory and f~back engineering. The
merge engendered more than combination. In crucible ofwmime research, control and
communication began to synthesize a new quantity: information. Technology reconfigured
perceptio'l, integration, and articulation as «!;stinguishing signals from background noise,
processing them as representations, tJJKl transmitting them back into the world. The idea ofthe
genercdized information pr~)r begat the general information machine, the "computer."
It has~rae commonplace, however, to say World War II merged "communication and
contral." ~~orbertWiener, in his 1948 book !;vbemetics: or Control and Communication in the
~JtimaI and the Machine articulated the marriage for a generation ofengineers, systems theorists,
and technical enthusiiWs ofvaried stripes. Wiener declared the merger occurred instantly,
obviously and completely in the course orhis work on prediction devices. "I think that I can claim
credit," Wiener wrote in his memoir, "for transferring the whole theory ofthe servomechanism
bodily to communication engineering."l Recent historians, incll!ding Steve Joshua Heims and Peter
Galison have revisited this account, exploring the genesis ofhis project, its roots in his earlier
work, and its short-tenn failure and profound long-tenn effects.2 But their views still center on
Wiener: the academic, the inteUectuaI, and the mathematician; they tend not to address his
connectiolj to a broader technical culture.
Before Wiener's cybernetics, technology was already suffused with what would later be
called "cybernetic" ideas. The pre-war threads ofcontrol engineering, as weD as wartime work on
fire control, sulSest a broader and more gradual convergence ofcommunications and control than
a "\\'ienerian" account. The culture ofthe NDRC, with its dual emphasis on BeD Labs and MIT,
brought institutional pressure to bear on oommunications and control. Servo engineers turned to
I NOIbcrt Wiener, I Am a Ma'¥'!e'iQan: 11M; Later Life ofa Prodicy. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1956), 265. Also
se~ Cybernetics: or Control and c.munication in the Api.' and the Macbipe. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1948), 8
for a cimiIar aa:GUDt aod a similar claim.
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frequency response to characterize servomechanism behavior. Radar engineers adapted
communications theory to deal with noise in tracking. And human operators were always
necessary but problematic components ofautomatic control systems. These were but a few ofthe
features ofthe technological terrain onto which Norben Wiener stepped in 1940.
This terrain, particularly the field ofcontrol systems, was developing the technology,
indeed the practical philosophy, that Wiener would articulate so effectively in his postwar writing.
During the war, much of that philosophy coalesced around difficult problems offire control:
dynamic perfonnance, mathematical precision, corrupted data, and the human operator. Research
in data smoothing and prediction, including Wiener's, began to formalize the signals-based
approach emerging at several institutions. Engineering practice coevolved with this theoretical
work, and sometimes preceded it. Ballistics and firing tables stretched calculating machines,
especially the differential analyzers, to their limits. Engineers at RCA and MIT sought to improve
these "continuous" devices with "numerical" techniques, both for central computing facilities and
for battlefield automation. Bell Labs built digital testers (m.deed coined the word "digital,''') out of
telephone relays, maintaining and disseminating the NDRC's authority to evaluate fire co.ntrol
systems.
Tracing this broad outline ofcommu.~ticationsand control sets into relief the emergence of
distinct ideas of"information," and "computers" out of the conjunction ofcommunications and
control. Neither "information" nor "computer" had a stable meaning during World War D, as each
underwent struggles ofdefinition. No episode illustrates these struggles better than Division 7's
experience with the proposed electronic computer which eventually became "the first electronic
digital computer," ENIAC. The NDRC fire control committee turned down a request to fund the
machine. Why was Division 7, highly innovative in other respects, unwilling or unable to support
forward-looking work in electronic computing? Instead ofexplanations pointing to Division 7'8
"limited vision,n or "commitment to analog computing," we must understand Division 7's interest
(or lack thereat) in electronic digital computing in the context of its overall research program in
fire control. As a kind ofscientific controversy, the NDRC's rejection of the ENIAC proposal
2 Steve Joshua Heism, John von NeullWlD and Norbert Wiener: From Mathematics to the Technologies ofLife and
~ (CambricIp: MIT Press, 1980,). Peter Gali50~ ""I1Je Ontology of the Enemy: Nomen Wiener and the
Cybernetic Vision," Critical Inquiry 21 (Autwn.n, 1994), 228-66.
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highlights the epistemological and institutional stakes surrounding infonnation ano~ computer~
during World War II.
In contrast to their ambivalence about electronic computers, Division 7 supported
fundamental intellectual work. Wiener and Claude Shannon, both under Division 7 sponSorship,
shaped information science as much as any hardware innovation. In general - through feedback
theory, frequency-response methods, smoothing and prediction theory, and system engineering-
fire control established a mathematical and conceptual framework for post-war electrical and
computer engineering. Tile legacy ofDivision 7 thus remains a richly charged paradox: failure to
build the first "computers" combined with successful intellectual contributions. This paradox,
however, is no coincidence. It derives from tensions in the NDRC's role as sponsor of
"fundamental" research within a focused wartime environment. Technologies ofcontrol bore the
imprint ofthe control oftechnology.
Noise, Out of Coatrol, PredictiDI tbe Future
During the fall of 1940, when Warren Weaver and 0-2 conducted their research survey,
Ed Poitras visited MIT and met separately with Gordon Brown and Norbert Wiener. Brown was
beginning his NDRC work on servos, and Wiener felt he might be able to contribute. He wanted
to apply communications and network theory to servo problems. Poitras noted in his diary,
[Wiener] wants to tackle the problem ofsolving for the controller of servos in tenns oCthe
input as the frequency spectrum...He believes that coosiderable ofthe present network
theory could be applied to the servo problem.3
Wiener referred Brown's work then underway in his own institute; from Poitras's notes he seemed
not ya: familiar with fire control and expressed no interest in prediction. None ofWiener's
correspondence mentions prediction before late 1940. He did, however, draw on long-standing
interests in network theory and harmonic analysis. On and offfor nearly ten years, Wiener had
worked with a former Bush student, Yuk Wing Lee, at MIT and in China, reformulating network
synthesis and even building an analog computer. While simultaneous with Bode's work on
feedback networks, Wiener's work did not address feedback. He recalled later, "What was
lacking in our work was a thorough understanding ofthe problems ofdesigning an apparatus in
3 EJP diary, November 9, 1940. OSRD7 OP Box 70, collected diaries volume I.
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which part of the output motion is fed back again to the beginning ofthe process as a new input.,,4
When Wiener proposed applying network theory to servo design to Poitras in 1940, then, he
unknowingly sought to replicate Bode's work which was published that year.
Wiener and Bigelow: Prediction and Stability
lust where Wiener learned ofthe fire control problem and the importance ofprediction is
not clear from surviving documents. It may have been his peripheral involvement with Brown and
Draper's work.' But by late 1940, Wiener applied his knowledge ofnetworks to prediction in fire
control- trying to circumvent the problem ofdifferentiating the target's location to derive its
velocity, an operation highly susceptible to noise. Working with Sam Caldwell, Wiener simulated a
prediction network on MIT's Differential Analyzer, with encouraging results. Caldwell, who was
then beginning as a member ofD-2, submitted a proposal to the NDRC to build a network and an
anticipator. D-2 let a contract, Project #6, on December 1, 1940 for "General Mathematical
Theory ofPrediction and Applications." Wiener then hired a research usistant, electrical engineer
Julian Bigelow, who had had graduated from MIT in 1936 and worked for Sperry Gyroscope and
IBM as an electronics engineer.' For the contract, Wiener and Bigelow would devise a theory to
foUow a given curve, chosen to represent the path ofan airplane, and to estimate the value ofthat
curve at some time in the future. During ~Iy 1941 Wiener and Bigelow designed and built a
machine to simulate their ideas for prediction.7
.. Wiener, I Am a Mathematician, 190. Pesi R. Masani, Norbert Wiener 1894-1964 (Basel: Burkhauser Verlag,
1990), 168-9.
5 According to a letter Brown wrote to Nathaniel Sage of MIT's Division of Industrial Cooperation on December 9,
1940, Wiener had been invited into fire control work after a meeting at MIT between Fry and Brown that
November. Brown wished to discriminate Wiener's "fundamental," work (which belonged to the NDRC) and his
own practical work (which belonged to Sperry). Brown wanted the ability to freely apply Wiener's conclusions in
the Servo Lab. Brown wrote to Sage, "Dr. Wiener is an authority on many aspects of the branch oi mathematics
that is related to this work. However, be is but meagerly infonned on the techniques necessaty to reduce 10 practice
the~rs which be can express mathematically. He is also but meagerly infonned on~ specific limits which
mU\l be met wbea the results ofa mathcmaticaI investigation are reduced to practice." Brown to Sage, December
18, 1940. OSRD7 GP Box 4, Project #16.
6 Steve J. Heims interview with Julian Bigelow, November 12, 1968, Princeton NJ. Steve J. Heims Papers, MIT
ArcIUves, MC-361 Box 1 Folder 5. It is unlikely Bigelow worked on fire control at Sperry, as his specialty was
commWlications elo:tronics; be probably worked in Sperry'. nascent radar JfOUP.
7 Several publisbcd accounts narrate ofWieoer'. work in prediction. Wiener, I Am a Mathematician. 242-56.
Stuart 8eDDcU, A HisIoD' ofControl EnaJ\Cerin1. 1930-1955 (London: Peter Pcregrinus, 1993), 170-79. Idem.,
"Norbert Wiener aDd Control ofAnti-Aircraft Guns," IEEE Control Systenu (December, 1994), ~8~2. Peter
GaliIon, "The Ontology of the Enemy." P. Masani and R.S. Phillips, "Antiaircraft Fire Control and the Emergence
mCybcmctics," iD Norbert Wiener: Collected Works with Commentaries. eel.. Masani, (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1985), Volume 4, 141-79. This article, 157-69, bas a mathematical analysis ofan antiaircraft director system based
434
They quickly ran into a stability problem: "the pieces ofapparatus designed for best
following a smooth curve wer~ oversensitive and were driven into violent oscillation by a comer."
In other words, like classic prediction methods, Wiener's network was highly sensitive, even
unstable, in the presence ofhigh frequency noise, "it became obvious that in any curve not
precisely ofthe shape ofa simple sinusoid or straight line, any attempt to use this method of
prediction would lead to a failure because of lack of stability.'" This was a cousin ofthe stability
problem electric power had faced twenty years before - trensient inputs caused high-frequency
oscillations. Engineers at Sperry, and increasingly at BTL also, knew only too weil that jerky-
tracking and rapid maneuvering ofthe target would introduce high-frequency perturbations.
Wiener quickly realized the problem was fundamental, "in the order of things," and would need a
new approach (he compared it to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle). He and Bigelow now turned
to statistics, designing a new predictor based on "8 statistical analysis ofthe correlation between
the past perfonnance ofa function oftime and its present and future perfonnance." The network
calculated a future position ofthe target based on the statistical characteristics of its past
perfonnance (its autocorrelation). It then continually updated its own prediction as time passed,
comparing the target's flight path with previous guesses. A feedback network converged on
guesses which minimized this error.9 In modern terms, this device might be described as a one-
dimensional neural network, whi~h learned about the world as it gathered new data.
By June of 1941, Wiener and Bigelow designed an electrical filter to perform this
prediction and presented it to BeD Labs. Bode, LoveD, and their group were working on similar
problems with their new electrical directors (the T-IO and T-lS) and were favorably impressed.
on WieDer's theory and on input from Ivan Getting. It describes a closed-loop system comprising a conically-
scanned radar, along the lines of the SCR-~84, a computing director, and a set ofgun control servos. Its conclusion,
OOwever, that "All told. the results of the air war fought in the years 1942 to 1944 with AA directors designed and
operated along the lines of the principles described in this section were impressive," is misleading. No directors
working with CODicalIy-scanDtAt radars, nor any electrical directors, were deployed until 1944. Even those devices,
the M-9 and SCR·584 were both designed weD before Wiener produced his result (Sec Chapter 8). The statement
"The methods of filtration used by Vt'OIkers after 1942 were all adaptations of the general filtration theory worked
out by WieDer using the RMS error criterion," may have been true at the Radiation Laboratory, where Ralph
Phillips himself took the lead in applying WieDer's ideas, but was DOt yet valid for the wider community of control
engiDeen. Even close by at the Servo Lab, Wiener's ideas were DOt employed in servo design through most of the
war.
• NOibert Wiener, Final RqJort on Section D2, Project 116, December 1, 1942, quoted in Masani and R. Phillips,
"Antiairaaft Fire CootroI and theE~ ofCybemctics," IS2.
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But while BTL sought a device for immediate application., MIT worked toward the longer-range
goal ofoptimal prediction. Still, Wiener \lias cheered by the two groups' "similarity ofapproach"
although he may have meant no more than "the identical concepts of realization by electrical [as
opposed to mechanical] means."IO Through the remainder ofthe year, Wiener worked out the
theory behind his statistical approach in detail, scribbling on a blackboard as Bigelow took notes.
Warren Weaver, the mathematician turned science manager, retained an active interest in the
project and the two men got along well. Weaver noted Wiener's work "probably represents about
the ultimate that could be accomplished in designing a predicting system which will take into
account aU ordinary geometric and dynamic factors, will do the best possible job in filtering out
errors, and will take proper account ofany statistical trends which may exist in aerial tactics
and/or in the habits ofaviators." 11
Weaver let a D-2 contract (Project #29) for Wiener to write up his theoretical results.
Wiener's report, The Extrapolation. Interpolation,. and Smoothing of Stationary Time Series, was
published by the NDRC for restricted circulation in early 1942. Here Wiener explicitly brought
together statistics and communications theory and echoed Frank Jewett's pre-war aim ofunifying
communications theory along the spctrum,
In that moment in which circuits of large power are used to transmit a pattern or to control
the time behavior ofa machine, power engineering differs from communication engineering
only in the energy levels involved and in the particular apparatus used suitable for such
energy levels, but is not in fact a separate branch ofengineering from communicatioos.12
Building on his own work in harmonic analysis and operational calculus, Wiener constructed a
general theory ofsmoothing and predicting "time series," - any problem (including economic and
policy questions) expressed as a discrete series ofdata. While he gestured at ejectric power and
selVa design as weD as communications, Wiener did not explicitly address any previous work in
feedback theory. Chapters included a general mathematical introduction, a treatment of linear
9 See BeDDdt, A History «Control EnJrineerinl., 174, aDd "Norbert Wiener and Control of Anti-Aircraft Guns,"
for a technical explanation of this approach. See also Thomas~ "Norben Wiener and the Development of
Mathematical EngiDeering," (unpublished manuscript, Stanford "University, 1996).
10 "Meeting at BTL ofWiCDel" aDd Bigelow (and SHC) and BU Group," June 4, 1941. OSRD7 GP Box 70
collected diaries volume 2.
II "SWDJDaI)' ofProjrd Wi: Section D-l, NDRC," October I, 1941. OSRD E-ISI Applied Mathematics Panel
Geoeral Ra:onIs, Box 24.
12 Norbert Wiener, The Extrapolation. Interpolation. and Smoothing of Stationary Time Series (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1949), 3. This is the publisbed \lemon ofWieoer's original "Yellow Peril," report (so named because or its
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prediction, an algorithm for minimizing the prediction error, a method for synthesizing filters to
accomplish optimal prediction, and an extension ofprediction to multiple time series. The final
chapter detailed relevant examples, including the problem ofderiving rates from noisy signals, so
common to fire control and "ofvital importance to all designers of servomechanisms."13 Among
the paper's numerous contributions was its demonstration that a feedback system could be made
to optimize not only position or velocity, but an arbitrarily chosen measure of"goodness," in this
case the statistically-defined "root mean square" (RMS) error. A number of NDRC researchers,
including Ralph Phillips, George Stibitz, J.R. Ragazzini, and John Russell took up and expanded
on Wiener's work. Wiener's frequently-cited paper formed the basis for post-war work ofoptimal
estimation, smoothing and control (much of it intimately tied to military applications). 14 It was in
response to a request for this paper in 1947 from a guided missile researcher that Wiener wrote his
anti-military manifesto, "A Scientist Rebels."
Despite Weiner's formidable attack on prediction, Weaver and D-2 harbored doubts about
its ultimate practicality. "It is not at all clear," Weaver wrote, "th:tt this study will result in a design
practicable for large scale production.,,15 Fundamental and influential as the work would prove in
later years, Wiener's scheme had in5Unn~untable problems in practice. The algorithm assumed an
infinite or very long period in the past on which to base its prediction. In reality, a target could be
tracked for only a few seconds before the prediction was needed. Also, starting and stopping the
system in a finite time interval introduced noise spikes at the ends Dfthe time series, further
corrupting the prediction. Furthermore, Wiener's scheme minimized RMS error, which gave
progressively less value to a miss based on the square of its distance to the target. But RMS error
does not accurately describe antiaircraft fire: if the shell does not explode within about ten meters
yellow cover aad difIiaIlt mathematics) "Extrapolation, Interpolation, and Smoothing of Statiorwy Time Series
with EngiDecriq Applicatioas," NDRC Report to the Services 370, February 1, 1942.
13 Wiener, ExtrgoIatioa. Intgpolation, and Smoothing, 116. For a discussion of the technical significance of this
paper, see MasIni, Holbert Wiener. 182-87.
14 For one example lee Arthur Gelb, eel, Applied Optimal Estimation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974). Gelb cites
Wiener's paper third in the introduction to the volume. Gelb also identifies the intimate similarity between
smoothiDg, filtering, aDd predietioa, all ofwhich estimate the state of some system, differing only in that they work
during, after, or before the data is available, respcaively. Also see Kailath, "Norbert Wiener aDd the Development
ofMatlwmatical EftIiDeerinI." L. A. zadeh and J. R. Ragazzini, "An Extension ofWiencr's Theory ofPrediction,"
J. Appl. PItys. 21 (00. 7, July, 1950) n:printed in Richard BeDman, eel, Selected PaReD on Mathematical Trends in
Control Ibeory (New York: Dover, 1964), 150-62. For NDRC researchers involvement with Wiener's work, see
HeDDell, A History ofControl Engineering 180-81.
•, "Summauy ofProject #16: Section D-2, NDRC."
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ofthe target, its worthless, no matter how far away it is ("a miss is as good as a mile"). The
optimal predictor also required an extensive and colnplex network ofelectronics. George Stibitz
ofBTL, who now supervised the project for D-2, b«:came increasingly skeptical, as, in fact, did
Julian Bigelow himself In July of 1942 Wiener and Bigelow demonstrated their predictor to
Weaver, Poitras, lbomton Fry, and Stibitz. The D-:! members were impressed with the
perfonnance; Stibitz operated the device and recalled "It gave me the feeling ofhaving my mind
read." But questions remained, in Weaver's view, "'Nhether this is a useful miracle or a useless
miracle."" Norbert Wiener, after all, was trying to t.uild a machine for predicting the future - a
goal with a definite alchemical tinge.
Wiener and Bigelow believed they were limited by statistical knowledge of pilot behavior
and flight paths. They wanted to collect dab on actual human tracking operators and pilots. The
iwo set out then, on a tour of sites doing research in antiaircraft fire control. By this time Weaver
became fed up with what he saw as Wiener's naive faith in an ideal analytical solution: the project
had been underway for nearly two years with no practical applications to show. During that time
BTL, the Rad Lab, and the Servo Lab had radically transformed the practice, ifnot the theory, of
fire control.
Weaver vented his fiustration in a memo which conveys how poorly the idealistic mathematician
fit into Weaver's new, secret world ofcontrol,
[WieDer and Bigelow] have gaily started out on a series of visits to military establishments,
without itinerary, without any autborizatioos, and without any knowledge as to whether the
people they want to see (in case they Imow whom they want to see) are or are not available.
WW [Weaver] is highly skeptical about this whole business, but inasmuch as the die has
been cast that they are trying to do this job, the only alternative is to try to give them as
complete an exposure as possible....Inside of twenty four hours my office begins to receive
telegrams wanting to know where these two infants are. This item should be filed under
"innocents abroad."17
Wiener and Bigelow visited military installations at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Frankford
Arsenal, and the Anti-Aircraft Artillery board at Camp Davis, North Carolina. The two also
visited Tufts, Princeton, Fort Monroe, and the Foxboro Company in Massachusetts, all ofwhich
16 GeorJc Stibitz, Tbc ZeroIh Gcneralioo: A Scientist'. R.ccollc;etioD sl1937-19SS) from the Early Binary Relay
Digital Coapden at Ben Tek;pbone I zlhnptnry and OSRD 10 a Ameline Minicomputer at the 8aJber Coleman
Company.~MS, 204. The IUIbor is indcbttAI to Paul Ceruzzi for the loan of this rare book. WW diary,
July 1, 1942. 0SRD7 Box 71 c:olIected diaries volume 4. Also see Bcnncu, A History ofControl Engineering, 178-
9.
l'WW Diary, Scptemtu I, 1942. OSRD1 OP Bod 71, ooIlcctcd diaries volume 4.
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were conducting studies ofhuman operator perfonnance under 0-2 contracts. Wiener and
Bigelow returned to MIT and prepared an experiment where a human operator would try to track
a dot oflight as it traveled along a random path on the wall- a means ofcollecting the statistics
ofhuman operators in the laboratory. All through the year Wiener had confidence in the program.
Not immune to wartime ambitio~ he pressed for a larger organization, proposing the NDRC
support a staffofsix plus several mathematicians to help with servo and radar problems. As the
project neared completion, he wrote to Weaver "we ourselves feel it has been carried out
successfully and any further development will involve a very considerable expansion which we feel
will be worthwhile."l.
Where Wiener felt ambitious and inspired, Bigelow became discouraged. Discussing a
report oftheir trip, Weaver recorded that Bigelow, "is now convinced that the Wiener statistical
predicting method, taking into account the character ofthe present problem and the character of
the associated equipment, has no practical application to fire control at this time," and the young
engineer "seriously doubts that W[iener] will be able to bring himself to make this statement."
Bigelow's pessimism wu driven his observation ofthe highly subtle, non-linear nature ofthe
human operators' performance. 19 This was late 1942, just as D-2 was transfonning into Division 7.
At the new division's first meeting, Weaver reported that Bode's work on "curved flight
prediction" for the new T-1Sdirector seemed more promismg than Wiener's predictor. For
predicting aetuaI recorded target tracks, Wiener~s "optimal" method proved only marginally more
effective than Bode's far, far simpler design. At its next meeting, Divis;on 7 decided to "tenninate"
Wiener's work; Project #6 ended in January, 1943 (Bigelow left to joint a statistical fire control
group at Columbia).20 By contrast, on this same occasion the committee initiated its work in
system integration, naval fire control, and the optimal use of radar. The tennination ofWiener's
contracts just u 0-2 transferred to Division 7, although somewhat coincidental, reflects the
NDRC's turn away from "fundamental" studies toward more industrial, applied projects.
•INW to WW, JanUlJ)' 6, 1942 aad JUDe 18t 1942. WieDer Papers, Box 2 Folder 64.
•'ww diaryt November 10, 1942. 0SRD7 GP Box 72, coIIedcd diaries volume 5.
2Ot>ivisioa 7 Meetiq Minldel, Janwuy 7-1, 1943 aDd February 3t 1943. 0SRD7 GP Box 72 Division 7 Meetings
folder. See aim GaIiIOR, "The 0aI0I0gy of the Eaemy." 244-5 aad Bigelow interview, 8. NW to WW, January IS,
1943 aDd Jammy 28, 1943 are Wieacr's last words OR the project to the NDRC. WieDer recognized his predictor
barely exceeded the performance ofoompeti0l smoodIers, but be believed there was too liUle data (only two courses
for comparisoa) aad that further work should continue to compare ten or a hundred courses.
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Still, the shift away from fundamental research may not fully explain Wiener's termination.
Something seems missing. Weaver and D-2 surely recognized the profound import ofWiener's
ideas. In 1944 Weaver reported to Division 7 his belief that "when this war is over the theory and
mechanization ofsmoothirig will be one ofthe outstanding contributions of the NDRC fire control
group.,,21 Immediately after the war, Weaver and the Rockefeller Foundation supported Wiener's
early cybernetics work. Wiener and Bigelow's two contracts cost just over 530,000, a paltry sum
less than one third oCone percent ofD-2 and Division 7's total outlays (the $2,000 for Wiener's
Extrapolation. Interpolation, and Smoothing report was the single smallest fire control contract).
It remains odd that they terminated such important work that cost so little money, immediate
application or DO. Perhaps Wiener's inability to confonn alienated him from the chummy culture of
the NDRC. Perhaps the committee distrusted the left-leaning Jewish Professor with t1 disdain for
secrecy. Existing documents do not confirm these speculations, but the evidence we have doesn't
quite teU the full story.
Whatever the reasons, Wiener was disappointed by his failure to produce a practical device
for the war effort; he plunged into elaborating on his work. The previous spring, Wiener and
collaborators physician Arturo Rosenblueth and physiologist Walter Cannon, began addressing
physiological and neurological feedback (Cannon's 1932 book, The Wisdom ofthe Body, had
explored the feedback mechanism in biological homeostasis). In the Spring of 1942 Wiener first
mentioned the idea of the human operator as a feedback element, an integral part of the system.
He discussed the ubehaviorist" implications his work in control, "the problem ofexamining the
behavior ofan instrument from this [behaviorist] point ofview is fundament&l in communication
engineering."n "In order to obtain as complete a mathematical treatment as possible of the over-
all control problem," he wrote in his memoirs, "it is necessary to assimilate the different parts of
the system to a single basis, either human or mechanical."21 This period, then, marked the
conception ofWiener's "cybernetic vision," which would make him famous after the war. Wiener
labeled this understanding ofthe servomechanical nature ofthe human-machine relationship as the
21 Division 7 Meeting Minutes, March I, 1944. OSRD7 GP Box 72, Folder Division 7 Meetings.
22 See, for example. Wiener to Haldane, Juoc 22, 1942. Wiener Papers, Box 2 Folder 64. This letter is marked
"NOT SENT." ThaI May, RoIeabIDeIh meatioried his _ with Wiener and Bigelow in a presentation at a
IDC'dinl. die pIIysioIogy oldie _ ~ spoIIIOIaI by the Macy FCMlndation. See Steve J. Heims,
O!P!!Juqinr'SociaI ScieDce for Postwar America: The Cybernetics Group: 1946-19~3 (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1993), 14-15.
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core ofcybernetics and his research program sought to extend that understanding to biological,
physiological, and social systems.
Did Wiener originate the idea ofthe human as part ofa feedback loop? Or did he articulate
and expand a "cybernetic vision" already taking shape within engineering practice? Our goal here
is not to asses the significance ofcybernetics, nor to trace its subsequent development and
complicated legacy.24 But since so much ofcybernetics, even in today's colloquial sense, derives
from the idea ofthe human as an integral part ofthe control system, these questions are worth
asking. In light afthe NDRC's research program in fire control, and, for that matter, in light of
decades ofpre-war control engineering, Wiener's syntheses, ofcommunications and control,
human and machine, were inspired articulations ofbroad patterns in control more than new
configurations.
Consider, for example, a letter written by Harold Hazen to Warren Weaver, in May of
1941, after Hazen's own visit to the anny's antiaircraft research facilities. He wrote "the idea
struck me more and more forcefully that we should know as much as possible ofthe dynamic
characteristics ofthe human being as a servo and therefore his effect on the dynamic perfonnance
ofthe entire control system." Hazen suggested studies of"the fundamental mechanical parameters
ofthe human operator," and while he did not explicitly recommend a statistical approach, he did
argue for knowing the frequency response ofhuman reactions and "ranges ofvariation among
individuals and for a given individual their variation with the various factors that influence human
behavior." Psychologist Samuel L. Femberger expanded on Hazen's ideas, suggesting emotional
stability, group behavior ofmachine operators, and the effects ofbattle st!ess on human control as
worthy, ifdiffiadt.. objects of laboratory study.25 Under Femberger, D-2 initiated a program of
research into the human being as an element in feedback loops.
By the time Wiener made his tour in late 1942, 0-2 had its own program of"cybernetic"
research. Psychologists at Brown University, Harvard, Ohio State, and Tufts and a number of
other institutions studied the human element offire control for Division 7, part ofa larger pattern
23 WieDer, I Am a Matlgyptician 190.
24 For some oldie complex eYaluatioa mCybernetics' Iepcy, see Heims, The Cybernetics Groug. Michael Arbib,
"Cybernetics After 25 Ycan: A PcnoaaJ VIeW ofSystem Tbcory aDd Brain Tbcory,tt IEEE TIYIIU. Syste1lU, Man,
tlIId CykIWtia 5 (May, 1975), 359-365.
251D.J1 to WW, "The IIumaD BeinI as a FundalllCDtai Link in AuIomaIic Cootrol Systems," May 13, 1941.
Femberaer to HLH, May 27, 1941. 0SRD7 Office Files ofWanea Weaver Box 3 MIT General Folder.
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ofsocial scientists contributing to the war effon.26 Princeton University set up a special laboratory
for manlmachine interfaces at Fort Monroe in Virginia, which Wiener visited on his tour. Studies
at the Foxboro Company, which Wiener also examined, looked at the effects of inertia, friction,
and gear ratio on hand and foot controls, as weD as the effectiveness ofdata displays. Computer
innovator John Atanasoffconducted experiments at Iowa State College, for example, on tracking
with smaI1 knobs instead ofhandwheels to achieve finer control with finger nluscles than would be
possible with coarser hand and back movements (project #12). Another battery of tests tried to
determine the effects ofdiverse factors on operator perfonnance including gender, exercise,
practice, stereo acuity, pupil size, startle, beDs and loud noises, electric shocks, and drugs.
The strangest ofthese human perfonnance studies gave new meaning to the concept of
stability in a control system: psychologists searched for ways to detennine ifan individual would
become "emotionally unstable" under fire. Division 7 brought five British seaman who operated
fire control equipment to the Princeton Laboratory in VU"ginia. Two of these men had "broken up"
in combat offCrete and the remainder had stayed at their positions. Without being told who was
who, researchers tried to distinguish the "'stable" and "excellent" men from the unreliable ones.
Psychiatric evaluations, Rorschach Ink Blot Test~ opthamalogical exams, electric shockst and a
number ofother scientific indignities all failed to detect which ofthe men had "broken.,,27
Communications engineers proved most rigorous in applying control theory to human
performance. E.B. Ferrell ofBeD Labs studied the stability ofan antiaircraft system including the
perfonnance ofthe human operator. His May, 1942 memorandum, "Automatic Tracking as a
Feedback Problem," used Bode plots ofamplitude and phase relations to map the stability ofa
closed-loop tracking network,
The differeoce in azimuth between the output sbaa as marked by the telescope cross-hairs,
and the target azimuth is dctccted by a human eye and brain, amplified by human muscles,
and paued through a handwbeel and gear-train to the output !haft in such a polarity as to
reduce the observed diffen:Dce. This is a negative feedback system. Ifthe higher frequency
26 For aootbcr social scieotisIs in World War n.. see Peter S. Buck. "Adjusting to Military Life: The Social Sciences
Go to War 1941·1950" in Mcnitt Roe Smith, ceL, Military EnterRrise and Technological Change: Perspectives on
the AmcricaD ExperieDce (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1917), 203·1S2.
21 Report from Project 10 (Tufts College) to the NDRC, 6£Expcrimcnts with British ScaJr.A:1l,"OSRD7. General
Project Files. A1Io see Summary Technical Rg?ort of Division 7. NDRC Volume m: Rangefinders and TrackilllL
pp.126-7.
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components are transmitted around the loop with improper phase relations then oscillations
may occur aDd jerky tracldng may result.21
This short survey of0-2 &nO Division 7 projects shows the id~ of the human being as a
servomechanism and the notion ofthe human-machine combffiation as e feedback system were
maturing before Wiener did his work on fire control. He reacted to and built on M evolving
understanding, pervasive among engineers and psychologists involved with fire control, that the
boundary between humans and machines affected the performance ofdynamic S)·stems and was a
fruitful area of research. Unlike Wiener, however, NDRC researchers remained bound by military
secrecy at least until 1945 (many remained so after the war) and busy with contractual obligations.
Wiener, by early 1943 was free to do and say as he pleased (M ~lgri1y resigned as consultant to
the Radiation Lab in February, 1942), with no publication restrictions and no obligations to
wartime research contracts.
Did Wiener's alienation from the NDRC induce his post-war estrangement from military
engineering? Pe!i Masaniy Wiener's colleague and biographer, argues no, because his final report
suggested further research into military prediaion.29 The wartime writings certainly contain none
oftile criticism which appeared after Hiroshima and N~agasaki. In the early faries, Wiener was
anything but a pacifist; he suggested antiaircraft sheDs filled with flammable gasses to bum enemy
planes from the sky and methods for fire bombing forested areas and grain crops.Xl Still, the
disappointing NDRC project must have influenced Wiener's feelings about military research. His
only substantive contact with what he later called "the tragic insolence of the military mind,"
occurred under NDRC auspices and endt:d in January, 1943.31 George Stibitz, when submitting his
final report on the NDRC project he supervised, added an addendum which read "Professor
\-{ie!!er has asked that no mention ofhis name be mentioned in connection with any War work.,,32
For Norbert Wiener, in the midst ofthe technological war, cybernetics became a civilian
enterprise. Working outside the massive wartime research effort, he had access only to civilian
21 E.8. FerrelL 64AIitOIDatic Tracking as a Feedback Probl~" Ma)' 20, 1942, OSRD7 GP Box #2.
29 Masani, NOIbert Wieqer. 190.
30tt Col. C. Thomas Sthole to NW, July 23, 1943. WieDer Papers, Box 1 Folder 57. NW to Bush, September 21,
1940. Box 2. Folder 58, WieDer Papers.
31 Norbert Wiener, "A Scientist Rebels,It Atlantic Monthly January, 1947, reprinted in Masani cd., Collected Works
vol. 4741. Hole tbat in~ Norbert Wieper. the bibliography ofWieoer's military work (p. 391) lists DO
contributions after January 15, 1943. WieDer did do some peicemeal consutling for the military throug.1) the early
19SOs, and his attitude toward the military mellowed after the initial post-Atomic bomb bittcmess.
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resources. His 1943 paper, "Behavior, Purpose, 8'id Teleology," written witt. Rosenblueth and
Bigelow, allies servomechanisms \\1th the "behavioristic approach" to organisms and classifies
behavior by levtl of prediction.33 The raper's philosophical tone and biological metaphors reflect
not only Wiener's alliance with the life sciences but also the strictures ofsecrecy surrounding his
prior work. Physiologists and biolllgistS, like Wiener, \\'ere froo of the war effort. Wiener
~knowled8ed the role fire control and prediction played in hi~ thinking, but beginning with
"Behavior, P\lrpose, and Teleology," cybernetics recast military control in a civiiicul mold.
Most indicative ofthis alienation and reconstruction is Wiener's consistent failllre to
acknowledge the multiple traditions offeedback in engineering which preceded him. In all his
writing on cybemetic~, he never cited Elmer Sperry, Nicholas Minorsky, Harold Black, Hany
Nyquist, Hendrik Bode, or Harold Hazen - all published on the theory offeedback before 1940;
all were recognized as important to the field; all speculated on the human :ole in automatic
-antrol; some even wfDte on the merger ofcommunications anti control and the epistemology of
feedback. But Wiener only rarely cited any servo theory !at.er than Maxwell's 1867 paper "On
Governors.,!34 Wiener ~ed this paper as fundamental but, as Otto Mayr persuasively argued, it
lacked the idea ofa "closed feedback loop" so central to later conceptions ofcontrol.33 The
omissions are striking. Wiener must have heen aware ofthese predecessors: he was closely
:nvolved in Vannevar BU3h's research program in the 1930s including the work on servos; he
worked with the MI~I's Servomechanisms L&b and its Radiation Laboratory duritlg the war; he
WitS in touch with Hendrik Bode during the war. Still he wrote, "I think that .f can claim creditfor
32 George Stibitz, "'Summary Report oc Division 7.S, Relay Computers," OSRD7 Office Files of Harold Hazen, Box
6.
33 Arturo RosenbIucd1, Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow, "BehaviM, Purpose, and Teleo;ogy," Phi/os. Sci. 10
(1943) 18-24, rqxintcd in Masani ed., Collected Wcrks Vnlume 4, 180-86.
34 On page 7 C,ybemetics. Wiener cites Leroy A. MaceoU, Fundamental Theory of Servomechanisms (New York:
'ian NOItrand, 1946). This book synthesizes am: Bell Labs approach to servos as developed for tM T-IO director. In
WieDer" CoIkcIed Works (Masani, ed.) on cybernetics, the only merences to feedback theory other thac Maxwell
in about scventy-five papcn: "Tame Communication and the Nervous Syrte~" (220-242) ~ ttanscript ofa speech
Wiener gave to the New York Academy ofScience;J meeting on "Teleological Mecbanisms,\i in 1946, contains
more references to feedback theory than the rest of Wiener's writing combined. It cites MacCoU, James, Nichols~
anc: Phillil'S, Arendt and Taplin, and Brown and CampbeU, as bibliography entries, not footnotes. "Automazation,"
from the St. Lollis Dispatch, Decembt:r S, 1954, was co-authored with Donald Cambgell, MIT engineering
professor, Servo Lab engineer, aDd student ofGordon Brown. This article is clearly divided betwec'i Cambpell's
praIic:tioDs for iDdusby and Wiener's warnings. "Muscular Clonus: Cybernetics and Physiology/' {Misenblueth,
Wiener, aDd Garca.t Ramos) 4fJ6..S10 includes Nyquist diagraJlli (citing MacCoIl), but this paper seems to have
been written by Garcia Ramos in 1985 from rcxarch notes~
444
transfemng the whole theory ofthe servomechanism bodily to communication engineering."
Wiener's chapter on "Cybernetics in history," from The Human use ofHuman Beings, refers only
to Leibniz, PascaL MaxweU, and Gibbs as "anscestors," ofthe new discipline.36 Wiener gave
cybernetics an intellectual, scientific trajectory, divorced from the ~raditions of technical practice
from which it sprang.
ImproviDg tbe Analog Iarnstructure
Wiener's relatioMhip to other research in communications and control would be irrelevant
were it not for their own 5Ubtle and significant histories. Because fire control involved ballistics,
and because it required rapid, precision computation, D-2 and Division 7 drove research in
computing machines. What we now~ as the most advanced ofthese technologies - electronic
digital computing - had a tense and ultimately untenable place within the NDRC. The agency's
support and rejection ofdifferential analyzers, "numerical" fire control, relay computers~ digital
testers, and electronic computers, traces control's hesitant contribution to computing.
At the start ofthe war, four Bush-style differential analyzers comprised the country's
largest and primar). mechanized calculating facilities. The original one, at MIT, had six integrators
and spent the war doing ballistics fun-time for the Naval Proving Ground at Dahlgren, Virginia.
The Moore School ofEngineering at the University ofPennsylvania built a copy ofBu~h's
machine with fourteen integrators, and a six integrator machine for the Ballistics Research
Laboratory (DRL) at the Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. The Penn machine, in
addition to having the lar~est number of integrators (and hence the ability to solve the most
complex equations), was also the most refined. Researchers there had embellished Bush's original
design with new servos and automatic aarve followers (improvements they also applied the to the
DRL machine).37 Both machines COIDputed army ballistics tables during the war. General Electric
built a differential analyzer, based on the Penn machine, with fourteen integrators, ready in the
35 Otto Mayr, "Maxwell aDd the Origins of Cybemetics" m Philosophers and Machines (New York: Science History
PubliaitioaI, 1976), 168-88.
16 NoIbert WieDer, Dc H"map uS ofHllmfD Beiul (Cambridge: MIT Press, 19SO), Chapter J.
37 Edward MorcIaDd, OSRD, to Ridwd Tayb"~MIT, AUJWil18, 1~2 aDd Richard Taylor to WW, August 29,
1942. 0SR07, Oftice Piles mHarold HazeD, om-enmtial Analyzer Folder. Taylor's letter contains a survey of
compdi"l &cilitia available to the NDRC in 1942.
1943.31 The fourth computer, lthe Rockefeller Differential Analyzer at MIT, had eighteen
integrators but was under comtruction until 1943. When operational, it ran fire control tables for
BuOrd.
Even with tht~se efforts,. an 1942 firing tables became a bo~lenleck in the army's ability to
field new ordnance. Pressure mounted, therefore, to increase capacity. In July of 1942, the Moore
School, thrOllgh the Aberdeen 13RL, proposed the NDRC help impro~/e its machine for faster
throughput and greater accurac:y. On Decem'her 1, 1942 Division 7 let contract #62 to Penn for
"Improvement ofDifferentiaJ Analyzers." nle project would add new' types oftorque amplifiers,
modify the equations, and make a recording devir,e to log several valules simultaneously with
regard to more than one variable,. Penn wou'ld also improve input and output devices, study
mechanical slip in the integratoru, automate curve fonowing and "pro,iide for the possibility of
automaticaJly transferring recorded values for subsequent punch card operation." The Nieman
torq'ue amplifiers would be replac;ed \\~th Irl0re advanced servoS.39 WUtile Penn was attacking the
practical imp,rovement ofthe diffi~rential &rialyzers, Weaver suggest~1 a theoretical project for
Claude Shanmon.40
(:laude Shannon - Channel to Bel/lab:;
D-2'5 work on differential anaJy7;er5 supported the machines iilS computing facilities; their
ability to produce firing tables (and datlt for ballistic cams) made diffi~rential analyzers a legitimate
part offire control research. Another, 'possibly more important angle presented itself: however,
through the technical similarity ofctitJerentiaJ analyzers and mechanif:a1 fire control computers.
The analyzers used feedback loops (I-lazen's "back coupling") to sollve equations, just as the
directors used feedback to solve the coupled problems ofballistics 8111d prediction (Earl Chafee's
"culnulative cycle ofcorrection an(j recorrection"). Both made extensive use ofdifferential gears,
inttegrators, and s=rvos - the standard building block!, of mechanic;al computing. D-2 sought to
31 RP. Kuehni and H.A. Peterson, "~.. New Differential Analyzer," Trans. IRE 63 (May, 1944), 221-28 and
discussion, 429·31 describes the G.E. machine, with commentaJy from C.N. Wygandt of Penn. Also see HLH diary,
December 8, 1942, OSRD7 OP Box 72, HLH Diaries Folder.
19 "R«ommendalion for Contract: Improvement ofDifferential Analyzers," December 23, 1942, OSRD7 OP Box
46 Project 161. Edward Moreland, OSRD, to Richard Taylor, MIT, August 18, 1942. Proposal from BRL to OSRD,
July 27, 1942. OSRD7, Office Files ofHarold Hazen, DiJrcrential Analyzer Folder. Also wee WW diaJy, October
28, 1942, meding with J.G. Brainerd ofMoore School, OSRD7 GP Box 71 Collected diaries volume 4.
.fO WW to Willy FeUer, December 28, 1942. OSRD7 GP Box 46 Project 162.
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apply the universities' experience with the machines, including the theory of feedbac~ to
industrially-produced mechanisms. Claude Shannon made the connection.
Shannon left MIT for a post-doctoral year at Princeton, and he was there when the NDRC
organized in 1940. On Thornton Fry's suggestion, D-21et contract #7 to Shannon for
"Mathematic Studies Relating to Fire Control," asking him to analyze Sperry's 8l1tiaircraft director
and another designed by the Frankford Arsenal. Shannon produced five papers for this contract,
mostly on improving the smoothness oftracking. He studied calculating mechanisms, especially
the smoothing circuits, as feedback networks. Using feedback, stability, and transient response,
Shannon identified both the director and the diff~rential analyzer as dynamic, closed-loop systems.
As he had done with telephone relays, he compared the devices to electric circuits, "I find the use
ofelectrical analogues very useful in understanding these devices and have used throughout a
notatil~n which emphasizes this idea." In "The Theory and Design ofLinear Differential Equation
Machines," Shannon drew on network theory and his relav algebra to define "analysis and
synthesis," for differential analyzer setups as though they were electrical circuits. This paper made
explicit the equivalence between the mathematical machines created at universities and "tire
control equipment as rate finden, predictors, smoothers, etC...,,·l [*Figure 9-2: Shannon
Smoother]
In 1941 Shannon joined Thornton Fry's mathematics departinent at Bell T."abs, where he
had spent the previous summer working on relay switching circuits. At Fry's suggestion, he began
to work on fire control. Shannon thus became an institutional and intellectwJ link between MIT's
differential analyzers and BTL's new work in fire control. Until then, Shannon's work on
mechanical smoothing analyzed and improved existing machines; it did not synthesize new devices
except as add-ons. Differential analyzers and mechanical computers represented mature
... Claude Shannon, "TheoIy and Design ofLinear Differential Equation Marllines," Report to the SeMces 20, Bell
Telepbooc Laboratories, Inc., January, 1942, reprinted in N.J.A. Sloane and /\\aroo D. Wyner cds., CIau1e Elwood
S"annon: Collected PapeIJ, (New York, IEEE Press, 1993), S14-5S9. Also sec Harold Hazen, Summary Technical
Report ofDivision 7. NDRC Volume I: Gunfire Control (Washington: Office of Scientific Research and
Development. National DeCease Research Committc=, 1946), 59-60. Shannon's other four papers were "A Height
Data SlIIOOIhing Mechanism.,It '4A Study of the DeOed.iOD Mechanism and some Results on Rate Finders," Some
Expcrimcn&al Results OIl the Dct1cdion Mccbanism," "Daddasb in Ovcrdampcd Systems." Shannon Papers, MIT
Archives. Also sec FlCUlkford Arsenal, Fire Control Design Section, "Description of Antiaircraft Director,"
November 12, 1940. OSRD7, Mile. Project Files, Box 61.0-2 meeting minutes, January 28, 1941. OSRD7 GP,
collectat diaries, Box 70.
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technology, the workhorse computers ofthe war. At Bell Labs Shannon was exposed to electrical
computers and to the increasingly difficult problem ofsmoothing in electrical circuits.
Speed and Accuracy: Electronic Digital Computing
When Shannon arrived at Bell Labs, they were working on D-2's flagship project, the
analog T-IO director. But D-2 was born with a digital spoon in its mouth. At section's first formal
gathering at the American Mathematical Society meeting at Dartmouth in September, 1940,
George Stibitz demonstrated his binary computer made out oftelephone relays. The "Complex
Number Computer,n (or Model I) worked with the imaginary numbers familiar to communications
engineers (and power engineers).42 Thornton Fry, one ofD-2's first members, was Stibitz's
supervisor at Bell Labs and had encouraged his efforts. From this early date, relay computers had
a high profile within the division, a profile which Stibitz used to great success.
MITBtJckgroundin Numerical Computing
In addition to BeD Labs, MIT, which became so prevalent in NDRC circles, pursued
numerical projects as an outgrowth ofdifferential analyLers. The Rockefeller Differential Analyzer,
a hybrid analog/digital machine, was under construction in 1940. Vannevar Bush, before he left
MIT, built on his computing experience and in 1937-38 circulated memoranda outlining a "rapid
a~thmetical machine" based entirely on electronic switching. This architectu~e included keyboard
inputs, a control unit, an arithmetical unit, memory storage, and recording outputs. The machine
would employ "cascaded electric counting rings" in electrical tubes. Sam Caldwell, m early D-2
member, pursued Bush's ideas after his departure, supervising research assistant William H.
Radford under sponsorship ofthe National Cash Register Company (NCR). Caldwell, just
finishing the drawn-out construction ofthe Rockefeller machine, warned Radford of the difficulty
ofbuilding machines with large numbers ofvacuum tubes. Thus he focused on components, trying
to include an entire counter (the equivalent ofabout ten tubes) in a single tube to reduce
complexity and improve reliability. In the fall of 1939, Radford began teaching and turned the
project to Wilcox P. Overbeck, woo had recently returned to MIT Ilfter a few years at Raytheon.
Overbeck continued the work unti1 early 1942 when he went to Chi,...,ago to work on the
Manhattan project. Overbeck's departure, combined with Caldwell's commitment to the NDRC
42 GecnJc Stibitz, "Computer." 1940, reprinted in RandcU, ed, The Origins ofDiptal Computers (Berlin: Springer-
VerIa& 1982), 247·252.
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marked lhe end ofMIT's Rapid Arithmetical Machine project. No system-level hardware had been
built; NCR collected the results.43
The Arithmetical Machine did leave a personal and institutional legacy in numerical
computing. In 1940, MIT consolidated its computing research and calculating services into the
Center for Analysis. Caldwell, as head ofthe center, was both invested in analog computing and
familiar with the latest numerical techniques - his opinions would heavily influe~ce D-2 and
Division 7 policy on computing. While the Center for Analysis was primarily a calculating facility
and not officially involved in problems ofcontrol, at least two of its research MSistants found
broad significance in the mathematical instruments. Claude Shannon, who had been a differential
analyzer operator, wrote his 1937 master's thesis inspired by the relays in the Rockefeller
Differeiltial Analyzer. "A Symbolic Analysis ofRelay Switching Circuits," brought rigorous
mathematics to the design ofswitching circuits, based on Boolean Algebra (see Chapter 5).
When Shannon completed his doctorate and left MIT, he was replaced as operator of the
differential analyzer by another Caldwell student, Perry o. Crawford. Crawford worked on the
NCR Rapid Arithmetical Machine project, he read Shannon's thesis on relay circuits, and he
became interested in numerical computing. Because the differential analyzers were heavily
involved in ballistics work for BuOrd during the war, and because Caldwel~ became increasingly
devoted to 1.>-2, Crawford saw that numerical computing could be applied to fire control. His
cryptically-titled 1942 Master's thesis, "Automatic Control by Arithmetic Calculation," sketched a
design for a numerical fire control computer. It was not a complete system, only the mathematical
architecture required for target prediction, v:.ith components borrowed from Radford and
Overbeck's work.44
From the outset, then, 0-2 had at its disposal burgeoning interest and expertise in
numerical computing. Stibitz's relay computer~ had been successfully demonstrated before a
..3 For a detailed biSIOIy of tbese projects, see the manuscript version of Wildes and Lindgren, A Centwy of
Electrical Engineerinc at MIT Karl Wildes Papers, MIT archiv~ Chapter S, 101-112. Bush's original memoranda
have been 1_ but they are summarized in V. Bush, "Arithmetical Mac~," March 7, 1940, reprinted in Brian
Randell, ed, The Orilins g(Dilital Computers,. 337-43. Claude Shannon, "A Height Data Smoothing
Mechanism." May 26, 1941, ShanDon Papers, MIT Archives.
.... Peny Crawford, 66Automatic Control by Arithmetic~" (8.M. Thesis, MIT,. 1942). Perry Crawford.,
interview with avWor, JanuaJY 10, 1995 (notes in author's possession). While Crawford's ideas were never
implemented in a~ be did play a significant role in digital computing at MIT. Late in the war bepined the
Navy Special Devieces Center (SDC), which built simalation aDd training devices. SOC sponsored an analog flight
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sophisticated audience. MIT's work in electronic counters, while building on extensive experience
with differential analyzers, had not produced any functional hardware. Most important, woven
throughout these projects were engineers who saw the potential ofapplying this new type of
computing to problems ofcontrol. 0-2'5 task, then. was to determine how to deploy these
intellectual resources and energies, in a proper balance ofexploratory research and systems design,
to its own goals in fire control.
Electronic Fire Control at RCA
MIT's was not the only project of its kind. One other investigated electronic numeriC31
computing for fire control. At RCA, television pioneer Vladimir Zworykin and colleague Jan
Rajchman were working under contract with the Bureau ofOrdnance. For a new fire control
system, they studied electronic computing, individual computing elements, coordinate systems,
and "the manner in which these elements are coupled together." Zworykin and Rajchman had
particular interest in "computing devices in which variables are represedted by discrete impulses,"
i.e. numerical techniques. They concentrated their effort on "coders," or electromechanical
analog-to-digital converters, and a "computron," a vacuum tube which incorporated elements for a
ten-bit counter into a single tube (similar to the NCR-sponsored work at MIT).4' Individual
vacuum tubes failed regularly, so the computro~ by reducing the number of tubes, would
correspondingly improve the reliability ofany numerical machine.
BuOrd, however, was not used to funding this kind offundamental research. Bureau chief
Blandy, pressed by ihe urgency ofthe antiaircraft situation, wanted an electronic gun director by
the end ofthe contract period, April of 1942. He soon realized the bureau "was perhaps too
sanguine in its hOpeS" for practical hardware.46 Progress toward numerical 4:omputing would be
slow and long-term, so BuOrd requested the NDRC take over the RCA pr()~ect. D-2 agreed; they
had already been considering electronic "pulse" computing. Thornton Fry had recommended
simulator at MITt. Servo Lab, and Crawford was instn1JDenlal in convincing Jay Forrester to build a digilal
computer for the project, which eventually became the Whirlwind compuacr.
"s Vladimir Zworkin memo describing RCA tasks, June 6, 1941. OSRD1 GP, Project 148, Box 40.
"_0for Appropriation," July 1, 1942. OSRD7, General Project Files. J.A. Rajchman., G.A. Morton,
and A.W. Vaocet "Report ODE~nic Pn:dictors for Anti-Airaaft Control." April, 19~'2 in Brian RandeU, eel,
The Orig ofDjlital Computers; Selected Papers, pp. 345-348. Jan Rajcbman, who worked on this project with
ZworykiD, later deligncd a mapctic core memory, Iisenc:cd it 10 IBM, and cballcngcd Jay Fonater's patent for the
teehDology. See Emenon~ Memories that Shaped an Industry (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1984). 81-87.
450
Weaver "look into the possibilities oflong range development ofcalculating techniques,"
specifically the ileA work and Stibitz's relay computers...7
In response to the navy's request, Weaver wrote to Zworykin at RCA and informed him of
D-2'5 existing work in electronic (notn~y digital) computation. He mentioned Caldwell's
work at MIT, the BTL analog electronic director (the T-IO), as well as Wiener's prediction
network. Weaver also warned Zwory~ however, ofD-2'5 commitment to mechanical
computing:
We [0-2] are rather strongly of the opinion that a serious and unnecessary handicap is
imposed by ruling out mechanical techniques. We are also oftbc present opinion that the
presem state ofthe art, as regards impulse electrooic computing devices, is not sufficiently
advanced to warrant the attempt, at this time, to incorporate such devices into an over-all
design for a predictor. It is our opinion that sounder and more substantial progress would
be made by concentrating all efforts, at the present time, OIl the problem ofsimplifying and
otherwise perfecting the essential computing elements themselves.a
D-2 was not looking to build computing facilities, rather to build fieldable predictors. Weaver
pointed Zworykin to the work D-2 found most interesting: improving the "computron" tube and
the basic electronics ofthe problem. The subtext ofthis note drew an institutional boundary.
RCA's existing contract with BuOrd, typical for navy fire control work, was to conclude with the
design ofa complete fire ooot("ol system and a proposal to build such a system.49 The NDRC had a
different definition ora research contract. Weaver demarcated what D-2 would support RCA to
explore: feel free to look into components, W~ver seemed to say, but systems are our terrain.
Other D-2 contractors, especially at BTL, could build systems. Restricting RCA to components
meant restricting them to fulldamental research, and D-2 was develo;>ing a habit ofcanceling such
work.
Conference on "Electronic Fire Control Computers"
Defining organizational roles and defining the place offundamental research also meant
defining the computer. In April of 1942, D-2 held a conference on "Electronic Fire Control
Computers" in New York City to clarify its position and to merge existing experti~ in computers
46 W.H.P. Blandy to Secretary of the Navy, n.d., ca. spring, 1941;) OSRD7, Oftice Files of Warren Weaver,
Electronic Computers Folder.
47 TCF 10 WW, JUDe 27, 1941. OSRD', Oftice Files of Warren Weaver, lbomton FJY Folder.
.. WW toZ~ January 20, 1942. OSRD7, Office Files of Warren Weaver, Electronic Computers Folder.
4§» See Rajcbman, eeL t "Report on Electronic Predictors for Anti-Aircraft Controt" Also "Electronic Fire Control
Compblal." December 16, 1941. OSRD7 GP Box 40 Project 1148.
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with that in control systems. Attendees represented military fire control experts, computer
researchers7 and NDRC sponsors. Commander Trichel and Haseltine attended from the army's
Frankford Arsenal, in addition to Emerson Murphy, head ofBuOrd's antiaircraft fire control
section, Zworykin from RCA, Samuel B.Williams and F.H. Hibbard from BTL, Tuttle and Tyler
from Eastman Kodak, Caldwell and Overbeck from MIT~ and from D-2 Fry, Stewart, Stibitz (and
also Caldwell).
The meeting began with an extended discussion on the advantages ofelectronic
computation. Analog methods then in use, both mechanical and electronic, suffered from
difficulties ofscaling: how "big" could you make th~ electrical quantities in the machine? Does one
mile per hour oftarget speed correspond to one volt, or to ten volts? These questions echoed
Harold Hazen's about the Network Analyzer; again answers depend on accuracy. Given some
minimum amount ofnoise or uncertainty in the signal, scaling depends on how precise the machine
needs to be. Ifit can mea.qare differences ofa hundredth ofa \folt, for example, tracking a target of
three hundred miles per hour means thirty volts. In contrast, the participants at the New York
meeting noted, numerical techniques had no such scaling difficulties; arbitrarily ttigh accuracies
were obtainable merely by adding extra "digits" (or "bits") to the numbers. This, ofcourse,
increased the size and complexity of the machine as well, but how much, and with what effects,
remained unknown.
Accuracy requirements, however, depended heavily on the application. For mathematical
and scientific uses, more accuracy was often desirable. But in control, the system overall was only
as accurate as its roughest component, and heavy servos to drive guns were not precision devices.
This distinction had critical implications for D-2'5 interest in electronic computers,
It is important to remember that it is impracLcal and indeed useless to carry the accuracy
oCthe computer beyond a certain point. In fact, it is useless to have the computer operate
with an accuracy which is unreasonable either from the point ofview of the input data with
which the computer must operate, or from the point of view ofthe accuracy with which the
output oftbc computer can be utilized.
Tracking inputs, servo outputs, and the guns themselves had some finite accuracy, so improved
computation would not improve the ability to hit a target. D-2 estimated current fire control
technology would benefit a factor oCtwo to three increase in computation accuracy, but more
could not be justified. Existing computers gave a probable error ofabout eighty yards for ranges
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of7000 yards; other factors, inctuding gun dispersion, the accuracy of the power drives, and
tracking errors stacked up total uncertainty to twenty to thirty yards.
Similarly, the advantages ofspeed turned 4)D perspective. The army complained Sperry M-
4 directors had too much delay in their computation. But a number ofdifferent speeds together
detennine speed in fire control solutions. Slowness in mechanical directors, others argued, resulted
less from mechanical techniques than from the feedback involved in approximating the calculation
(this was in part the issue Claude Shannon had been hired to examine). The speed of raw
computation was thus distinct from the amount oftime the time offlight circuit takes to converge
on the solution (known as "settling time"). Other time delays, namely those due to data smoothing
and the time offlight of the shell, inhered physically in the problem and could not be reduced with
new computing. As with accuracy, electronic computing improved speed for only part ofthe
system. The group reached "no definite conclusion" on the speed ofelectronic computation and
how it would effect fire control systems. Proponents ofelectronic computing had a difficult
predicament: D-2 did not concede their two critical advantages, speed and accuracy (which seem
so obvious today). Without consensus on these points, electronic computing could not establish
authority in fire control.
Electronic computation dici seem "to be ofa charaLter well suited to large scale
production," but so little experience on the topic existed that the topic was not discussed in detail.
The issue of reliability and maintenance, however, proved more contentious. Because electronic
computers would use a yes-or-no signal, uelectrical circuits for such signals can be made highly
reliable and insensitive to small variations." But many within the services, as well as in research,
still distrusted the reliability ofelectronic equipment in the field. The issue resolved into familiarity.
George Stibitz noted that "people with mechanical experience think all electronic devices fun of
troubles, and correspondingly reverse opinions [were held] by the others." This early meeting on
electronic computing defined the issues for members ofD-2. Numerical electronic computing
might improve fire control systems, but only to the point where other components became limiting
factors. The appeal ofsuch mBChitles differed ifone was building a large, central computation
facility or a mobile, reliable, field-deployed control system. For D-2, primarily interested in the
latter, RCA had not made a IUOng case for numerical electronic computing.
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still, 0-2 kept its options open. After the meeting, its representatives again visited RCA,
where they saw a prototype "ballistic computer." This device had a "resistive function matrix,~'
which stored firing tables for the guns. Equivalent in function to the Sperry ballistic cam, a
derivative ofRajchman's function matrix would eventually be included in ENIAC. Several months
had passed since RCA finished its navy contract, and they pressed the D-2 members fur a prompt
decision on spending money, otherwise the company would commit its resources to other
projects.!O D-2 acted promptly, and issued a "Recommendation for Appropriation" on July 1 for
RCA to "carry the work forward" in el~ronic computing.~l
But the support was cautious and qualified. Weaver emphasized to Zworykin that, because
ofother errors in the system, fire control would not benefit from the improved accuracy of
electronic computers. Two possibilities could change this situation, Weaver added, and increase
the deDWld for accurate computing: guns with much longer ranges, or radically reduced errors
from dispersion, ballistics, and fuzes. These systems-level issues bore directly on D-2's definition
of the type of research RCA would conduct:
Thus the development ofelectronic antiaircraft predictors shou!d be viewed as of the long-
range future, rather than immediate present interest. We therefore do not think that such
work should be allowed to compete with first priority development,; of immediate interest
and need.52
The NDRC would support the RCA work for three to four months, Weaver concluded, then
decide on next steps. But just as with Wiener's "fundamental" studies of prediction, and nearly at
the same time, defining the project as "long-range future" amountoo to kill~!lg it.
After a few months, in November 1942, the NDRC ctropr~ RCA's numerical computing
project. Weaver explained that neither ofD-2's two major devices, BTL's T-IO or T-15, could
incorporate numerical computing. He did, however, recognize the scientific potential and
importance oftile work, writing to Zworykin, "We arrived at this decision [to cancel the project]
reluctantly, because we all have lively personal and scientific interest in seeing this computron
project continued to its successful conclusion...,'3 Weaver sincerely tried to find other sponsors
within the NDRC who might have taken up the project. He spoke with George Harrison of section
50 DJS diaJy, June 19, 1942. 0SRD7, GP Project 148, Box 40.
51"_for Appropriation." July 1, 1942. OSRD7, GP Project 148, Box 40. Sec also "Automatic
Computer for Anti-Aircraft Fire CoDb:oI," July 6, 1942, OSRD7 GP Box 40 Project 148.
52 ww toZ~ July 20, 1942. OSRD7, GP Project 148, Box 40.
53 WeINer to Zworykin, November 11. 1942. OSRD7, GP Project 148, Box 40.
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D-3 (instruments), who saw great scientific and commercial potential in the RCA project, but no
military application. At the end of 1942, Harold Hazen was taking over Division 7. Weaver
recommended to him the project be dropped, "with genuine scientific regret...because beautiful as
the work is it does not appear at present to have any real prospect ofbeing directly useful in the
war.,,54 Hazen, for his part, also tried to find other NDRC divisions willing to support the project,
but to no avail." The contract tenninated March 31, 1943, just weeks after Norbert Wiener's
own.
ENIAC Proposal
Defining computers within control systems, and defining electronic computers as
fundamentai research, shaped Djvision 7 policy throughout the war. No episode illustrates the
ambiguous effects of that policy like the division's response to an idea that became "the first
electronic computer." Just as the RCA project was ending, a group from the Moore School at
Penn, including John Brainerd and John W. Mauchly, proposed an "electronic ditf analyzer" i to
do ballistics calculations (they purposely used the abbreviation "diff" to stand for both
"differential,n and "difference")." Later, the machine was renamed electronic numeric integrator
and calculator, or ENlAC. The proposal built on Penn's experience with their differential analyzer,
and some project work with the RadiatiOil Laboratory. The term "integrator" in the title reflects
the importance of integration in the mathematics ofthe time, as well as the centrality of integrators
in Penn's differential analyzer. Harold Hazen, however, did not think ENIAC could become
operational before the end ofthe war, assumed to be within five years. He discussed the proposaJ
with Sam Caldwell,
who rightly emphasized the emergence ofconsiderable DC\1I differential analyzer capacity in
that the new diftim:otiaI analyzer at MIT ir DOW actually doUlg ballistic solutions in shake-
down operations. Only after the demoo.stratioo of a real justification by such a group
should the undertaking ofa new project be given serious consideration.S1
A month later Caldwell acted forcefully to srottle the project, writing to Wacren Weaver (now at
the Applied Mathematics Panel but still an influential member ofDivision 7).
~ WW to HLH, NovemiJer 20, 1942. OSRD7, GP Project HI) Box 40.
"HLH to KiopIaeg. February 6, 1943. Begs to HLH, March 22, 1943. OSRD7, GeDeraI Project Files.
56 John G. BraiDad. "Gcocsil afthe ZNIAC." TedmoIoIy apd Culture 17 (DO. 3, July, 1976) 482-88. The prop.JS8l
was daIed April 2, 1M3, just two clays after the RCA project terminated Nancy Stem, From ENIAC to UNIVAC:
An Aanipl of the Eckert-MauchIy Computers (Bedford, Mass., DEC Press, 1981), 18-19.
57 HLH diary, April 14, 1943. OSRD GP, Project 162, Box 46.
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There is a certain amount ofagitation, coming primarily from Brainerd at the Universit}, of
Pennsylvania, for the development ofan electronic differential analyzer to do high-speed
numerical integration. This is a huge undertaking. I doubt that it can be finished until five
yean after the war is over.sa
Division 7 deci~ed not to fund the ENIAC project, which Arnty Ordounce th~---:: supported through
Aberdeen's BRL.59
Historian Nancy Stem has argued that the conservatism ofthe NDRC leadership.
combined with their "personal commitment to different technologies," blinded them to the value of
digital techniques. Hazen indeed was an apostle ofthe analog art. He had written in his 193 1
dissertation that numerica~ methods "have an artificiality irksome to the physically minded.',60
Penn's Herman Goldstine suggested the NDRC was caught between Caldwell's mechanical analog
machines and Stibitz's electromechanical digital approach.61 Institutional politics surely played a
role. Hazen and Caldwell, MIT professors and Bush disciple~ had a clear stake in the success of
the RockefeUer machine (as did its private sponsor, Warren Weaver). Still, they did not see the
Penn project as potential competition; in their eyes it would be time consuming an/d difficult to
bu~d. Caldwell, tired of the costly and drawn-out RockefeUer project (it was years late coming on
line), wished to avoid another such headache. Aberdeen, in contrast, did pose a potential threat to
Division 7. In 1943, just as he took over Division 7, Hazen visited Aberdeen's new Director
Testing Center -a competitor to Division 7'5 testing infrastructure, and hence its authority in fire
~ntrol. Hazen reported certam Aberdeen members antagonistic and resentful toward the NDRC,
which they bel~evedwas siphoning scientific talent from the army. According to Hazen, they
threatened not to accept any new NDRC tecb.nology into the army.62
The NDRC also had technical concerns about the Moore School. Division 7 was already
funding a project at Penn to improve the differential analyzer which was moving slowly and had
technical problems, probably including stability problems with its servos. When Weaver and
CaldweU vi~ted Penn in October of 1943 to evaluate it, they reported "a depressing day. Initiative
51 SCH to WW, May 15, 1943. OSRD GP, BaUisti~ General Correspondence Folder, Box 80.
S9 For~pant accounts ofENIAC development, sec RM. Goldstine, The Computer: From Pascal to von
Nqunanp (PriDcdoo: PriDcdon University Press, 1972) and Brainerd, "Geoesis offbe ENlAC."
60 Stem iDcona:tIy implies the MIT engiwwn were jealous ofPenn's '~more powerfuJ" diJrerentiai analyzer - in
fact they fdt PauL bad DOt adcquatdy acImowIed&ed their inteUcctual debt to MIT. Stem, Fm..m EHlAC to
UNIVAC, 21.
61 GoIdmoe, Tbc Compdcr, ISO.
Q HLH diIiieI, Mudl5, 1943 aDd April 14, 1943. OSRD7 OP Box 72, Folder HLH Diaires.
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and candor were entirely lacking.n03 Division 7 also found the electronics ofPenn's prc,posal to be
behind NCR and RCA. Jan Rajchman visitel the Moore 3chool group in 1943 and thought the~
technical ideas "extraordinarily naive.,,64 Indeed the ENIAC architecture, while Il,umerical and
electronic, was in an important sense less adv8I\ced than the Rockefeller Differential Analyzer.
That machine used a digital crossbar switch and a punched paper tape for reconflguration and
iJrogramming. ENIAC resembled the Network Analyzer, programmed with a plugboard. To set up
new problems, the machine needed to be rewired with cables - a process as difficult and time-
consuming with a digital computer as with an analog one. The ENIAC designers wrote, "no
attempt has been made to make provision for setting up a problem automatically." l~hei: attitude
toward programming reflected the-ir experience with the mechanical differential analyur, "it is
acticipated that the ENlAC will be used primarily for problems ofa type in whith one setup will
be used many times Wore another is placed on the machine.,,65
We must~ Division 7's interest (or lack thereot) in ci~ronic digital computing in the
context ofit8 overall work on fire control. Weaver and Hazen did not fund generic technology
research; they rather expJ.ored all avenues that would get them closer to a pressing, immediate, an6
short-term goal. Wh~ they received the ENIA\~ proposal, t,he}' had just shut down at least two
projects as too fundamtmtal and f3r off (Wiener, RCA). IndeetJ~ ENIAC did not become
operational until the war was over. Weaver and Hazel certainly saw the scientific an" intellectual
value ofdigital computir~ reseJ8:ch; they expressed sUlcere regret at not funding the RCA project,
and their efforts to find it another sponsor are well documented (although the record shows no
63 Division 7 MectiD& MiDtW:S, October 6, 1943 and November 3, 1943. OSRD7 GP Box 72, Folder Di¥ision'"
Meetings. Also sec HLH diary, April 14, 1943. See HLH to Edward Moreland, May 10, 1943 for a clear, concise
st&lement ofDivilioo 7'. position 011 the ENIAC pIlJpOUlI, including CaldweU's opinion and references to the RCA
projecl OSRD7 GP Box 46 Project 1162. Weygandt, in his discussion of G.E. '5 Kuehne and Peterson, "A New
Differential Analyser," wrote "Tbore of us who have s;ent a great deaJ of time and effort in trying to design a fervo
S)-stem for this purpose (a differential analyur) realize the difficulty of the job....(it) is 1\ difficult one because of of
the wide speed ranse which must be covered and also because in the setup of a problem a number of the servo
mechanisms may be cascaded . A servo :ystem which is stable in itself may not remain stable when interconnected
with otha' similar aystems."
64 Rajman qumed in~ 44.
65 "ENIAC Progress RqJort," December 31, 1943. Quoted in Stem, 7S. For ENIAC programming, sec MittbeU
MaraIs and Atsusbi Akera. "Exploring the Architecture ofan Early ~hiDc: The Historical Relevance of the
ENIAC Micbinc Architecture," JEEEA""als o/the History o/Compllting 18 (no. It 1996) 17-24.
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similar effort for the Penn proprsal). Weaver, in fact, began funding an electronic digital computer
at MlT through the RrlCkefeUer Foundation immediately after the WaI.66
By 1943 fire control was moving out ofa period of radical innovation and into a period of
refinement, incremental improvement, and system i~tegration. Other elements in the system shnply
could not benefit from more accurate computing. More than speed and accuracy, military control
systems required reliability, r~ggedness, and compactness - characteristics decades away in
digital computing. Furthermore, Penn dici not propose such a field-deployable system. Tb~1
wanted to built a university ca1culatin~ center, akin to the differential analy.';er. Division 7 might
support fundamental work in fire contlol computers, (-\ut not a machine to produce firing tables, an
application already peripheral to its charter. For the differential analyzers, it sponsored only
im;>rovements to existing machines.
Such a vi~w does not diminish but ~'atberuJiderscores the radical natu..e of the early
proponents' faith in digital techniques, despite great d.fficulties of reliability, size, and complexity.
These problems, however, made electronic digital computing unsuitable for Division 7 support.
The NDRC's failure to pursue such work, despite their recognition ofiis scientific ilnportanc:,
oU'~lines the limitations ofthe wartime ref~..arch paradigm, focused on short-term results and
practical devices rather tlvut fundamental research.67 Wartime research in control systems achieved
success, but within, and perhaps because of: Lhe narrow goal~ it defined for itself
"Topological, DOl Metric:" Relay Computers
D-2 and Division 7 did build computers, but those which met the key qualifications of
ulstitutiorw !>OsitilJ1\, ,apid construction, and immediate applicatiokl. Gecrge Stibiv ofBell Labs
had been instrumental in shaping these criteria, and he satisfied them alt Stibitz's computers,
neither fire control systems nQr ballistics machines, stood between applications and mathematics,
between machinery and information, between control and communication. They were testers.
In late 1941, Barber Colem:,dl's Dynamic Tester :Jegan redefining the perfonnilnce of fire
control systems in the laboratory. It quickly became standard; contra~ors and fire control vendors,
including Sperry and Ford Instrument, wanted their own machines to prepare for the Army's nov.'-
66 Wildes A Century ofEiectrical Enpneering, manuscript versio~ 5-127. This project, and the Center for Analysis
itlel( were eventually terminated due to j)e increasing prominence of the Wbirlwind project run by the
SeIVOlDftbanisms Labc:atoty.
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rigorous acceptance tests.6I But the Dynamic Tester was difficult to reproduce. Different flight
profiles, simulating differing paths ofaracking airplanes, were "programmed" ~y specially
machined two-dimensional cams. Changing the cams would change the flight profile, from dive
bombing to evasive action, for example, but in a difficult and time consuming process.69 These
cams required a great deal ofattention to create, including precision machining which itself
introduced errors. A~ with Sperry's ballistic cams, a machinist would drill a number specific points
around the cam and then grind it smooth. Mechanical cams could not produce the unifonn,
reproducible testing D-2 needed to disseminate its authority in fire control beyond the walls of its
own laboratory.
Tape Dynamic Tester
During 1942, George Stibitz, technical aide to Division 7, began thinking about building
repeatable and uniform testers, "it is now desirable to have a simplified fornl ofdynamic tester
which can be duplicated readily." In October he proposed the "Tape Dynamic Tester," which
replaced mechanical cams with punched paper tape to program flight profiles. Comparatively
inexpensive,~ machine would consist largely ofcommon parts already in production for the
telephone n~·ork. Its "cams," i.e. ta~, could be easily, cheaply, and exactly duplicated for
multiple installations, "typists replace machinistS.,,70 Such a machine would continue Stibitz's
earlier work; he had experimented with relay computers since 1937. And Stibitz had credibility
with the NORC. In addition to being an increasingly active technical aide to D-2, he and associate
S2J1luel B. Williams (one ofBTL's prernie:e switching designers) demonstrat.ed the "Complex
Number Computer," or Model I, at the Dartmouth meeting when 0-2 first m~(. In late 1942 D-2
let a contract, Project #60, to Western Electric and Bell Labs for a "Punched Tape Dynamic
Tester." The original appropriation was $2,500; by the end of the war, Division 7 spent almost
$400,000 on the project and more than haifa million on Stibitz's three major computers.7l
671t woukl take Vannevar Bush's 1945 report to the President, Science: the Endless Frontier to add the crucial
ingredjCDt to the postwar research paradigrn: govre~nt support ofbasic research.
61 OSRD7 OP, Office Files ofHarold Hazen, Folder Director Tria'~ Box 4.
69 See OSRD7 GPt Project '25, April-Novcmber, 1942 for problcms with dynamic testers.
70 George Stibitz, "Proposed Dynamic Tester," <k1ober 19, 1942. OSRD7 GP, Project~ Box 44. Also see Stibitz,
The 7&rotb GcomIIiog, 167-1.
71 "Project Recommended for Appropriation, No. 60, Scctk.n D-2 - Fire Control, Simplified I>'fIWltic Tester."
OSRD7 OP, Project N60t Box 4~.
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Feedback lay at the heart ofStibitz's device, which amounted to~, "tape controlled servO."
[*Figure 9-3: Tar-e Servo] [·Figi~~re 9-4: Tape Dynamic Tester] A rotating shaft connected to a
series of32 contacts and sensed tile tactual shaft position. These switches fed a set of relays which
read the desired position offholes on the punched paper tape. Five holes, coded (in binary) which
ofthe 32 positions the shaft ought t«'11 assume, the desired position (25=32). A relay network
compared desired position with actual position and determined which way the shaft should rotate.
The network drove the shaft one way or the other tc make the error, the desired minus the actual
position, equal to zero. To synthesize ~he rf;lay network to perform this comparison, Stibitz
employed the "relay algebran developed by Claude Shannon in his master' s the~is.72 Stibitz termed
the tape servo a "sampledn data system because it. operated in discrete rather than continuous time
intervals. Using a Nyquist diagram, Sti1'itz analyzed the servo as a feedback amplifier, using the
"sampling period" to establish eq·1ivalence with a continuous servo.73
The Tape I):'mamic Tester was less a computer thall a data-driven servo (it did not acquire
a model number in the Stibitz series). Digital tapes driving mechanical movements resembled the
numerically controlled machine tools which appeared after the war. The application W~ not lost
on the NDRC. In 1941, Stibitz and Duncan Stewart contemplated a tape-controlled device to mill
the mechanical cams for the Barber Coleman Dynamic Tester (possibly the source ofStibitz's idea
for the tape tester). In 1943 a Division 7 contractor wrote to Stibitz proposing "a means of
constructing the metal cams by the use of a duplicating device on a milling m~chine, controlled by
one of the BeU Laboratories tape controlled units." Indeed the company adapted the Tape
Dynamic Tester to mill cams for an antiaircraft gunsights tester at the University ofTexas (the
"Texas Tester").'· For fire control, the means for loading raw ballistic data into the machine
proved a significant, sometimes limiting, component ofdesign. Sperry solved it with ballistic cams,
72 George Stibitz, "Relay Servo Circuit." October 28, 1942. OSRD7 OP, Project #60, Box 45. Stibitz sent copies of
this memo to Poi~ Stewa~Weaver, Mooney (Division 7'5 liaison with the Antiaircraft Artillery Board) and
W.A. MacNair of BTL.
73 George Stibitz, "Nyquist Loop for Tape Servo," February 19, 1943, and "Equivalent FcedbBck Amplifier for Tape
Servo," February 14, 19~3. OSRD OP, Project N60 Box 45. In 1944, Claude Shannon perfonned a similar analysis
for a different application, with equivalent results those Subitz produced, "Feedback Systems with Periodic Loop
Closure, MeIDOl3bdum for File," March 16, 1944, OSRD OP, Project 160, Box 45.
74 Daniel Silverman to GRS, April 29, 1943. OSRD7 OP Box 45. Also see David Noble, Forces of Production: A
Social HisIoIy afAutomation (New York: AJ.fred A. Knopf: 1986), 88. Noble incorrectly !Utes that BTL never used
the Tape DynamicT~r for its original purpose.
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BTL with specially-shaped potentiometers, the testers with paper tapes, RCA and ENIAC with the
function matrix.
Stibitz's computers embodied the conjunction ofcolnmunicataon and control. Input and
output devices were all borrowed from telephone systems: ttape readers, keyboards, teletypes. A
teletype printout in the Division 7 archives dramatically del1Bonstrates the equivalence of messages,
signals, and data. A brief typed conversatiun, clearly between observers and operators of the
machine, precedes a long series ofnonsensical letters. This nOflsense, however, codes data for the
machine, "}OOO cos N/2" a perturbation signal for the tester." [*Figure 9-5: Equivalence of Signal
and Text] Stibitz noted his design could also serve as a dati transmission system, effecting action
at a distance, "with no essential modification, the impulses could be transmitted over a single
telegraph channel from the tape transmitter...and be reproduced in the form ofmotor rotation at
the other end ofthe line.,,76 The Tape Dynamic Tester, like the Complex Number Computer, could
cperate remotely over phone lines with little modification. 'Nhere Norbert Wiener theorized the
fundamental notion of"the.~essageSJ in computing systems" Stibitz implemC::lted it in practice,
even turning teletype messages into custom mttallic parts.
Relay Interpolator
The Tape Dynamic Tester could absorb and process so much data, however, that it drove
further automation. To prepMe target courses for input to the machine, human computers
calculated a series of points which described the track ofthe simulated attacker. The Tape
Dynamic Tester needed about twenty of these points per second, all ofwhich operators had to
manually punch ooto paper tape, a laborious and error-prone job. A typical nln required six
functions (three input and three output variables) ofabout 150 seconds in length, requiring about
20,000 points. The sixty or so courses required to thoroughly test a new director amounted to
over a million points, or "about three years ofa skilled [human] computer's time." Division 7
investigated a number ofoptions for automating this process, including specialized machinery from
NCR and IBM punched cards. Each printed its output data on paper, which still needed
transcription to tape.77 In June of 1942, Stibitz proposed another relay computer to "to generate
15 OSRD7 GP Box 45, Project M60.
76 GRS tiaIy, Fcbnwy 10, 1943. OSRD7 OP, Project 1#60, Box 4S.
11 Caldwell toS~ JUDe 28,1945. OSRD7 OP, Projea 1#70, Box 50.
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dynamic tester tapes punched at 1/20 second intervals from data given at one second intervaJs.,,'8
Thus only one point in every twenty would need to be calculated, and the machine would nil in, or
interpolate, the rest. Stibitz called the device the "Relay Interpolator," (RI) (it became "Modei If')
[OFigure 9-6: Relay Interpolator]. On July 1, 1943, Stibitz and Bell Labs began Division 7 Project
#70, to design and build the relay interpolator in three months. Ten weeks later, the machine,
comprised ofabout Soo relays, began running and producing paper tapes for the dynamic tester.
In his proposal for the Relay Interpolator, Stibitz noted "the Applied Mathematics Panel is
very much interestea in this device and considers that its construction would be Justified on
gene!'al grounds, even ifit were not to be used for this partt,,:ular application.,,79 Indeed, as soon as
it became operational, Stibitz and the Applied Mathematics Panel began offering it to NDRC and
military researchers as a general mathematical machine. They distributed a pamphlet describing the
device and its programming, announcing, "NDRC now has a calculator of rather low native
intelligence but of indefatigable energy." Vlhile limited to reading, \vriting, storing, and adding
numbers, it could be programmed to repeat those operations with mind-numbing repetition.so The
pamphlet goes on to describe the structure of the machine, which had nine "registers," or locations
for storing numbers, two ofwhich could add numbers and store them in a third register. To
manipulate these numbers, U A system ofdes4gnation of the orders to RI has been worked out, and
each order is identified by two letters." The command CA, for example, would copy a number
from register C to register A -- similar to modem computer "assembly language." Other
commands coulrl add two ~egisters, input data from the tape, or output to a typewriter.
Hence the Relay Interpolator could do mure than prepare trajectories; it could perform on
any sequence of numbers. For example, in addition to interpolating points for the dynamic tester,
the RI could calculate the "one second" points which were themselves the source of the
interpolation. Stibitz's extensive writing on the RI traces his conception of the machine as it
evolved from a special purpose trajectory calculator to a general purpose signal processor. He
refined his thinking in a series ofmemos distributed to Division 7 in 194:1, including, "Harmonic
Analysis on the RI," "Hannonic Analysis as a Smoothing Operation on the RI," "Finding Complex
7. GRS to SHe (cc to WW and DJS), June 9, 1943. George Stibitz. "An Application of Relay Interpolator," June 10,
1943. OSRD7 OP, Project '70, Box SO.
79Contract Proposal, "Relay Interpolator," August 10, 1943. OSRD7 GP, Project 1#70, Box SO.
10Applied Mathematics Panel, NDRC, 44A Statement Concerning the Future Availability of a New Computing
Device." AMP Note No.7, November, 1943. OSRD7 GP, Project 1#70, Box SO.
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Roots ofPolynomials on RI~" and "The Relay Interpolator as a Differential Analyzer." Properly
set up, he argued, the RI could solve not only ordLury differential equations, but also partial
differential equations, which the MIT machines could not do. While the RI co..;d not explicitly
solve ballistics problems, it could interpolate and improve them.11 To clarify the difference
between the differential analyzer and his own machines, Stibitz coined a new term: "digital," to
contrast with the older "analog" techniques.
In the most ambitious ofthese memoran~ "Unified Theory ofthe Relay Interpolator,"
Stibitz connected the RI to the general processing ofsignals. Interpolatio~ he recognized, was
really a smoothing operation, akita to that in fire control directors. As he later recalled,
"interpolation looked just like the 'filtering' that communication engineers applied to noisy
telephone signals." The "Unified Theo!)''' paper showed how the RI could simulate electrical
filters, electronic oscillators, differential equations~ and Fourier analysis. These simulations, in fact,
would even face the stability problems ofcontuluOUS, linear systems: "The data generated by the
Computer Model 2 and punched or printed on the output list tape could be made "stable" or
"unstable" by choice of the coefficients used in the program given to the computer. Unstable
programs would cause the output to oscillate with increasing amplitude, and conversely with
stable programs.,,12 The Relay Interpolator continued the redefinition of flight profiles as ge'neral
signals, the computer as the general signal processor.
The Ballistic Computer
Soon after this project had begu~ Stibitz proposed yet another machine to automate
testing for the Anti..Aircraft Artillery Board (AAAB) at Camp Davis, North Carolina. [*Figure 9-
7: AAB data f)o,v] Planes flew simulated bombing runs, and as the directors tracked them, their
outputs were logged, as was a visual record of the plane. The~ data were then transcribed to
tapes and fed into the "AAAB Computer" (Model ill). Unlike .he Dynamic Tester, which
compared actual and ideal data, the AAAB Computer actually calculated the ideal response, using
firing tables stored on tape. Another "master control tape" programmed the machine with the
requisite formulas, then "the operator pushes the start key and leaves the machine to do the rest.
I. For all thesememo~ sec OSRD7 OP. Project '70, Box SO Folder Re12y Interpolator BIL. For a rechnicaJ
descripUon of the Relay Interpolator see O. Cesareo, "'The Relay Interpolator," Bell Laboratories Record 24 (1947)
'-9.
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If the machine, which consisted ofabout 1,300 relays, experienced a failure or a jam, it "stops
further computation and sounds an alarm," requesting human intervtmtion into the calculating
process. Analyzing a typical set of data took a human computer using a calculating machine forty
minutes. The relay machine could do it in about two and a half83 Division 7 let a contract to Beli
Labs in late 1943 (project #74); the machine began its first calculation the following May. BTL
eventually built several similar lruu;mnes, one for NACA, one for the Aberdeen Proving Ground,
and a derivative, "Model IV," for the Naval Research Lab.14 While the Relay Interpolator and the
"Ballistic Computer," were intended for specific fire control applications, Stibitz and BTL came to
offer them as genercl-purpose computers. Stibill~'S Relay Interpolator and Ballistic Computers
(Models ll, IlL and IV) computt~Sremained in service for military applications until 1961.
Stibitz 's Digital Philosophy
How did Stibitz obtain and sustain Division 7 support for his extensive computing program
while Penn and RCA could not? He certainly had institutiQ~J advantages: he himself was a
member, the NDRC tended to favor BTL and MIT, and BTL was the site of the leading fire
control project in the country, the T-10. Still, politics alone might explain a single, isolated project,
but not this expensive and uraique series ofmachines. The source ofStibitz's success lay in his very
conception ofdigital computing, how that conception mapped on the distinction between
fundamental and applied researc~ and ho\\' his notion of information maintained a delicate balance
ofabstraction and physical form.
12 Stibi~ "Unified Theory of the Relay Interpolator," OSRD7 GP, Project i70, Box SO Folder Relay Interpolator
811.,. Stibitz, The Zeroth Generation. 181.
83 George Stibitz, "Outline of Relay Ballistic Computer," July 7. 1943. OSRD7, GP, Project #74, Box 54. Joseph
Juicy, "Tbc Ballistic Com9Uk~," Bell Laboratories t.ecord 24, (1947) S-9. The "Ballistic Computer" or llodellI
could calculate the errors in on.~ of two ways. Fi~ the machine could replicate the calcu1atiol1§ in the diJ"e(.,wr and
compute the correct gun orders h.'UCd on the three inputs, then &abtraet them from the director's gun orders to find
the errors. This mctbod bas the advantage of isolating errors in each of the three variables so they can be analyzed
separately, Stibitz called this "Class 1" error. Class 2 cnor, incon~ lakes as input the gun orders produced by
the director, and essentially performs the ballistics calculation to detennine the point and time at which the shell
would explode. The machine then interpolates the position of the target plane at that particular time, and produces
a disaance by which the shell missed (or bit) the target when it exploded. This technique lumps the errors in all
tIh~ output variables together, but bas the advantage of producing a "miss distance" which quantitatively compares
the performance ofdifferent din:c!ors. Stibitz's AAB computer, or Model III as be called i~ could calculate by
either' of these methods.
14~~ Stibitz, "Progress on AAB Computer," May 13, 1944. OSRD7 OP, Projed ##74, Box 54. F. L. All, "A
Ben Tekt?Moc Laboratories Computing Machine." M.T.A.C. 3, (1948) 1-13,69-84, reprinted in Randell. eel., lk
Origin! ofDicital Computers, 263-292. See also Stibitz, The Zeroth G<:neratioo' Chapter 9, wPlanning and
BuildinI the 'Ballistic' Computer. Model 3, 1943-44."
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For Stibitz digital computing was as much a structural as a mathellUltical strategy. Physical
proximity did not co~rain a digital machine like the complex ~i:erconnection ofgears,
differentials, and shafts constrained mechanical analogs. "The electrical computer," he wrote, "was
topological, not metric."" This "topological" nature ofStibitz's machines separated function front
physical form. As in the telephone network, design inhered not in the components (whicil, after all,
were standard teleptaone relaya) but in the wiring between them - Stibitz's digital machines were
defined by connection and communications. Shannon's relay algebra allowed him to manipulate
and combine digital circuits as network diagrams and mathematical notation.
Both Penn and RCA could design with similar abstraction (no evidence suggests they
employed Shannon's relay algebra, but the didn)t work with relays). One key difference set B1L
apart: the translation from design to structure was simple, unproblematic, :md proven. Western
Electric's thick Standard Operating Procedures (~OP) manuals specified "how to do almost
anything that could be done legitimately in the Bell System." Using telepholle relays, Stibitz stuck
to the SOPs when laying out his systems. Thus Western Elec.:ric could build the machines quickly
and reliably, relying on the technical culture oftelephone engineering:
All parts required are in production and are available at short notice in any quantity likely
to be required. Construction does not demand highly trained or scarce personnel. Design of
the mecbanis~n, ooce the fundamentals are sketcbOO out for~ is Q familiar and routitre
manevfor telephone machine switching engineers. This group has not been drained as
completely 15 have most skilled groups.16
Any ofthousands ofWestern Electric wiremen could build the machines as they built any
telephone swit~hing system,
The fact that the computers were completely novel devices, and ofa kiOO they had never
b..,~ore constructed, was DO deterrent; the wiremen w~rked at the speed and precision with
which they would have done bad they been coo.Wucting dozens of relay computers in their
careers."
Digital pr<x~g made data interchangeable, just as Bell's SOPs standardized wiring skill. Rapid,
reliable traJU·:·ation ofideas into things not only made for predictal!le project schedules but also
reliable, maintainable hardwar~. It also fostered architectural innovation: Stibit",- hlJilt three
successive generations ofcomputers in eighteen months (late 1942 to mid-1944) each responding
.5 Stlbitz, IKZeroth Generation, 106.
16 Stibitz. "Relay Intapolator as a Differential Analyzer," emphasis added.
11 Stibitz, The Zeroth Generation. 109.
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to new problems and building on prior experience. ENIAC, in contrast, took more than two years
to build, based on a differential analyzer model from early in the war.
Thus Stibitz owed his success not onfy to digital computing but to computers based on
telephone relays and not vacuum tubes. For him and for Division 7, the difference mapped onto
that between system design and component devf;topment - the former could cuntribute to the
war effort in short order, the latter represented fundamental research and might not pay offbefore
the war ended. Stibitz summarized his philosophy in 1943: uelectronic methods may well be the
computing means of the future, but their application at present would present a research as
contrasted with a design problem."a Stibitz, BeD Labs, and relay computers thus reinforced the
distinctions Weaver had imposed on RC~ and which informed Division 7's rejection ofENIAC.
Digital relay computers, while neatly separating design from construction, did DC't fully
separate machinery from information. Bell Labs machines moved data around ever more
interchangeably, stretching the tie to mechanics but never quite breaking it. Computing remained
mechanical, information remained a thing - a switch position, a paper tape, a list of numbers.
"Speed" ofcomputation translated the physicality, the heaviness of information. Later, electronics
would radically separate data from mechanical (but not physical) limitations, as the repeater
amplifier had done in the phone system thirty years before. For D-2 and Division 7, however,
information remained classical and Newtonian: tied to things, to movement, and to machinery.
• Stibitz, "Relay Interpolator as a Differential Analyzerf " emphasis added
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Figure 9-2: Claude Shannon's height data smoothing
mechanism, showing electrical-type schematic
symbols, feedback loop, and smoothing ofjerky
tracking data. (From C. E. Shannon, "A Height Data
Smoothing Mechanism," May 25, 1941, Shannon
papers, tvtlT Archives).
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Figure 9-3: George Stibitz's Sketch for a "Tape
Controlled SeIVo," October 18, 1942. (From G.R.
Stibitz, "Proposed Dynamic Tester," October 19,
1942, OSRD7 GP Box 45, Project #60).
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Figure 9-5: Teletype printout from Bell Labs
demonstrating equivalence of messages and data in
Relay Computers (OSRD7 GP Box 45, Project #60).
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Chapter 10
COGcMusiOD
"Datum for its own annihilation:"
Feedback and Information in 1945
They thought in tenos of airplan~ in space, not totally in terms of symbclic logic.
Robert Wieser on programmers of the Whir!wind Computerl
D-2 and Division 7'5 work on controi systems extended ihe signai, a generai,
reconfigurable carrier, from communications into control. In electrical engineering these
extensions took the form of spectra and Fourier transfonns, frequency response selVO techniques,
statistical approaches to oredietion and filtering, and a model of h~lman op:-rator!i as dynamic
signal processors. They congealed in thrl--e new quantities: information, the computer, and
government-supported basic research. In 1945, however, none had settled on a common
definition. Soon after the war each would stabilize, break fr~m its foundations, and mix in new
networks.
Division 7 ended on the cusp of those breaks. Its three-voilime .summary Technical
Report, published in 1946, provides a ll.nique windo~J( into the state ofcontrol at th~ close of the
war. The first volume, Gunfire Control, edited by Harold Hazen, surveys the NDRC's broad
range of projects. Volume Two, Range Finders 811d Tracking, summarizes extensive work in
optics and applied psychology undertaken to ~pport th~t fire control r~search. The final volume,
Airborne Fire Control, contains three separate essays on aiming controls, aerial torpedo directors,
Lnd aeriAl gunnery written by Division 7 members George Philbrick, AI Ruiz, ftIld John Russell,
respectively. The volumes depict what Latour would call the uprevious sciences," offeedback,
stability, computation, and the human operator, and hence the social context of their immanent
transtonnations into post-war technology.
I C. Robert Wieser, "A Perspective on Sage: Discussion,~ Anilals ofthe History o/Computing S (00.4, Octobe~,
1983), 387.
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Syatbail aDd Coatrol
George Philbrick, for exanlple, worked in Sam Caldwell's Section 7.2 on fire control for
airplanes and articulated his own "cylY:metic vision," distinct fro~ but parallel to, 'Wiener ~ ~ own.
Philbrick introduced the volume with a section, "Feedback in General," describing the basic
feedback loop which 'may be entirely automatic in nautre, or may contain one or m.ore human
elements as an ~ssential coMecting link.,,2 The idea of tracking, he wrote~ extended. to human
behavior, "people 'trackS during every conscious moment...aligrunent processes, in which the
aligrunent error serves as datum for its own annihilatio~ are forever being carried ()ut in the
familiar operations of living." il-2 and Division 7, with their distinctly behaviorist a.pproach,
defined the dimensions of human activity acceptable for machine operators: speed ,ofresponse and
accuracy in trackillg. Other factors, inciuding iatigue and emotional stabilit);, were ei\1:emal
variables to be excluded. To clarify these ooundaries, Philbrick drew an extended cmalogy
between human operators and automatic regulators, including the human nervous system in his
model of tracking. His conception ofthe operator derived from an engineering pra~ctice of
simulation: building models of systems both for analysis and for training. Philbrick elaborated at
length on "simulation as an aid in development," and "the philosophy of models." Engineers used
mechanical and electronic representalions (like the Network Analyzer) to repljcatf~ the behavior of
existing systems, but soon began to simulate systems before building them. As an example,
Philbrick wroie, "the differential analyzer may be thought of as a synthesizer, or flexible model, as
well as an Q1!Allyzer...the equipment under discussion is really a bridge between a11a1ysis and
synthesis. ,,3
As Hazen had done \\·ith the Network AlWyzer, Philbrick conceptualized a general
maciaine,
For the increasingly diversified uses to which the simulative methods were being put,
requiring new construction or at least major physical rearrangemc::nt ofcomponents each
time, it would be preferable to build an extremely general and flexjble assembly, covering
every conceivable type of ~fstemwhich could be adapted to any particular problem simply
by the manipulation ofcooveniendy provided organizational controls.
2 George Philbrick, Symmary Technical Report of Division 7, NDRC Volume Ii: Airborne Fire Control
(Washingtoo: Ofticc of Scientific R.cscarcb and DevelopmcD~ Nat,ooal Defense Research Conuraittee, 1946), S.
3 Philbrick, AiIbome Fire Control, 24, 48.
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Philbrick called such a machine a "supersimu/ator, j~ but today we would call it a computer, the
"manipulation ofconveniently provided organizational controls" a kind of programming.4
Philbric~ firmly ensconced in analog electronics, did not conceptualize the machine as digital. S In
1947, he started a compeliY, George Philbrick Researches, to build analog computers and
components for industrial process control; the "Philbrick Amplifier," was a popular building block
for analog computers after the war.6 Still, the impetus behind Philbrick's "supersimulator" stood
between that driving the Network Analyzer and the general-purpose computer: the unified
machille to simulate the entire world.
Philbrick exemplified the multiple "cybernetic visions" nascent in engin~ering practice.
Military control requires a close coupling of people and machinery - a coupling which presses
.. .• • ••• • I I J h· ••.. A Lever Closer to mstabUlty as It stretcnes Duman ana mec a.flicaJ WlutS. tU war uecariie mOie
technologicaL new wea;lons became increasingly difficult to test under realistic conditions, and
increasingly difficult for operators to handle. Conceptual tools (signals, feedback loops, and
frequency spectra) helped engineers understand how to stabilize and optimize these syst~ms.
Concr~te tools (models, instruments, and simulators) separated a machine's dynamics from its
physical embodiment. Thus engineers eatl experiment with the system during devel~pmellt and
operators can experiment with it during training. ~imulations tied to a sitlgle referent are useful
for one purpose only, but a flexible simulator can replit4te all systems. "There is, in reality,"
Philbrick concluded of his virtual machines, "no limit at all."
Philbrick was not alone in his vision for a "supersimulator.'· The navy's Bureau of
Aeronautics had an office rlevoted to "synthetic training," the Special Devices Division. This
group built simulations ofcombat situations such as bombing or submarine chasmg. 7 Its director,
-4 Philbric~ AiJbome Fire Control, 6S, emphasis original. As be notes on page SI of this voltmte, P..li~brick was
elaborating ideas be had before the war; be built an industrial process simulator for the Foxboro Company. See Per
A. Holst, "George A. Philbrick and Polyphemus: 11le First Electronic Training Simulator," Annals o/the History
o/Computing 4 (DO.2, April 1982), esp. 144-45.
S George A. Philbric~ "Designing IndustJUI Controllers by Anal0&" Electronics 21 (no.6, June, 19..8), 108-1 ~..
6 Electronic Design, December 16, 1995, p. 8, reprints the original 1955 announcement afthe Philbrick K2-X
Operational Amplitier. The magazine's retrospective called the device "an industry classic," and notes that a
number of today's ltdding analog electronics designers got ilieir stut at Philbrick Researches.
'; Perry Crawford, interview with a~thor, January 10" 1995 (notes in author's posse1"sion). Kent C. Redmond and
Thomas M Smi~ Project Whirlwind: The History of A Pioneer Computet: (Bedfont Mass.: DEC Press, 1980). In
his report, Philbrick mentioned the BuA~r/SJXCW Devices Division project, "It. is now possible...to experience
'electrol!\c' flight in the laboratory, the whole illus;on being accomplished by simulative components..." AiIbome
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MIT graduate Captain Luis de Florez, had been the navy liaison for Sperry's aircraft instrument
projects in the twenties. Special Devices' flight trainers proved among its most useful products,
but they needed to be recreated for each airplane. De Florez wanted a generalized flight simulator
which he could reconfigure for different types of airplanes, even for airplanes still in design. He
wanted, in effect, a "supersimu!ator," similar to Philbrick's.
Tv build this machine, in 1944, de Florez and Special Devices went to Bell Laboratories,
the leader in electronics and analog computing. The group already had a number of similar
projects underway and declined to take on the work. Special Devices then went to MIT's Servo
Lab. The project ended up in the hands ofGordon Brown's student Jay F~orrester as tht: uAirplane
Stability and Control Analyzer" (ASCA). In 1945, after about a year ofwork~ Forrester grew
frustrated with impiementing ASCA in anaiog eiectrorucs. just then Perry Crawford joined
Special Devices as the project's supervisor. Crawford., who had proposed digital fire control in his
MIT master's thesis, Stt~gested a digital computer. Forrester, inspired by Crawford~ b)' the
ENIAC group at Pe~ and Howard Aiken's work at Harvard, dCf';ided to go digital. Special
Devices, increasingly interested in simulating human interfaces in Combat Information Centers,
supported the switch. The project developed into Whirlwina, MIT's first electronic d~gital
computer, the first such machine for real-time control. During the 1950s, it spawned the
continental air defense system SAGE, a host of institutions and companie!l (MITRE, Lincoln
Labs, Digital Equipment Corporation), and new computing technologies (nulnerically-controlled
machine tools, magnetic core memory, digital modems, graphics displays). 8 [*Figure 10-1]
Other traditions, including scientific computing (Howard Aiken., Jon von Neumann),
cIYPtography (Alan Turing, C()~ossus), and business processing (IBM, Remington Rand) also
Fire Control, 63-4. For the typical products of the Special Devices Divisio~ see C1C Magazine, 1944-45, World
War n Command File, eNO, Naval Operational Archives
8 See "Special Issue: SAGE," Annals o/the History ofComputing 5 (no. 4, October, 1983) for a number of
personal accooots and oral hiSlOries of SAGE and related projects. George E. Valley, "How the Sage Development
Be~" Annals ojthe History o/Computing 7 (no. 3, July, 1985), 196-226. Also see Paul Edwards, Closed World:
Computers 3lld the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), Chapter 3 for a
discussion of SAGE as a Cold War icon of technology and its connection to other hU'ge-scale corr..manl1 and control
systems. Descendants of these systems found their way into mcdcm comput:r technologies includiug graphics,
networking, and user interfaces. See Arthur Norberg and Judy O'Neill, Promoting TechnolC'gicallnnovation: The
!PTO ofthc Defense Advanced Research Prqjects Agcns;y (Charles Babbagc Institute research manuscript, 1992).
For numerical control at the SeNt) Lab, see David Noble, Forces ofProduetion: A Soci~ Histort...Qflndustrial
Automation (New York: Knopf: 1984) and Francis J. Keint~ Numeri;:aJ Control: Making a New Technology
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
482
shaped information technology. ASCA, Whir~wind and SAGE, however, exemplify the particular
approach moldec:i by wartime resevch in control systems and fire control. Engineering practice
based on models and simulation drove the search for fast, flexible machines. General,
reconfigurable analog simulation machines became immediate predecessors of digital computers.
Whirlwind came from a tradition of simulation and control rather than one of mathelnatics.
Forrester and his group, as engineers and not mathematicians, emphasized reliability,
human/machine interaction, and connection as much as "speed and accuracy." As one Servo Lab
engineer recalled, Whirlwind programmers "thought in terms of airplanes in space, not totally in
terms ofsymbolic logic.,,9 SAGE extended the basic antiaircraft fire control problem: tracking
targets, smoothing signals, predicting future positions, directing weapons. Through perception,
intA«'l'filtinn ~nA '2rtiMII~tinn WhirlurinA ~nA ~Anp hrnllaht ~nti~ir~r:4ft firp r..nntV"rai tna~thpT into
u ""&- v • ." ~ " • .., " " - _.- _. --- -- --0--. -_.-- -- -- ---.,,; ------ -- --0-'- .- - --- .. -
the world ofdigital electroni~s, intbnnation processing, and national systems.
SAGE became the prototype computerized "COJTl11llUid and control" system ofth~ Cold
War. It spawned a number of derivative systems, including the fan'lous NORAD command center
buried deep inside Cheyenne Mountain. These systems contributed a popular image of the control
oftechnology: men sitting at glowing terminals in darkened, air-conditioned rooms, examining
representations of the world (computei..2ed maps and radar images), and speaicing orders into
telephones. This configuration derived from radar, fire control, combat information centers, and
the conception ofthe human operator as a system component. It stood for the series of
abstractions which would direct (and perhaps leatt to) nuclear Annageddon; it stood for
technically-mediated action at a distance; it stood for the margins of tecimology where political
control coupled to large technical systems.
Control rooms provided the stage on which dramas of technology and society were acted
out. The mythical "button," ever under the anxious finger of the president, ·;rystallizes the
representation in a single, binary figure. The "button" has two functions: to launch the missiles
when commanded, not to launch when not conlllWlded. Such singular decisiveness, however,
masks the complex and distinctly non-binary nature of command and control systems, which ill
reality depend on extensive concatenations of radars, computers, telephone lines, and human
9 c. Robert Wieser, '4A Perspective on Sage: Discussio~ " A"nals o/the Hist0'Y ofComputing S (80.4, October,
198:;), 387.
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operators. 10 The more quickly the system can respond, the more it risks accidental firing. This so-
called "hair trigger" phenomenon replicates the stability problem at the intersection of
technologies ofcontrol and the control of technology.
Philbrick's industrial simulators and Whirlwind/SAGE command and control were just
two of several distinct trajectories of control which emerged from Warld War II. Norbert
Wiener's Cybemetjn. despite its author's anti-militarism, defined the issues ofhunlalllmachine
interaction for a ge.'leration oftechnologir.ts, military and civilian alike. Wiener's assistant, Julian
Bigelow, became chief engineer ~nder John von Neumann at Princeton, buildil!g the so-called
"lAS Machin~," among the first stored-program computers. Ivan Getting, spent the fifties as Vice
President of Engineering and Research at Raytheon and became the first president of the non-
profit Aerosp'4Ce Corporatio~ which grew out of TRW in 1960 to do system engineering for the
Air Force. Nathaniel Nichols, Rad Lab alurra..nus and servomechanisms author, followed Getting to
Raytheon and then to Aerospace as head of the company's guidar.ce and control. ll Bell Labs' fire
control group, which included Hendrik Bode and Walter MacNai,r, built the l'Iike series of
antiaircraft missiles based in pan on their wartime work. Bode himself played a prominent role in
Cold War scientific advisory committees and finished his career as Gordon MacKay Professor of
Systems Engineering at Harvard. 12 Gordon Brown, as Dean ofEngineering at MITs ushered in the
"university polarized around science," that defined the institute during the sixties. Perry Crawford
left the navy in 1952 for mM, where he spearheaded SABRE, an adaptation of military command
and control systems to automate American Airlines' national ticketing operations. In the navy, the
"gun club" became the nuke club: BuOrd chief William Blandy (with aid from Horacio Ri~lero)
directed Operation Crossroads in 1946, when the navy tested its first atomic bombs. In 1947,
Edwin Hooper became military advisor to the Atomic Energy Commission. 13 All of the MIT ufour
horsemen," (Rivero, Hooper, Mustin and Ward) became admirals.
10 See, for example, Daniel Ford, Tbe Button: The Pentagon's Command and Control Sy~- Does it Work?
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985). One ofFord's main points is the dependence (at least until the 1980s) of
the Pentagon's command and control systems on standard long-disumce telephone lines leased from AT&T.
11 Ivan Getting. All in" Lifetime: Science in the Defense of Democracy (New York: Vantage~ 1989).
~rospace Corporation, Aerospace Corporation, its Work: 1960-1980 (El Segundo, Calif: AefOSJMCe Corporation,
'980).
12 ME. Van VaIkcnburg, "In Memoria&l: Hcdrik W. Bode, 1905-19H2," IEEE Trans. Automatic Control AC-29
(DO. 3, March, 1984). Also sec Bode Papers, Harvard University.
13 Hooper, Rivero Admiral's Biographies, Naval Operational Archives. Blandy Papers, Library of Congress.
484
S~vera1 textbooks published soon after the war.) reflected the NDRC's work and dennuJ
control from diverse angles, including the telephone company (MaCoU), the Radiation Laboratory
(Nichols, James, and Phillips), the process industries (Ahrendt and Taplin), &nd the Servo Lab
(Browil and Campbell). Professional activities followed a similar trend: in 1946 the AlEE
established a subcommittee on Servomechanisms and the IRE founded a Feedback COnti"ot
Systems committee in 1952. Control engineers became incre~singly concerned with standardizing
language and terminology" "almo.~t every early postwar paper made some reference to a 'new
language,' to 'problems with terminology,' to the need to 'tldllslate' thejargDn of one or other
groUp.,,14 L., the fifties, due in part to the proselytizing of former NDRC members such as Brown,
Campbell, Warren Weaver, and Louis Ric-.enour, "automation" became a popular icon for the
technological future.•, Rather than unifying, :antrol systems engineering took diffe;ent, even
diverging paths: cybernetics, systems engineering, automation, process control, inertial guidan~e,
command and con~rol. Even this brief survey of post-war careers, pub..~tions, and
professionalization in control gives the flavor of its multiple, overlapping legacies. Each
elaborated the classical gov~mor' s elements of perception, articulation, and integration.
Of these multiple paths, few attained the currency, both in engineering methodology anI! in
popular discourse, ofClaude Shannon's theory of information, proposed in his 1948 paper, "A
Mathematical Theory ofCommunication."16 Shannon defined the act ofcommunication as
transferring a gi'/en message, or a series of symbols, from one place to :ulother (nne perSOll to
anoc:her or one machine to another), with some additional noise in the channel. Echoing fIartiey,
Shannon used information to :D.easure freedom ofchoice in selecting a message: if only one
14 Chris C. Hissel, "Spreading tile word: aspects of the evolution of the lauguage of the measurement of control,"
Measure1tU!nt and Control 27 (June, 1994), 154, Hubert M. James, Nathaniel E. Nichols, and Ral~h S. PhiIiips
TIleOry of Servomechanisms (New York: McGraw Hill, 1947), Gordon S. Brown and Donald P. Campbell,
Principles of5eryomec"anisms (New York: Wiley, 1948), Leroy MacColl, Fundamental Theory of
Servomechanisms (New York: Van Nostrand, 1945), William R AhrewJt and John Taplin, Automatic Feedback
Control_<New York: McGraw Hiil, 1951). See Chris C. Bissel, ~7extbooks and Subtexts: A sidevroys look at ~ie
post-war control engineering textbooks, which appeared half a ceotury ago," iEEE Control Systems 16 (no. 2,
April, 1996), 7l-8. StuartBe~~ "The Emergence ofa Discipline: AutCJmatic Control, 1940-1960," Automati~
12 (1976), 113·121.
15 Sec, for example, !he Scientific American book Automatic Control (New York: SinlOn and ~:.uster, 1948) witIl
articles by Brown, Campbell, William Pease, Warren Weaver, and LoWs Ridenour in addition to Arnold Tustin
and Wassily Leontief.
16 Claude Shannon, "A Mathematical Theory of Communication.," PSTJ 27 (JulyJJctober, 1048), 379-423, 623-
656, reprinted in N.J.A. Sloane and Aaron D. Wynel, ed., Clal.A: ~Iwood Shannon: CoUe".'1ed Papers (New York:
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message is possible, no information is transmitted; if ten messages are possibie, more information
is transmitted, still more if a hundred are possible, even though the same message might be sent.
Infonnation is measured as the logarithm of the number ofchoices, related to the thermodynamic
measure ofentropy.
Shannon built on his own experience in fire control, computing, and cryptography as 1NeIJ
as on Nyquist and Hartley's ideas, from twenty years before at Bell Labs. Shannon provided
provide a measure ofchannel capacity, in bits per second, which describes the maximum amount
of information possible to send down a given channel. He added a serious consideration of noise
and a statistical approach to the problem. "Communication theory is heavily indebted to Wiener
for much of its basic philosophy and theory," Shannon wrote, citing Wiener's NDRC report. 17
Shannon's measure leads to a theory ofefficient coding, how to optimally translate a series of
"primary symbols," such as English text, into "secondary code" to be transmitted, such as Morse
code or ASCn, "It is possible to send information at the rate C through the channel with as small
a frequency ofe"OTS or equivocation as desired by proper encodin~." II Maximum use of atl
available channel capacity depends on optimal coding, a translation whicb reduces redundancy in
the message (normal English already has about twenty percent redundancy, Morse code about
fifteen percent). Redundancy, however, can help compensate fo:- the presence ofnoise in the
channel, which disrupts the message and effectively reduces the channel's capacity (English is still
readable with about twenty percent erroneous characters). As if to solidify the connection
between Shannon's theory and fire control, Louis Ridenour (who had directed Ivan Getting at the
Rad Lab) asked Warren Weaver to write a popular introduction and explication of information
theory, published with Shannon's paper in a small book. 19
IEEE Press, 1993), ~-83. Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theon' of Communication
(Urbana and Chicago: Univeristy of Winois Press, 1949).
17 Shannon, "A Mathematical Theory ofCommunicatio~" 530. The relationship between Shannon and Wiener's
work is more complex than alluded to here. In a later interview, Shannon related "I don't think Wiener had much
to do with information theory. He wasn't a big influence on my ideas there (at MIT], though 1once took a course
from him." Shannon, Collected PiIRm, xix. Semmtic confusion sometimes exists over the "Weaver-Shannon" or
the "Wiener-Shannon," theory ofcommunicatioD. The former derives from the book listed in the previous note,
and is inaccurate because Weaver served only to translate Shannon's work to make it more accessible (Weaver
clall-ud DO more).
18 Shannon, "A Mathematical Theory ofCommwtication," 36.
19 Shannon and Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of CoDU1l1unication.
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Today, "infonnation,n implies a discrete category, something independent, infinitely
mobile, and prior to tile networks it inhabits. But whence this independence and this mobility? The
very idea ofan ~'equivalentquantity" which we today call informal - n results from a historical
process. That process intimately involved the conditions ofcreating, coding, and sending signals
through the network. Indeed the idea of information developed in parallel with the networks
through which it travels.
Information exemplifies what Bruno Latour calls an "immutable mobile," that is, a
representation of the world which retains its internal integrity, accuracy, and authority through a
series of manipulations and translations in a variety ofdifferent networks. Given these two
qualities, immutability and mobility, objects can be presented, read, recombined, shifted, inverted
in a dizzying variety ofways without changing their basic structure. A historical view of
infonnation, then, lays bare the work of producing this abstraction; it exposes the labor behind
universal coding. It is a story of representation, ofmaking machines to manipulate analogs,
symbols, and simulations (the Ford Rangekeeper, the Network and Differential Analyzers, the PPI
radar display). It is a tale ofstruggle, often lost, against the tenacious stickiness of representations
to the physical world. The "freedom" of information in our networks today followed a strenuous
historical fracture of the bond between signs and referents.
In machinery, that fracture owes to digital pr~sing. A determinist view oftechnology
naturalizes the transition from 3J1aIog to digital in the 19405 as an instant transformation due to
the obvious superiority ofthe speed and accuracy ofdigital techniques over their analog
predecessors. Speed and accuracy, however, the two primary argl!ments fer digital computing,
map directly onto mobility and immutability; they result not from a natural dichotomy but from a
conscious abstraction. Speed stands for the lightness of information in a machine - the "heavier"
it is, the more energy it takes to move it, and the slower it moves. Electronic computers have
speed because the vacuum tube divorced data from its mechanical weight. Accuracy stands for the
freedom from decay as signals are manipulated and transmitted - digital signals retain their
integrity as they travel through networks. Digital computers maintain accuracy because they
manipulate and transmit data without decay, much as Harold Hazen's original servomechanisms
renewed signals between stages in the differential analyzer, or as Sperry's "human
servomechanisms," filtered data and fed it back to the machine. Proponents ofelectronic digital
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computing repeated the dual mantra, "speed and accuracy." Later, the two woul,d combine to
describe "power" in computers.
Communications engineers, in their efforts to translate between the analog world and its
coded representations, long dealt with the dichotomy of analog and digital signals. Claude
Shannon himself defined the boundaries of this translation with his early work on digital
switching. His theory of information similarly charted the boundary between a~a1og and digital,
between continuous and discrete: it determined how well, and under what conditions, a digital
message can survive in the noisy, chaotic, analog world.
Understanding control, computers, and infonnation as historically definedl categories, then,
and narrating their definition as labors of abstraction, counters an "instant and obvious" view of
the transition from analog to digital, and hence of the emergence of the ntodem computer. Rather,
it shows a subtle and lengthy evolution from machinery to information, a progre~sive stretching of
the tie between signifier and signified. Telephones transmitted a continuous simulacra of the
speaker's voice. Analog computers directly simulated the world in the labor21tory. Differential
Analyzers affected "continuous" intesration. Digital computing before electronic:; represented
numbers with things. Feedback loops always remained within 1800 of their own referents. Only a
believable immutable mobile could break these signifying links - information could only set be
adrift from its mooring in mechanics when it carried a credible portrait of th~~ shore.
1948 was a critical year for congealing the intellectual products of the war. Textbooks,
information theory, and cybernetics (not to mention Orwell's 19H4) helped break the moorings
tying t~hnical signifiers to the mechanical world. In 1945, however, when tile war ended and the
NDRC closed down, the connection remained intact, if stretched. A special essa)' in Volume I of
Division 7'8 Summary Technical Report exemplified these limits of the modem. "Data Smoothing
and Prediction in Fire-Control Systems," by Richard B. Blackrn~ Hendrik Bodc~, and Claude
Shannon, formally integrated communications and control and pointed toward gc~nerality in signal
procesmng. The authors treated fire control as "a special case of the transmission., Dlanipulation,
and utilization of intelligence." They assessed control as a problem in electrical communications,
developing analogs to the prediction problem, "couched entirely in electricallan!~age." The
authors, like Wiener, recognized the broad applicability oftheir study, "The input data...are
thought ofas constituting a series in time similar to weather records, stock market prices,
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production statistics, and the like.,,20 Acknowledging the importance ofWiener's work
Blackman, Bode, and Sharmon devoted significant effort to summarizing his statistical approach.
Ultimately they rejected it, however, due to problems applying the RMS error criterion to fire
control, as well as its assumptions about statistical behavior of human pilots. Instead., the paper
fonnulated the problem as one ofcommunications engineering, drawing heavily on Bode's WOI k
in feedback contfol: "there is an obvious analogy between the problem ofsmoothing the data to
eliminate or reduce the effect oftracking errors anti the problem ofseparating a signal from
interfering noise in communications systerrts." Hen,ce tracking is a filtering proble~
The spectrum of the "signal," or true [flight] patth is concentrated principally in a low-
frequency band, in most instances, while the eo:rgy oftracking errors or "noise," appears
principally at higher frequencies. Thus the two can he separated by a lo\v-pass filter.
While noting "this analogy...must ofcourse not be carried too far," the paper considered inputs
and disturbances in fire control systems as signals in the frequency domain. After a detailed
comparison ofvarious smoothing methOOs, the pal»ef closed with several examples; smoothing
circuits for the M-9 and T-15 gun directors, which employed electric motors to attenuate
perturbations in tracking.
The Blackman, Bode, and Shannon article illustrates how contfol engineering in World
War II began to combine feedback with notions ofgeneralized machines and digital processing.
Still, by the end ofWorld War II, speed and accuracy had acquired only partial authority. Data
stretched its tie to mechanics, but the tie had not yet broken. Norbert Wiener's statistical
treatment of signals proposed general methods ofprocessing number series, but wartime research
could not realize the fundamental research in practical hardware. Philbrick's analog
supersimulator was speedy but not accurate. Stibitz's digit~1 relay computers '.oJ/ere accurate but
not speedy. Jay Forrester rejected a general, analog flight simulator, neither speedy nor accurate.
Penn's vision ofa speedy and accurate machine did not yet have institutional authority. Blackman,
Bode, and Shannon, while recogJlli~g the generality ofsmoothing and prediction, tied it to
familiar technologies offeedback amplifiers and servos, not to the new computers.
20 R.B. Blac:bnao, K W. Bode, and C.E.S~ "Data Smoothing and Prediction in Fire-Control Systems," in
Harold Hazen, Summa Technical Report ofDivision 1, NDRC Volume I: Gunfire Control (Washington: Officc
ofScienfifk: Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee, 1946). Also see H.W. Bnde and
C.E. ShanDon, "A Simplified Derivation ofLinear Least Square Smoothing and Prediction Theory," Proc. I.R.E.
l8 (April, 1950) 425, which addresses Wiener's predidioo in more detail Also sec RB. Blackman, Linear Data-
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Technology was turning from machinery to information, but the tum was incomplete when
the war ended. Still, a generation ofengineers had learned to think ofelectricity as signals and to
think of machines as systems. They also learned the delicate place of the "fundamental" in
federally supported research. They taught themselves to see action in the world, by humans,
machines, or systems, as a recursive series of perception (telescopes, radars, sensors, gyroscopes),
articulation (servos, plotters, telephones, key'lJOards), and integration (switches, integrators,
computers, human operators).
Research in control systems developed the tools which directed the technologies of
nuclear confrontation. Had the Cold War turned out differently, the history ofcontrol during
World War n would be a precursor to holocaust, akin to Nazi eugenics. Close as the world came,
however, it escaped the ultimate instability of a technical system: a nucle<tr transient (such as an
accidental launch or a false warning) initiating mutual destruction. Do we owe this success to
control systems, reining in the unstable war machine? Or does the promise of control fuel the
obsessive drive for technological power? As we enter a period defined more by distributed
infonnation than by military command and control, these historical questions frame an anxious
paradox. Sitting at a personal computer, we experience our most powerful and intimate
relationship with a machine: the thrill of control, extending our powers. In that very moment,
however, we sense an abstract and impersonai force: the specter of technology, threatening
instability.
Smoothinl aod Prediction in Theory and Practice (Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1965), an extension oCtile
1948 wort.
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Figure 10-1: SAGE computerized air defense system. Note the role of the telephone network in
the diagram above. Below, operators use "light guns" to designate targets on a computer-driven
radar screen (Claude Baum, The System Builders: The Story of SDC (Santa Monica, California: System
Development Corporation, 1981)).
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